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Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.

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-----=====[ Background ]=====-----

The Microsoft Font Subsetting DLL (fontsub.dll) is a default Windows helper library for subsetting TTF fonts; i.e. converting fonts to their more compact versions based on the specific glyphs used in the document where the fonts are embedded. It is used by Windows GDI and Direct2D, and parts of the same code are also found in the t2embed.dll library designed to load and process embedded fonts.

The DLL exposes two API functions: CreateFontPackage and MergeFontPackage. We have developed a testing harness which invokes a pseudo-random sequence of such calls with a chosen font file passed as input. This report describes a crash triggered by a malformed font file in the fontsub.dll code through our harness.

-----=====[ Description ]=====-----

We have encountered the following crash in fontsub!MergeFonts:

--- cut ---
(5f7c.29fc): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
FONTSUB!MergeFonts+0x774:
00007fff`aa53b214 413944cd00      cmp     dword ptr [r13+rcx*8],eax ds:0000018a`014e8000=????????

0:000> ? r13
Evaluate expression: 1692239036224 = 0000018a`014e7f40

0:000> ? rcx
Evaluate expression: 24 = 00000000`00000018

0:000> ? eax
Evaluate expression: 1191239935 = 00000000`4700e0ff

0:000> dd r13 r13+18*8-1
0000018a`014e7f40  68656164 c18e145a 000000cc 00000036
0000018a`014e7f50  68686561 0bde01ea 00000104 00000024
0000018a`014e7f60  6d617870 0666d833 00000128 00000020
0000018a`014e7f70  686d7478 4872344e 00000148 0000016a
0000018a`014e7f80  636d6170 4079c39a 000002b4 00000996
0000018a`014e7f90  676c7966 4ec7e46c 00000c4c 00009e8c
0000018a`014e7fa0  6c6f6361 a4f67e41 0000aad8 00000166
0000018a`014e7fb0  45424454 fe7d185f 0000b148 00000145
0000018a`014e7fc0  45424c43 1babe979 0000ac40 00000508
0000018a`014e7fd0  62646174 fe7d185f 0000b798 00000145
0000018a`014e7fe0  626c6f63 1babe979 0000b290 00000508
0000018a`014e7ff0  64747466 74f237b6 0000b8e0 00000176

0:000> !heap -p -a r13
    address 0000018a014e7f40 found in
    _DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 18a01001000
    in busy allocation (  DPH_HEAP_BLOCK:         UserAddr         UserSize -         VirtAddr         VirtSize)
                             18a0100f068:      18a014e7f40               c0 -      18a014e7000             2000
          unknown!printable
    00007fffcf6530df ntdll!RtlDebugAllocateHeap+0x000000000000003f
    00007fffcf60b52c ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x0000000000077d7c
    00007fffcf59143b ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeapInternal+0x00000000000005cb
    00007fffb4efbe42 vrfcore!VfCoreRtlAllocateHeap+0x0000000000000022
    00007fffcca398f0 msvcrt!malloc+0x0000000000000070
    00007fffaa53fd1e FONTSUB!Mem_Alloc+0x0000000000000012
    00007fffaa53abbd FONTSUB!MergeFonts+0x000000000000011d
    00007fffaa53baac FONTSUB!MergeDeltaTTF+0x00000000000003ec
    00007fffaa5314b2 FONTSUB!MergeFontPackage+0x0000000000000132
[...]

0:000> k
 # Child-SP          RetAddr           Call Site
00 00000079`dc4fd910 00007fff`aa53baac FONTSUB!MergeFonts+0x774
01 00000079`dc4fdac0 00007fff`aa5314b2 FONTSUB!MergeDeltaTTF+0x3ec
02 00000079`dc4fdc00 00007ff6`1a8a8a30 FONTSUB!MergeFontPackage+0x132
[...]
--- cut ---

The root cause of the crash seems to be an out-of-bounds access to an array storing SFNT table headers.

The issue reproduces on a fully updated Windows 10 1709; we haven't tested earlier versions of the system. It could be potentially used to disclose sensitive data from the process heap. It is easiest to reproduce with PageHeap enabled, but it is also possible to observe a crash in a default system configuration. Attached are 3 proof of concept malformed font files which trigger the crash.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/47084.zip